THE

WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;

NINE OF THE DIALOGUES BY THE LATE FLOYER SYDENHAM,

AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR:

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM,

AND

COPIOUS NOTES,

BY THE LATTER TRANSLATOR;

81435

IN WHICH IS GIVEN

THE SUBSTANCE OF NEARLY ALL THE EXISTING GREEK MS. COMMENTARIES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO,

AND A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF SUCH AS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. [illegible].

ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ ΤΥΠΟΝ ΦΑΙΗΝ ΑΝ ΕΓΩ ΕΙ[illegible]ΝΘΡΩΠΟ[illegible]
ΤΩΝ ΤΗΔΕ ΨΥΧΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΕΡΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΟΛΗΣ [illegible]
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THE PARMENIDES

A DIALOGUE

ON THE GODS

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PARMENIDES.

IT was the cuſtom of Pythagoras and his followers, amongſt whom Plato holds the moſt diſtinguiſhed rank, to conceal divine myſteries under the veil of ſymbols and figures; to diſſemble their wiſdom againſt the arrogant boaſtings of the Sophiſts; to jeſt ſeriouſly, and ſport in earneſt. Hence, in the following moſt important dialogue, under the appearance of a certain dialectic ſport, and, as it were, logical diſcuſſion, Plato has delivered a complete ſyſtem of the profound and beautiful theology of the Greeks. For it is not to be ſuppoſed that he, who in all his other dialogues introduces diſcuſſions adapted to the character of the principal ſpeaker, ſhould in this dialogue deviate from his general plan, and exhibit Parmenides, a venerable and aged philoſopher, engaged in the puerile exerciſe of a merely logical diſputation. Beſides, it was uſual with the Pythagoreans and Plato to form an harmonious conjunction of many materials in one ſubject, partly in imitation of nature, and partly for the ſake of elegance and grace. Thus, in the Phædrus, Plato mingles oratory with theology; in the Timæus, mathematics with phyſics; and in the preſent dialogue, dialectic with divine ſpeculations.

But the reader muſt not ſuppoſe that the dialectic of Plato is the ſame with vulgar dialectic, which is converſant with opinion, and is accurately inveſtigated in Ariſtotle's Topics: for the buſineſs of this firſt of ſciences, which at preſent is utterly unknown, is to employ definitions, diviſions, analyſations, and demonſtrations, as primary ſciences in the inveſtigation of cauſes; imitating the progreſſions of beings from the firſt principle of things, and their continual converſion to it, as the ultimate object of deſire. "But there are [illegible]gies," ſays Proclus[1], "of this moſt ſcientific method:

[1] Comment. in Parmenidem, lib. i.

the firſt of which is adapted to youth, and is uſeful for the purpoſe of rouſing their intellect, which is, as it were, in a dormant ſtate; for it is a true exerciſe of the eye of the ſoul in the ſpeculation of things, leading forth through oppoſite poſitions the eſſential impreſſion of reaſons which it contains, and conſidering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing worthy of belief; and, laſtly, ſtimulating the all-various conceptions of the ſoul. But the ſecond energy takes place when intellect reſts from its former inveſtigations, as becoming moſt familiar with the ſpeculation of beings, and beholds truth itſelf firmly eſtabliſhed upon a pure and holy foundation. And this energy, according to Socrates, by a progreſſion through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible nature, till it arrives at that which is firſt; and this by analyſing, defining, demonſtrating, and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, till, having entirely inveſtigated the nature of intelligibles, it raiſes itſelf to a nature ſuperior to beings. But the ſoul being perfectly eſtabliſhed in this nature, as in her paternal port, no longer tends to a more excellent object of deſire, as ſhe has now arrived at the end of her ſearch: and you may ſay that what is delivered in the Phædrus and Sophiſta is the employment of this energy, giving a twofold diviſion to ſome, and a fourfold to other operations of the dialectic art; and on this account it is aſſigned to ſuch as philoſophize purely, and no longer require preparatory exerciſe, but nouriſh the intellect of their ſoul in pure intellection. But the third energy, which is exhibitive according to truth, purifies from twofold ignorance when its reaſons are employed upon men full of opinion; and this is ſpoken of in the Sophiſta." So that the dialectic energy is triple, either ſubſiſting through oppoſite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falſehood.

Parmenides by means of this dialectic perfects the conceptions of Socrates about ideas. For, as Proclus well obſerves, the mode of diſcourſe is every where obſtructive, but does not confute; and is explorative, but not defenſive. [illegible] conſidered as ſometimes proceeding from on high to ſuch [illegible] ſometimes aſcending from ſenſible particulars to ſuch [illegible] to divine cauſes; but, according to each of [illegible] native co[illegible]rning

ſpect, ſays Proclus, Parmenides truly imitates the paternal cauſe of the univerſality of things, who from the ſupreme hypoſtaſis of all beings, preſerves and perfects all things, and draws them upwards by his unknown and ineffable powers.

With reſpect to the dramatic apparatus of this dialogue, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that the Athenians had two feſtivals in honour of Minerva; the former of which, on account of the greater preparation required in its celebration, was called *the greater Panathenaia*; and the latter, on account of its requiring a leſs apparatus, was denominated *the leſſer Panathenaia.* The celebration of them, likewiſe, was diſtinguiſhed by longer and ſhorter periods of time. In conſequence, therefore, of the greater feſtival taking place, ſacred to Minerva, Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens, Parmenides being the maſter, and Zeno his diſciple; but both of them Eleateans—and not only this, ſays Proclus, but partakers of the Pythagoric doctrine, according to the relation of Callimachus the hiſtorian. Parmenides and Zeno, therefore, in a place called the Ceramicus, beyond the walls of the city, and which was ſacred to the ſtatues of the Gods, met with one Pythodorus, together with Socrates and many other Athenians, who came thither for the purpoſe of hearing the writings of Zeno. The enſuing dialogue, which was the conſequence of Zeno's diſcourſe, was afterwards related by Pythodorus to one Antiphon, the brother on the mother's ſide of Adimantus and Glaucus, who were the brothers of Plato, both from the ſame father and mother; and the dialogue is ſuppoſed to be again related by Antiphon to Cephalus and his companions, in conſequence of their ſoliciting Adimantus and Glaucus to requeſt Antiphon for the narration.

Zeno, therefore, having read to the audience a book, in which he endeavoured to exhibit the difficulties attending the doctrine which aſſerts the exiſtence of *the many*, and this in order to defend the favourite dogma of Parmenides, who called *being*, *the one*; Socrates by no means oppoſes his arguments, but readily admits the erro[illegible] which muſt enſue from ſuppoſing multitude to exiſt, without participati[illegible] *the one*. H[illegible] Soc[illegible] does not reſt h[illegible]t urges Zeno to a ſpeculati[illegible] of [illegible] whi[illegible]ble natures, not enduri[illegible] [illegible]enſibles co[illegible]

not in the leaſt contradicting Socrates, but completing the contemplation which he had begun, unfolds the entire doctrine of ideas, introducing for this purpoſe four queſtions concerning them: whether they have a ſubſiſtence; of what things there are ideas, and of what not; what kind of beings they are, and what power they poſſeſs: and how they are participated by ſubordinate natures. And this being diſcuſſed, Parmenides aſcends from hence to *the one* which ſubſiſts above intelligibles and ideas, and adduces nine hypotheſes concerning it; five, ſuppoſing *the one* to have a ſubſiſtence, and four, ſuppoſing it not to ſubſiſt; accurately inveſtigating, at the ſame time, the conſequences reſulting from theſe hypotheſes. But of this more hereafter.

With reſpect to ideas, though many invincible arguments may be adduced for their exiſtence, the following appear to me remarkable for their perſpicuity and ſtrength. Diverſity of powers always indicates diverſity of objects. But it is obvious to every one, that the power of intellect is different from the power of ſenſe; that which is ſenſible, therefore, is one thing, and that which is intelligible another. And as intellect is ſuperior to ſenſe, ſo is intelligible more excellent than that which is ſenſible. But that which is ſenſible has an exiſtence; and by a much greater reaſon, therefore, that which is intelligible muſt have a real ſubſiſtence. But intelligible is a certain univerſal ſpecies; for univerſal reaſon is always the object of intelligence. And hence there are ſuch things as intelligible and common ſpecies of things which we call ideas.

Again, all corporeal natures ſubſiſt in time; but whatever ſubſiſts in time is meaſured by time; and whatever is thus conditioned depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is compoſed of the paſt, preſent, and future. And if we conceive that any one of theſe periods is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature muſt immediately periſh. Time, therefore, is ſo eſſentially and intimately united with the natures which it meaſures, that their being, ſuch as it is, depends on the [illegible] But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this [illegible] imagination can conceive. [illegible] evident, therefore, [illegible] which it is ſo eſſential [illegible] cannot, ther[illegible]

the preſent time is no more, ſo with reſpect to all corporeal natures (from their ſubſiſtence in time), before we can ſay that they exiſt, they loſe all identity of being. And hence no one of them is truly that which it is ſaid to be. On the contrary, truth is eternal and immutable: for, if any one ſhould aſſert that truth is not, he aſſerts this either truly or falſely; but if falſely, there is ſuch a thing as truth; and if truly, then it is true that there is no ſuch thing as truth. But if it is truly aſſerted, it can only be true through truth; and, conſequently, there is ſuch a thing as truth, which muſt alſo be eternal and immutable. Hence, truth cannot ſubſiſt in any thing mutable; for that which is ſituated in a mutable nature is alſo changed in conjunction with it. But all corporeal natures are continually changed, and hence they are neither true, nor have a true exiſtence. If, therefore, the forms of bodies are imperfect, they are not the firſt forms; for whatever ranks as firſt is perfect and entire, ſince the whole reaſon of every nature is eſtabliſhed in that which is firſt. There are, therefore, certain forms above theſe, perfect, primary, and entire, and which are not indigent of a ſubject.

But if the forms of bodies are not true, where do the true forms ſubſiſt? Shall we ſay nowhere? But in this caſe falſehood would be more powerful than truth, if the former poſſeſſed, and the latter had no, ſubſiſtence. But this is impoſſible. For that which is more powerful derives its power from truth; ſince, unleſs it was truly more powerful, it would not be that which it is ſaid to be. But, indeed, without the preſence of truth, the forms which are ſaid to be falſe could not ſubſiſt; for they would no longer be what they are, unleſs it was true that they are falſe. True ſpecies, therefore, have a ſubſiſtence ſomewhere. But does not our ſoul poſſeſs truer ſpecies than thoſe which are the objects of ſenſible inſpection, by which it judges, condemns, and corrects them, and underſtands how far they depart from, and in what reſpect they agree with, ſuch forms as are true? But he who does not behold true forms, can by no means make a compariſon between them and others, and rectify the inaccuracy of the one by the accurate truth of the other. For the ſoul, indeed, corrects the viſible circle, when it does not touch a plane in one point only; approves or condemns every artificial ſtructure and muſical modulation; and judges concerning the goodneſs or depravity, utility or detriment, beauty or deformity, of every object in nature.

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ture. The ſoul, therefore, poſſeſſes truer forms, by which ſhe judges of corporeal natures. But neither are theſe forms in the ſoul firſt forms, for they are movable; and though not ſubſiſting in place, yet they have a diſcurſive proceſſion through the intervals of time. Nor do they always exiſt in energy; for the ſoul does not always energize through them. Nor do they ſubſiſt in a total but in a partial intellect. For as the ſoul is not total intellect, on account of its ſelf-motive nature, ſo the intellect which is in ſoul is not a total and firſt intellect, but ſuffers a remiſſion of intellectual union, from its connection with the diſcurſive energies of ſoul. There is, therefore, above ſoul, and that intellect which is a part of ſoul, a certain firſt intellect, in itſelf entire and perfectly complete, in which the firſt and moſt true ſpecies of all things are contained, and which have a ſubſiſtence independent of time, place, and motion. And this firſt intellect is no other than that vital nature αυτοζωον, or *animal itſelf*, in which Plato in the Timæus repreſents the artificer of the univerſe contemplating the ideas of things, and fabricating the machine of the world according to this all-beautiful exemplar.

Again, the artificer of the univerſe muſt be a God. Every God operates eſſentially, or produces from his eſſence that which he produces, becauſe this is the moſt perfect mode of production. Every thing which operates eſſentially produces an image of itſelf. He, therefore, who fabricated the univerſe, fabricated it an image of itſelf. But if this be the caſe, he contains in himſelf paradigmatically the cauſes of the univerſe: and theſe cauſes are ideas. To which we may add, that the perfect muſt neceſſarily antecede the imperfect; unity, multitude; the indiviſible, the diviſible; and that which abides perpetually the ſame, that which ſubſiſts in unceaſing mutation. From all which it follows, that things do not originate from baſer natures, but that they end in theſe; and that they commence from natures the moſt perfect, the moſt beautiful, and the beſt. For it is not poſſible that our intellect ſhould be able to apprehend things properly equal, ſimilar, and the like, and that the intellect of the artificer of the univerſe ſhould not contain in itſelf the eſſentially equal, juſt, beautiful, and good, and, in ſhort, every thing which has a univerſal and perfect ſubſiſtence, and which, from its reſidence in deity, forms a link of that luminous chain of ſubſtances to which we very properly give the appellation of ideas.

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The following additional arguments in defence of the Platonic doctrine of ideas are given for the ſake of the liberal and Platonic reader. The whole is nearly extracted from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides.

This viſible world is either ſelf-ſubſiſtent, or it derives its ſubſiſtence from a ſuperior cauſe. But if it is admitted to be ſelf-ſubſiſtent, many abſurd conſequences will enſue: for it is neceſſary that every thing ſelf-ſubſiſtent ſhould be impartible; becauſe every thing which makes and every thing which generates is entirely incorporeal. For bodies make through incorporeal powers; fire by heat, and ſnow by coldneſs. But if it is neceſſary that the maker ſhould be incorporeal, and in things ſelf-ſubſiſtent the ſame thing is the maker and the thing made, the generator and the thing generated, that which is ſelf-ſubſiſtent will be perfectly impartible. But the world is not a thing of this kind: for every body is every way diviſible, and conſequently is not ſelf-ſubſiſtent. Again: every thing ſelf-ſubſiſtent is alſo ſelf-energetic. For, as it generates itſelf, it is by a much greater priority naturally adapted to energize in itſelf, ſince to make and to generate are no other than to energize. But the world is not ſelf-motive, becauſe it is corporeal. No body, therefore, is naturally adapted to be moved, and at the ſame time to move according to the whole of itſelf. For neither can the whole at the ſame time heat itſelf, and be heated by itſelf: for, becauſe it is heated, it will not yet be hot, in conſequence of the heat being gradually propagated through all its parts; but, becauſe it heats, it will poſſeſs heat, and thus the ſame thing will be, and yet not be, hot. As, therefore, it is impoſſible that any body can move itſelf according to internal change, neither can this be effected by any other motion. And, in ſhort, every corporeal motion is more ſimilar to paſſion than to energy; but a ſelf-motive energy is immaterial and impartible: ſo that, if the world is corporeal, it will not be ſelf-motive. But, if not ſelf-motive, neither will it be ſelf-ſubſiſtent. And if it is not ſelf-ſubſiſtent, it is evident that it is produced by another cauſe.

For, again, that which is not ſelf-ſubſiſtent is twofold, viz. it is either better than, or inferior to, cauſe. And that which is more excellent than cauſe [1], as is the ineffable principle of things, has ſomething poſterior to

[1] This is demonſtrated by Proclus in his Elements of Theology.

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itſelf, ſuch as is a ſelf-ſubſiſtent nature. But that which is ſubordinate to cauſe is entirely ſuſpended from a ſelf-ſubſiſtent cauſe. It is neceſſary, therefore, that the world ſhould ſubſiſt from another more excellent cauſe. But, with reſpect to this cauſe, whether does it make according to free will and the reaſoning energy, or produce the univerſe by its very eſſence? for, if according to free will, its energy in making will be unſtable and ambiguous, and will ſubſiſt differently at different times. The world, therefore, will be corruptible: for that which is generated from a cauſe moving differently at different times is mutable and corruptible. But, if the cauſe of the univerſe operated from reaſoning and inquiry in producing the world, his energy could not be ſpontaneous and truly his own; but his eſſence would be ſimilar to that of the artificer, who does not derive his productions from himſelf, but procures them as ſomething adventitious by learning and inquiry. Hence we infer that the world is eternal, and that its maker produced it by his very eſſence; for, in ſhort, every thing which makes according to free will has alſo the eſſential energy. Thus, our ſoul, which energizes in many things according to free will, imparts at the ſame time life to the body by its very eſſence, which life does not depend on our free will: for, otherwiſe, the animal from every adverſe circumſtance would be diſſolved, the ſoul on ſuch occaſions condemning its aſſociation with the body. But not every thing which operates from its very eſſence has alſo another energy according to free will. Thus, fire heats by its very eſſence alone, but produces nothing from the energy of will; nor is this effected by ſnow, nor, in ſhort, by any body, ſo far as body. If, therefore, the eſſential energy is more extended than that of free will, it is evident that it proceeds from a more venerable and elevated cauſe: and this very properly; for the creative energy of natures that operate from their very eſſence is unattended with anxiety. But it is eſpecially neceſſary to conceive an energy of this kind in divine natures; ſince we alſo then live more free from anxiety, and with greater eaſe, when our life is divine, or according to virtue. If, therefore, there is a cauſe of the univerſe operating from his very eſſence, he is that primarily which his production is ſecondarily; and that which he is primarily he imparts in a ſecondary degree to his production. Thus, fire both imparts heat to ſomething elſe, and is itſelf hot; and ſoul imparts life, and poſſeſſes life: and this reaſoning will be found to

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be true in every thing which operates eſſentially. The cauſe of the univerſe, therefore, fabricating from his very eſſence, is that primarily which the world is ſecondarily. But, if the world is full of all-various forms, theſe will ſubſiſt primarily in the cauſe of the world: for it is the ſame cauſe which gave ſubſiſtence to the ſun and moon, to man and horſe. Theſe, therefore, are primarily in the cauſe of the world; another ſun beſides the apparent, another man, and, in a ſimilar manner, every other form. There are, therefore, forms prior to ſenſibles, and demiurgic cauſes of the phænomena pre-ſubſiſting in the one cauſe of the univerſe.

But if any one ſhould ſay that the world has indeed a cauſe, yet not producing, but final, and that thus all things are orderly diſpoſed with relation to this cauſe, it is ſo far well indeed, that they admit the good to preſide over the univerſe. But, it may be aſked, whether does the world receive any thing from this cauſe, or nothing according to deſire? for, if nothing, the deſire by which it extends itſelf towards this cauſe is vain. But if it receives ſomething from this cauſe, and this cauſe not only imparts good to the world, but imparts it eſſentially, by a much greater priority, it will be the cauſe of exiſtence to the univerſe, that it may impart good to it eſſentially; and thus he will not only be the final, but the producing cauſe of the univerſe.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to the phænomena, to things equal and unequal, ſimilar and diſſimilar, and all ſuch ſenſible particulars as are by no means truly denominated: for where is there equality in ſenſibles which are mingled with inequality? where ſimilitude in things filled with diſſimilitude? where the beautiful among things of which the ſubject is baſe? where the good in things in which there is capacity and the imperfect? Each of theſe ſenſible particulars, therefore, is not that truly which it is ſaid to be: for, how can things, the nature of which conſiſts in the impartible and in priyation of interval, ſubſiſt perfectly in things partible, and endued with interval? But our ſoul is able, both to conceive and generate things far more accurate and pure than the phænomena. Hence, it corrects the apparent circle, and points out how far it falls ſhort of the perfectly accurate. And it is evident that in ſo doing it beholds another form more beautiful and more perfect than this: for, unleſs it beheld ſomething more pure, it could not ſay that this is not truly beautiful, and that is not in every reſpect equal. If, therefore, a partial ſoul ſuch as ours is able to generate and contemplate

in itſelf things more perfect than the phænomena, ſuch as the accurate ſphere and circle, the accurately-beautiful and equal, and, in a ſimilar manner, every other form, but the cauſe of the univerſe is neither able to generate, nor contemplate, things more beautiful than the phænomena, how is the one the fabricator of the univerſe, but the other of a part of the univerſe? For a greater power is effective of things more perfect, and a more immaterial intellect contemplates more excellent ſpectacles. The maker of the world, therefore, is able both to generate and underſtand forms much more accurate and perfect than the phænomena. Where, then, does he generate, and where does he behold them? Evidently, in himſelf: for he contemplates himſelf. So that, by beholding and generating himſelf, he at the ſame time generates in himſelf, and gives ſubſiſtence to forms more immaterial and more accurate than the phænomena.

In the third place, if there is no cauſe of the univerſe, but all things are from chance, how are all things coordinated to each other, and how do things perpetually ſubſiſt? And whence is it that all things are thus generated according to nature with a frequency of ſubſiſtence? for whatever originates from chance does not ſubſiſt frequently, but ſeldom. But if there is one cauſe, the ſource of coordination to all things, and this cauſe is ignorant of itſelf, muſt there not be ſome nature prior to this, which, by knowing itſelf, imparts being to this cauſe? for it is impoſſible that a nature which is ignorant ſhould be more excellent than that which has a knowledge of itſelf. If, therefore, this cauſe knows itſelf, it is evident that, knowing itſelf to be a cauſe, it muſt alſo know the things of which it is the cauſe; ſo that it will alſo comprehend the things which it knows. If, therefore, intellect is the cauſe of the univerſe, it alſo coordinated all things to each other: for there is one artificer of all things. But the univerſe is various, and all its parts do not participate either of the ſame dignity or order. Who is it then that meaſures the dignity of theſe, except the power that gave them ſubſiſtence? Who diſtributed every thing in a convenient order, and fixed it in its proper ſeat—the ſun here, and there the moon, the earth here, and there the mighty heaven—except the being by whom theſe were produced? Who gave coordination to all things, and produced one harmony from all, except the power who imparted to every thing its eſſence and nature? If, therefore, he orderly diſpoſed all things, he cannot be ignorant

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of the order and rank which every thing maintains in the univerſe; for to operate in this manner would be the province of irrational nature, and not of a divine cauſe, and would be the characteriſtic of neceſſity, and not of intellectual providence. Since, if, intellectually perceiving himſelf, he knows himſelf, but knowing himſelf and the eſſence which he is allotted, he knows that he is an immovable cauſe, and the object of deſire to all things, he will alſo know the natures to which he is deſirable: for he is not deſirable from accident, but eſſentially. He will therefore either be ignorant of what he is eſſentially, or, knowing this, he will alſo know that he is the object of deſire; and, together with this, he will know that all things deſire him, and what the natures are by which he is deſired: for, of two relatives, to know one definitely, and the other indefinitely, is not the characteriſtic of ſcience, and much leſs of intellectual perception. But, knowing definitely the things by which he is deſired, he knows the cauſes of them, in conſequence of beholding himſelf, and not things of a poſterior nature. If, therefore, he does not in vain poſſeſs the cauſes of all things, he muſt neceſſarily, according to them, bound the order of all things, and thus be of all things the immovable cauſe, as bounding their order by his very eſſence.

But whether ſhall we ſay that, becauſe he deſigned to make all things, he knew them, or, becauſe he underſtands all things, on this account he gave ſubſiſtence to all things? But if, in conſequence of deſigning to make all things, he knows all things, he will poſſeſs inward energy, and a converſion to himſelf ſubordinate to that which proceeds outwardly, and his knowledge of beings will ſubſiſt for the ſake of things different from himſelf. But if this is abſurd, by knowing himſelf he will be the maker of all things. And, if this be the caſe, he will make things external ſimilar to thoſe which he contains in himſelf; for ſuch is the natural order of things, that externally proceeding ſhould be ſuſpended from inward energy, the whole world from the all-perfect monad of ideas, and the parts of the viſible univerſe from monads which are ſeparated from each other.

In the fourth place, we ſay that man is generated from man, and from every thing its like. After what manner, therefore, are they generated? for you will not ſay that the generation of theſe is from chance: for neither nature nor divinity makes any thing in vain. But, if the generation of men is not from chance, whence is it? You will ſay, It is evidently from ſeed.

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Let it then be admitted, that man is from ſeed; but ſeed poſſeſſes productive powers in capacity, and not in energy. For, ſince it is a body, it is not naturally adapted to poſſeſs productive powers impartibly and in energy: for every where a ſubſiſtence in energy precedes a ſubſiſtence in capacity: ſince, being imperfect, it requires the aſſiſtance of ſomething elſe endued with a perfective power. This ſomething elſe you will ſay is the nature of the mother; for this perfects and faſhions the offspring by its productive powers. For the apparent form of the mother does not make the infant, but nature, which is an incorporeal power and the principle of motion. If, therefore, nature changes the productive powers of ſeed from capacity to a ſubſiſtence in energy, nature muſt herſelf poſſeſs theſe productive powers in energy. Hence, being irrational and without imagination, ſhe is at the ſame time the cauſe of phyſical reaſons. As the nature of man, therefore, contains human productive powers, does not alſo nature in a lion contain thoſe of the lion; as, for inſtance, the reaſons or productive powers of the head, the hair, the feet, and the other parts of the lion? Or, whence, on ſhedding a tooth, does another grow in its place, unleſs from an inherent power which is able to make the teeth? How, likewiſe, does it at the ſame time make bone and fleſh, and each of the other parts? for the ſame thing energizing according to the ſame would not be able to faſhion ſuch a variety of organization. But does not nature in plants alſo poſſeſs productive powers as well as in animals? or ſhall we not ſay that, in theſe likewiſe, the order of generation and the lives of the plants evince that they are perfected from orderly cauſes? It is evident, therefore, from the ſame reaſoning, that the natures of theſe alſo comprehend the apparent productive powers. Let us then aſcend from theſe to the one nature of the earth, which generates whatever breathes and creeps on its ſurface, and which by a much greater priority contains the productive powers of plants and animals. Or whence the generation of things from putrefaction? (for the hypotheſis of the experimentaliſts is weak and futile.) Whence is it that different kinds of plants grow in the ſame place, without human care and attention? Is it not evident that it is from the *whole nature* of the earth, containing the productive powers of all theſe in herſelf? And thus proceeding, we ſhall find that the nature in each of the elements and celeſtial ſpheres comprehends the productive powers of the animals which it contains. And if from the celeſtial ſpheres

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we aſcend to the nature of the univerſe itſelf, we may alſo inquire reſpecting this, whether it contains forms or not, and we ſhall be compelled to confeſs, that in this alſo the productive and motive powers of all things are contained: for whatever is perfected from inferior ſubſiſts in a more excellent and perfect manner from more univerſal natures. The nature of the univerſe, therefore, being the mother of all things, comprehends the productive powers of all things; for, otherwiſe, it would be abſurd that art, imitating natural reaſons, ſhould operate according to productive principles, but that nature herſelf ſhould energize without reaſons, and without inward meaſures. But, if nature contains productive principles, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be another cauſe prior to nature, which is comprehenſive of forms; for nature verging to bodies energizes in them, juſt as if we ſhould conceive an artiſt verging to pieces of timber, and inwardly, by various operations, reducing them to a certain form: for thus nature, merged together with and dwelling in corporeal maſſes, inſpires them with her productive powers and with motion; ſince things which are moved by others require a cauſe of this kind, a cauſe which is properly irrational indeed, that it may not depart from bodies, which cannot ſubſiſt without a cauſe continually reſiding with them, but containing the productive powers of bodies, that it may be able to preſerve all things in their proper boundaries, and move every thing in a convenient manner. Nature, therefore, belongs to other things, being merged in, or coordinated with, bodies. But it is requiſite that the moſt principal and proper cauſe ſhould be exempt from its productions: for, by how much more the maker is exempt from the thing made, by ſo much the more perfectly and purely will he make. And, in ſhort, if nature is irrational, it requires a leader. There is, therefore, ſomething prior to nature, which contains productive powers, and from which it is requiſite that every thing in the world ſhould be ſuſpended. Hence, a knowledge of generated natures will ſubſiſt in the cauſe of the world more excellent than the knowledge which we poſſeſs; ſo far as this cauſe not only knows, but gives ſubſiſtence to, all things; but we poſſeſs knowledge alone. But if the demiurgic cauſe of the univerſe knows all things, if he beholds them externally, he will again be ignorant of himſelf, and will be ſubordinate to a partial ſoul; but, if he beholds them in himſelf, he will contain in himſelf all forms, intellectual and gnoſtic.

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In the fifth place, things produced from an immovable cauſe are immovable and without mutation; but things produced from a movable cauſe are again movable and mutable, and ſubſiſt differently at different times. If this be the caſe, all ſuch things as are eſſentially eternal and immutable muſt be the progeny of an immovable cauſe; for, if from a movable cauſe, they will be mutable; which is impoſſible. Are not, therefore, the form of man and the form of horſe from a cauſe, if the whole world ſubſiſts from a cauſe? From what cauſe, therefore? Is it from an immovable or from a movable cauſe? But if from a movable cauſe, the human ſpecies will ſome time or other fail; ſince every thing which ſubſiſts from a movable cauſe ranks among things which are naturally adapted to periſh. We may alſo make the ſame inquiry reſpecting the ſun and moon, and each of the ſtars: for, if theſe are produced from a movable cauſe, in theſe alſo there will be a mutation of eſſence. But if theſe, and all ſuch forms as eternally ſubſiſt in the univerſe, are from an immovable cauſe, where does the immovable cauſe of theſe ſubſiſt? For it is evidently not in bodies, ſince every natural body is naturally adapted to be moved. It therefore ſubſiſts proximately in nature. But nature is irrational; and it is requiſite that cauſes properly ſo called ſhould be intellectual and divine. Hence, the immovable cauſes of theſe forms ſubſiſt primarily in intellect, ſecondarily in ſoul, in the third gradation in nature, and laſtly in bodies. For all things either ſubſiſt apparently or unapparently, either ſeparate or inſeparable from bodies; and if ſeparate, either immovably according to eſſence and energy, or immovably according to eſſence, but movably according to energy. Thoſe things, therefore, are properly immovable, which are immutable both according to eſſence and energy, ſuch as are intelligibles; but thoſe poſſeſs the ſecond rank which are immovable indeed according to eſſence, but movable according to energy, and ſuch are ſouls: in the third place, things unapparent indeed, but inſeparable from the phænomena, are ſuch as belong to the empire of nature; and thoſe rank in the laſt place which are apparent, ſubſiſt in ſenſibles, and are diviſible: for the gradual ſubjection of forms proceeding as far as to ſenſibles ends in theſe.

In the ſixth place, let us ſpeculate after another manner concerning the ſubſiſtence of forms or ideas, beginning from demonſtrations themſelves. For Ariſtotle has proved in his Laſt Analytics, and all ſcientific men muſt

confeſs, that demonſtrations are entirely from things which have a priority of ſubſiſtence, and which are naturally more honourable. But if the things from which demonſtrations conſiſt are univerſals, (for every demonſtration is from theſe),—hence, theſe muſt be cauſes to the things which are unfolded from them. When, therefore, the aſtronomer ſays, that the circles in the heavens biſect each other, ſince every greateſt circle biſects its like, whether does he demonſtrate or not? For he makes his concluſion from that which is univerſal. But where ſhall we find the cauſes of this ſection of circles in the heavens which are more univerſal than the circles? For they will not be in bodies, ſince every thing which is in body is diviſible. They muſt, therefore, reſide in an incorporeal eſſence; and hence there muſt be forms which have a ſubſiſtence prior to apparent forms, and which are the cauſes of ſubſiſtence to theſe, in conſequence of being more univerſal and more powerful. Science, therefore, compels us to admit that there are univerſal forms, which have a ſubſiſtence prior to particulars, are more eſſential and more cauſal, and from which the very being of particulars is derived.

By aſcending from motion we may alſo after the ſame manner prove the exiſtence of ideas. Every body from its own proper nature is alter-motive, or moved by another, and is indigent of motion externally derived. But the firſt, moſt proper and principal motion is in the power which moves the mundane wholes: for he poſſeſſes the motion of a mover, and body the motion of that which is moved, and corporeal motion is the image of that which pre-ſubſiſts in this power. For that is perfect motion becauſe it is energy; but the motion in body is imperfect energy: and the imperfect derives its ſubſiſtence from the perfect.

From knowledge alſo we may perceive the neceſſity of the ſame concluſion. For laſt knowledge is that of bodies, whether it be denominated ſenſible or imaginable: for all ſuch knowledge is deſtitute of truth, and does not contemplate any thing univerſal and common, but beholds all things inveſted with figure, and all things partial. But more perfect knowledge is that which is without figure, which is immaterial, and which ſubſiſts by itſelf, and from itſelf; the image of which is ſenſe, ſince this is imperfect knowledge, ſubſiſting in another, and not originating from itſelf. If, therefore, as in motion, ſo alſo in knowledge and in life, that which participates, that which is participated, and that which is imparticipable, are different

from each other, there is alſo the ſame reaſoning with reſpect to other forms. For matter is one thing, the form which it contains another, and ſtill different from either is the ſeparate form. For God and Nature do not make things imperfect which ſubſiſt in ſomething different from themſelves, and which have an obſcure and debile exiſtence, but have not produced things perfect, and which ſubſiſt from themſelves; but by a much greater priority they have given ſubſiſtence to theſe, and from theſe have produced things which are participated by, and merged in, the darkneſs of matter.

But if it be requiſite ſummarily to relate the cauſe that induced the Pythagoreans and Plato to adopt the hypotheſis of ideas, we muſt ſay, that all theſe viſible natures, celeſtial and ſublunary, are either from chance, or ſubſiſt from a cauſe. But that they ſhould be from chance is impoſſible: for things more excellent will ſubſiſt in things ſubordinate, viz. intellect, reaſon, and cauſe, and that which proceeds from cauſe. To which we may add, as Ariſtotle obſerves, that prior to cauſes according to accident, it is requiſite that there ſhould be things which have an eſſential ſubſiſtence; for the accidental is that in which the progreſſions of theſe are terminated. So that a ſubſiſtence from cauſe will be more antient than a ſubſiſtence from chance, if the moſt divine of things apparent are the progeny of chance. But if there is a cauſe of all things, there will either be many unconjoined cauſes, or one cauſe; but if many, we ſhall not be able to aſſign to what it is owing that the world is one, ſince there will not be one cauſe according to which all things are coordinated. It will alſo be abſurd to ſuppoſe that this cauſe is irrational. For, again, there will be ſomething among things poſterior better than the cauſe of all things, viz. that which, being within the univerſe, and a part of the whole, operates according to reaſon and knowledge, and yet derives this prerogative from an irrational cauſe. But if this cauſe is rational and knows itſelf, it will certainly know itſelf to be the cauſe of all; or, being ignorant of this, it will be ignorant of its own nature. But if it knows that it is eſſentially the cauſe of the univerſe, it will alſo definitely know that of which it is the cauſe; for, that which definitely knows the one will alſo definitely know the other. Hence, he will know every thing which the univerſe contains, and of which he is the cauſe: and if this be the caſe, beholding himſelf, and knowing himſelf, he knows things poſterior to himſelf. By immaterial reaſons, therefore, and forms, he knows

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the mundane reaſons and forms from which the univerſe conſiſts, and the univerſe is contained in him as, in a cauſe ſeparate from matter. This, Proclus adds, was the doctrine of the Eleatic Zeno, and the advocates for ideas: nor did theſe men alone, ſays he, form conceptions of this kind reſpecting ideas, but their doctrine was alſo conformable to that of the theologiſts. For Orpheus ſays, that after the abſorption of Phanes in Jupiter all things were generated: ſince prior to this the cauſes of all mundane natures ſubſiſted unitedly in Phanes, but ſecondarily and with ſeparation in the demiurgus of the univerſe. For there the ſun and the moon, heaven itſelf, and the elements, Love the ſource of union, and in ſhort all things, were produced: for there was a natural conflux, ſays Orpheus, of all things in the belly of Jupiter. Nor did Orpheus ſtop here; but he alſo delivered the order of demiurgic forms through which ſenſible natures were allotted their preſent diſtribution. Proclus further adds: The Gods alſo have throught fit to unfold to mankind the truth reſpecting ideas; and have declared what the one fountain is whence they proceed; where ideas firſt ſubſiſt in full perfection; and how in their progreſſion they aſſimilate all things, both wholes and parts, to the Father of the univerſe. What Proclus here alludes to is the following Chaldaic Oracle:

Νους πατρος ερροιζησε νοησας ακμαδι βουλη
Παμμορφους ιδεας· πηγης δε μιας αποπτασαι
Εξεθορον· πατροθεν γαρ εην βουλητε τελος τε.
Αλλ' εμερισθησαν νοερω πυρι μοιρηθεισαι
Εις αλλας νοερας· κοσμῳ γαρ αναξ πολυμορφῳ
Προυθηκεν νοερον τυπον αφθιτον, ὁυ κατα κοσμον
Ιχνος επειγομενος μορφης μετα κοσμος εφανθη,
Παντοιαις ιδεαις κεχαρισμενος, ὡν μια πηγη,
Εξ ἡς ῥοιζουνται μεμερισμεναι αλλαι απληται,
Ῥηγνυμεναι κοσμου περι σωμασιν, ἁι περι κολπους·
Σμερδαλεους σμηνεσσιν εοικυιαι φορεονται,
Τραπουσι περι τ' αμφι παρα σχεδον αλλυδις αλλη
Εννοιαι νοεραι πηγης πατρικης απο, πολυ
Δραττομεναι πυρος ανθος ακοιμητου χρονου, ακμῃ
Αρχεγονους ιδεας πρωτῃ πατρος εβλυσε τας δε
Αυτοτέλης πηγη.

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i. e. "The intellect of the Father made a craſhing noiſe, underſtanding with unwearied counſel omniform ideas. But with winged ſpeed they leaped forth from one fountain: for both the counſel and the end were from the Father. In conſequence, too, of being allotted an intellectual fire, they are divided into other intellectual forms: for the king previouſly placed in the multiform world an intellectual incorruptible impreſſion, the veſtige of which haſtening through the world, cauſes it to appear inveſted with form, and replete with all-various ideas of which there is one fountain. From this fountain other immenſe diſtributed ideas ruſh with a craſhing noiſe, burſting forth about the bodies of the world, and are borne along its terrible boſoms like ſwarms of bees. They turn themſelves, too, on all ſides, and nearly in all directions. They are intellectual conceptions from the paternal fountain, plucking abundantly the flower of the fire of ſleepleſs time. But a ſelf-perfect fountain pours forth primogenial ideas from the primary vigour of the Father."

Through theſe things, ſays Proclus, the Gods have clearly ſhown where ideas ſubſiſt, who the divinity is that comprehends the one fountain of theſe, and that from this fountain a multitude proceeds. Likewiſe, how the world is fabricated according to ideas; that they are motive of all mundane ſyſtems; that they are eſſentially intellectual; and that they are all-various according to their characteriſtics.

If, therefore, he adds, arguments perſuade us to admit the hypotheſis reſpecting ideas, and the wiſe unite in the ſame deſign, viz. Plato, Pythagoras, and Orpheus, and the Gods clearly bear witneſs to theſe, we ſhould but little regard ſophiſtical arguments, which are confuted by themſelves, and aſſert nothing ſcientific, nothing ſane. For the Gods have manifeſtly declared that they are conceptions of the Father: for they abide in his intelligence. They have likewiſe aſſerted that they proceed to the fabrication of the world; for the craſhing noiſe ſignifies their progreſſion;—that they are omniform, as comprehending the cauſes of all diviſible natures; that from fontal ideas others proceed, which are allotted the fabrication of the world, according to its parts, and which are ſaid to be ſimilar to ſwarms of bees; and laſtly, that they are generative of ſecondary natures.

Timæus, therefore, places in intelligibles the one primary cauſe of all ideas; for there animal itſelf ſubſiſts, as is evident from that dialogue. But the

the oracles ſay, that the fountain of ideas pre-ſubſiſts in the demiurgus; nor are theſe aſſertions diſcordant with each other, as they may appear to be to ſome. For it is not the ſame thing to inveſtigate the one and total cauſe of mundane forms, and ſimply to contemplate the firſt unfolding into light of every ſeries of ideas; but the comprehenſion of the former muſt be referred to the demiurgus, and of the latter to the intelligible order itſelf, of divine natures, from which the demiurgus is filled, and all the orders of an ideal eſſence. And, on this account, I think the oracles aſſert, that ideas proceed with a craſhing noiſe from their intellectual fountain, and, being diſtributed in different places, burſt about the bodies of the world, in conſequence of the cauſe of mundane natures being comprehended in this fountain, according to which, all generated compoſite natures in the world are inveſted with form, conformably to the demiurgic will. But the forms ſubſiſting in animal itſelf, according to an intelligible bound, are neither ſaid by Plato to be moved, nor to leap into bodies, but to impart eſſence to all things by their very eſſence alone. If, therefore, to ſubſiſt through energy and motion is ſecondary to a making prior to energizing and being moved, it is evident that the ideas intelligibly and immovably eſtabliſhed in animal itſelf are allotted an order more elevated than demiurgic ideas. And the demiurgus is fabricative of forms in a twofold reſpect; both according to the fountain in himſelf, and according to intelligible ideas: for there are the total cauſes of all things, and the four monads; but, thence originating, they proceed through the whole divine orders as far as to the laſt of things, ſo that the laſt and ſenſible images of theſe poſſeſs a certain ſimilitude, more clearly of ſome, and more obſcurely of others. He, likewiſe, who is capable of following the divine progreſſions will perceive that every ſenſible form expreſſes the idioms of all of them. For the immovable and the eternal in ſenſible forms are no otherwiſe preſent than from the firſt forms: for they are primarily eternal; and hence they communicate eternity to the conſequent progreſſions in a ſecondary and third gradation. Again, that every form is a multitude, ſubſiſts according to a peculiar number, and is filled with its proper numbers, and that on this account a different form is referred to a different divine order to us unknown and ineffable,—this it receives from the ſummit of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual order, and from the forms which there ſubſiſt occultly, and ineffably: juſt as the power of

uniting a diſſipated eſſence, and bounding the infinity of generated natures in common limits, is derived from the connecting order, and from connective forms. But to be entirely perfective of an imperfect nature, and to produce into energy the aptitude of ſubjects, comprehending the unfigured in figures, and the imperfect in perfection, is ſolely derived from perfective deity, and the forms which there appear. Again, ſo far as every form haſtens to verge to itſelf, and comprehends parts uniformly in itſelf, ſo far it bears an image of the ſummit of intellectuals, and the impartible ſubſiſtence of forms eſtabliſhed according to that order. But ſo far as it proceeds with life, ſubſiſts through motion, and appears immovably in things moved, ſo far it participates of the vivific ſeries, and expreſſes the powers of vivific forms. Again, ſo far as it poſſeſſes the power of giving form to matter, is filled with artificial fabrication pervading through nature herſelf, and evinces a wonder ſubtilty, and a production of forms according to reaſon, ſo far it receives the repreſentations of demiurgic ideas. If, likewiſe, it aſſimilates ſenſibles to intelligibles, and ſeparates the eſſences of them by mutations according to reaſons, it is evident that it reſembles the aſſimilative orders of forms, from which the diviſible progreſſions of mundane natures appear, which inveſt ſenſibles with the repreſentations from intelligibles. Further ſtill, if every form pervades to many things, though it be material, and bounds the multitude of them according to its proper form, muſt it not, according to this power, be referred to that order of Gods which governs with a liberated characteriſtic the allotments in the world, and draws to itſelf many portions of divine allotments in the univerſe? We may behold, therefore, an uninterrupted continuity of the whole ſeries ſupernally proceeding from intelligible ideas as far as to the laſt of things, and likewiſe perceive what peculiarities ſenſibles derive from each order. For it is requiſite that all ſecondary things ſhould participate of the natures prior to them, and thus enjoy each, according to the order which they are ſeverally allotted.

With reſpect to *what things there are ideas of, and what not*, I ſhall ſummarily obſerve, that there are ideas only of univerſal and perfect ſubſtances, and of whatever contributes to the perfection of theſe, as for inſtance of man, and whatever is perfective of man, ſuch as wiſdom and virtue; and conſequently matter, particulars, parts, things artificial, evil and ſordid natures, are excluded from the region of ideas.

To the queſtion *what kind of beings ideas are*, we may anſwer with Zenocrates, according to the relation of Proclus, that they are *the exemplary cauſes of things, which perpetually ſubſiſt according to nature.* They are *exemplars*, indeed, becauſe the final cauſe, or *the good*, is ſuperior to theſe, and that which is properly the efficient cauſe, or the demiurgic intellect, is of an inferior ordination. But they are the exemplars of things *according to nature*, becauſe there are no ideas of things unnatural or artificial: and of ſuch natural things as are *perpetual*, becauſe there are no ideas of mutable particulars.

Laſtly, *ideas are participated by material natures*, ſimilar to the impreſſions in wax of a ſeal, to images appearing in water or a mirror, and to pictures. For material ſpecies, on account of their union with matter, are analogous to the impreſſions of a ſeal; but on account of their apparently real, but at the ſame time deluſive ſubſiſtence in its dark receptacle, they are ſimilar to images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream; and they reſemble pictures on account of their ſimilitude, though very remote and obſcure, to firſt ideas themſelves. We may add too, as Proclus beautifully obſerves, that they derive their ſubſiſtence as *impreſſions* from the *mundane* Gods; their *apparent* exiſtence from the *liberated* Gods; and their *ſimilitude* to ſupernal forms from the *ſupermundane* or *aſſimilative* Gods. And thus much for the firſt part of the dialogue, or the doctrine of ideas [1].

But in order to a ſummary view of the inimitably profound and ſublime diſcuſſion which the ſecond part contains concerning *the one*, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that by *the one itſelf* the Pythagoreans and Plato ſignified the firſt cauſe, which they very properly conſidered as perfectly ſupereſſential, ineffable and unknown. For it is neceſſary that multitude ſhould be poſterior to unity: but it is impoſſible to conceive *being* [2] without multitude, and conſequently the cauſe of all beings muſt be void of multitude and ſupereſſential. And that this was really the opinion of the moſt antient Pythagoreans, from

[1] See more concerning ideas in the firſt diſſertation prefixed to my tranſlation of Proclus on Euclid, in the notes to my tranſlation of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics, and in the notes to this dialogue.

[2] If *being* were the ſame with *the one*, multitude would be the ſame with non-being: for the oppoſite to *the one* is *multitude*, and the oppoſite to *being* is *non-being*. As *being*, therefore, is not the ſame with, it muſt be poſterior to, *the one*; for there is not any thing in things more excellent than *unity*.

whom

whom Plato derived his philoſophy, the following citations will abundantly evince.

And, in the firſt place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, a moſt antient Pythagorean, on the principles of things, preſerved by Stobæus, Eclog. Phyſ. p. 82, and in which the following extraordinary paſſage occurs: Ὥστ' αναγκα τρεις ειμεν τας αρχας, ταν τε εστω των πραγματων και ταν μορφω, και το εξ αυτου κινατικον και αορατον δυναμει· το δε τοιϐτον ὀν ου μονον[1] ειμεν δει, αλλα και νοῳ τι κρεσσον· νοῳ δε κρεσσον εστι ὁπερ ονομαζομεν Θεον φανερον.—i. e. "So that it is neceſſary to aſſert that there are three principles; *that which is the ſubject of things* (*or matter*), *form, and that which is of itſelf motive, and inviſible in power.* With reſpect to the laſt of which, it is not only neceſſary that it ſhould have a ſubſiſtence, *but that it ſhould be ſomething better than intellect.* But that which is better than intellect is evidently the ſame with that which we denominate God." It muſt here however be obſerved, that by the word *God* we are not only to underſtand the firſt cauſe, but every God: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every Deity, conſidered according to the characteriſtic of his nature, is ſuperior to intellectual eſſence. Agreeably to the above paſſage is that alſo of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianus in Ariſt. Meta. p. 102, b. who expreſsly aſſerts that the firſt cauſe νϐ παντος και ϐσιας δυναμει και πρεσϐειᾳ ὑπερεχει—"ſurpaſſes every intellect and eſſence both in power and antiquity." Again, according to the ſame Syrianus, p. 103, b. we are informed, "that the Pythagoreans called God *the one*, as the cauſe of union to the univerſe, and on account of his ſuperiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the meaſure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things, through illumination, eſſence and bound; and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable ſupereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound." Των Θειων ανδρων ἐν μεν λεγοντων τον Θεον ὡς ἑνωσεως τοις ὁλοις αιτιον, και παντος τϐ ὀντος, και πασης ζωῆς, και νϐ τϐ παντελϐς επεκεινα. Μετρον δε των παντων ὡς πασι την ουσιαν, και το τελος επιλαμποντα, και ὡς παντα περιεχοντα, και οριζοντα ταις αφραστοις αυτϐ, και παντος ὑπερηπλωμεναις περατος ὑπεροχαις. And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place *præclari* is erroneouſly ſubſtituted for *Clinii*. "That which is *the one*, and *the meaſure of*

[1] Inſtead of ὀν ου μονον, which is evidently the true reading, ὀνομον μονον is erroneouſly printed in Stobæus.

all things (ſays he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewiſe from intelligibles themſelves; ſince he is the venerable principle of beings, the meaſure of intelligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (μονον), poſſeſſing abſolute dominion (κυριωδες), and himſelf manifeſting himſelf (αυτο το εαυτο δηλων)." This fine paſſage I have tranſlated agreeably to the manuſcript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not inſerted. To this we may likewiſe add the teſtimony of Philolaus; who, as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cauſe which is ſuperior to the two firſt elements of things, *bound* and *infinite*. For (ſays he) "Philolaus aſſerts that the Deity eſtabliſhed *bound* and *infinite*: by bound, indeed, exhibiting every coordination, which is more allied to *the one*; but by infinity a nature ſubjected (ὑφειμενην) to *bound*. And prior to theſe two principles he places one, and a ſingular cauſe, ſeparated from the univerſality of things, which Archainetus (Αρχαινετος) denominates a cauſe prior to cauſe; but which, according to Philolaus, is the principle of all things." To all theſe reſpectable authorities for the ſupereſſential nature of the firſt cauſe, we may add the teſtimony of Sextus Empiricus himſelf. For in his books againſt the Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us, "that the Pythagoreans placed *the one* as tranſcending the genus of things which are eſſentially underſtood." Και δη των μεν καθ' αυτα νοωμενων γενος ὑπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικων παιδες, ὡς επαναβεβηκος το εν. In which paſſage, by things which are eſſentially underſtood, nothing more is meant than intelligible eſſences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philoſophy.

But in conſequence of this doctrine of the antients concerning *the one*, or the firſt principle of things, we may diſcover the meaning and propriety of thoſe appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photius and others: ſuch as αλαμπια, σκοτωδια, αμιξια, βαραθρον ὑποχθονιον, Απολλων, &c. viz. *obſcurity*, or *without illumination*, *darkneſs*, *without mixture*, *a ſubterranean profundity*, *Apollo*, &c. For, conſidered as ineffable, incomprehenſible, and ſupereſſential, he may be very properly called *obſcurity*, *darkneſs*, and a *ſubterranean profundity*: but conſidered as perfectly ſimple and one, he may with no leſs propriety be denominated *without mixture*, and *Apollo*; ſince Apollo ſignifies a privation of multitude. "For (ſays Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominated the firſt God *Apollo*, according to a more ſecret ſignification, implying a negation of many." Ennead. 5. lib. 5. To which we may

may add, that the epithets *darkneſs* and *obſcurity* wonderfully agree with the appellation of *a thrice unknown darkneſs*, employed by the Egyptians, according to Damaſcius [1], in their moſt myſtical invocations of the firſt God; and at the ſame time afford a ſufficient reaſon for the remarkable ſilence of the moſt antient philoſophers and poets concerning this higheſt and ineffable cauſe.

This ſilence is, indeed, remarkably obvious in Heſiod, when in his Theogony he ſays:

Ητοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ',——

That is, "*Chaos was the firſt thing which was generated*"—and conſequently there muſt be ſome cauſe prior to Chaos, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cauſe. Such, however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Heſiod γενετο is tranſlated *fuit*, as if the poet had ſaid that *Chaos was the firſt of all things*; and he is even accuſed by Cudworth on this account as leaning to the atheiſtical ſyſtem. But the following teſtimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, γενετο was conſidered as meaning *was generated*, and not *was* ſimply. And, in the firſt place, this is clearly aſſerted by Ariſtotle in lib. 3, de Cœlo. "There are certain perſons (ſays he) who aſſert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are *generated*. And this is eſpecially the caſe with Heſiod."—Εισι γαρ τινες οἱ φασιν ουθεν αγεννητον ειναι, αλλα παντα γιγνεσθαι—Μαλιστα μεν οἱ περι τον Ησιοδον. And again, by Sextus Empiricus in his Treatiſe Adverſus Mathemat. p. 383, edit. Steph. who relates, that this very paſſage was the occaſion of Epicurus applying himſelf to philoſophy. "For (ſays he) when Epicurus was as yet but a young man, he aſked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of Heſiod,

Chaos of all things was the firſt produced,

from what Chaos was *generated*, if it was the firſt thing generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his buſineſs to teach things of this kind, but was the province of thoſe who are called philoſophers—To thoſe then, ſays Epicurus, muſt I betake myſelf, ſince they know the truth

[1] Περι αρχων.

of

of things." Κομιδη γαρ μειρακισκος ων, ηρετο τον επαναγινωσκοντα αυτω Γραμματιστην (η τοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ') επι τινος το χαος εγενετο, ειπερ πρωτον εγενετο. Τουτου δε ειποντος μη αυτου εργον ειναι τα τοιαυτα διδασκειν, αλλα των καλουμενων Φιλοσοφων· τοινυν εφησεν ὁ Επικερος, επ' εκεινους μοι βαδιστεον εστιν, ειπερ αυτοι την των οντων αληθειαν ισασιν.

Simplicius, too, in commenting on the paſſage above cited from Ariſtotle, beautifully obſerves as follows—" Ariſtotle (ſays he) ranks Heſiod among the firſt phyſiologiſts, becauſe he ſings Chaos was firſt *generated.* He ſays, therefore, that Heſiod in a particular manner makes all things to be generated, becauſe that which is firſt is by him ſaid to be generated. But it is probable that Ariſtotle calls Orpheus and Muſæus the firſt phyſiologiſts, who aſſert *that all things are generated, except the firſt.* It is, however, evident that thoſe theologiſts, ſinging in fabulous ſtrains, meant nothing more by *generation* than the proceſſion of things from their cauſes; on which account *all of them conſider the firſt cauſe as unbegotten.* For Heſiod alſo, when he ſays that *Chaos was firſt generated,* inſinuates that there was ſomething prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. For it is always neceſſary that every thing which is generated ſhould be generated from ſomething. But this likewiſe is inſinuated by Heſiod, that the firſt cauſe is above all knowledge and every appellation." (De Cœlo, p. 147.)

But theſe divine men not only called the firſt cauſe *the one,* on account of his tranſcendent ſimplicity, but likewiſe *the good,* on account of the ſuperlative excellency of his nature; by the former of theſe appellations conſidering him as that principle from which all things flow, and by the latter as that ſupreme object of deſire to which all things ultimately tend. And hence Plato, in his Republic, aſſerts that *the good* is ſupereſſential; and Ariſtotle, in lib. 14, Metaphyſ. cap. 4, alluding to Plato and the Pythagoreans, ſays, " that according to ſome, *the one* is the ſame with the good." Οι μεν φασιν αυτο το εν, το αγαθον αυτο ειναι.

With great beauty, therefore, does Proclus [1], with his uſual magnificence of expreſſion, aſſert of this incomprehenſible cauſe, " that he is the God of all Gods, the unity of unities, and above the firſt adyta [2]; that he is more

[1] In Plat. Theol. p. 110.

[2] Αδυνατων is erroneouſly printed for αδυτων.

 ineffable

ineffable than all ſilence, and more unknown than all eſſence; that he is holy among the holies, and is concealed among the intelligible Gods."

Plato, too, in the Republic, that we may be enabled to gain a glimpſe from analogy of this tranſcendent nature, compares him to the ſun. For as the ſun by his light not only confers the power of being ſeen on viſible objects, but is likewiſe the cauſe of their generation, nutriment, and increaſe; ſo *the good*, through ſupereſſential light, imparts being and the power of being known to every thing which is the object of knowledge. Hence, ſays Damaſcius [1], "this higheſt God is ſeen afar off as it were obſcurely; and if you approach nearer, he is beheld ſtill more obſcurely; and laſtly, he takes away the ability of perceiving other objects. He is, therefore, truly an incomprehenſible and inacceſſible light, and is profoundly compared to the ſun: upon which the more attentively you look, the more you will be darkened and blinded; and will only bring back with you eyes ſtupefied with exceſs of light."

And ſuch is the doctrine of Plato and the Pythagoreans concerning the higheſt principle of things. But, according to the ſame divine men, the immediate progeny of this ineffable cauſe muſt be Gods; and as ſuch muſt have a ſupereſſential ſubſiſtence. For what elſe prior to unities is it lawful to conjoin with *the one*, or what is more conjoined with a God ſubſiſting according to unity, than the multitude of Gods? Beſides, progreſſions are every where perfected through ſimilitude to their principles. For both nature herſelf, intellect, and every generative cauſe, leads and conjoins to itſelf ſimilar natures, prior to ſuch as are diſſimilar. For as there can be no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is neceſſary that every thing which has a natural progreſſion ſhould proceed through ſimilitude. Hence, every cauſe muſt deliver its own form and characteriſtic to its progeny, and, before it generates that which is hypoſtatic of progreſſions far diſtant and ſeparate from its nature, muſt conſtitute things proximate to itſelf according to eſſence, and conjoined with it through ſimilitude. As nature, therefore, generates a natural number, ſoul one that is animal, and intellect an intellectual number, it is neceſſary that the firſt unity ſhould produce from itſelf,

[1] Περι αρχων.

prior

prior to every thing elſe, a multitude of natures characteriſed by unity, and a number the moſt of all things allied to its cauſe. And hence the fountain of univerſal good muſt produce and eſtabliſh in beings *goodneſſes* naturally conjoined with himſelf; and theſe exalted natures can be no other than Gods.

But if theſe divine natures are alone ſupereſſential, they will in no reſpect differ from the higheſt God. They muſt, therefore, be participated by beings; that is, each muſt have ſome particular being conſubſiſtent with its nature, but yet ſo as not to loſe its ſupereſſential characteriſtic. And hence every unity may be conſidered as the lucid bloſſom or centre of the being by which it is participated; abſorbing, as it were, in ſupereſſential light, and thus deifying the eſſence with which it is connected.

Nor let the reader imagine that this ſublime theory is nothing more than the fanatic jargon of the latter Platoniſts, as is raſhly and ignorantly aſſerted by Cudworth; for it is a doctrine as old at leaſt as Timæus the Locrian. For, in his book *On the Soul of the World*, after aſſerting that there are two cauſes of all things, intellect of ſuch as are produced according to reaſon, but neceſſity of ſuch as are produced by force, according to the powers of bodies, he adds—"that the former of theſe, that is intellect, is a cauſe of the nature of *the good*, and is called God, and is the principle of ſuch things as are beſt." Τουτεων δε, τον μεν τας τἀγαθω φυσιος ειμεν, θεον τε ονυμαινεσθαι; αρχαν τε των αριστων. But according to the Pythagoreans, as we have abundantly proved, *the good* or *the one* is above eſſence and intellect; and conſequently by intellect here we muſt not underſtand the firſt cauſe, but a deity ſubordinate to the firſt. Intellect, however, is (ſays he) of the nature of *the good*; but *the good* is ſupereſſential, and conſequently intellect participates of a ſupereſſential nature. And when he adds that intellect is called God, he plainly intimates that every God (the firſt being excepted) partakes of a ſupereſſential nature.

But to return to our inimitable dialogue: This ſecond part conſiſts of nine hypotheſes; five of which conſider the conſequences which reſult from admitting the ſubſiſtence of *the one*, and the other four what muſt be the conſequences if it were taken away from the nature of things. But as Plato in theſe hypotheſes delivers the Eleatic method of reaſoning, it is neceſſary to inform the reader that, according to Proclus [1], it was as follows:—Two

[1] In lib. 5. MS. Comment. in Parmenidem.

hypotheſes

hypotheſes being laid down, viz. *if a thing is*, and *if it is not*, each of theſe may be tripled by conſidering in each *what happens*, *what does not happen*, *what happens and at the ſame time does not happen*: ſo that ſix caſes will be the reſult. But ſince, *if a thing is*, we may conſider itſelf either with reſpect to itſelf, or itſelf with reſpect to others; or we may conſider others themſelves with reſpect to themſelves, or others with reſpect to that thing itſelf, and ſo likewiſe if a thing is not: hence, the whole of this proceſs will conſiſt of eight triads, which are as follows:—1. *If a thing is*, what happens to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, what does not happen, what happens and at the ſame time does not happen. 2. *If a thing is*, what happens to itſelf with reſpect to others, what does not happen, what happens and at the ſame time does not happen. 3. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with reſpect to themſelves, what does not happen, what happens and at the ſame time does not happen. 4. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with reſpect to that thing, what does not happen, what happens and at the ſame time does not happen. And the other four, which are founded on the hypotheſis *that a thing is not*, are to be diſtributed in exactly the ſame manner as thoſe we have juſt enumerated. Such (ſays Proclus) is the whole form of the dialectic method, which is both intellectual and ſcientific; and under which thoſe four powers, the *definitive* and *diviſive*, the *demonſtrative* and *analytic*, receive their conſummate perfection.

In the firſt hypotheſis, therefore, Plato conſiders *what does not follow* to *the one*, conſidered with reſpect to itſelf and to others. *In the ſecond, what does follow. In the third, what follows and at the ſame time does not follow.* And this forms the firſt hexad. But *in the fourth hypotheſis* he conſiders *what follows to others with reſpect to themſelves, and what does not follow, what follows and at the ſame time does not follow. In the fifth, what follows to others with reſpect to the ſubject of the hypotheſis, what does not follow, what follows and at the ſame time does not follow.* And ſo two hexads, or four triads, are by this means produced from the five hypotheſes, if *the one* is. And the reader will eaſily perceive how each of the other four, which ſuppoſe *the one* is not, may form a triad: ſo that theſe four triads, in conjunction with the preceding four, will give the whole Eleatic or dialectic method complete.

It

It is likewiſe neceſſary to obſerve, that theſe hypotheſes are derived from the triple diviſion of *the one*, and the twofold diviſion of *non-being*. For *the one* is either *above being*, or *in being*, or *poſterior to being*. But *non-being* is either *that which in no reſpect is*, or *that which is conſidered as partly having a ſubſiſtence, and partly not*. This being premiſed, let the reader attend to the following beautiful account of theſe hypotheſes from Proclus on Plato's Theology, and from his admirable commentary on this dialogue.

The firſt hypotheſis demonſtrates by negations the ineffable ſupereminence of the firſt principle of things; and evinces that he is exempt from all eſſence and knowledge. But the ſecond unfolds the whole order of the Gods. For Parmenides does not alone aſſume the intellectual and eſſential idiom of the Gods, but likewiſe the divine characteriſtic of their hyparxis, through the whole of this hypotheſis. For what other *one* can that be which is participated by *being*, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the *imparticipable one?* For, as bodies through their *life* are conjoined with *ſoul*, and as *ſouls* through their *intellective part* tend to *univerſal intellect* and *the firſt intelligence*, in like manner *true beings*, through *the one* which they contain, are reduced to *a ſeparate union*, and are conjoined with *the firſt cauſe of all.*

But becauſe this hypotheſis commences from that which is *one being*, and eſtabliſhes the ſummit of intelligibles as the firſt after *the one*, but ends in an eſſence which participates of time, and deduces divine ſouls to the extremities of the divine orders, it is neceſſary that the third hypotheſis ſhould demonſtrate by various concluſions the whole multitude of particular ſouls, and the diverſities which they contain. And thus far the ſeparate and incorporeal hypoſtaſis extends.

But after this follows *that nature which is diviſible about bodies and inſeparable from matter*, which the fourth hypotheſis delivers ſupernally depending from the Gods. And the laſt hypoſtaſis is the proceſſion of matter, whether conſidered as *one* or as *various*, which the fifth hypotheſis demonſtrates by negations, according to its diſſimilar ſimilitude to *the firſt*. But ſometimes, indeed, the negations are privations, and ſometimes the ſeparate cauſes of all productions. And that which is moſt wonderful of all, the higheſt

higheſt negations are only enunciative, but ſome in a ſupereminent manner, and others according to ſubjection. But each of the negations conſequent to theſe is affirmative; the one paradigmatically, but the other iconically, or according to ſimilitude. But the middle correſponds to the order of ſoul: for it is compoſed from affirmative and negative concluſions. But it poſſeſſes negations ſimilar to affirmations. And ſince it is alone multiplied, as conſiſting from wholes, it poſſeſſes an adventitious *one*. And this *one* which it contains, though truly one, ye ſubſiſts in motion and multiplication; and in its progreſſions is, as it were, abſorbed by eſſence. And ſuch are the hypotheſes which unfold all beings, both ſeparable and inſeparable, together with the cauſes of the univerſe, as well exempt as ſubſiſting in things themſelves, according to the hyparxis of *the one*.

But there are four hypotheſes beſides theſe, which by taking away *the one* entirely ſubvert all things, both ſuch as truly are, and ſuch as ſubſiſt in generation, and ſhow that no being can any longer exiſt. *The one*, therefore, being admitted, all things ſubſiſt even to the laſt hypoſtaſis; and this being taken away, eſſence itſelf is immediately deſtroyed.

The preceding mode of expoſition (except in the ſecond hypotheſis) agrees with that of the great Plutarch, preſerved by Proclus in his commentary on this dialogue, and which is as follows:

The firſt hypotheſis diſcourſes concerning the firſt God. The ſecond, concerning the firſt intellect, and an order entirely intellectual. The third, of the ſoul. The fourth, of material ſpecies. And the fifth, of formleſs matter. For theſe are the five principles of things. Parmenides in the mean time, after the manner of his own Pythagoreans, calls every ſeparate ſubſtance, on account of its ſimplicity, by the common appellation of *one*. But he denominates matter and corporeal form *different*, on account of their flowing nature and far diſtant diverſity from divine eſſences: eſpecially ſince theſe two do not ſo much ſubſiſt by themſelves as through others, and are not ſo much cauſes as concauſes, as it is aſſerted in the Timæus and Phædo. With great propriety, therefore, the three firſt hypotheſes, which inquire how *the one* is related to itſelf and to others, are conſidered as treating of principal cauſes. But the other two, which inveſtigate how other things are related to each other and to *the one*, are conſidered as repreſenting form

and matter. In theſe five hypotheſes, therefore, theſe principles, together with what they contain or ſubſiſts about them, are confirmed from the poſition of *one:* of *one*, I ſay, *above* being, *in* being, and *poſterior* to being. The remaining four hypotheſes demonſtrate how many abſurdities follow from taking away *that one* which beings contain, that we may underſtand how much greater abſurdities muſt enſue from denying the ſubſiſtence of that which is *ſimply one*. The ſixth hypotheſis, therefore, proves that, if there is not *that which is one* in beings, i. e. if intelligible has no real ſubſiſtence, but partly poſſeſſes and is partly deſtitute of being, that which is ſenſible would alone exiſt in the order of things. For, if intelligible is taken away, that which is ſenſible muſt alone remain; and there can be no knowledge beyond ſenſe. And this the ſixth hypotheſis demonſtrates to be abſurd. But the ſeventh hypotheſis proves that, if *the one which beings contain* has no kind of ſubſiſtence, there can be no knowledge, nor any thing which is the object of knowledge, which this ſeventh hypotheſis ſhows is fooliſh to aſſert. And again, *if this one partly ſubſiſts and is partly without ſubſiſtence*, as the ſixth hypotheſis feigns, other things will be ſimilar to ſhadows and dreams, which the eighth hypotheſis confutes as abſurd. But *if this one has no kind of ſubſiſtence*, other things will be leſs than ſhadows or a dream, that is, nothing; which the ninth hypotheſis repreſents as a monſtrous aſſertion. Hence the firſt hypotheſis has the ſame relation to thoſe which remain, as the principle of the univerſe to the univerſality of things. But the other four which immediately follow the firſt, treat concerning the principles poſterior to *the one*. And the four conſequent to theſe prove that, *one* being taken away, all that was exhibited in the four prior hypotheſes muſt entirely periſh. For ſince the ſecond demonſtrates that, *if that one ſubſiſts which is conjoined with being*, every order of ſoul muſt ſubſiſt; the ſeventh declares that, *if this one is not*, all knowledge, reaſon, imagination, and ſenſe, muſt be deſtroyed. Again, ſince the fourth hypotheſis declares that, *if this one being* ſubſiſts, material ſpecies alſo muſt ſubſiſt, which in a certain reſpect participate of *one being*,—the eighth hypotheſis ſhows that, *if this one being* has no ſubſiſtence, what we now call ſenſible natures would be only ſhadows and dreams, without any formal diſtinction or ſubſtance whatever. And laſtly, ſince the fifth hypotheſis admoniſhes us that, *if this one being* ſubſiſts, matter will

ſubſiſt, not indeed participating of *one being* ſo far as *being*, but conſidered as *one*; the ninth hypotheſis at length ſhows that, *if this one being* is taken away, not even the ſhadow of any thing could poſſibly ſubſiſt.

Thus far Plutarch; who likewiſe obſerves that this dialogue was conſidered as divine by the antients; and declares that the preceding expoſition is partly taken from the writings of the antients, and partly from his own private opinion.

Now from all this we may ſafely conclude, with Proclus, that all the axioms of theological ſcience are perfectly exhibited in this part of the dialogue; that all the diſtributions of the divine natures are unfolded in connected continuity; and that this is nothing elſe *than the celebrated generation of the Gods, and every kind of exiſtence, from the ineffable and unknown cauſe of the univerſe.* For the antients by *generation* meant nothing more than the *proceſſion* of things from their cauſe; and hence the firſt cauſe was ſymbolically called by Orpheus *time*,—becauſe, ſays Proclus, where there is generation, there time has a ſubſiſtence.

That firſt and imparticipable one, then, who is declared to be the cauſe of all things after an ineffable manner, but who is without circumſcription, and does not poſſeſs any power or characteriſtic of a kindred kind with the other Gods, is celebrated by the firſt hypotheſis. And from this ſupereminent cauſe, as from an exalted place of ſurvey, we may contemplate the divine unities, that is, the Gods, flowing in admirable and ineffable order, and at the ſame time abiding in profound union with each other, and with their cauſe. And here, ſays Proclus, an apt reſemblance of their progreſſion preſents itſelf to our view. Becauſe a line is the firſt continuous and diviſible nature amongſt magnitudes, hence it participates of an indiviſible, that is, of a point. And this point, though it is allotted a ſuperlinear condition and is indiviſible, yet it ſubſiſts in the line, is ſomething belonging to it, and is the ſummit of the line. To which we may add, that many lines in a circle touch by their ſeveral points the centre of the circle. In like manner an intelligible and intellectual eſſence, becauſe it is the firſt multiplied nature, on this account partakes of an excellent unity. And this unity, though it is neither eſſence nor obnoxious to eſſential multitude, yet abides in eſſence, or rather ſubſiſts as its vertex, through which every intellectual eſſence is a God, enjoying

divine unity as the very flower of its nature, and as that which conjoins it with the ineffable one. And as every thing is eſtabliſhed in its own ſpecies through form, and as we derive the characteriſtic of our nature from ſoul, ſo every God becomes that which he is, or a Deity, through the unity of his nature.

Laſtly, ſays he, the intention of the firſt hypotheſis is to abſolve that which is ſimply one from all the properties and conditions of the unities of the Gods; and by this abſolving to ſignify the proceſſion of all things from thence. But our intention in purſuing theſe myſteries is no other than by the logical energies of our reaſon to arrive at the ſimple intellection of beings, and by theſe to excite the divine one reſident in the depths of our eſſence, or rather which preſides over our eſſence, that we may perceive the ſimple and incomprehenſible one. For after, through diſcurſive energies and intellections, we have properly denied of the firſt principle all conditions peculiar to beings, there will be ſome danger, leſt, deceived by imagination after numerous negations, we ſhould think that we have arrived either at nothing, or at ſomething ſlender and vain, indeterminate, formleſs, and confuſed; unleſs we are careful in proportion as we advance in negations to excite by a certain amatorial affection the divine vigour of our unity; truſting that by this means we may enjoy divine unity, when we have diſmiſſed the motion of reaſon and the multiplicity of intelligence, and tend through unity alone to *the one itſelf*, and through love to *the ſupreme and ineffable good.*

It may likewiſe be clearly ſhown, and will be immediately obvious to thoſe who underſtand the following dialogue, that the moſt antient poets, prieſts, and philoſophers, have delivered one and the ſame theology, though in different modes. The firſt of theſe, through fabulous names and a more vehement diction; the ſecond, through names adapted to ſacred concerns, and a mode of interpretation grand and elevated; and the third, either through mathematical names, as the Pythagoreans, or through dialectic epithets, as Plato. Hence we ſhall find that the *Æther*, *Chaos*, *Phanes*, and *Jupiter*, of Orpheus; the *father*, *power*, *intellect*, and *twice beyond* of the Chaldæans; the *monad*, *duad*, *tetrad*, and *decad*, of Pythagoras; and *the one being*, *the whole*, *infinite*, *multitude*, and *ſameneſs and difference* of Plato, reſpectively,

ſpectively, ſignify the ſame divine proceſſions from the ineffable principle of things.

I only add, that I have followed the opinion of Proclus in inſcribing this Dialogue ON THE GODS: for as ideas, conſidered according to their ſummits or unities, are Gods, and the whole dialogue is entirely converſant with ideas and theſe unities, the propriety of ſuch an inſcription muſt, I think, be apparent to the moſt ſuperficial obſerver.

THE

THE PARMENIDES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CEPHALUS,	PYTHODORUS,
ADIMANTUS,	SOCRATES,
ANTIPHON,	ZENO,
GLAUCO,	PARMENIDES.

SCENE, the CERAMICUS[1].

WHEN we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, the place of our abode, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus in the forum: and Adimantus, taking me by the hand, I am glad to ſee you (ſays he), Cephalus; and if you are in want of any thing here, in which we are able to aſſiſt you, I beg you would inform me. Upon which I replied, I came for this very purpoſe, as being indigent of your aſſiſtance. Tell me, then (ſays he), what you are in want of. And I replied, What was your brother's name? for I do not remember: as he was almoſt a child when I firſt came here from Clazomenia; and, ſince that circumſtance took place, a great length of time has intervened. But his father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes. Entirely ſo (ſays he), and my brother's name was Antiphon. But what is it you principally inquire after? I replied, Theſe my fellow-citizens are very philoſophic, and have heard that this Antiphon was frequently preſent with one Pythodorus, the familiar of Zeno, and that he treaſured in his memory the diſcourſes which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other, and which had frequently been heard by Pythodorus. You ſpeak the truth

[1] See the Introduction.

(ſays

(ſays he). Theſe diſcourſes, therefore (ſays I), we are deſirous to hear. But this (ſays he) is no difficult matter to accompliſh: for the young man has made them the ſubject of vehement meditation; and now with his grandfather, who bears the ſame name as himſelf, very much applies himſelf to equeſtrian affairs. But if it is neceſſary, we will go to him: for he juſt now went from hence home; and dwells very near, in Melita. After we had thus ſpoke, we proceeded to the houſe of Antiphon; and found him at home, giving a certain bridle to a copperſmith, to be furniſhed in a proper manner. But as ſoon as the ſmith was gone, and the brothers had told him the cauſe of our arrival, Antiphon knew me, in conſequence of my former journey to this place, and very kindly ſaluted me: and upon our begging him to relate the diſcourſes, at firſt he ſeemed unwilling to comply (for he ſaid it was a very operoſe undertaking); but afterwards, however, he gratified our requeſt. Antiphon, therefore, ſaid that Pythodorus related that Zeno and Parmenides once came to celebrate the great Panathenæa: that Parmenides was very much advanced in years, extremely hoary, but of a beautiful and venerable aſpect, and about ſixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, was very tall and graceful to the view, and was reported to be the boſom friend of Parmenides. He likewiſe ſaid that he met with them, together with Pythodorus, in the Ceramicus, beyond the walls; where alſo Socrates came, and many others with him, deſiring to hear the writings of Zeno, for then for the firſt time they became acquainted with his writings: but that Socrates at that time was very young. That, in conſequence of this, Zeno himſelf read to them. And Pythodorus further related that it happened Parmenides was gone out; and that but a ſmall part of the diſcourſe remained unfiniſhed, when he himſelf entered, together with Parmenides and Ariſtotle, who was one of the thirty Athenians. That, in conſequence of this, he heard but a little at that time; but that he had often before heard the whole diſcourſe from Zeno.

He further added, that Socrates, upon hearing the latter part of Zeno's diſcourſe, entreated him to repeat the firſt hypotheſis of his firſt diſcourſe; and that, when he had repeated it, Socrates ſaid—How is it you aſſert, O Zeno, that if beings are many, it is requiſite that the ſame things ſhould be both ſimilar and diſſimilar? But that this is impoſſible. For neither can things diſſimilar be ſimilar, nor things ſimilar be diſſimilar. Is not this what

what you aſſert? Zeno anſwered, It is. If, therefore, it is impoſſible that diſſimilars ſhould be ſimilar, and ſimilars diſſimilar, is it not impoſſible that many things ſhould have a ſubſiſtence? For, if there were many, they would ſuffer impoſſibilities. Is it not then the ſole intention of your diſcourſes to evince, by conteſting through all things, that *the many* has no ſubſiſtence? And do you not conſider each of your diſcourſes as an argument in ſupport of this opinion; and ſo think that you have produced as many arguments as you have compoſed diſcourſes, to ſhow that *the many* is not? Is not this what you ſay, or do I not rightly underſtand you? Upon which Zeno replied, You perceive excellently well the meaning of the whole book. That Socrates then ſaid, I perceive, O Parmenides, that this Zeno does not only wiſh to connect himſelf in the bands of friendſhip with you, but to agree with you likewiſe in ſentiments concerning the doctrines of the preſent diſcourſe. For Zeno, in a certain reſpect, has written the ſame as yourſelf; though, by changing certain particulars, he endeavours to deceive us into an opinion that his aſſertions are different from yours. For you in your poems aſſert that the univerſe is *one*; and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in ſupport of this opinion: but Zeno ſays that *the many* is not, and delivers many and mighty arguments in defence of this aſſertion. As, therefore, you aſſert that *the one* is, and he, that *the many* has no ſubſiſtence; and each ſpeaks in ſuch a manner as to diſagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly aſſert the ſame; on this account it is that your diſcourſes ſeem to be above our comprehenſion. That Zeno ſaid—Indeed, Socrates, ſo it is: but you do not perfectly apprehend the truth of my writings; though, like Laconic dogs, you excellently purſue and trace the meaning of the aſſertions. But this in the firſt place is concealed from you, that this diſcourſe is not in every reſpect ſo venerable, that it was compoſed, as you ſay, for the purpoſe of concealing its real doctrines from men, as if effecting a thing of great importance: yet you have ſpoken ſomething of that which happens to be the caſe. But indeed the truth of the matter is this: Theſe writings were compoſed for the purpoſe of affording a certain aſſiſtance to the doctrine of Parmenides, againſt thoſe who endeavour to defame it by attempting to ſhow that if *the one* is *many*, ridiculous conſequences muſt attend ſuch an opinion; and that things contrary to the aſſertion muſt enſue. This writing, therefore, contradicts

tradicts thoſe who ſay that *the many* is, and oppoſes this and many other opinions; as it is deſirous to evince that the hypotheſis which defends the ſubſiſtence of *the many* is attended with more ridiculous conſequences than that which vindicates the ſubſiſtence of *the one*, if both are ſufficiently examined. You are ignorant, therefore, Socrates, that this diſcourſe, which was compoſed by me when a youth, through the love of contention, and which was privately taken from me, ſo that I was not able to conſult whether or not it ſhould be iſſued into the light—you are ignorant, I ſay, that it was not written through that deſire of renown which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile deſire of contention: though, as I have ſaid, you do not conjecture amiſs. I admit it (ſays Socrates); and I think the caſe is juſt as you have ſtated it. But ſatisfy me in the following particulars. Do you think that there is a certain form of ſimilitude, itſelf ſubſiſting from itſelf? And another which is contrary to this, and is that which is diſſimilar? But that you and me, and other things which we call many, participate of theſe two? And that ſuch things as participate of ſimilitude become ſimilar, ſo far as they participate? But thoſe which participate of diſſimilitude become diſſimilar? And that thoſe which participate of both become both? But if all things participate of both, which are contrary to each other, and become ſimilar and diſſimilar to each other through participating of both, is there any thing wonderful in the caſe? For, if any one ſhould ſhow that ſimilars themſelves become diſſimilar, or diſſimilars ſimilar, I ſhould think it would be a prodigy: but if he evinces that ſuch things as participate both theſe ſuffer likewiſe both theſe, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be any thing abſurd in the caſe; nor again, if any one ſhould evince *that all things are one*, through their participating of *the one*, and at the ſame time *many*, through their participating multitude. But I ſhould very much wonder if any one ſhould ſhow that that which is *one* is *many*, and that *the many* is *one*; and in a ſimilar manner concerning all the reſt: for, doubtleſs, he would produce a proper ſubject of admiration, who ſhould evince that both genera and ſpecies ſuffer theſe contrary affections. But what occaſion of wonder would there be, ſhould any one ſhow that I myſelf am both *one* and *many*? and ſhould prove his aſſertion by ſaying, when he wiſhes to aſſert that I am *many*, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from thoſe on the left, the ante-

rior

rior from the poſterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts (for I think that I participate of multitude): but when he deſires to ſhow that I am *one*, ſhould ſay, that as we are ſeven in number, I am *one* man, and participate of *the one*? ſo that he would by this means evince the truth of both theſe aſſertions. If any one, therefore, ſhould endeavour to ſhow that ſtones, wood, and all ſuch particulars, are both *many* and *one*, we ſhould ſay that he exhibits to our view ſuch things as are *many* and *one*, but that he does not aſſert that *the one* is *many*, nor *the many one*; nor ſpeak of any thing wonderful, but aſſerts that which is confeſſed by all men. But if any one ſhould, in the firſt place, diſtribute the forms of things, concerning which I have juſt been ſpeaking, ſeparating them eſſentially apart from each other, ſuch as *ſimilitude* and *diſſimilitude*, *multitude* and *the one*, and the reſt of this kind, and ſhould afterwards ſhow himſelf able to mingle and ſeparate them in themſelves, I ſhould be aſtoniſhed (ſays he), O Zeno, in a wonderful manner. But it appears to me that we ſhould ſtrenuouſly labour in the inveſtigation of theſe particulars: yet I ſhould be much aſtoniſhed if any one could ſolve this doubt, which is ſo profoundly involved in ſpecies; ſo as to be able no leſs clearly to explain this affair in the forms which are apprehended by the reaſoning power, than in thoſe belonging to viſible objects, and which you have already diſcuſſed.

Pythodorus ſaid, that when Socrates had thus ſpoken, he thought that Parmenides and Zeno ſeemed to be indignant at the ſeveral particulars of Socrates's diſcourſe; but that they beſtowed the greateſt attention on what he ſaid, and frequently looking at each other ſmiled, as wondering at Socrates: and that, in conſequence of his ceaſing to ſpeak, Parmenides ſaid—How worthy, O Socrates, of admiration is your ardour in the purſuit of liberal diſciplines! Tell me, therefore, have you ſeparated, as you ſay, certain ſpecies apart by themſelves, and likewiſe the participants of theſe ſpecies apart? And does there appear to you to be a certain *ſimilitude* ſeparate from that *ſimilitude* which we poſſeſs, and a certain *one* and *many*, and all ſuch other particulars, which you have juſt now heard mentioned by Zeno? That Socrates ſaid, So it appears to me. And (that Parmenides ſaid) does it alſo appear to you, that there is a certain ſpecies or form of *juſtice*, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf; likewiſe of *beauty* and *the good*, and every thing of this kind? That Socrates ſaid, It does. And likewiſe of all ſuch things as we

are compoſed from: ſo that there is a certain form of *man* [1], or of *fire*, or *water*? That Socrates anſwered—I have often been in doubt, O Parmenides, concerning theſe; whether it is neceſſary to ſpeak of them in the ſame manner as of the former particulars, or in a different manner. And do you doubt, O Socrates, whether it is neceſſary to ſay that there is a certain form of every ſuch particular as may appear to be ridiculous, I mean hair [2], clay, and mud, or any thing elſe which is vile and abject; and that theſe forms are different from the particulars with which we are converſant? That Socrates ſaid, I do not by any means think that the forms of theſe can be

[1] It is neceſſary, ſays Proclus, that immovable cauſes of all things which have a perpetual ſubſiſtence in the univerſe ſhould preſubſiſt in the intellect of the fabricator of the world: for the immutable is preſent with theſe, through the eternal power of cauſes. Hence, of man ſo far as man, and of every individual form in animals and in plants, there are intellectual cauſes; and the progreſſion of all things from thence is not immediately into theſe material genera. For it was not lawful for intellectual, eternal, and immaterial cauſes to generate material particulars, which have a various ſubſiſtence; ſince every progreſſion is effected through ſimilitude; and prior to things which are ſeparated from their cauſe as much as poſſible, ſuch things as are conjoined with, and are more clearly aſſimilated to, it, muſt have a ſubſiſtence. From *man itſelf*, therefore, or the ideal man in the demiurgic intellect, there will be, in the firſt place, a certain celeſtial man; afterwards an empyrean, an aërial, and an aquatic man; and, in the laſt place, this terreſtrial man. All this ſeries of form is perpetual, (the ſubjection proceeding into that which is more partial,) being ſuſpended from an intellectual unity, which is called *man itſelf*. There is alſo another ſeries from *horſe itſelf*, from *lion itſelf*, and in a ſimilar manner of all animals and plants. Thus, too, there is a fountain and unity of all fire, and a fountain of all mundane water. And that theſe monads are more partial than thoſe before mentioned, viz. than beauty, ſimilitude, juſtice, &c. is evident; and it is alſo clear that the fountain, or idea, of all the ſeries of man is the moſt partial of all the forms that are participated by mundane natures.

[2] We have already obſerved in the Introduction to this dialogue, and ſhall largely prove in the Additional Notes, that there are ideas alone of *univerſal* eſſences, and of ſuch things as contribute to the perfection of theſe: for *the good*, *the eſſential*, and *the perpetual*, eminently pertain to forms; the firſt of theſe being derived from the firſt cauſe, the ſecond from the higheſt being, and the third from eternity. From theſe three elements, therefore, we may define what things are generated according to a paradigmatic intellectual cauſe, and what things ſubſiſt indeed from other principles, but not according to an intellectual paradigm. Of hair, therefore, becauſe it is a part, there can be no idea; nor of clay, becauſe it is an indefinite mixture of two elements, earth and water, and is not generated according to a phyſical reaſon, or productive principle; ſince there are ten thouſand other things which we combine for the various purpoſes of life, and which are the works of art, and not of nature. Nor is there any idea of mud, becauſe there are no ideas of degenerations, detriments, and evils, which either ariſe from a confluence of divulſed cauſes, or from our actions and paſſions.

different from thoſe which are the objects of our inſpection: but is it not vehemently abſurd to think that there is a certain form of theſe? For this has formerly diſturbed me, whether or not ſomething of this kind does not take place about every thing: but, after having been fixed for ſome time in this opinion, I have haſtily withdrawn myſelf and fled away; fearing leſt, falling into a certain abyſs of trifles, I ſhould utterly periſh and be loſt; but, returning from thence, I have ſeriouſly applied myſelf to conſider thoſe particulars, to which, as we have juſt now aſſerted, forms belong. That Parmenides then ſaid, You are as yet but a young man [1], O Socrates, and Philoſophy has not yet received you into her embraces: for, in my opinion, when you are received by her, you will not deſpiſe any of theſe particulars: but now, on account of your juvenile age, you regard the opinions of men.

Tell me, then, does it appear to you, as you ſay, that there are certain forms, of which other things participating [2] retain the appellations; as, for inſtance,

[1] Parmenides, as Proclus juſtly obſerves, in correcting this conception of Socrates, reproves in what he now ſays thoſe who conſider theſe little and vile particulars as without a cauſe. For every thing which is generated, as Timæus ſays, is neceſſarily generated from ſome cauſe, ſince it is perfectly impoſſible that it ſhould be generated without a cauſe. There is nothing, therefore, ſo diſhonourable and vile which does not participate of *the good*, and thence derive its generation. Since, even though you ſhould ſpeak of matter, you will find that this is good; though of evil itſelf, you will find that this alſo participates of a certain good, and is no otherwiſe able to ſubſiſt than as coloured with, and receiving a portion of, a certain good. But the opinions of men are aſhamed to ſuſpend from a divine cauſe things ſmall and vile, looking to the nature of the latter, and not to the power of the former; and not conſidering that, being generative of greater things, it is much more ſo of ſuch as are leſs, as the Athenian gueſt ſays in the Laws. True philoſophers, however, ſuſpending every thing in the world both great and ſmall from providence, ſee nothing diſhonourable, nothing deſpicable in the dwelling of Jupiter; but they perceive all things good, ſo far as they ſubſiſt from providence, and beautiful, ſo far as generated according to a divine cauſe.

[2] The diſcourſe of Parmenides, ſays Proclus is perfective of, evolves and elevates, the conceptions of Socrates; praiſing, indeed, his unperverted conceptions, but perfecting ſuch as are imperfect, and diſtinctly unfolding ſuch as are confuſed. But as there are four problems concerning ideas, as we have obſerved in the Introduction, with reſpect to their ſubſiſtence Parmenides excites Socrates, in order to learn whether he ſuſpends all things from a formal principle, or whether he knew another cauſe more antient than this; and his reproof of Socrates was in conſequence of looking to this firſt cauſe. He proceeds, therefore, ſupernally from the moſt total

inſtance, that ſuch things as participate of *ſimilitude* are *ſimilars*; of *magnitude* [1], *great*; and that the participants of *beauty* and *juſtice* are *beautiful* and

forms, through the more partial, and ſuch as are moſt individual, to ſuch things as do not ſubſiſt according to an intellectual form, but originate from the monad of all beings, or, in other words, being itſelf. Hence truly proceeding as far as to the laſt of things, and ſuſpending all things from a paternal cauſe, and perfecting the conceptions of Socrates concerning theſe, he proceeds to the third problem, or the manner in which ideas are participated, again extending obſtetric aid. For the mode of the diſcourſe is every where maieutic or obſtetric, and does not confute, and is piraſtic, or explorative, but not vindicative. It differs, however, ſo far as at one time it proceeds from on high as far as to the laſt of things, and at another recurs downwards to aſſertions adapted to divine cauſes; according to each of theſe forms perfecting and elevating Socrates, and diſtinctly unfolding his conceptions reſpecting theſe particulars. Such, then, is the mode of the diſcourſe, calling forth ſpontaneous conceptions, accurately expanding ſuch as are imperfect, and elevating thoſe that are able to follow them; truly imitating the paternal cauſe, which from the ſummit of all beings preſerves, perfects, and draws upwards all things by the unknown powers which he contains. Let us now proceed to conſider the mode in which forms or ideas are participated, following the divine Proclus as our leader in this arduous inveſtigation.

The participations of intellectual forms are aſſimilated to the repreſentations in a mirror; for as, in theſe, *habitude* and *poſition* cauſe the image of the perſon to be ſeen in the mirror; ſo, the *aptitude* of matter extending itſelf as it were to the Artificer of the univerſe, and to the inexhauſtible abundance which he contains, is filled from him with forms. The participations are alſo aſſimilated to the impreſſions in wax. For ideas impart a certain veſtige and impreſſion of themſelves; and neither is this impreſſion the ſame with the ſeal by which it was produced, as neither is the form merged in matter the ſame with the immaterial and divine form from which it originated. But this latter mode differs from the former ſo far as it indicates a certain paſſive property in the recipient; for the mirror does not exhibit paſſivity ſenſibly, as the wax does in the latter inſtance. Hence ſome of the Platonic philoſophers, conſidering matter as impaſſive in the participation of forms, aſſimilate it to a mirror, but call forms images and repreſentations. Others again, conſidering matter as paſſive, ſay, that it is impreſſed like the wax by the ſeal, and call forms the *paſſions* of matter.

Forms alſo are ſaid to be like the ſimilitudes of icons, whether effected by the painter's, or the plaſtic, or any other art. For theſe forms, being faſhioned by a divine artificer, are ſaid to be *ſimilar* to divine forms; and hence the whole ſenſible order is called the icon of the intelligible. But this aſſertion differs from the former, ſo far as this ſeparates the maker from the exemplar; but

[1] *Magnitude* here, as Proclus well obſerves, is not ſuch as that of which geometricians ſpeak; for they denominate whatever poſſeſſes interval magnitude, whether it be line, ſuperficies, or ſolid. Ed. Plato does not denominate the form which is the cauſe of every interval, magnitude, but that which according to every genus imparts *tranſcendency* to things.

and *juſt?* That Socrates replied, Entirely ſo. Does not every thing which participates either participate the whole form, or only a part of it? Or can there

but thoſe produce the analogy from conſidering both as one. And ſuch are the modes according to which material forms have been ſaid to ſubſiſt with relation to ſuch as are divine.

It muſt, however, be obſerved, that each of theſe is imperfect conſidered by itſelf, and incapable of repreſenting to our intellectual conceptions the whole truth reſpecting this participation. For, in the firſt place, conſider, as to the mirror, that the countenance beheld in it turns itſelf towards the mirror, while, on the contrary, an intellectual cauſe beholds itſelf, and does not direct its viſion to outward objects. If, too, the mirror appears to poſſeſs a communication of ſomething, but in reality does not, (for the rays are reflected back to the countenance,) it is evident that this alſo is foreign from the participation of divine forms; for, as they are perfectly incorporeal, nothing can be ſeparated from them and diſtributed into matter.

In the ſecond place, if we conſider the impreſſions in wax, we ſhall find, that both that which impreſſes externally impreſſes, and that which is paſſive to the impreſſion is externally paſſive; but form pervades through the whole of the ſubject matter, and operates internally. For nature faſhions body inwardly, and not externally like art. And above all, in this inſtance, that which is participated approximates to that which participates. But it is requiſite that divine forms ſhould be exempt from all things, and not be mingled with any thing of a different nature.

In the third place, let us conſider the analogy from icons, and we ſhall find this alſo deficient. For, in the firſt place, forms faſhion the whole of the ſubject matter by which they are received, and this by an internal energy: and, in the next place, the exemplar and the maker are here ſeparated from each other. Thus, the figure which is painted does not produce its likeneſs on the canvaſs, even though the painter ſhould paint a reſemblance of himſelf; for it is the ſoul which operates, and not the external figure, which is the exemplar; nor does that which makes, *aſſimilate* that which is produced to itſelf; for it is ſoul which makes, and that which is produced is the reſemblance of external form. But divine forms are at the ſame time paradigmatic and demiurgic of their reſemblances: for they have no ſimilitude to the impreſſions in wax, but poſſeſs an efficacious eſſence, and a power aſſimilative of things ſecondary to themſelves.

No one of theſe modes, therefore, is of itſelf ſufficient to repreſent the true manner in which divine forms are participated. But, perhaps, if we can diſcover the moſt proper mode of participation, we ſhall ſee how each of theſe touches on the truth, at the ſame time that it falls ſhort of the whole characteriſtic.

It is requiſite, therefore, in order to this participation, to conſider as the cauſes by which it is effected, the efficacious power of primary and divine forms, and the deſire and aptitude of the natures which thence derive their formation. For neither is the fabricative and efficacious power of forms alone ſufficient to produce participation; for they are every where ſimilarly preſent, but are not ſimilarly participated by all things. Nor is the deſire and aptitude of the participants ſufficient without the productive energy of forms; for deſire and aptitude are of themſelves imperfect. The prolific eſſence, therefore, of the demiurgic intellect exerts an efficacious

there be any other mode of participation beſides theſe? That Socrates ſaid, How can there be? Does it then appear to you that the whole form [1] is one

efficacious energy, which the ſubject nature of ſenſibles receives. But, in effecting this participation, it neither makes uſe of impulſions, for it is incorporeal; nor of any indefinite impetus, as we do, for it is impaſſive; nor of any projectile force, for it is perfect; but it operates by its very eſſence. Hence, that which is generated is an image of its maker, intellection there concurring with eſſence: ſo that, according as he intellectually perceives, he fabricates; and, according as he fabricates, intellectually perceives. Hence, too, that which is generated is *always* generated by him; for, in eſſential productions, that which is generated is every where conſubſiſtent with its maker. In conſequence of this, in things ſubſiſting according to time, form, in *the ſudden*, ſupervenes its ſubject matter, whatever has been effected previous to its preſence alone removing the impediments to its reception. For, *the ſudden* imitates according to *the now*, the at-once-collected and eternal generation of all things through the aptitude of the recipient.

If, again, we deſire to ſee what it is which connects demiurgic power with the aptitude of recipients, we ſhall find it is goodneſs itſelf, this being the cauſe of all poſſible union. For, participations proceed to mundane cauſes through a deſire of good; and demiurgic forms, through goodneſs, make their progreſſions into ſecondary natures, imitating the inexhauſtible and exuberant fountain of all good, which, through its own tranſcendent goodneſs, gives ſubſiſtence to all the divine orders, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak. We have therefore theſe three cauſes of the participation of forms, the one goodneſs of the Father of all things; the demiurgic power of forms, and the aptitude of the natures which receive the illuminations of forms. But, participation ſubſiſting according to theſe cauſes, we may perceive how it is poſſible to aſſimilate it to repreſentations in a mirror, and ſo *reflection*. For aptitude and deſire, which are imparted to ſenſible natures from on high, become the cauſes of their being again *converted* to the ſources whence they were derived. This participation too may, after another manner, be aſſimilated to a *ſeal*. For the efficacious power of divine cauſes imparts a *veſtige* of ideas to ſenſibles, and apparent impreſſions from unapparent forms. For we have ſaid that the demiurgic cauſe unites both theſe together. But he who produces an icon effects ſomething of this kind. For in a certain reſpect he congregates the ſubject and the paradigm; ſince, when this is accompliſhed, he produces an impreſſion ſimilar to the exemplar. So that theſe modes, in a certain reſpect, touch upon the truth. But it is by no means wonderful if each is found to be deficient. For the recipients of ideas are partible and ſenſible; and the characteriſtic peculiarity of theſe unapparent and divine cauſes cannot be circumſcribed by the nothingneſs of corporeal natures.

[1] He who inveſtigates whole and part, not corporeally, but in ſuch a manner as is adapted to intelligible and immaterial forms, will perceive that every ſenſible nature participates both of the whole and the part of its paradigm. For, as that has the relation of a cauſe, but ſenſibles are from a cauſe, and effects can by no means receive the whole power of their cauſes, hence, ſenſibles do not participate of the whole form. For, where can that which is ſenſible receive the intellectual lives and powers of form? Where can the uniform and impartible nature of idea ſubſiſt in matter? Becauſe however, ſenſibles preſerve the idiom according to which *the juſt* in

one in each individual of *many things?* Or what other opinion have you on this ſubject? That then Socrates ſaid, What hinders, O Parmenides, but

in the intelligible world is called *the juſt*, or *the beautiful the beautiful*; through this again they may be ſaid to participate of wholes, and not of parts. Thus, for inſtance, the idiom of *the beautiful* is every where and in all things; but in one place it is intellectually, and in another materially preſent. And it is evident that the participations of more perfect natures are more abundant than of thoſe more remote from perfection; and that ſome things participate according to many, and others according to a few, powers. For, let *the beautiful itſelf* be *an intellectual vital form the cauſe of ſymmetry. Form*, therefore, and *that which is effective of ſymmetry*, are preſent to every thing beautiful: for this was the idiom of *the beautiful itſelf*; ſo that every thing participates of its whole idiom. But the *intellectual* nature of *the beautiful* is not preſent to all beauty, but to that which belongs to ſoul: for the beauty in this is uniform. Nor, again, is its *vital* nature preſent to all beauty, but to that which is celeſtial; but the *ſplendour* of beauty is ſeen in gold, and in certain ſtones. Some things, therefore, participate of the intellectual and vital nature of *the beautiful*; others of its vital ſeparate from its intellectual nature; and others participate of its idiom alone. More immaterial natures, likewiſe, receive more of its powers than material natures. Things ſecondary, therefore, participate both the wholes and parts of their proper paradigms. And in this manner it is proper to ſpeak to thoſe who are able to look to the incorporeal eſſence of forms. But to thoſe who are of opinion that the participation is corporeal, we muſt ſay, that ſenſibles are incapable of participating either the wholes or parts of ideas; which Parmenides evinces, leading Socrates to the diſcovery of the moſt proper mode of the participation of forms, and, in the firſt place, that they are not participated according to the whole; for this was the firſt thing to be ſhown. And Socrates ſays, that nothing hinders the participation of the whole form. But Parmenides reprobates the poſition inferring that one and the ſame thing will be in many things ſeparate from each other, and ſo the thing itſelf will be ſeparate from itſelf, which is of all things the moſt abſurd. For if a finger, or any thing elſe which ſubſiſts in other things, whether it be a corporeal part or power, ſhould be in many things ſeparate from each other, it would alſo be ſeparate from itſelf. For a corporeal power being in a ſubject will thus belong to ſubjects, and be ſeparate from itſelf, ſince it will be both in one and many. And, with reſpect to a body, it is impoſſible that the whole of it ſhould be in this place, and at the ſame time in another. For it cannot be denied, that many bodies may be in one place when the bodies conſiſt of pure immaterial light, ſuch as thoſe of the ſpheres in which the planets are carried, but it is impoſſible for the ſame body to be at the ſame time in many places. And hence it is impoſſible for a whole to be in many ſubjects corporeally.

But, ſays Proclus, if you wiſh to perceive the accuracy of Plato's diction in a manner adapted to theological ſpeculation, divide the words, and ſay as follows:—Since forms firſt ſubſiſt in the paradigm of intelligibles, as we learn in the Timæus, each of the firſt forms will be *one*, and *being*, and *a whole*. And being ſuch, it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be in many things ſeparate from each other, and at once, except in an exempt manner; ſo as to be both every where and no where, and, being preſent with all things without time, to be unmingled with them. For

every

but that it ſhould be one? As it is, therefore, one and the ſame in things many and ſeparate from each other, the whole will be at the ſame time one, and ſo itſelf will be ſeparate from itſelf. That Socrates ſaid, It would not be ſo: but juſt as if this form was *day* [1], this being *one* and *the ſame*, is collectively preſent in many places, and yet is not any thing the more ſeparate from itſelf; in the ſame manner, every form may be at once *one* and *the ſame* in all. That Parmenides then ſaid, You have made, O Socrates, one and the ſame thing to be collectively preſent in many places, in a very pleaſant manner; juſt as if, covering many men with a veil, you ſhould ſay that there is *one whole*, together with *the many*. Do you not think that you would make an aſſertion of this kind? That Socrates ſaid, Perhaps ſo. Will, therefore, the whole veil ſubſiſt together with each man, or a different part of it with each individual? A different part only. That Parmenides ſaid, Theſe forms then, O Socrates, are diviſible [2], and their participants participate only parts of them: and hence there will no longer be one whole form in each individual, but only one part of each form. So indeed it

every divine form, being in itſelf, is alſo preſent with others. And thoſe natures which are incapable of being at the ſame time in many things, derive this inability from not being in themſelves: for that which is ſomething belonging to one thing is not capable of belonging to another.

[1] That Socrates, ſays Proclus, derived his example of day from the diſcourſe of Zeno, is evident. For Zeno, wiſhing to evince how the many participate of a certain one, and are not deſtitute of the one, though they ſhould be moſt remotely ſeparated from each other, ſays in this very diſcourſe, that whiteneſs, being one, is preſent both to us and the antipodes, in the ſame manner as day and night. Ὁτι μεν εκ του ζηνωνος λογου το παραδειγμα ειληφε, δηλον· εκεινος γαρ δηλωσαι βουλομενος ὁπως τα πολλα μετεχει τινος ενος, καὶ ουκ εστιν ερημα ενος, καν διεστηκει πορρωτατω απ' αλληλων, ειπεν εν τῳ αυτῳ λογῳ μιαν ουσαν την λευκοτητα παρειναι και ἡμιν και τοις αντιποσιν, ὁυτως ὡς ευφρονην και την ημεραν. Parmenides, however, corrects Socrates, as no longer preſerving, by the example of day, form one and the ſame; but as introducing the partible inſtead of the impartible, and that which is one, and at the ſame time not one, inſtead of one; ſuch as is whiteneſs with us and the antipodes. For the intention of Zeno's diſcourſe was not to aſcend to ſeparate form, but to lead his auditors to that form which ſubſiſts with, and is inſeparable from, the many.

[2] Every thing ſenſible is a multitude which has an adventitious one, but form is a certain one comprehending multitude uniformly. For in divine natures progreſſion begins from the one, and from hyparxis; ſince, if multitude ſubſiſts prior to the one, the one will be adventitious. From theſe things alſo, ſays Proclus, you may underſtand how fables aſſert that there are certain diviſions and lacerations of the Gods, when they are diviſibly participated by ſecondary natures, which diſtribute the impartible cauſes of things partible preſubſiſting in the Gods. For the diviſion is not in reality of the divinities, but of theſe ſecondary natures, about them.

ſeems.

ſeems. Are you then willing to aſſert that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheleſs it is ſtill one? That Socrates ſaid, By no means. For ſee (ſaid Parmenides), whether upon dividing magnitude [1] itſelf, it would not be abſurd that each of the many things which are great, ſhould be great by a part of magnitude leſs than magnitude itſelf? Entirely ſo, ſaid Socrates.

[1] Parmenides, ſays Proclus, wiſhing to ſhow the abſurdity of admitting that a formal eſſence is partible, diſcourſes concerning magnitude, equality, and parvitude, becauſe each of theſe is beheld about quantity. But quantity has not by any means a part the ſame with the whole, in the ſame manner as a part of quality appears to preſerve the ſame power with the whole; whence alſo a part of fire is indeed diminiſhed according to quantity, but according to quality preſerves the nature of fire. In magnitude, therefore, equality, and parvitude, he very properly confutes thoſe who ſay that forms are partible. For, if thoſe forms which eſpecially appear to be partible, becauſe they introduce with themſelves the conception of quantity, cannot be diviſible, by a much greater reaſon other forms muſt be impartible, which do not introduce together with themſelves ſuch a conception; ſuch as are the juſt itſelf, the beautiful itſelf, the ſimilar itſelf, and the diſſimilar itſelf, which Parmenides co-ordinating with magnitude itſelf inquires how they are participated by ſenſibles. About theſe, therefore, which appear to be quantities, he very properly forms the demonſtration, and, in the firſt place, about magnitude. For, let magnitude be corporeally diviſible. The part, therefore, will be leſs than the whole; and, if this be the caſe, the whole will be greater than the part. So that, if ſenſible magnitude receiving a part of magnitude in the intelligible world, i. e. of magnitude itſelf, becomes great, this very thing is called great from receiving that which is ſmaller: for a part of magnitude itſelf is leſs and ſmaller. But it is ſuppoſed that things which participate of *the great* are great, and that things which participate of *the ſmall* are ſmall.

Let us however conſider magnitude itſelf by itſelf, apart from corporeal diviſion. Do we not, therefore, ſay that it has multitude, and is not one alone? But, if it has multitude, ſhall we ſay that each of its parts is magnitude itſelf, or that each is leſs than the whole, but is by no means ſmall? For, if a part is magnitude itſelf, in no reſpect leſs than the whole, there will be a proceſſion to infinity; ſince this will not only be the caſe with this part, but alſo with its parts, and the parts of its parts, the parts always being the ſame with the wholes. But if magnitude has not magnitudes as its parts, the whole will conſiſt from parts unadapted to it. It is neceſſary, therefore, that the parts as it were of magnitude itſelf ſhould be magnitudes, according with the whole, but yet not that which the whole is. For the part of fire is fire, but the power of the whole is greater than that of the part; and neither does the whole conſiſt from cold parts, nor is each part of equal ſtrength with the whole. Hence we muſt conceive that magnitude itſelf has twofold powers, one of which inſerts tranſcendency in incorporeals with reſpect to incorporeals; for in theſe there is a certain magnitude, and the other in bodies with reſpect to bodies. So that, though form poſſeſſes abundance of power, yet it does not depart from its proper idiom in the multitude of the powers which it contains. By ſpeculating intellectually in this manner parts and wholes in ideas, we ſhall avoid the abſurdities with which Parmenides ſhows the ſpeculation of them in a corporeal manner is attended.

But what then? Can that which participates a part of equal [1] itſelf, be equal to any thing by this its part of equality, which is leſs than equal itſelf?

[1] *Magnitude itſelf* is the ſource of tranſcendency and exempt perfection to all things, whether ſuch tranſcendency and perfection be intellectual, or vital, or ſubſiſting with interval. But *the equal* is the cauſe of harmony and analogy to all things: for from equality, as we ſhall ſhow in the Additional Notes to the Timæus, all the mediums are derived, as well thoſe belonging to the ſoul and ſuch as are phyſical, as thoſe that are mathematical; and the end of it is friendſhip and union. Since therefore the demiurgus, in adorning the univerſe, employed all the mediums, and the arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonic bonds proceeding from theſe, it may be ſafely inferred that the one intellectual cauſe of theſe, which generates and adorns them, is this demiurgic equality. For, as the monad which ſubſiſts in the demiurgus gives ſubſiſtence to every natural number, ſo the equality which is there, generates all the mediums or middles which are here; ſince alſo the equality which is contained in our dianoëtic part generates the mathematical mediums. But, if this be the caſe in images, much more in intellectual forms is equality the prolific ſource of all the variety of mediums which proceed about the world. Equality, therefore, is the cauſe of theſe to all mundane natures. It is likewiſe the ſupplier of co-ordination to beings; juſt as *magnitude* is the cauſe of exempt perfection, and *parvitude* of eſſential ſubjection. It appears, indeed, that all beings are adorned from this triad of forms, as they impart tranſcendency to ſuperior natures, ſubjection to ſuch as are inferior, and a communion of the ſame ſeries to ſuch as are co-ordinate. And it is evident that the perpetually indiſſoluble ſeries of wholes are generated according to this triad. For every ſeries requires theſe three, viz. *tranſcendency*, *co-ordination* and *ſubjection*. So that, if there are certain progreſſions of every form from on high, as far as to the laſt of things, and which, together with communion, preſerve the diſtinction between things ſecond and firſt, they are perfected through this triad.

Let us now ſee how Parmenides confutes thoſe who think that ſenſible equals participate parts of equality itſelf corporeally. For, if any ſenſible particular thus participates a part of equality, it is evident that it participates of ſomething leſs than the whole. But, if this be the caſe, that which participates of the leſſer is no longer leſſer, but equal. It ought not however to be ſo; ſince it is agreed that forms give the appellations of themſelves to ſenſibles. Hence that which participates of the leſſer muſt not be called equal, but leſſer; nor muſt that which participates of the equal be called leſſer, but equal; nor that which participates of the greater be denominated equal or leſſer, but greater. If, therefore, we direct our view to equality itſelf as an incorporeal eſſence, we muſt ſay that being one it contains in itſelf the cauſes of all equalities, viz. of the equality in weights, in corporeal maſſes, in multitudes, in dignities and in generations; ſo that each of ſuch-like particulars, which are all-various, is a certain *equal*, poſſeſſing a power and dignity ſubordinate to the whole. Since every form, therefore, generates all the idioms of the powers which it contains, it follows that there are many equalities comprehended under one equality. Nor ought we to wonder if all equalities, being ſubordinate to their comprehending unity, ſuffer this through the participation of parvitude itſelf. For all forms communicate with all; and magnitude itſelf, ſo far as it poſſeſſes a leſſer power than other forms, participates of parvitude. Parvitude itſelf alſo, ſo far as it ſurpaſſes other forms, participates of magnitude itſelf; while in the mean time every form is participated by ſenſibles ſo far as it is that which it is, and not ſo far as it communicates with others.

It is impoſſible. But ſome one of us muſt poſſeſs a part of this ſmall quantity; and that which is *ſmall itſelf* [1] will be greater than this, this ſmall quantity

[1] Parvitude itſelf may be conſidered as that which is the ſource of ſubjection in all forms, or it may be ſaid to be that which ſupplies impartibility, connected continuity, and a power which converges to the ſame in every form. For through this ſouls are able to proceed from a life extended with body and ſenſe to a more impartible form of life. Through this alſo bodies are compreſſed and connectedly contained in their indiviſible cauſes; the whole world is one, and poſſeſſes the whole of its life converging in one thing, the middle; and from this the poles and centres, and all impartible ſections, and contacts of circles, are derived. But the preſent diſcourſe evinces that it is impoſſible for ſenſibles to participate a part of parvitude corporeally. For, if parvitude itſelf had a certain part, it would be greater than its part; ſince a part of the ſmall, ſo far as it is a part, muſt be ſmaller than the whole: ſo that the ſmall will evidently be greater than its proper part, which is ſmaller than it. But it is impoſſible that the ſmall ſimply conſidered ſhould be greater. For we now conſider parvitude itſelf by itſelf, without any connection with magnitude. And ſuch is the abſurdity attending thoſe that divide parvitude when ſuch diviſion is conſidered in the form itſelf. But we may alſo inveſtigate another abſurdity which takes place in the participants of parvitude, and which is as follows: If we divide the ſmall itſelf, ſince the part of it is, as has been ſhown, ſmaller than the whole, it is evident that the thing, to which the part taken away from the whole of *the ſmall* is added, will become greater by this addition, and not ſmaller. Hence parvitude muſt not be divided.

We may alſo, ſays Proclus, interpret the preſent paſſage in the ſame manner as our aſſociate Pericles. For, to whatever the part taken away from the ſmall is added, this muſt neceſſarily become greater; but, by adding to that ſame thing the remaining part of the ſmall thus divided, the whole thing will become ſmall, and not greater than it was before: for the form was ſmall from the beginning. It is abſurd, therefore, to think that the ſmall can be divided. Proclus adds, that the preſent paſſage to ſome appeared ſo difficult, that they conſidered it as ſpurious. The words of Parmenides however, by introducing certain ablations and additions, evince that the participation which he reprobates is corporeal.

But we may aſſert in common, ſays Proclus, reſpecting theſe three forms, magnitude, parvitude, and equality, or rather concerning all forms at once, that they are impartible, and are allotted an incorporeal eſſence. For every thing corporeal, being bounded according to interval, cannot after the ſame manner be preſent to things greater and leſſer; but the equal, the greater, the leſſer, and, in a ſimilar manner, every other form are preſent to their participants, whatever interval they may poſſeſs. All forms, therefore, are without interval. For the ſame reaſon they are alſo eſtabliſhed above all place; ſince without impediment they are every where preſent to their participants. But things which ſubſiſt in place are naturally deſtitute of this unimpeded preſence: for it is impoſſible that they can be participated by all things which are arranged in different places. In like manner, forms are entirely expanded above all time: for they are preſent untemporally and collectively to all things; ſince generations themſelves are certain preparations which precede the participations of forms. And generations indeed ſubſiſt in time, but

quantity being a part of *ſmall itſelf*; and thus *ſmall itſelf* will be that which is *greater:* but that to which this part which was taken away is added, will become ſmaller, and not greater than it was before. That Socrates ſaid—This cannot take place. But after what manner [1] then, O Socrates, can individuals

forms give the participations of themſelves to generated natures, in an inſtant, impartibly, without being in any reſpect indigent of temporal extenſion. Let not, therefore, any one transfer from participants to the things participated, either time, or local comprehenſion, or corporeal diviſion; nor let him, in ſhort, underſtand in forms either corporeal compoſitions or ſeparations. For theſe things are very remote from the immaterial ſimplicity of forms, and from the purity of an impartible eſſence which is contained in eternity.

[1] The whole form of theſe words, ſays Proclus, is excitative and maieutic of the conceptions of Socrates. Hence Parmenides does not add, like one who contends for victory in diſputation, "ſenſibles, therefore, do not participate of forms," but he excites Socrates, and calls forth his intellect to the diſcovery of the moſt proper mode of participation. But we have already obſerved that whole and part are not to be conſidered corporeally, but in a manner accommodated to immaterial and intellectual eſſences. Senſibles, therefore, participate both the whole and the parts of form. For, ſo far as the idiom of every form proceeds in its participants as far as to the laſt of them, the participation is that of a whole; but, ſo far as things ſecondary do not receive all the power of their cauſes, the participation is of parts. Hence the more elevated of participants receive more powers of the paradigm; but the more ſubordinate, fewer. So that, if there are men in other parts of the univerſe better than us, theſe, being nearer the idea of man, will have a greater communion with it, and according to a greater number of powers. Hence the celeſtial lion is intellectual, but the ſublunary irrational: for the former is nearer to the idea of lion than the latter. The idiom indeed of idea pervades as far as to mortal natures; and hence things ſublunary ſympathize with things celeſtial. For one form, and communion according to this, produce the ſympathy. The moon alſo, ſays Proclus, as beheld in the heavens is a divinity; but the lunar form, which is beheld here in ſtones, preſerves alſo a power appropriate to the lunar order, ſince it increaſes and decreaſes in conformity to the changes of the moon. Thus, one idiom proceeds from on high as far as to the laſt of things; and it is evident that it proceeds through mediums. For, if there is this one form both in Gods and ſtones, much prior to its being preſent with the latter muſt it ſubſiſt in the middle genera, ſuch as dæmons, or other animals. For certain ſeries pervade from the intellectual Gods to the heavens, and again from the heavens into generation or the ſublunary realms, being changed according to each of the elements, and ſubſiding as far as to earth. But of theſe ſeries the higher parts participate in a greater, but the lower in a leſſer degree; one idiom being extended to all the parts, which makes the whole ſeries one.

Again, after another manner, we may ſay that ſenſibles participate both of the whole and of the parts of form. They participate of the whole, ſo far as the fabrication of form is impartible; whence alſo the ſame whole is every where preſent to all things, ſubſiſting from itſelf in the firſt place, and afterwards filling the eſſence of its participants with its proper power. But they participate

individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able to participate according to parts, nor according to wholes? That Socrates ſaid, It does not appear to me, by Jupiter, to be in any reſpect an eaſy matter to define a circumſtance of this kind. But what will you ſay to this? To what? I think that you conſider every form as one [1], on this account; becauſe, ſince a certain multitude of particulars ſeems to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him who ſurveys them all to be one idea, from whence you think

ticipate of the parts of form, ſo far as they do not participate of form itſelf, but of its images; and images are parts of their proper paradigms. For image is to its paradigm, as a part to the whole. And if any one, admitting this expoſition, examines what has been already delivered concerning ideas, none of thoſe impoſſibilities will follow, which ſome of the antients have conſidered as the inevitable conſequences of the doctrine of ideas. For, will it any longer be impoſſible that the ſame thing ſhould be in all things, if we admit that an immaterial and intellectual form ſubſiſting in itſelf, and requiring no ſeat nor place, is equally preſent to all things which are able to participate it? Will it be impoſſible that eſſentially impartible form, and which pre-ſubſiſts as one, ſhould be divided in its participants and ſuſtain a Titanic divulſion? And how is it not moſt true that what participates of magnitude itſelf participates of the leſſer? For magnitude in the participant, being diviſible, is the image of magnitude itſelf; but the image is leſs than the paradigm by a certain part. In like manner, that which we call equal in ſenſibles is leſs than the power of the equal itſelf, and is nothing more than the image of perfection; but the equal itſelf is greater than this, ſo far as it is more perfect in power. In ſhort, with reſpect to each of theſe three forms, ſince they are exempt from their participants, meaſure their eſſence, and impart the cauſe of ſubjection to them; according to exempt tranſcendency, each employs magnitude itſelf; according to a meaſuring power, the equal itſelf; and according to the gift of ſubjection, parvitude itſelf. All, therefore, co-operate with each other in the gifts which they impart to ſecondary natures. For, if magnitude itſelf imparts a power which extends to all things, but parvitude impartibility, they are connaſcent with each other; ſince then pervading more impartibly to a great number of particulars, they are impartible in a greater degree: and both are in a greater degree equal, by being eſpecially the meaſures both of themſelves and others. There is nothing, therefore, abſurd, nothing impoſſible, if whole and part are conſidered in a manner adapted to the nature of forms; but all things follow appropriately to the hypotheſis. Whence alſo Parmenides appears continually to aſk Socrates, how ſenſibles participate of, and how whole and part are to be ſurveyed in, forms, elevating him to the moſt true conceptions concerning ideas.

[1] From what has been already delivered (ſays Proclus) it is ſufficiently evident that forms are not participated in a corporeal manner; whence we may infer that neither do they fabricate corporeally, nor operate by impulſion, like the motions of bodies. But if this be the caſe, it is evident that the order of forms is incorporeal. In the Sophiſta, therefore, it is ſhown that *the one* is incorporeal; for, if it were body, it would require ſomething elſe to unite its parts. But it is here ſhown that *true being* and *intellectual forms* have an impartible ſubſiſtence: and in the Laws,

that

think them to be one great thing. That then Socrates ſaid, You ſpeak the truth. But what if you conſider the *great*[1] *itſelf*, and other things which are

that *ſouls* are incorporeal through their ſelf-motive hypoſtaſis. Theſe, however, are the three orders prior to ſenſibles, viz. the order of *ſouls*, the order of *intellectual eſſences*, and the order of *unities*, the immediate progeny of *the one*.

But here Parmenides aſcends to a more perfect hypotheſis concerning ideas, viz. whether ſenſibles participate of ideas as of phyſical reaſons or productive principles, which are coordinate and connaſcent with their participants, but are at the ſame time incorporeal: for the doubt prior to this conſidered the participation of ideas as corporeal. Parmenides, therefore, aſcends to a certain incorporeal reaſon, which, looking to things, we muſt define to be phyſical, and muſt aſſert, that the mode of participation is indeed incorporeal, but poſſeſſes ſomething common with its participants. For if, together with incorporeal participation, we alſo conſider the things participated as perfectly exempt from their participants, there will no longer any doubt remain concerning the participation; ſince theſe two things produce the doubt, the corporeal mode of being preſent, and the poſſeſſion of ſomething common between ideas and their participants, to which Socrates looking in the Phædo ſays, that it is dubious whether participation is the *preſence* of forms, as in the preceding inquiry, whether ſenſibles participate of the whole of form, or only of a part; or whether it is not a being preſent. This ſecond inquiry, therefore, conſiders form as in its participants, and as coordinate with them. For phyſical reaſons and natures are arranged above bodies and the apparent order of forms; but at the ſame time they verge to bodies, and do not

[1] Ideas muſt be conſidered as exempt and ſeparate from, and as generative of, the many; and the tranſitions from things which are ſeparated muſt be made, not through privations, but through forms, and in forms, till we arrive at ſelf-ſubſiſtent and firſt natures. For how, through things indefinite and formleſs, can we arrive at form and bound? Aſcending, indeed, from things material to ſpermatic reaſons, we ſhall find ſomething common in them, but which is imperfect; and proceeding from theſe to cauſes ſubſiſting in ſoul, we ſhall perceive that the effective power of theſe is temporal. But if we run back to forms which are truly ſo called, we ſhall find that there is nothing common between theſe and ſenſibles. For theſe true forms are perfect, and their energy is incorporeal and eternal, and is above all generation. For the characteriſtics of all generation are the imperfect from itſelf, the partible, the temporal, from which forms being purified, they are liberated from all ſenſibles, and poſſeſs nothing in common with them; ſo that it is no longer poſſible to make a tranſition to any other ſomething common. As, therefore, ſays Proclus, we obſerved in commenting on the former doubt, that forms are preſent with their participants through that which they impart, and are not preſent through their ſeparate hypoſtaſis; ſo, with reſpect to this ſecond doubt, we ſay, that forms communicate with their participants, and do not communicate. They communicate by illuminating them from themſelves, but do not communicate, in conſequence of being unmingled with the illuminated natures. So that a certain ſimilitude to them is divulſed, not from forms themſelves, but from the illuminations proceeding from them. Hence, through theſe they are ſaid to communicate after a certain manner with ſenſibles; not as in things ſynonymous, but as in things ſecond and firſt.

are *great*, in the ſame manner, with the eye of the ſoul, will not again a certain ſomething which is *great* appear to you, through which all theſe neceſſarily

not connect them exemptly. Hence, alſo, phyſical reaſons are entirely coordinated with ſenſible forms. But Parmenides himſelf clearly teaches how we aſcend to phyſical reaſons; ſince we recur from things common in particulars to the proximate cauſe of them, which is entirely phyſical form. For, perceiving many things that are great, and one idea extending to all theſe, we conceive that there is a certain ſomething *great* which is common to the magnitude in particulars. But that the diſcourſe is about phyſical form, and a tranſition from ſenſibles to this form, is evident, as Proclus juſtly obſerves, from Parmenides employing ſuch expreſſions as το σεσθαι, το δοξει, το δοκει, το ηγη, and the like, which could not be employed about things which are objects of ſcience, but are only adapted to phyſical concerns. In like manner we muſt ſay, with reſpect to men, that we ſee many men, and one idea extending to all of them, the man in particulars. Whence we think that one man pre-ſubſiſts in the reaſons or productive principles of nature, generative of the apparent man, and that thus the many participate of the one, as of phyſical reaſon proceeding into matter; ſuch reaſon or form not being ſeparate from matter, but reſembling a ſeal verging to the wax, impreſſing in it the form which it contains, and cauſing it to be adapted to the whole of the inſerted form. As the proximate tranſition, therefore, is from bodies to natures, Parmenides evinces that phyſical reaſons fall ſhort of the perfection of ideas, which is primary and unmingled with its participants.

From hence it may be inferred, that, as form is that primarily which the multitude under it is ſecondarily, it neither communicates with this multitude according to name alone, nor is ſynonymous with it; and that it is not neceſſary again to inveſtigate that which is common to form and its depending multitude. When, therefore, we conſider the one in every form, we ought not to inveſtigate it either doxaſtically or dianoëtically: for theſe knowledges are not connate with intellectual monads, which neither belong to the objects of opinion, nor to thoſe of the dianoëtic part, as we learn from the ſixth book of the Republic. But it is fit that we ſhould ſurvey the ſimple and uniform eſſence of forms through intellectual intuition. Nor muſt we conceive that the one in theſe ſubſiſts according to compoſition from the many, or by an abſtraction from particulars: for the intellectual number of forms proceeds from *the good* and *the one*, and does not depart from a union and alliance adapted to the cauſe which gave it ſubſiſtence. Hence, Socrates in the Philebus, at one time calls ideas *unities*, and at another time *monads*. For, conſidered with relation to *the one*, they are *monads*, becauſe each is a multitude, ſince it is a certain being, life, and intellectual form; but conſidered with relation to their productions, and the ſeries to which they give ſubſiſtence, they are *unities*; for things poſterior to them are multiplied, and from their impartible eſſence become partible. If, therefore, that which is characterized by unity in forms is exempt from the many, it is evident that the knowledge of intellect, which is profoundly one, is ſufficient to the apprehenſion of the one of forms. Whether, therefore, there is a multitude of participants, it does not multiply the unity of that which is participated; or, whether there are differences of parts in the participants, the impartible nature of forms is preſerved immutable; or, whether there is compoſition in that which participates, the ſimplicity of intel-

lectual

neceſſarily ſeem to be great? It ſeems ſo. Hence, another form of *magnitude* will become apparent, beſides *magnitude itſelf* and its participants: and beſides

lectual forms remains eternally the ſame. For they are neither connumerated with their effects, nor do they give completion to their eſſence; ſince, if they ſubſiſted in their productions, they could not be beheld as the principle of them, and as their prolific cauſe. For, in ſhort, every thing which is ſomething belonging to another cannot be a cauſe, ſimply conſidered; ſince every true cauſe is exempt from its effects, and is eſtabliſhed in itſelf and from itſelf, ſeparate from its participants. He, therefore, who is willing to paſs from theſe ſenſibles, and every way divided natures, to forms themſelves, muſt permit intellect inſtead of opinion to be the leader of the way, and muſt contemplate every form uncoordinated and unmingled with objects of ſenſe; neither conceiving that they poſſeſs any habitude with ſenſibles, nor ſurveying any common definition of eſſence between them and the many, nor, in ſhort, any coordination of participants and the things which are participated. But he who uſes opinion in this tranſition, and apprehends forms mingled with ſenſibles, and connumerated with material reaſons, will ſcarcely aſcend as far as to nature, and the phyſical order of forms: whence, again, he muſt after theſe contemplate other more total monads, and this to infinity, till, arriving at intellectual boundaries themſelves, he beholds in theſe ſelf-ſubſiſting, moſt ſimple, and eternal natures, the definite derivation of forms. Parmenides, therefore, gradually evinces that primary are expanded above diviſible forms, and all that is mingled and connumerated with theſe, and this according to a wonderful tranſcendency of nature.

And here, what Socrates obſerves in the Phædo reſpecting the participation of forms, is worthy of admiration: for he there ſays, that he cannot yet ſtrenuouſly affirm whether it is requiſite to call this participation *preſence*, or *communion*, or any thing elſe beſides theſe. For, from the firſt doubt, it may be evinced that it is impoſſible for the participation to be *preſence*, ſince neither the whole, nor certain parts of them, are able to be preſent with their participants. But, from this ſecond doubt, we may confute thoſe who contend that the participation is *communion*. If, therefore, there is any thing common to ideas and their participants, there will be a tranſition ad infinitum from the participants of that which is common to that which is common; and hence this latter doubt is different from the former. For the former was, that form is preſent with its participants, and is ſomething belonging to them; but the latter, that form is different from its participant, but poſſeſſes an abundant communion with it. Hence, in the former, the argument proceeds from the inability of form being preſent, either according to the whole or a part of itſelf; but, in the latter, it no longer proceeds in a ſimilar manner, but, from that which is common in form and its participant, again aſcends to ſomething elſe which is more common than the one form, and the many by which it is participated. He alone, therefore, can aſſign a ſcientific reaſon concerning the participation of forms, who takes away that which is corporeal in their being preſent, and removes that which is common from an incorporeal eſſence. For thus ideas will be incorporeally preſent with their participants, but will not be ſubdued by one relation towards them; that they may be every where, through their incorporeal nature, and no where, in conſequence of being exempt from their participants. For a communion with participants takes away

beſides all theſe another *magnitude*, through which all theſe become great; ſo that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude.

away exempt tranſcendency. For it is requiſite, indeed, that there ſhould be communion, yet not as of things coordinate, but only ſo far as participants are ſuſpended from ideas; but ideas are perfectly exempt from their participants. Corporeal preſence, however, obſcures a preſence every way impartible. Bodies therefore, are things incapable of being wholly in many things; but eſſentially incorporeal natures are wholly preſent to things which are able to participate them; or, rather, they are not preſent to their participants, but their participants are preſent to them. And this is what Socrates obſcurely ſignifies in the Phædo, when he ſays, "whether preſence, or communion, or any thing elſe may be the cauſe of the participation of forms." Forms, therefore, muſt not be admitted to be the progeny and bloſſoms of matter, as they were ſaid to be by the Stoics; nor muſt it be granted that they conſiſt from a comixture of ſimple elements; nor that they have the ſame eſſence with ſpermatic reaſons. For all theſe things evince their ſubſiſtence to be corporeal, imperfect, and diviſible. Whence, then, on ſuch an hypotheſis, is perfection derived to things imperfect? Whence union to things every way diſſipated? Whence is a never-failing eſſence preſent with things perpetually generated, unleſs the incorporeal and all-perfect order of forms has a ſubſiſtence prior to theſe? Others again, of the antients, ſays Proclus, aſſigned that which is common in particulars as the cauſe of the permanency in forms: for man generates man, and the ſimilar is produced from the ſimilar. They ought, however, at the ſame time, to have directed their attention to that which gives ſubſiſtence to what is common in particulars: for, as we have before obſerved, true cauſes are exempt from their effects. That which is common, therefore, in particulars, may be aſſimilated to one and the ſame ſeal which is impreſſed in many pieces of wax, and which remains the ſame, without failing, while the pieces of wax are changed. What, then, is it which proximately impreſſes this ſeal in the wax? For matter is analogous to the wax, the ſenſible man to the type, and that which is common in particulars, and verges to things, to the ring itſelf. What elſe, then, can we aſſign as the cauſe of this, than nature proceeding through matter, and thus giving form to that which is ſenſible, by her own inherent reaſons? Soul, therefore, will thus be analogous to the hand which uſes the ring, ſince ſoul is the leader of nature; that which ranks as a whole of the whole of nature, and that which is partial of a partial nature. But intellect will be analogous to the ſoul which impreſſes the wax through the hand and the ring; which intellect fills that which is ſenſible through ſoul and the nature of forms, and is itſelf the true Porus *, generative of the reaſons which flow, as far as to matter. It is not neceſſary, therefore, to ſtop at the things common in particulars, but we ſhould inveſtigate the cauſes of them. For why do men participate of this peculiar ſomething which is common, but another animal of a different ſomething common, except through unapparent reaſons? For nature is the one mother of all things; but what are the cauſes of definite ſimilitudes? And why do we ſay the generation is according to nature when man is from man, unleſs there is a reaſon of men in nature, according to which all ſenſible men ſubſiſt? For it is not becauſe that which is produced is an animal, ſince if it were a lion that was pro-

* See the ſpeech of Diotima in the Banquet.

titude. But that upon this Socrates replied, Perhaps, O Parmenides, each of theſe forms is nothing more than an intellectual *conception* [1], which ought

duced from a man, it would be a natural animal indeed, but would no longer be *according to nature*, becauſe it would not be generated according to a proper reaſon. It is neceſſary, therefore, that there ſhould be another cauſe of ſimilars prior to ſimilars; and hence it is neceſſary to recur from the things common in particulars to the one cauſe which proximately gives ſubſiſtence to ſenſibles, and to which Parmenides himſelf leads us. That he does not, however, think it proper that we ſhould ſtop at this cauſe, he manifeſts from what follows. For if, looking to theſe things which are common, we wiſh, beginning from theſe, to faſhion ideas, in conſequence of recurring in a ſimilar manner to them from all things, we ſhall be in want not only of things of which there are ideas, but alſo of thoſe of which there are not, ſuch as of things contrary to nature, of things artificial, of things uneſſential, and of ſuch as have no ſubſiſtence, ſuch as an animal mingled from a goat and ſtag, (τραγελαφος), or an animal mingled from a horſe and centaur, (ιπποκενταυρος); for there are alſo things common in theſe, and thus we ſhall eſtabliſh ideas of non-entities. To which we may add, that we muſt likewiſe admit that there are ideas of infinities, as of irrational lines, and the ratios in numbers: for both theſe are infinite, and of both there are things common. If, therefore, we faſhion certain ideas from theſe, we ſhall often make infinities, though it is requiſite that ideas ſhould be leſs numerous than their participants, the participants of each, at the ſame time, being many. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides direct the mode of tranſition to ideas, as not being ſcientific, if it proceeds from the things common in ſenſibles; for it will always be poſſible to conceive different things common, and thus to proceed ad infinitum. But this is evident from the words that immediately follow.

[1] The fourth problem concerning ideas is here conſidered, viz. what kind of beings they are, or in other words, where they ſubſiſt, whether in ſouls, or prior to ſouls. Socrates, therefore, being ſeparated by Parmenides from phyſical forms, calls idea a conception belonging to the ſoul, (νοημα ψυχικον), and defines the place of it to be ſoul. For the form in ſoul is one and incorporeal; and this dogma is not attended with the former difficulties. For this form is exempt from the many, and is not co-ordinate with them like the forms in matter, in conſequence of being allotted a ſubſiſtence in ſoul. There is likewiſe nothing common between this form and the many; nor is it either according to the whole, or a part of itſelf, in its participants, ſo that it may be ſhown to be ſeparate from itſelf, or to have a partible ſubſiſtence. Socrates, therefore, by adopting this dogma, avoids the above-mentioned doubts. But, ſays Proclus, when Socrates calls idea *a conception* (νοημα), we muſt not think that he aſſerts it to be that which is the object of intellectual viſion, (το νοουμενον) in the ſame manner as we call that which is apprehended by ſenſe *ſenſible* (ὡς αισθημα φαμεν το τη αισθησει ληπτου); but that intelligence itſelf underſtanding form, is here called *a conception*; being ſo denominated as a certain theorem and dogma ingenerated in ſouls, about dogmatized and deiform concerns. (Ουτω νοημα λεγομενον ὡς θεωρημα τι και δογμα εν ταις ψυχαις εγγινομενον περι των δογματιζομενων και θεοειδων πραγματων). This conception, therefore, he ſays is *ingenerated* in ſouls, through the word *ingenerated*, (εγγινεσθαι), manifeſting that it does not ſubſiſt in them *eſſentially*. And this is that form of poſterior origin (το υστερογενες ειδος), which ſome of the followers

ought not to ſubſiſt any where but in the ſoul; and if this be the caſe, each will be one: and the conſequences juſt now mentioned will not enſue. That Parmenides

of Ariſtotle, and moſt of the moderns, ſo much celebrate, but which is entirely different from that reaſon or form which abides eſſentially in ſouls, and does not derive its ſubſiſtence from an abſtraction from ſenſibles. Looking to this eſſential reaſon we ſay, that the ſoul is all forms, and is the place of forms, not in capacity only, but in that kind of energy, through which we call one ſkilled in geometry a geometrician in energy, even when he does not geometrize, and which Ariſtotle accurately calls the prior form of being in energy. This, therefore, which is denominated a conception, as of poſterior origin, is very properly ſaid to be different from the eſſential reaſon of the ſoul: for it is more obſcure than the many in ſenſibles, as being poſterior and not prior to them. But the eſſential reaſon or form of the ſoul is more perfect, becauſe the conception of poſterior origin, or in modern language, abſtract idea, has a leſs eſſence than the many, but the eſſential form more.

That it is not, however, proper to ſtop at conceptions of poſterior origin, i. e. notions gained by an abſtraction from ſenſible particulars, but that we ſhould proceed to thoſe eſſential reaſons which are allotted a perpetual ſubſiſtence within the ſoul, is evident to thoſe who are able to ſurvey the nature of things. For, whence is man able to collect into one by reaſoning the perceptions of many ſenſes, and to conſider one and the ſame unapparent form prior to things apparent, and ſeparated from each other; but no other animal that we are acquainted with, ſurveys this ſomething common, for neither does it poſſeſs a rational eſſence, but alone employs ſenſe, and appetite, and imagination? Whence, then, do rational ſouls generate theſe univerſals, and recur from the ſenſes to that which is the object of opinion? It is becauſe they eſſentially poſſeſs the gnoſtically productive principles of things: for, as nature poſſeſſes a power productive of ſenſibles, by containing reaſons, or productive principles, and faſhions, and connects ſenſibles, ſo as by the inward eye to form the external, and in a ſimilar manner the finger, and every other particular; ſo he who has a common conception of theſe, by previouſly poſſeſſing the reaſons of things, beholds that which each poſſeſſes in common. For he does not receive this common ſomething from ſenſibles; ſince that which is received from ſenſibles is a phantaſm, and not the object of opinion. It likewiſe remains within ſuch as it was received from the beginning, that it may not be falſe, and a non-entity, but does not become more perfect and venerable, nor does it originate from any thing elſe than the ſoul. Indeed, it muſt not be admitted that nature in generating generates by natural reaſons and meaſures, but that ſoul in generating does not generate by animaſtic reaſons and cauſes. But if matter poſſeſſes that which is common in the many, and this ſomething common is eſſential, and more eſſence than individuals; for this is perpetual, but each of thoſe is corruptible, and they derive their very being from this, ſince it is through form that every thing partakes of eſſence,—if this be the caſe, and ſoul alone poſſeſſes things common which are of poſterior origin (ὑστερογενη κοινα), do we not make the ſoul more ignoble than matter? For the form which is merged in matter will be more perfect and more eſſence than that which reſides in the ſoul; ſince the latter is of poſterior origin, but the former is perpetual; and the one is after, but the other generative and connective of the many. To which we may add, that a common phantaſm in the ſoul derives its ſubſiſtence from a ſurvey of that which is

ſaid, What then? is each of theſe *conceptions* [1] one, but at the ſame time a *conception* of nothing? That Socrates ſaid, This is impoſſible. It is a *conception*, therefore, of ſomething? Certainly. Of *being* or of *non-being*? Of *being*. Will it not be of one particular thing, which that conception underſtands as one certain idea in all things? Undoubtedly. But now will not that which is underſtood to be one, be a form always the ſame in all

common in particulars. Hence it tends to this; for every thing adheres to its principle, and is ſaid to be nothing elſe than a predicate; ſo that its very eſſence is to be predicated of the many.

Further ſtill: the univerſal in the many is leſs than each of the many; for by certain additions and accidents it is ſurpaſſed by every individual. But that which is of poſterior origin (i. e. univerſal abſtracted from particulars) comprehends each of the many. Hence it is predicated of each of theſe; and that which is particular is contained in the whole of this univerſal. For this ſomething common, or abſtract idea, is not only predicated of that ſomething common in an individual, but likewiſe of the whole ſubject. How then can it thence derive its ſubſiſtence, and be completed from that which is common in the many? For, if from the many themſelves, where do we ſee infinite men, of all which we predicate the ſame thing? And if from that which is common in the many, whence is it that this abſtract idea is more comprehenſive than its cauſe? Hence it has a different origin, and receives from another form this power which is comprehenſive of every individual; and of this form the abſtract idea which ſubſiſts in opinion is an image, the inward cauſe being excited from things apparent. To which we may add, that all demonſtration, as Ariſtotle has ſhown in his Laſt Analytics, is from things prior, more honourable, and more univerſal. How, therefore, is univerſal more honourable, if it is of poſterior origin? For, in things of poſterior origin, that which is more univerſal is more uneſſential; whence ſpecies is more eſſence than genius. The rules, therefore, concerning the moſt true demonſtration muſt be ſubverted, if we alone place in the ſoul univerſals of poſterior origin: for theſe are not more excellent than, nor are the cauſes of, nor are naturally prior to, particulars. If, therefore, theſe things are abſurd, it is neceſſary that eſſential reaſons ſhould ſubſiſt in the ſoul prior to univerſals, which are produced by an abſtraction from ſenſibles. And theſe reaſons or productive powers are indeed always exerted, and are always efficacious in divine ſouls, and in the more excellent orders of beings; but in us they are ſometimes dormant, and ſometimes in energy.

[1] From the things common in particulars, it is neceſſary to recur to phyſical form, which is proximate to theſe; and after this to the reaſon or form in the ſoul which is of poſterior origin, or which derives it ſubſiſtence from an abſtraction from ſenſibles, and is a conception ingenerated in the ſoul. But when we have arrived thus far, it is requiſite to paſs on to the conception of the eſſential reaſon of the ſoul, and from this to make a tranſition to being itſelf, to which alſo Socrates is now led through the obſtetric arguments of Parmenides. As in intellect, therefore, that which underſtands, intelligence, and the intelligible, are united to each other, and intellectual conception every where pertains to the intelligible, it is evident that the intelligible is prior to intellectual conception, in which intelligible, the reaſon in the ſoul being firmly fixed, is a noëma, or intellectual conception. Hence, we muſt not ſtop in aſcending from one form to another,

all things? This ſeems to be neceſſary. That Parmenides then ſaid, But what, is it not neceſſary, ſince other things participate of forms, that each ſhould be compoſed from intellectual conceptions [1]; and thus all of them be

another, till we arrive at true beings, or, in other words, intelligibles. For though we ſhall find that intellect and intelligibles are connately united to each other, yet intellect is a plenitude of forms according to the intelligible which it contains. And as we unite intellect and the intelligible to each other, ſo we ſhould conſider intelligibles to be the ſame with beings. For intellect being in itſelf, and intellectually perceiving itſelf, is at the ſame time full of intelligibles. And, as among ſenſibles, whatever is apparently one, is in reality a multitude; ſo in intelligibles, intellectual conception and being, which are two things, are profoundly abſorbed in unity.

[1] If all things participate of forms, but all things do not participate of intellectual conceptions, forms or ideas will not primarily be intellectual conceptions. For one of theſe three things muſt happen, either that things which participate of intellectual conceptions do not participate of intellection, or that forms are not intellectual conceptions, or that things which are deſtitute of intelligence do not participate of forms, of which three the firſt and laſt are perfectly abſurd. For every thing which participates of intellectual conception, underſtands intellectually, ſince the word noëma manifeſts intelligence; and things deprived of intelligence participate of forms; for inanimate natures participate of the equal, the leſſer, and the greater, which are forms. Ideas, therefore, are not intellectual conceptions, nor are they eſſentiallized in intellections, but in intelligibles. We muſt aſcend, therefore, from things partible to the impartible reaſons of nature, which do not intellectually perceive the things prior to themſelves: for nature is not only deprived of intelligence, but is alſo irrational and deſtitute of phantaſy. In the next place, we muſt riſe from theſe to the intelligibles which are proximately placed above phyſical forms, and are the energies of the intellective ſoul, according to the poſition of Socrates concerning them: for he ſays, that they are ingenerated in the ſoul, and are noëmata, as being intellections of the ſoul. But from theſe we muſt aſcend to true intelligibles: for theſe are able to be the cauſes of all things which have a formal ſubſiſtence, but this cannot be aſſerted of ſuch things as are intellectual conceptions only.

Here, however, as Proclus well obſerves, it is worth while to enquire, why, ſince all things ſubſiſt intellectually in intellect, all ſenſible natures in conſequence of participating forms do not intellectually energize? and why, ſince all things there poſſeſs life, all things that are aſſimilated to them do not live? The anſwer is, that the progreſſion of beings gradually ſubſiding from the firſt to the laſt of things, obſcures the participations of wholes and all-perfect eſſences. Demiurgic energy alſo pervading through all things, gives ſubſiſtence to all things, according to different meaſures of eſſence; and beſides this, all things do not ſimilarly participate of the ſame form. For ſome things participate of it in a greater, and others in a leſſer degree; and ſome things are aſſimilated to form according to one power, others according to two, and others according to many powers. Whence alſo there are certain ſeries which beginning ſupernally extend as far as to things beneath. Thus, for inſtance, ſays Proclus, the form of the moon is beheld firſt of all in the Gods according to that which is characterized by *the one* and *the good* in form: for all things

are

be endued with intellection? Or will you aſſert that though they are intellectual conceptions, yet they underſtand nothing? But that Socrates ſaid, This is by no means rational. But, O Parmenides, the affair appears to me to take place, in the moſt eminent degree, as follows: *that theſe forms are eſtabliſhed paradigms*[1], *as it were, in nature; but that other things are aſſimilated*

are deified from *the good*, as Socrates ſays in the ſixth book of the Republic, through the light of truth. This form is alſo beheld in angels, according to that which is intellectual in form; and in dæmons, according to the dianoëtic energy. It is likewiſe beheld in animals which are no longer able to imitate it intellectually, but vitally. Hence, the Egyptian Apis, and the lunar fiſh, and many other animals, differently imitate the celeſtial form of the moon. And this form is beheld in the laſt place in ſtones; ſo that there is a certain ſtone ſuſpended from this form, and which ſuſtains augmentations and diminutions, together with the moon in the heavens, though it is deprived of life. It muſt not, therefore, be ſuppoſed that all things receive all the powers of forms, but, together with proper ſubjection, ſome things receive a greater, and others a leſſer, number of theſe; while that alone which is the idiom of the participated form, and according to which it differs from other forms, is neceſſarily ſeen in all its participants. To which we may add, that the participation being different, the ſubordinate idioms of forms firſt deſert the participants, and afterwards thoſe that are more total than theſe; but thoſe idioms which are primary, and are particularly allied to *the one*, are ſimilarly apparent in all the productions of form. For every form is *one* and a *multitude*, the multitude not giving ſubſiſtence to *the one* according to compoſition, but *the one* producing the many idioms of the form. Form, therefore, uniformly *is*, and *lives*, and *intellectually energizes*; but with reſpect to its progeny, ſome participate of all theſe, others of more or leſs of them, and others of one idiom alone. Since alſo in forms themſelves, their intellectual nature is derived from the firſt intellect, their life from imparticipable, or the firſt life, their being from the firſt being, and *the one* which they contain from the unity which is beyond beings.

[1] Socrates, ſays Proclus, being led by the obſtetrication of Parmenides to the intelligible eſſence of forms, thinks that here eſpecially, the order and the mode of the participation of forms ſhould be inveſtigated; aſſerting, indeed, that forms themſelves are eſtabliſhed in nature, but that other things are generated as their reſemblances. Having, therefore, thus explored the order of forms, he at the ſame time introduces the mode of participation, and diſſolves the former doubts, that he may not be compelled to ſay that ſenſibles participate either of the whole or a part of form, or that forms are coordinate with ſenſibles. For a paradigm is not preſent with its image, nor coordinate with it. The participation, therefore, is through ſimilitude; which Socrates introduces, calling forms paradigms, but their participants reſemblances. And ſo confident is he in theſe aſſertions, that he who before ſwore that it was not eaſy to define what the participation of forms is, now ſays that the mode of participation is eminently apparent to him. But he is thus affected through his acuteneſs, and the power of Parmenides perfecting his ſpontaneous conceptions concerning divine natures; by which it is alſo evident that the manner of what is ſaid is maieutic, or obſtetric, and not contending for victory (καταγωνιστικος). For it would not otherwiſe

lated to theſe, and are their reſemblances: and that the participation of forms by other things, is nothing more than an aſſimilation to theſe forms. If any thing,

wiſe advance Socrates, and perpetually perfect his conceptions. For the end of obſtetrication is the evocation of inward knowledge, but of contention, victory. If, therefore, Socrates by every doubt advances, and is perfected, and diſtinctly evolves his conceptions concerning primary forms, we muſt ſay that he is rather obſtetricated than vanquiſhed by Parmenides.

This being premiſed, let us ſee how the hypotheſis of Socrates approximates to the truth, but does not yet poſſeſs the perfect. For he is right in apprehending that forms are intellectual and truly paradigms, and in defining their idiom, by aſſerting that they are *eſtabliſhed*; and further ſtill, in admitting that other things are aſſimilated to them. For the ſtable and a perpetual ſameneſs of ſubſiſtence are the idioms of eternally energizing forms. For, in the Politicus, it is ſaid that a ſubſiſtence according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner, belongs only to the moſt divine of all things; and the Eleatean gueſt, in the Sophiſta, defines *the being eſtabliſhed* (το ἑστανα) to be nothing elſe than a ſubſiſtence according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner. If, therefore, Socrates alſo ſays, that forms are *eſtabliſhed*, but things eſtabliſhed ſubſiſt according to the ſame and after the ſame manner, and things which thus ſubſiſt are the moſt divine of all things, it is evident that forms will be moſt divine. Hence, they will no longer be the conceptions of ſouls, but will be exempt from every thing of this kind. Theſe things, therefore, are rightly aſſerted; and Socrates alſo very properly admits union in forms prior to multitude. For the words *in nature* (ἐν τῃ φυσει) manifeſt the one enad or unity of forms. It is uſual indeed with Plato to give the appellation of *nature* to intelligibles. For Socrates, in the Philebus, ſays, that a royal intellect, and a royal ſoul, ſubſiſt in the *nature* of Jupiter; and Timæus ſays, "the *nature* of animal itſelf being eternal," ſignifying by *nature* the monad of intelligible ideas. Such, therefore, is that which is now called nature, viz. the one unity and comprehenſion of intelligible forms. And thus far, as we have ſaid, Socrates is right.

However, as he only attributes a paradigmatic idiom to ideas, and does not aſſert that they alſo perfect, guard, and unite, in this reſpect he will appear to have yet imperfectly apprehended the theory concerning them. For every form is not only the paradigm of ſenſibles, but alſo gives ſubſiſtence to them; ſince if it were alone paradigmatic, another nature would be requiſite, in order to produce and aſſimilate ſenſibles to forms, which would thus remain ſluggiſh and unmoved, without any efficacious power, and reſembling impreſſions in wax. Forms, therefore, produce and generate their images: for it would be abſurd that the reaſons in nature ſhould poſſeſs a certain effective power, but that intelligible forms ſhould be deprived of it. Hence, every divine form is not only paradigmatic, but alſo *paternal*, and is by its very eſſence a cauſe generative of the many. It is alſo *perfective*: for it leads ſenſibles from the imperfect to the perfect, fills up their indigence, and brings matter, which is all things in capacity, to become that in energy which it was in capacity, prior to its becoming ſpecific. Forms, therefore, contain in themſelves this perfective power. But do they not alſo poſſeſs a *guardian* power? For whence is the order of the univerſe indiſſoluble, except from forms? Whence thoſe ſtable reaſons, and which preſerve the one ſympathy of wholes infrangible, through which the world abides for ever perfect,

thing, therefore, becomes ſimilar [1] to a form, can it be poſſible that the form ſhould not be ſimilar to the aſſimilated, ſo far as the aſſimilated nature is rendered

perfect, without the deſertion of any form, except from ſtable cauſes? Again, the diviſible and diſſipated nature of bodies is no otherwiſe compreſſed and *connected* than by impartible power. For body is of itſelf diviſible, and requires the connective power of forms. But, if *union* precedes this connection, for every thing connective muſt previouſly be one and undivided, form will not only be *generative*, and poſſeſs a *guarding* and *perfective* power, but it will alſo be *connective* and *unific* of all ſecondary natures. Socrates, therefore, ſhould not only have ſaid that form is a *paradigm*, but ſhould alſo have added, that it *connects*, *guards*, and *perfects* the things aſſimilated; which Timæus alſo teaching us, ſays, that the world was generated *perfect* and *indiſſoluble* through the *aſſimilation* to all-perfect animal itſelf.

[1] Socrates, as we have before obſerved, was not accurate in aſſerting that ideas are paradigms alone, ſince they alſo generate, perfect, and guard ſenſibles; and that ſenſibles are reſemblances alone of ideas, ſince they are generated and guarded by them, and thence derive all their perfection and duration. This being the caſe, Parmenides, in a truly divine manner, grants that forms are eſtabliſhed as paradigms in nature; but Socrates having introduced ſimilitude, and a participation according to ſimilitude, in order to ſolve the firſt doubts concerning the participation of forms, Parmenides being deſirous to indicate the primary and total cauſe of paradigm and its exemption from all habitude to its reſemblances, ſhows, that if ſenſible is ſimilar to intelligible form, it is not requiſite that the habitude ſhould reciprocate, and that the intelligible ſhould be ſimilar to the ſenſible form, leſt, prior to two things ſimilar to each other, we ſhould again inveſtigate ſome other form, the cauſe of ſimilitude to both: for things ſimilar to each other entirely participate a certain ſomething which is the ſame, and through this ſomething ſame which is in them they are ſaid to be ſimilar. Hence, if it be granted that the participant and that which is participated are ſimilar, or, in other words, the paradigm and its reſemblance, there will be prior to theſe ſomething elſe which aſſimilates them, and this will be the caſe ad infinitum. To avoid this inconvenience, Socrates ſhould have ſaid that the ſimilar is twofold, the one being ſimilar conjoined with the ſimilar, the other being as a ſubject ſimilar to its archetype; and the one being beheld in the ſameneſs of a certain one ratio, but the other not only poſſeſſing ſameneſs, but at the ſame time difference, when it is ſimilar in ſuch a manner as to poſſeſs the ſame form from, but not together with, it. And thus much may be ſaid logically and doubtingly.

But if we direct our attention to the many orders of forms, we ſhall find the profundity which they contain. For there are phyſical forms prior to ſenſibles, the forms in ſoul prior to theſe, and intellectual forms preceding thoſe in ſoul; but there are no longer others prior to theſe. Intellectual forms, therefore, are paradigms alone, and are by no means ſimilar to the things poſterior to theſe; but the forms in ſoul are both paradigms and images. And ſo far as they are images, both theſe forms themſelves, and the things poſterior to them, are ſimilar to each other, as deriving their ſubſiſtence from the ſame intellectual forms. This is alſo the caſe with phyſical forms, which are ſimilar to ſenſibles, ſo far as both are images of the forms which are above them. But thoſe forms which are alone paradigms, are no longer ſimilar to their images: for things

rendered ſimilar to the form? Or can any reaſon be aſſigned why ſimilar ſhould not be ſimilar to ſimilar? There cannot. Is there not, therefore, a mighty neceſſity that the ſimilar to ſimilar ſhould participate of one and the ſame form? It is neceſſary. But will not that through the participation of which ſimilars become ſimilars be *form itſelf?* Entirely ſo. Nothing, therefore, can be ſimilar to *a form*, nor *a form* to any other. For in this caſe another *form* will always appear beſides ſome particular *form:* and if this again ſhould become ſimilar to another, another would be required; and a new *form* would never ceaſe to take place, as long as any *form* becomes ſimilar to its participant. You ſpeak moſt truly. Hence, then, other things do not participate of *forms* through ſimilitude [1]; but it is neceſſary to ſeek after ſomething elſe through which they participate. So it ſeems.

That

things are ſimilar through a participation of a certain ſameneſs; but paradigmatic forms participate of nothing, ſince they rank as the firſt of things.

We may alſo ſay, ſpeaking theologically, that there is one order of forms in the mundane intellect, another in the demiurgic intellect, and another ſubſiſting between theſe, viz. in participated but ſupermundane intellect, or, in other words, in an intellect conſubſiſtent indeed with ſoul, but unconnected with body, and binding the forms in the mundane intellect with that intellect which is not conſubſiſtent with ſoul, and is therefore called imparticipable. To thoſe, therefore, who begin downwards, we may ſay that the intellectual forms in the world and in ſoul are ſimilar to each other, ſo far as all theſe are ſecondary to the aſſimilative or ſupermundane intellects, and are as it were ſiſters to each other. But to thoſe who recur to imparticipable intellect, this can no longer be ſaid. For the aſſimilative order has a middle ſubſiſtence; and hence it aſſimilates ſenſibles which are ſubordinate to it to intellectual forms, but not, vice verſa, intellectuals to ſenſibles. For it is not lawful that what is ſecondary ſhould impart any thing to that which is primary, nor that what is primary ſhould receive any thing from what is ſecondary. That Parmenides, therefore, might indicate to Socrates theſe paradigms, which are indeed intellectual, but eſtabliſhed in imparticipable intellect prior to aſſimilative intellects, he ſhows him that it is not proper that the habitude of forms to ſenſibles ſhould reciprocate: for this pertains to things ſecondary to an aſſimilative cauſe.

[1] Parmenides juſtly infers that ſenſibles do not participate of all forms through the ſimilar; for this is effected through another more principal cauſe, viz. the uniting cauſe of wholes. The efficacious power of forms alſo, in conjunction with the aptitude of ſenſibles, muſt be conſidered as together giving completion to the fabrication of the univerſe. The aſſimilative genus of forms, therefore, which are denominated by theologiſts ſupermundane, are able to connect and conjoin mundane cauſes with their participants. This genus alſo connects according to a medium firſt intellectual forms and their participants, imparting to ſecondary natures a habitude to theſe forms; but the uniting cauſe of wholes, or in other words *the one*, connects ſupernally, and with

That Parmenides then ſaid, Do you ſee, O Socrates, how great a doubt ariſes, if any one defines forms as having an eſſential ſubſiſtence by themſelves? I do very much ſo. Know, then, that you do not apprehend what dubious [1] conſequences are produced, by placing every individual form of beings ſeparate from its participants. But that Socrates ſaid, How do you mean? That Parmenides anſwered, There are many other doubts [2], indeed, but this is the

exempt tranſcendency, intelligible forms with ſenſibles. It may alſo be truly aſſerted that the third cauſe of ſimilitude is the aptitude of the recipient. For, in conſequence of this being in capacity what form is in energy, that which is generated becomes ſimilar to form. So that the three cauſes of aſſimilation are the ſubject matter, that which collects together the things perfecting and perfected, and that which ſubſiſts between theſe, and binds the extremes in union. What is aſſerted, therefore, is in a certain reſpect true. For if we inveſtigate the one moſt principal cauſe of participation, we muſt not ſay that it is ſimilitude, but a cauſe ſuperior to both intellectual and intelligible forms.

[1] Parmenides here indicates the eſſence of divine forms, which is uncircumſcribed, and incapable of being narrated by our conceptions. For the diſcourſe is, indeed, dubious to thoſe who undertake to define accurately their eſſence, order, and power, to behold where they firſt ſubſiſt, and how they proceed; what the divine idioms are which they receive; how they are participated by the laſt of things, and what the ſeries are to which they give ſubſiſtence; with ſuch other particulars of a more theological nature as the ſpeculation of them may afford. And theſe things, indeed, Parmenides indicates, but Socrates has not yet touched upon the doubts concerning them. For Parmenides was willing, not only beginning downwards to define the order of divine forms, but alſo beginning from on high to behold their idiom. For he has already ſpoken concerning phyſical forms, and ſuch as are ſimply intellectual, and concerning thoſe that are properly intellectual. Something alſo will be ſaid concerning thoſe that are called intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual; and, in the laſt place, concerning thoſe that are alone intelligible. But how he ſpeaks concerning theſe, ſays Proclus, and that his diſcourſe is under the pretext of doubting, is already evident to the more ſagacious, and follows from what has been ſaid.

[2] That the diſcourſe concerning ideas, ſays Proclus, is full of very numerous and moſt difficult doubts, is evident from the infinite aſſertions of thoſe poſterior to Plato, ſome of which regard the ſubverſion, and others the admiſſion, of ideas. And thoſe that admit their ſubſiſtence think differently reſpecting their eſſence; concerning the particulars of which there are ideas, the mode of participation, and other all-various problems with which the ſpeculation of them is attended. Parmenides, however, does not attend to the multitude of doubts, nor does he deſcend to their infinite length, but, in two of the greateſt, comprehends all the ſubſequent inveſtigation concerning them; through which doubts it appears that forms are neither apprehended and known by us, nor have any knowledge of, nor providentially energize about, ſenſibles; though, through this we eſpecially embrace a formal eſſence, that, as being ourſelves intellectual, we may energize about it, and may contemplate in it the providential cauſes of wholes. But, if ideas are

not

the greateſt: if any one ſhould aſſert that it is not proper *forms* ſhould be known, if they are ſuch as we have ſaid they ought to be, it is impoſſible to demonſtrate

not known by us, it is alſo vain to ſay that they have any ſubſiſtence; for we do not even know that they are, if we are ignorant of their nature, and are, in ſhort, incapable of apprehending them, and do not poſſeſs from our own eſſence that which is preparatory to the ſpeculation of them. Such, then, are the doubts, both of which happen through the exempt eſſence of forms, which exemption we conſider ſo tranſcendent as to have no communication with ſecondary natures. For that which thus ſubſiſts is foreign from us, and is neither known by, nor is gnoſtic of, us. But, if the exempt nature of forms, together with tranſcendency, is alſo preſent to all things, our knowledge of them will be preſerved, and they will poſſeſs a formal knowledge of ſecondary natures. For if they are every where preſent to all things, we may then be able to meet with them, by only making ourſelves adapted to the reception of them. And if they adorn all things, they comprehend intellectually the cauſe of the things adorned. It is neceſſary, therefore, that thoſe who wiſh to guard theſe dogmas, ſhould conſider forms as unſhaken and exempt, and pervading through all things. And here alſo we may ſee how this accords with the unreſtrained nature of forms: for neither does that which is demiurgic in them poſſeſs any habitude to things ſecondary, nor is their unreſtrained and exempt nature ſuch as to be incommunicable with, and foreign from, ſenſibles.

But here the divine conception of Plato is truly admirable, which previouſly ſubverts through theſe doubts all the confuſed and atheiſtical ſuſpicion concerning divine forms; imitating in this reſpect intellect itſelf, which, prior to the ſhadowy ſubſiſtence of evils, gave ſubſiſtence to ſubvertive powers. That it is not proper, therefore, to make that which is generative in forms poſſeſſing any habitude to that which is generated, or that which is paradigmatic to conſiſt in verging to that which is governed, Parmenides has ſufficiently ſhown in what has been already delivered. For all habitude requires another collective and connecting cauſe, ſo that, prior to forms, there will be another form conjoining both through ſimilitude; ſince habitude is of the ſimilar, with relation to the ſimilar. But that the exempt nature of forms is not ſluggiſh and without providential energy, and is not foreign from things ſecondary, Parmenides indicates through theſe doubts. For, perhaps, ſome one, alone looking to the unreſtrained nature of forms, may ſay that they neither know their participants, nor are known by us. Hence, he leads Socrates to an animadverſion of the mode of the exempt power of divine forms. And how, indeed, he collects that ſenſibles are not known by them, will be afterwards manifeſt to us; but he wiſhes, firſt of all, to evince that we are not able to know them, aſſuming, for this purpoſe, in a manner perfectly divine, that the ſcience which we poſſeſs pertains to human objects of ſcientific knowledge, but that divine ſcience belongs to ſuch as are divine. And this, indeed, appears to deprive us of the knowledge of divine natures. It is, however, true in a certain reſpect, and not according to one mode, but after one manner when philoſophically, and after another when theologically, conſidered. For let the ſcience which is with us pertain to our objects of ſcientific knowledge; but what prevents ſuch objects from being images of divine natures? And why may we not know divine natures through them, in the ſame manner as the Pythagoreans, perceiving the images of

demonſtrate that he who aſſerts this is deceived, unleſs he who doubts is ſkilled in a multitude of particulars, and is naturally of a good diſpoſition. But

the divine orders in numbers and figures, and being converſant with theſe, endeavoured to obtain from them as from certain types, a knowledge of things divine. Why, alſo, is it wonderful that the ſcience which is with us ſhould be ſo called with relation to that which is with us the object of ſcientific knowledge, and ſhould be conjoined with this? For it is coordinate to that with reſpect to which it is denominated. It may alſo, not as coordinate knowledge, but as that which is of an inferior order, be admitted to intelligibles themſelves. For coordinate knowledges of all things are of one kind, and thoſe which are arranged according to a different order of things known, of another, and which either apprehend the nature of things ſubordinate in a more excellent manner, as opinion the nature of ſenſibles, or which apprehend things more excellent ſecondarily and ſubordinately, as opinion that which is the object of ſcience. He, therefore, who poſſeſſes ſcientific knowledge, and he who opines rightly, know the ſame thing, but the one in a more excellent, and the other in a ſubordinate manner. Hence there is no abſurdity that ſcience ſhould be denominated not with relation to the object of ſcience among intelligibles, but with relation to that with which it is conjoined, and that it ſhould apprehend the former not as coordinate, but in a ſecondary degree. Agreeably to this, Plato in his ſeventh Epiſtle ſays that the intelligible form is not known through ſcience but through intelligence, or the direct and immediate viſion of intellect. For ſcientific knowledge is of a more compoſite nature with reſpect to intellectual intuition; but intellect is properly the ſpectator of ideas: for theſe are naturally intellectual, and we every where know the ſimilar by the ſimilar; intelligibles indeed by intellect, the objects of opinion by opinion, and things ſcientific by ſcience. It is by no means wonderful, therefore, that there ſhould be no ſcience of forms, and yet that another knowledge of them ſhould remain, ſuch as that which we denominate intelligence.

But if you are willing, ſays Proclus, to ſpeak after another more theological mode, you may ſay that aſcending as far as to intellectual forms, Parmenides ſhows that the forms which are beyond theſe, and which poſſeſs an exempt tranſcendency, ſuch as are the intelligible, and the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual forms, are better than our knowledge. Hence by aſſerting that ſouls when perfectly purified, and conjoined with the attendants on the twelve ſuperceleſtial Gods, then merge themſelves in the contemplation of theſe forms, you will perhaps not wander from the divinely-inſpired conception of Plato. For as there are three orders of forms prior to the aſſimilative order as is evident from the ſecond hypotheſis of the Parmenides, viz. the intellectual, the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual, and the intelligible; intellectual forms indeed are proximate to ſecondary natures, and through the ſeparation which they contain are more known to us, but intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual forms are not to be apprehended by that partial knowledge by which we perceive things coordinate with our nature; and hence theſe forms are characterized by *the unknown*, through their exempt tranſcendency.

Let us now conſider, ſays Proclus, the words of Plato, becauſe through theſe he indicates who is a fit hearer of theſe things, and who is adapted to be a teacher of them. For it is requiſite that

But he ſhould be willing to purſue *him* cloſely who endeavours to ſupport his opinion by a multitude of far-fetched arguments: though, after all, he who

that the hearer ſhould poſſeſs a *naturally good diſpoſition*, and this in a remarkable degree, that he may be by nature a philoſopher, may be aſtoniſhed about an incorporeal eſſence, and prior to things viſible may always purſue ſomething elſe and reaſon concerning it, and may not be ſatisfied with things preſent; and in ſhort he muſt be ſuch a one as Socrates in the Republic deſcribes him to be, who *naturally* loves the ſpeculation of wholes. In the next place, he muſt be ſkilled in a multitude of particulars, not indeed in a multitude of human affairs, for theſe are trifling, and contribute nothing to a divine life, but in logical, phyſical, and mathematical theorems. For ſuch things as our dianoëtic power is unable to ſurvey in the Gods, we may behold in theſe as in images; and beholding we are induced to believe the aſſertions of theologiſts concerning divine natures. Thus if he wonders how multitude is contained in *the one*, and all things in the impartible, he will perceive that the even and the odd, the circle and the ſphere and other forms of numbers are contained in the monad. If he wonders how a divine nature makes by its very eſſence, he will perceive in natural objects that fire eſſentially imparts heat, and ſnow coldneſs. And if he wonders how cauſes are every where preſent with their effects, he will behold the images of this in logic. For genera are every where predicated of the things of which ſpecies are predicated, and the latter indeed with the former, but the former without the latter. And thus in every thing, he who is unable to look directly to a divine nature, may ſurvey it through theſe as images. It is requiſite, therefore, in the firſt place, that he ſhould poſſeſs a naturally good diſpoſition, which is allied to true beings, and is capable of becoming winged, and which as it were from other perſuaſions vindicates to itſelf the conceptions concerning permanent being. For as in every ſtudy we require a certain preparation, in like manner in order to obtain that knowledge which genuinely leads to being, we require a preceding purified aptitude. In the next place, ſkill, as we have ſaid, in many and all-various theorems is requiſite, through which he will be led back to the apprehenſion of theſe things; and, in the third place, *alacrity*, and an extenſion of the powers of the ſoul about the contemplation of true beings; ſo that from his leader alone indicating, he may be able to follow his indications.

Three things, therefore, are requiſite to the contemplation of an incorporeal nature, a naturally good diſpoſition, ſkill, and alacrity. And through a naturally good diſpoſition indeed, faith in a divine nature will be ſpontaneouſly produced; but through ſkill the truth of paradoxical theorems will be firmly poſſeſſed; and through alacrity the amatory tendency of the ſoul to the contemplation of true being will be excited.

But the leader, ſays Proclus, of theſe ſpeculations, will not be willing through a long diſcourſe to unfold divine truth, but to indicate it with brevity, framing his language ſimilar to his intellections; nor will he accompliſh this from things known and at hand, but ſupernally, from principles moſt profoundly one. Nor again, will he ſo diſcourſe as that he may appear to ſpeak clearly, but he will be ſatisfied with indications. For it is requiſite that myſtical concerns ſhould be myſtically delivered, and that occult conceptions reſpecting divine natures, ſhould not be rendered popular. Such then is the hearer and ſuch the leader of theſe diſcourſes. And in

Parmenides

who contends that *forms* cannot be known will remain unperſuaded. That Socrates ſaid, In what reſpect [1], O Parmenides? Becauſe, O Socrates, I think

Parmenides you have a perfect leader of this kind; and hence if we attend to the mode of his diſcourſe we ſhall find that he teaches many things through a few words, that he derives what he ſays ſupernally, and that he alone indicates concerning divine natures. But in Socrates you have a hearer of a naturally good diſpoſition indeed, and amatory, but not yet perfectly ſkilled; whence alſo Parmenides exhorts him to exerciſe himſelf in dialectic, that he may obtain ſkill in the theorems, receiving indeed his naturally good diſpoſition and his impulſe, but ſupplying what is deficient. He alſo informs us that the end of this triple power is the being freed from deception in reaſonings concerning divine natures: for he who is deficient in any one of theſe three, muſt be compelled to aſſent to many things that are falſe. I only add that inſtead of *και μη αφυης*, as in Thompſon's edition of this dialogue, it appears from the commentary of Proclus that we ſhould here read *και μεν ευφυης*, as in our tranſlation.

[1] The diſcourſe here proceeds to other doubts, one of which takes away from our ſoul the knowledge of true beings, but the other deprives divine natures of the knowledge of ſenſibles; through both which our progreſſions from and converſion to divine natures, are deſtroyed. Things ſecond and firſt alſo appear to be divulſed from each other, ſecond being deprived of firſt, and firſt being unprolific of ſecond natures. The truth however is, that every thing is in all things in an appropriate manner; the middle and laſt genera of wholes ſubſiſting cauſally in things firſt, whence alſo they are truly known by them, as they alſo ſubſiſt in them; but things firſt ſubſiſting according to participation in ſuch as are middle; and both theſe in ſuch things as are laſt. Hence ſouls alſo know all things in a manner accommodated to each; through images indeed things prior to them; but according to cauſe things poſterior to them; and in a connate and coordinate manner, the reaſons or productive principles which they themſelves contain. Theſe doubts, therefore, are extended after the two prior to theſe concerning the order of ideas, becauſe Socrates and every one who admits that there are ideas muſt be led to this hypotheſis, through a cauſal and ſcientific knowledge of every thing in the world. Hence thoſe who deny that there are ideas, deny alſo the providential animadverſion of intelligibles. Parmenides, therefore, propoſes at preſent to ſhow that by admitting ideas to be alone exempt from things it muſt alſo be neceſſarily admitted that they are unknown, as there will no longer be any communion between us and them, nor any knowledge, whether they ſubſiſt or not, whether they are participated, and how, and what order they are allotted, if they are alone exempt, and are not together with unreſtrained energy, the cauſes of ſecondary natures. But to the ſpeculation of this the diſcourſe pre-aſſumes certain axioms and common conceptions; and, in the firſt place, that ideas are not entirely exempt, and do not ſubſiſt by themſelves without any communion with things ſubordinate. For how can this be poſſible, ſince both we and all other things are ſuſpended from them? For the place in which they ſubſiſt is intellect, not that it is the place as if they required a ſeat, in the ſame manner as accidents require eſſence for their ſupport, or as material forms require matter. Intellect indeed, does not comprehend them, as if they were its parts heaped together by compoſition, but in the ſame manner as the centre comprehends in itſelf the many terminations

I think that both you and any other, who eſtabliſhes the eſſence of each *form* as ſubſiſting by itſelf, muſt allow, in the firſt place, that no one of theſe ſubſiſts

tions of the lines which proceed from it, and as ſcience, the many theorems of which it is the ſource; not being compoſed from the many, but ſubſiſting prior to the many, and all being contained in each. For thus intellect is many, containing multitude impartibly in the unity of its nature; becauſe it is not *the one* which ſubſiſts prior to all multitude, but is collectively one multitude, its multitude being profoundly united through the dominion of unity in its nature. In this manner, therefore, is intellect the place of ideas. Hence, if ſoul is not the ſame with intellect, thoſe ideas will not be in us of which intellect is the place. Hence, alſo, it is evident that the diſcourſe in this dialogue about ideas becomes perpetually more perfect, aſcending to certain more-united hypoſtaſes of theſe luminous beings. For the diſcourſe no longer ſuppoſes them to be corporeal or phyſical, or conceptions of the ſoul, but prior to all theſe. For they are not in us, ſays Parmenides; nor are they coordinate with our conceptions.

You may ſay, then, philoſophically with Proclus, that they are exempt from, and are not in us; and that they are preſent every where, and are participated by us, without being ingenerated in their participants. For they being in themſelves, are proximate to all things for participation that are capable of receiving them. Hence, we participate them through the things which we poſſeſs, and this is not only the caſe with us, but alſo with more excellent natures, who poſſeſs in themſelves eſſential images of ideas, and introducing theſe as veſtiges of paradigms to ideas, they know the latter through the former. For he who underſtands the eſſence of theſe, knows alſo that they are images of other things, but knowing this, it is alſo neceſſary that by intellections he ſhould come into contact with the paradigms. But you may ſay, theologically, that the forms which are exempt from thoſe that are intellectual, are perfectly eſtabliſhed above our order. Hence, of intellectual forms, we perceive both in ourſelves, and in ſenſibles, images; but the eſſence of intelligibles, through its profound union, is perfectly exempt both from us and all other things, being of itſelf unknown. For it fills Gods and intellects with itſelf; but we muſt be ſatisfied with participating intellectual forms in a manner adapted to the ſoul. Plato alſo manifeſts theſe things when he makes our life to be twofold, political and theoretical, and aſſigns us a twofold felicity; elevating the former life to the patronymic government of Jupiter, and the latter to the Saturnian order and a pure intellect. For from hence it is evident that he re-elevates the whole of our life, as far as to the intellectual kings: for Saturn ſubſiſts at the ſummit, and Jupiter at the extremity, of the intellectual order. But ſuch things as are beyond theſe, he ſays in the Phædrus, are the ſpectacles of ſouls divinely inſpired and initiated in them as in the moſt bleſſed of all myſteries. So that thus the propoſed axiom will be true, when conſidered as pertaining to a certain formal order. And thus much for the things.

With reſpect to the diction, ſays Proclus, the words πη δη ὦ Παρμενιδη; "*In what reſpect, O Parmenides?*" are the interrogation of Socrates, vehemently wondering if intellectual form is unknown, and not yet perceiving the tranſition, and that Parmenides proceeds through the whole extent of forms till he ends in the firſt ideas. But the words πως γαρ αν αυτη καθ' αυτην ετι ειη; "*For how could it any longer ſubſiſt itſelf by itſelf?*" are aſſerted according to common conceptions.

ſubſiſts in us. For (that Socrates ſaid) how if it did, could it any longer ſubſiſt itſelf by itſelf? That Parmenides replied, You ſpeak well. But will you not admit that ſuch ideas as are, with relation [1] to each other, ſuch as they

For every thing exempt is of itſelf, and is itſelf by itſelf, neither ſubſiſting in any other, nor in us. Hence, through theſe three terms, *itſelf*, *by itſelf*, and *eſſence*, Parmenides unfolds the whole truth concerning theſe forms. For the firſt of theſe indicates their *ſimplicity*, the ſecond, their *ſeparate tranſcendency*, and the third their *perfection eſtabliſhed in eſſence alone*. In the next place, the words καλως λεγεις, "*You ſpeak well*," are not delivered ironically, and as if Parmenides was from them beginning a confutation, but as receiving the ſpontaneous intuition of Socrates, and his conception about divine natures. For the aſſumed axiom is true, Timæus alſo aſſerting that true being neither receives any thing into itſelf, as matter does form, nor proceeds into any other place, as form does into matter. It remains, therefore, ſeparately in itſelf, and being participated, does not become any thing belonging to its participants, but, ſubſiſting prior to them, imparts to theſe as much as they are able to receive; neither being in us, for we participate, not receiving idea itſelf, but ſomething elſe proceeding from it; nor being generated in us, for it is entirely void of generation.

[1] This is the ſecond axiom, ſays Proclus, contributing to the ſpeculation of the propoſed object of inquiry. For the former axiom was, that forms are by no means in us, but in themſelves; but this ſecond axiom is, that ſenſibles when denominated as relatives, are ſo denominated with relation to each other; and that intelligibles are denominated with relation to each other, and not with relation to ſenſibles; and that ſenſibles are not denominated with relation to intelligibles. For, by thoſe who are accuſtomed to conſider theſe things more logically, it is well ſaid, that univerſals ought to be referred as relatives to univerſals, but particulars to particulars; ſcience ſimply conſidered to that which is ſimply the object of ſcience, but a particular ſcience to a particular object of ſcience; things indefinite to the indefinite; ſuch as are definite to the definite; ſuch as are in capacity to things in capacity; and ſuch as are in energy to things in energy. And of theſe things the logical and phyſical treatiſes of the antients are full. If, therefore, in things univerſal, and things particular, alternations cannot be admitted in comparing the one with the other, by a much greater reaſon it cannot take place in ideas and the images of ideas; but we muſt refer ſenſibles to ſenſibles, and intelligibles to intelligibles. Theſe things, then, are perfectly true, if we conſider each ſo far as it is that which it is, and not ſo far as it makes ſomething, or is generated ſomething. For in this caſe, ſenſibles have the relation of things generated to intelligibles, but intelligibles, that of producing cauſes to ſenſibles; and as images, ſenſibles are related to intelligibles, but ideas, as paradigms, are related to ſenſibles.

If, therefore, we aſſume dominion itſelf, it muſt be referred to ſervitude itſelf; but if we conſider it as a paradigm, it muſt be referred to that which is ſimilar to dominion itſelf; though we are accuſtomed, indeed, to call the Gods our lords, ſo that dominion there will be denominated with reference to ſervitude with us. This, however, is true, becauſe we participate of ſervitude itſelf, to which dominion itſelf has a precedaneous reference. And here you may ſee how dominion among ideas, or in the intelligible world, evinces that more excellent natures are our lords, becauſe

they are, poſſeſs alſo their eſſence with reſpect to themſelves, and not with reference to things ſubſiſting among us, whether they are reſemblances, or in whatever manner you may eſtabliſh ſuch things; each of which, while we participate, we diſtinguiſh by ſome peculiar appellation? But that the things ſubſiſting among us, and which are ſynonymous to theſe, ſubſiſt alſo with reference to each other, and not with relation to forms; and belong to themſelves, but not to thoſe which receive with them a common appellation. That then Socrates ſaid, How do you mean? As if, Parmenides anſwered,

becauſe we participate of ſervitude itſelf. But that which is called dominion with us, with reference to ſervitude among us, is no longer alſo denominated with reference to ſervitude among ideas, becauſe the being of ſervitude which is there does not ſubſiſt from that which is with us, but the very contrary takes place. For things which govern more excellent natures muſt alſo neceſſarily govern ſuch as are ſubordinate, but not vice verſa.

But from all theſe doubts we learn what idea truly ſo called is. From the firſt doubt we aſſume that it is incorporeal; for if it were a body, neither the whole, nor a part of it could be participated. But from the ſecond doubt we aſſume that it is not coordinate with its participants; for if it were coordinate, it would poſſeſs ſomething common, and on this account we muſt conceive another idea prior to it. From the third doubt we learn, that it is not a conception of eſſence, but eſſence and being; for otherwiſe all its participants would participate of knowledge. From the fourth, we collect that it is a paradigm alone, and not an image alſo, as the reaſon or productive principle in ſoul, leſt being ſimilar to that which proceeds from it, it ſhould introduce another idea prior to itſelf. From the fifth, we learn that intelligible idea is not directly known to us, but from the images of it. For ſcience in us is not coordinate with it.' And from the ſixth we infer that it underſtands things which are ſecondary to it, and that it knows them by being itſelf their cauſe. Idea, therefore, truly ſo called, is an incorporeal cauſe, exempt from its participants, is an immovable eſſence, is a paradigm only and truly, and is intelligible to ſouls from images, but has a cauſal knowledge of things which ſubſiſt according to it. So that from all the doubts we derive one definition of idea truly ſo called. Hence, thoſe that oppoſe the doctrine of ideas, ſhould oppoſe this definition, and not aſſuming corporeal imaginations of them, or conſidering them as co-arranged with ſenſibles, or as uneſſential, or as coordinate with our knowledge, ſophiſtically diſcourſe concerning them. Let it alſo be obſerved that Parmenides ſays that ideas are Gods, and that they have their ſubſiſtence in deity; in the ſame manner as the Chaldæan oracle alſo calls them the conceptions of the father: for whatever ſubſiſts in deity is a God. Laſtly, we muſt be careful to remember that when we ſpeak of relation as ſubſiſting among ideas, we muſt remove from them mere, uneſſential habitudes: for nothing of this kind is adapted to the Gods. But we muſt aſſume ſameneſs for habitude; and even prior to this ſameneſs, the hyparxis of each in itſelf: for each is of itſelf firſt, and is both united to itſelf and to other things. Communion, therefore, according to participations characterizes the power of things which are ſaid to be relatives in the intelligible world.

ſome one of us ſhould be the maſter [1] or ſervant of any one; he who is maſter is not the *maſter* of ſervant, nor is he who is ſervant, *ſervant* of maſter;

[1] How relatives are to be underſtood, ſays Proclus, among forms, is I think evident from what has been already ſaid. You will, however, find dominion and ſervitude peculiarly ſubſiſting there. For what elſe pertains to deſpots, than to have abſolute dominion over ſlaves, and to arrange every thing pertaining to them with a view to their own good? And what elſe is the province of ſlaves, than to be governed by others, and to miniſter to the will of their maſters? Muſt not theſe, therefore, by a much greater priority, be found among forms which are arranged one under the other, and among which ſome are more powerful, and uſe thoſe of a ſubordinate nature, but others are ſubſervient, and cooperate with the powers of the higher orders of forms? *Dominion*, therefore, is an *employing* power (χρηστικη δυναμις), and *ſervitude* a *miniſtrant* power. And both theſe ſubſiſt eſſentially among forms, and not caſually, as in their images: for dominion and ſervitude among ſenſibles, are the the laſt echoes, as it were, of dominion and ſervitude in the intelligible world.

But if you are willing not only to ſurvey theſe two in forms philoſophically, but alſo theologically, in the divine orders themſelves, direct your intellectual eye to thoſe intellectual and at the ſame time intelligible Gods, and to the forms which are ſuſpended from them; and you will ſee how both theſe are adapted to that order of forms. For having primarily a middle ſubſiſtence, they rule over all ſecondary natures, but are ſuſpended from the forms which are prior to them, and which are alone intelligible, energize with reference to their good, and are from them that which they are. For being firſt unfolded into light from them, they are governed by, and abide in, them; but they ſupernally rule over the eſſences and powers poſterior to themſelves. Hence, alſo, in the ſecondary orders, the more total govern the more partial, the more monadic, the more multiplied, and the exempt, the coordinated. Thus, for inſtance, in the demiurgic genera, Jupiter in Homer at one time iſſues his mandates to Minerva, at another time to Apollo, at another to Hermes, and at another to Iris; all of whom act in ſubſervience to the will of their father, imparting their providential energies according to the demiurgic boundary. The angelic tribe, alſo, and all the better genera, are ſaid to act as ſervants to the Gods, and to miniſter to their powers.

But, that dominion and ſervitude have an eſſential, and not a caſual ſubſiſtence only, we may learn from the Phædo: for it is there ſaid, that nature commanded the body to act the part of a ſlave, but the ſoul that of a maſter. If, therefore, theſe have a natural ſubſiſtence in the ſoul and body, it is nothing wonderful that we ſhould refer dominion itſelf, and ſervitude itſelf, to divine forms, theologiſts employing theſe names as indications of the ruling and miniſtrant powers in the Gods; juſt as the paternal and maternal there ſubſiſt in one reſpect according to a divine idiom, and in another according to a formal cauſe, mere habitude having no ſubſiſtence in theſe, but prolific power, and an eſſence adapted to the Gods.

It muſt, however, here be carefully obſerved, that when the Gods are ſaid to rule over us alſo with abſolute dominion, as when in the Phædo Socrates calls the Gods our maſters, and us the poſſeſſions of the Gods, the mode of dominion is tranſcendently exempt. For in the divine orders

the

maſter; but he ſuſtains both theſe relations, as being a man; while, in the mean time, *dominion itſelf* is that which it is from its relation to *ſervitude*; and *ſervitude*, in a ſimilar manner, is ſervitude with reference to *dominion*. But the ideas with which we are converſant poſſeſs no power over the ideas which ſubſiſt by themſelves, nor have *they* any authority over us: but I aſſert that they ſubſiſt from themſelves, and with relation to themſelves; and ours, in a ſimilar manner, with relation to themſelves. Do you underſtand what I ſay? That Socrates replied, Entirely ſo. That Parmenides then ſaid, Is not ſcience [1] *itſelf*, ſo far as it is ſuch, the ſcience of truth [2] itſelf? Perfectly

the more total rule over the more partial coordinately, and we approach to the Gods, as our maſters, through the ſervitude which is there as a medium. Hence, as all the ſeries of ſervitude itſelf is under that of dominion itſelf, the Gods alſo govern according to their abſolute power. And not only do the more total rule over the more partial Gods, but alſo over men, participating according to comprehenſion of ſervitude itſelf, which makes ſubordinate ſubſervient o more excellent natures.

[1] Socrates, in the Phædrus, celebrates divine ſcience, elevating ſouls of a total characteriſtic, or which ſubſiſt as wholes to the intellectual and intelligible orders, and aſſerting that they there ſurvey juſtice itſelf, temperance itſelf, and ſcience itſelf, in conſequence of being conjoined with the middle order of theſe Gods. He alſo aſſerts that truth is there, proceeding from intelligibles, and illuminating all the middle genera of Gods with intelligible light; and he conjoins that ſcience with that truth. If, therefore, in diſcourſing concerning the formal orders, he ſays that ſcience itſelf is of truth itſelf, it is not wonderful. For there ſcience and truth, and all the forms in the middle genera of Gods, participate of ſcience itſelf, and truth itſelf, which cauſe every thing there to be intellectual: for ſcience itſelf is the eternal and uniform intelligence of eternal natures. For the light of truth being intelligible, imparts to theſe forms intelligible power. But ſince there are many orders of theſe middle forms; for ſome of them are, as theologiſts ſay, the higheſt, uniform, and intelligible; others connect and bind together wholes; and others are perfective and convertive; hence, after the one and the firſt ſcience, Parmenides mentions many ſciences. For they proceed ſupernally through all the genera in conjunction with the light of truth. For truth is *the one* in every order, and the intelligible, with which alſo intelligence is conjoined. As, therefore, total intelligence is of the total intelligible, ſo the many intelligences are united to the many intelligibles. Theſe middle forms, therefore, which poſſeſs intelligences united with their intelligibles, are perfectly exempt from our knowledge; or, in other words, they cannot be directly and without a medium apprehended even by the higheſt of our powers. Intellectual forms, indeed, are exempt from us; but ſince we proximately ſubſiſt from them, they are

[2] Inſtead of τῆς ὁ ἐστιν ἀληθεια, αὐτῆς αν ἐκεινης ειη ἐπιστημη, as in Thompſon's edition of this dialogue, it appears from the MS. commentary of Proclus that we ſhould read τῆς ἀληθειας αὐτης αν ἐκεινης κ. τ. λ. Indeed the ſenſe of the text requires this emendation.

fectly ſo. But will each of the ſciences which is, be the ſcience of each of the things which are? Certainly it will. But will not our ſcience [1] be converſant

are in a certain reſpect in us, and we poſſeſs a knowledge of them, and through theſe, of the unknown tranſcendency of more divine forms.

We ought not however, ſays Proclus, to ſay, with ſome of the friends of Plato, that divine ſcience does not know itſelf, but from itſelf imparts ſelf-knowledge to other things. For every divine nature primarily directs its energy to itſelf, and begins its idiom from itſelf. Thus the cauſe of life fills itſelf with life, and the ſource of perfection produces itſelf perfect. Hence, that which imparts knowledge to other things, poſſeſſes itſelf prior to other things the knowledge of beings; ſince alſo the ſcience which is with us being an image of ſcience itſelf, knows other things, and prior to other things, itſelf. Or what is that which informs us what this very thing ſcience is? And muſt not relatives belong to the ſame power? Knowing, therefore, the objects of ſcience, it alſo knows itſelf, being the ſcience of thoſe objects. As the knowledge, however, of divine ſcience is ſimple and uniform, ſo the object of its knowledge is ſingle and comprehenſive of all other objects of ſcientific knowledge. Science itſelf, therefore, is the cauſe of ſcientific knowledge to other things, and by a much greater priority, to itſelf. For it is an eſſence eſſentialized in the knowledge of itſelf and of being. For ſcience there is not a habit, nor a quality, but a ſelf-perfect hyparxis ſubſiſting from, and eſtabliſhed in, itſelf; and by knowing itſelf, knowing that which is primarily the object of ſcientific knowledge, or that which is ſimply being. For it is conjoined with this, in the ſame manner as that which is intellect ſimply, to that which is ſimply intelligible, and as that which is ſimply ſenſe, to that which is ſimply ſenſible. But the many ſciences after ſcience itſelf are certain progreſſions of the one ſcience conjoined with the multitude of beings, which the being of that one ſcience comprehends. For being is many, and in like manner ſcience. And that which is moſt characterized by unity in ſcience itſelf, is united to the one of being, which alſo it knows; but the multitude in ſcience itſelf knows the multitude of beings which being itſelf comprehends.

[1] We alſo participate in a certain reſpect of truth, but not of that of which thoſe divine forms alluded to in the preceding text participate, but of that which was imparted to our order by the artificer of the univerſe; and the ſcience which is with us is the ſcience of this truth. There are, however, knowledges more partial than this, ſome evolving one, and others a different object of knowledge. Some of theſe, alſo, are converſant with generation, and the variety it contains; others inveſtigate the whole of nature; and others contemplate ſupernatural beings. Some, again, employ the ſenſes, and together with theſe, give completion to their work; others require the figured intellection of the phantaſy; others acquieſce in doxaſtic reaſons; others convert pure reaſon itſelf to itſelf; and others extend our reaſon to intellect. As there is then ſuch a difference in the ſciences, it is evident that ſome form a judgment of theſe, and others of different, objects of ſcience, and things which contribute to our reminiſcence of being. Thus, for inſtance, geometry ſpeculates the reaſon of figure in us, but arithmetic unfolds, by its demonſtrations, the one form of numbers; and each of the other ſciences which have a partial ſubſiſtence ſpeculates ſome other particular of the things with which we are converſant. We muſt not, therefore,

pervert

verſant with the truth which ſubſiſts among us? And will not each of our ſciences be the ſcience of that being which happens to reſide with us? It is neceſſary that it ſhould be ſo. But you have granted that we do not poſſeſs forms [1], and that they are not things with which we are converſant? Certainly not. Is each genus [2] of beings known to be what it is, through

pervert the name of ſcience by introducing arts into the midſt, and the ideas of theſe, to which the uſes of a mortal life gave a being; for they are nothing more than adumbrations of true ſcience. As, therefore, we ſay that there are ideas of things which contribute to the perfection of eſſence, but not of things proceeding from theſe, and alone ſubſiſting accidentally in others, in like manner the arts being the images of the ſciences have here their generation. But the ſciences themſelves are derived from the ſciences which preſubſiſt among ideas; and through the former we are enabled to aſcend to the latter, and become aſſimilated to intellect. However, as there it is neceſſary that there ſhould be one ſcience prior to the many, being the ſcience of that which is truth itſelf, juſt as the many ſciences have many truths for their objects (for the peculiar ſcientific object of every ſcience is a certain truth) in like manner with reſpect to the ſciences with us which are many, it is neceſſary to underſtand the one and whole form of ſcience, which neither receives its completion from the many, nor is coordinated with them, but preſubſiſts itſelf by itſelf. But the many ſciences diſtribute the one power of ſcience, a different ſcience being arranged under a different object of knowledge, and all of them being referred to and receiving their principles from the one and entire form of ſcience. The ſcience, therefore, which is with us is very different from that which is divine; but through the former we aſcend to the latter.

[1] Here Parmenides, ſays Proclus, beginning from the preceding axioms collects the thing propoſed as follows: Exempt forms ſubſiſt by themſelves; things which ſubſiſt by themſelves and of themſelves are not in us; things which are not in us, are not coordinate with our ſcience, and are unknown by it. Exempt forms, therefore, are unknown by our ſcience. All forms indeed, are only to be ſeen by a divine intellect, but this is eſpecially the caſe with ſuch as are beyond the intellectual Gods. For neither ſenſe nor doxaſtic knowledge, nor pure reaſon, nor our intellectual knowlege, is able to conjoin the ſoul with thoſe forms; but this can alone be effected through an illumination from the intellectual Gods, as ſome one ſpeaking divinely ſays. The nature, therefore, of thoſe forms is unknown to us, as being better than our intellection, and the diviſible intuitive perceptions of our ſoul. Hence Socrates in the Phædrus, as we have before obſerved, aſſimilates the ſurvey of them to the myſteries, and calls the ſpectacles of them entire, tranquil, ſimple and happy viſions. Of intellectual forms, therefore, the demiurgus and father of ſouls has implanted in us the knowledge; but of the forms above intellect, ſuch as thoſe belonging to the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual orders, the knowledge is exempt from our immediate viſion, is ſpontaneous, and alone known to ſouls energizing from a divine afflatus. So that what Parmenides now infers, and alſo that we do not participate of ſcience itſelf, follow from the conceptions concerning this order of divine forms.

[2] The genera of being are not to be conſidered in this place, either as things appearing in the many, and which are the ſubject of logical predications, or as univerſals collected from the many, and which are called by the moderns abſtract ideas; for theſe are poſterior to beings. But the genera

through the *form itſelf* of ſcience? Undoubtedly. But this *form* we do not poſſeſs? By no means. No form, therefore, is known by us, as we do not participate of ſcience itſelf? It does not appear it can. The *beautiful* [1] *itſelf*, therefore, and the *good itſelf*, and all ſuch things which we have conſidered as being ideas, are unknown to us? So it ſeems. But ſurvey this, which is yet ſtill more dire [2]. What? You will ſay, perhaps, that if there is

of being here ſignify ſuch things as poſſeſs a generative power, more total than, and preceding according to cauſe, the progeny in more partial forms. For as the genera of forms in ſenſibles, either appear in the many, or are predicated of the many; in like manner genera in intelligibles are more principal, perfect and comprehenſive than other forms; ſurpaſſing the things comprehended in ſimplicity and prolific power. Theſe genera we muſt ſay are known by the form of ſcience itſelf, as beginning ſupernally, and comprehending according to one uniform knowledge, things multiplied, unitedly, and things partial, totally. This alſo the ſcience which is with us wiſhes to effect: for it always contemplates the progreſſions of things from their cauſes.

[1] *The beautiful*, and alſo *the good* conſidered as a form and not as ſupereſſential proceed ſupernally from the ſummit of intelligibles to all the ſecond genera of Gods. The middle orders of forms, therefore, receive the progreſſions of theſe in a becoming manner; according to *the good* becoming full of their own perfection, and of the ſufficient, and the unindigent; but according to *the beautiful* becoming lovely to ſecondary natures, leading back things which have proceeded, and binding together divided cauſes. For a converſion to *the beautiful* collects together and unites all things, and fixes them as in one center. Theſe two forms, therefore, *the good* and *the beautiful* ſubſiſt occultly and uniformly in firſt natures, but are changed in the different orders of things in a manner coordinate to each. So that it is not wonderful if there is certain beauty known only to ſenſe, another known to opinion, another beheld through the dianoëtic power, another by intelligence in conjunction with reaſon, another by pure intelligence, and laſtly another which is unknown, ſubſiſting by itſelf perfectly exempt, and capable of being ſeen by its own light alone.

[2] The preceding arguments have led us as far as to the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual order of forms: for being falſe and of a doubting idiom, they alone unfold the truth in intellectual forms. But what is now ſaid, ſays Proclus, leads us to thoſe forms which preſubſiſt in the intelligible, proceeding indeed in the form of doubt as about intellectual forms, but in reality ſignifying the idiom of the firſt forms. The diſcourſe, therefore, ſhows that forms neither know nor govern ſenſibles; falſely, indeed, in demiurgic ideas, for ſenſibles ſubſiſt from theſe, and theſe rule over their all-various diſtribution into individual forms; ſo that they previouſly comprehend the providence and government of ſenſibles: but the diſcourſe is moſt true in the firſt ideas, which are in the higheſt degree characterized by unity, and are truly intelligible. For theſe firſt ſhine forth from being in intelligible intellect, uniformly, unitedly, and totally. For they contain the paternal cauſes of the moſt common and comprehenſive genera, and are ſuperior to a diſtributed knowledge of and a proximate government of ſenſibles. Hence theſe intelligible Gods have dominion over the Gods which are unfolded from them, and their knowledge is beyond all other divine knowledge; to which alſo Plato looking collects, that the Gods neither rule over us, nor have any knowledge of human concerns.

is any certain *genus of ſcience*, it is much more accurate than the ſcience which reſides with us; and that this is likewiſe true of beauty, and every thing

concerns. For the divided cauſes of theſe, and the powers which rule over them, are in the intellectual Gods. But the ideas which are properly called intelligible, are eſtabliſhed above all ſuch diviſions; produce all things according to united and the moſt ſimple cauſes; and both their effective energy and knowledge are one, collected and uniform. Hence there the intelligible cauſe of the celeſtial genus produces every thing celeſtial, Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, ſouls, not ſo far as they are dæmons or angels, for this is the peculiarity of diviſible cauſes, and of divided ideas, of which the intellectual forms make a diſtribution into multitude, but ſo far as all theſe genera are in a certain reſpect divine and celeſtial, and ſo far as they are allotted an hyparxis united to the Gods; and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to each of the reſt. Thus for inſtance, the intelligible idea of every thing pedeſtrian and terreſtrial cannot be ſaid to rule over things, each of which is ſeparated according to one form, for this is the province of things diſtributed from it into multitude, but it governs all things ſo far as they are of one genus. For things nearer to the one, give ſubſiſtence to all things in a more total and uniform manner.

As, however, we ſhall hereafter ſpeak of this, let us rather conſider the opinion of Plato concerning providence. The Athenian gueſt, therefore, in the Laws clearly evinces that there is a providence, where his diſcourſe ſhows that the Gods know and poſſeſs a power which governs all things. But Parmenides at the very beginning of the diſcuſſion concerning providence evinces the abſurdity of doubting divine knowledge and dominion. For to aſſert that the concluſion of this doubt is ſtill *more dire* than the former, ſufficiently ſhows that he rejects the arguments which ſubvert providence. For it is dire to ſay that divinity is not known by us who are rational and intellectual natures, and who eſſentially poſſeſs ſomething divine; but it is ſtill more dire to deprive divine natures of knowledge; ſince the former pertains to thoſe who do not convert themſelves to divinity, but the latter to thoſe who impede the all-pervading goodneſs of the Gods. And the former pertains to thoſe who err reſpecting our eſſence, but the latter to thoſe who convert themſelves erroneouſly about a divine cauſe. But the expreſſion ſtill *more dire*, (δεινοτερον) ſays Proclus, is not uſed as ſignifying a more ſtrenuous doubt, in the ſame manner as we are accuſtomed to call thoſe *dire* (δεινοι) who vanquiſh by the power of language, but as a thing worthy of greater dread and caution to the intelligent. For it diſſolves the union of things, and diſſociates divinity apart from the world. It alſo defines divine power as not pervading to all things, and circumſcribes intellectual knowledge as not all-perfect. It likewiſe ſubverts all the fabrication of the univerſe, the order imparted to the world from ſeparate cauſes, and the goodneſs which fills all things from one will, in a manner accommodated to the nature of unity. Nor leſs dire than any one of theſe is the confuſion of piety. For what communion is there between Gods and men, if the former are deprived of the knowledge of our concerns. All ſupplications, therefore, of divinity, all ſacred inſtitutions, all oaths adducing the Gods as a witneſs, and the untaught conceptions implanted in our ſouls concerning divinity, will periſh. What gift alſo will be left of the Gods to men, if they do not previouſly comprehend in themſelves the deſert of the recipients, if they do not poſſeſs a knowledge of all that we do, of all we ſuffer, and of all that we think though we do not carry it into effect? With great propriety, therefore,

thing elſe? Certainly. If, therefore, any one poſſeſſes *ſcience itſelf*, will you not aſſert that no one poſſeſſes the moſt accurate ſcience more than a God?

fore are ſuch aſſertions called dire. For if it is unholy to change any legitimately divine inſtitution, how can ſuch an innovation as this be unattended with dread? But that Plato rejects this hypotheſis which makes Divinity to be ignorant of our concerns, is evident from theſe things, ſince it is one of his dogmas, that Divinity knows and produces all things. Since, however, ſome of thoſe poſterior to him have vehemently endeavoured to ſubvert ſuch-like aſſertions, let us ſpeak concerning them as much as may be ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe.

Some of thoſe, then, poſterior to Plato, on ſeeing the unſtable condition of ſublunary things were fearful that they were not under the direction of providence and a divine nature; for ſuch events as are ſaid to take place through fortune, the apparent inequality reſpecting lives, and the diſordered motion of material natures, induced them greatly to ſuſpect that they were not under the government of providence. Beſides, the perſuaſion that Divinity is not buſily employed in the evolution of all-various reaſons, and that he does not depart from his own bleſſedneſs, induced them to frame an hypotheſis ſo lawleſs and dire. For they were of opinion that the paſſion of our ſoul, and the perturbation which it ſuſtains by deſcending to the government of bodies, muſt happen to Divinity, if he converted himſelf to the providential inſpection of things. Further ſtill, from conſidering that different objects of knowledge are known by different gnoſtic powers; as, for inſtance, ſenſibles by ſenſe, objects of opinion by opinion, things ſcientific by ſcience, and intelligibles by intellect, and, at the ſame time, neither placing ſenſe, nor opinion, nor ſcience in Divinity, but only an intellect immaterial and pure;—hence, they aſſerted that Divinity had no knowledge of any other things than the objects of intellect *. For, ſay they, if matter is external to him, it is neceſſary that he ſhould be pure from apprehenſions which are converted to matter; but being purified from theſe, it follows that he muſt have no knowledge of material natures: and hence, the patrons of this doctrine deprived him of a knowledge of, and providential exertions about, ſenſibles; not through any imbecility of nature, but through a tranſcendency of gnoſtic energy; juſt as thoſe whoſe eyes are filled with light, are ſaid to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects, at the ſame time that this incapacity is nothing more than tranſcendency of viſion. They likewiſe add, that there are many things which it is beautiful not to know. Thus, to the entheaſtic, (or thoſe who are divinely inſpired) it is beautiful to be ignorant of whatever would deſtroy the deific energy; and to the ſcientific, not to know that which would defile the indubitable perception of ſcience.

But others aſcribe, indeed, to Divinity a knowledge of ſenſibles, in order that they may not take away his providence, but at the ſame time convert his apprehenſion to that which is external, repreſent him as pervading through the whole of a ſenſible nature, as paſſing into contact with the objects of his government, impelling every thing, and being locally preſent with all things; for, ſay they, he would not otherwiſe be able to exert a providential energy in a becoming manner, and impart good to every thing according to its deſert †.

* This opinion was embraced by the more early Peripatetics.

† This was the opinion of the Stoics.

Others

God[1]? It is neceſſary ſo to aſſert. But can a God, being ſuch as he is, know our affairs through poſſeſſing ſcience itſelf? Why ſhould he not? That

Others again affirm that Divinity has a knowledge of himſelf, but that he has no occaſion to underſtand ſenſibles in order to provide for them, ſince by his very eſſence he produced all things, and adorns whatever he has produced, without having any knowledge of his productions. They add, that this is by no means wonderful, ſince nature operates without knowledge, and unattended with phantaſy; but that Divinity differs from nature in this, that he has a knowledge of himſelf, though not of the things which are fabricated by him. And ſuch are the aſſertions of thoſe who were perſuaded that Divinity is not ſeparated from mundane natures, and of thoſe who deprived him of the knowledge of inferior concerns, and of a knowledge operating in union with providence.

With reſpect to theſe philoſophers, we ſay, that they ſpeak truly, and yet not truly, on this ſubject.

[1] Every divine intellect, ſays Proclus, and every order of the Gods, comprehends in itſelf the knowledge and the cauſe of all things. For neither is their knowledge inefficacious, poſſeſſing the indefinite in intellection; but they both know all things, and communicate good. For that which is primarily good, is alſo willing to illuminate ſecondary natures with a ſupply from himſelf. Nor are their productions irrational and void of knowledge: for this is the work of nature and of ultimate life, and not of a divine cauſe, which alſo produces rational eſſences. Hence, they at the ſame time both know and make all things; and prior to theſe, according to their will, they preaſſume both a knowledge and a power effective of all things. Hence, they preſide over all things *willingly*, *gnoſtically*, and *powerfully*; and every thing through this triad enjoys their providential care. And if you are willing to unite things which ſubſiſt diviſibly in ſecondary natures, and refer them to a divine cauſe, you will perhaps apprehend the truth concerning it more accurately. Nature, therefore, appears to poſſeſs reaſons or productive principles effective, but not gnoſtic; the dianoëtic power poſſeſſes as its end, knowledge in itſelf; and proæreſis, or a deliberative tendency to things capable of being accompliſhed, has for its end good, and the will of things good. Collect theſe, therefore, in one, *the willing*, *the gnoſtic*, *the efficacious*, and prior to theſe, conceiving a divine unity, refer all theſe to a divine nature, becauſe all theſe preſubſiſt there uniformly together. However, though all the Gods poſſeſs all theſe, yet in intelligibles, the firſt intelligence, the firſt power generative of wholes, and a beneficent will, are eſpecially apparent. For the intelligible order ſubſiſting immediately after the fountain of good, becomes that to natures poſterior to itſelf, which *the good* is to the univerſality of things; expreſſing his ſuper-cauſal nature through paternal power; *the good*, through beneficent will; and that which is above all knowledge, through occult and united intellection. Proclus adds, but it appears to me that through this Parmenides now firſt calls ideas Gods, as recurring to the firſt fountain of them, and as being uniform, and moſt near to *the good*, and as thus poſſeſſing a knowledge of, and dominion over, all things, ſo far as each participates of a divine power, and ſo far as all of them are ſuſpended from the Gods.

That Parmenides ſaid, Becauſe it has been confeſſed by us, O Socrates, that neither do thoſe forms poſſeſs the power which is peculiar to them, through relation

ſubject. For if providence has a ſubſiſtence, neither can there be any thing diſordered, nor can Divinity be buſily employed, nor can he know ſenſibles through paſſive ſenſe: but theſe philoſophers, in conſequence of not knowing the exempt power and uniform knowledge of Divinity, appear to deviate from the truth. For thus we interrogate them: does not every thing energize in a becoming manner when it energizes according to its own power and nature? as, for inſtance, does not nature, in conformity to the order of its eſſence, energize phyſically, intellect intellectually, and ſoul pſychically, or according to the nature of ſoul? And when the ſame thing is generated by many and different cauſes, does not each of theſe produce according to its own power, and not according to the nature of the thing produced? Or ſhall we ſay, that each produces after the ſame manner, and that, for example, the ſun and man generate man, according to the ſame mode of operation, and not according to the natural ability of each, viz. the one partially, imperfectly, and with a buſy energy, but the other without anxious attention, by its very eſſence, and totally? But to aſſert this would be abſurd; for a divine operates in a manner very different from a mortal nature.

If, therefore, every thing which energizes, energizes according to its own nature and order, ſome things divinely and ſupernaturally, others naturally, and others in a different manner, it is evident that every gnoſtic being knows according to its own nature, and that it does not follow that becauſe the thing known is one and the ſame, on this account, the natures which know, energize in conformity to the eſſence of the things known. Thus ſenſe, opinion, and our intellect, know that which is white, but not in the ſame manner: for ſenſe cannot know what the eſſence is of a thing white, nor can opinion obtain a knowledge of its proper objects in the ſame manner as intellect; ſince opinion knows only *that* a thing is, but intellect knows the cauſe of its exiſtence. Knowledge, therefore, ſubſiſts according to the nature of that which knows, and not according to the nature of that which is known. What wonder is it then that Divinity ſhould know all things in ſuch a manner as is accommodated to his nature, viz. diviſible things indiviſibly, things multiplied, uniformly, things generated, according to an eternal intelligence, totally, ſuch things as are partial; and that with a knowledge of this kind, he ſhould poſſeſs a power productive of all things, or, in other words, that by knowing all things with ſimple and united intellections, he ſhould impart to every thing being, and a progreſſion into being? For the auditory ſenſe knows audibles in a manner different from the common ſenſe; and prior to, and different from, theſe, reaſon knows audibles, together with other particulars which ſenſe is not able to apprehend. And again, of deſire, which tends to one thing, of anger, which aſpires after another thing, and of *proaireſis*, (προαιρεσις), or that faculty of the ſoul which is a deliberative tendency to things in our power, there is one particular life moving the ſoul towards all theſe, which are mutually motive of each other. It is through this life that we ſay, I deſire, I am angry, and I have a deliberative tendency to this thing or that; for this life verges to all theſe powers, and lives in conjunction with them, as being a power which is impelled to every object of deſire. But prior both to reaſon and this one life, is *the one* of the ſoul, which often ſays, I perceive, I reaſon,

relation to our concerns, nor ours from relation to theirs; but that the forms in each diviſion are referred to themſelves. It was admitted by us. If,

reaſon, I deſire, and I deliberate, which follows all theſe energies, and energizes together with them. For we ſhould not be able to know all theſe, and to apprehend in what they differ from each other, unleſs we contained a certain indiviſible nature, which has a ſubſiſtence above the common ſenſe, and which, prior to opinion, deſire, and will, knows all that theſe know and deſire, according to an indiviſible mode of apprehenſion.

If this be the caſe, it is by no means proper to diſbelieve in the indiviſible knowledge of Divinity, which knows ſenſibles without poſſeſſing ſenſe, and diviſible natures without poſſeſſing a diviſible energy, and which, without being preſent to things in place, knows them prior to all local preſence, and imparts to every thing that which every thing is capable of receiving. The unſtable eſſence, therefore, of apparent natures is not known by him in an unſtable, but in a definite manner; nor does he know that which is ſubject to all-various mutations dubiouſly, but in a manner perpetually the ſame; for by knowing himſelf, he knows every thing of which he is the cauſe, poſſeſſing a knowledge tranſcendently more accurate than that which is coordinate to the objects of knowledge; ſince a cauſal knowledge of every thing is ſuperior to every other kind of knowledge. Divinity, therefore, knows without buſily attending to the objects of his intellection, becauſe he abides in himſelf, and by alone knowing himſelf, knows all things. Nor is he indigent of ſenſe, or opinion, or ſcience, in order to know ſenſible natures; for it is himſelf that produces all theſe, and that, in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himſelf, comprehends an united knowledge of them, according to cauſe, and in one ſimplicity of perception. Juſt as if ſome one having built a ſhip, ſhould place in it men of his own formation, and, in conſequence of poſſeſſing a various art, ſhould add a ſea to the ſhip, produce certain winds, and afterwards launch the ſhip into the new created main. Let us ſuppoſe, too, that he cauſes theſe to have an exiſtence by merely conceiving them to exiſt, ſo that by imagining all this to take place, he gives an external ſubſiſtence to his inward phantaſms, it is evident that in this caſe he will contain the cauſe of every thing which happens to the ſhip through the winds on the ſea, and that by contemplating his own conceptions, without being indigent of outward converſion, he will at the ſame time both fabricate and know theſe external particulars. Thus, and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of the univerſe, poſſeſſing the cauſes of all things, both gives ſubſiſtence to, and contemplates, whatever the univerſe contains, without departing from the ſpeculation of himſelf. But if, with reſpect to intellect, one kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident that there is not the ſame intellectual perfection of all things, but that where intelligibles have a more total and undiſtributed ſubſiſtence, there the knowledge is more total and indiviſible, and where the number of forms proceeds into multitude and extenſion, there the knowledge is both one and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing the Orphic verſes, in which the theologiſt ſays:

Αυτη δε Ζηνος και εν ομμασι πατρος αϊδκτος
Ναιουσ' αθανατοι τε θεοι, θνητοι τ' ανθρωποι,
Ὁσσα τε ην γεγαωσα, και υστερον ὁσσα εμελλον.

i. e. There

If, therefore, there is the moſt accurate dominion with Divinity, and the moſt accurate ſcience, the dominion of the Gods will not rule over us, nor will

i. e. There in the ſight of Jove, the parent king,
Th' immortal Gods and mortal men reſide,
With all that ever was, and ſhall hereafter be.

For the artificer of the univerſe is full of intelligibles, and poſſeſſes the cauſes of all things ſeparated from each other; ſo that he generates men, and all other things, according to their characteriſtic peculiarities, and not ſo far as each is divine, in the ſame manner as the divinity prior to him, the intelligible father Phanes. Hence, Jupiter is called the father of things divided according to ſpecies, but Phanes of things divided according to genera. And Jupiter, indeed, is the father of wholes, though, by a much greater priority, Phanes is the father of all things, but of all things ſo far as each participates of a divine power. With reſpect to knowledge, alſo, Jupiter knows human affairs particularly, and in common with other things: for the cauſe of men is contained in him, divided from other things and united with all of them; but Phanes knows all things at once, as it were centrically, and without diſtribution. Thus, for inſtance, he knows man, ſo far as he is an animal and pedeſtrian, and not ſo far as he is man. For as the pedeſtrian which ſubſiſts in Phanes, is collectively, and at once, the cauſe of all terreſtrial Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, ſouls, animals, plants, and of every thing contained in the earth, ſo alſo the knowledge which is there is one of all theſe things collectively, as of one genus, and is not a diſtributed knowledge of human affairs. And as in us the more univerſal ſciences give ſubſiſtence to thoſe which are ſubordinate to them, as Ariſtotle ſays, and are more ſciences, and more allied to intellect, for they uſe more comprehenſive concluſions,—ſo alſo in the Gods, the more excellent and more ſimple intellections comprehend according to cauſal priority the variety of ſuch as are ſecondary. In the Gods, therefore, the firſt knowledge of man is as of being, and is one intellection which knows every being as one, according to one union. But the ſecond knowledge is as of eternal being: for this knowledge uniformly comprehends according to one cauſe every eternal being. The knowledge which is conſequent to this is as of animal: for this alſo has an intellection of animal according to union. But the knowledge which ſucceeds this is of that which is perfected under this particular genus, as of pedeſtrian: for it is an intellection of all that genus, as of one thing; and diviſion firſt takes place in this, and variety together with ſimplicity. At the ſame time, however, neither in this is the intellection of man alone: for it is not the ſame thing to underſtand every thing terreſtrial as one thing, and to underſtand man. Hence, in demiurgic, and in ſhort in intellectual forms, there is a certain intellection of man as of man, becauſe this form is ſeparated from others in theſe orders. And thus we have ſhown how the higheſt forms do not poſſeſs a knowledge of human affairs, and how they have dominion over all things, ſo far as all things are divine, and ſo far as they participate of a certain divine idiom. But that in the firſt order of forms dominion itſelf, and ſcience itſelf, ſubſiſt, is evident. For there is a divine intellection there of all things characterized by unity, and a power which rules over wholes; the former being the fountain of all knowledge, and the latter the primary cauſe

will their ſcience take cognizance of us, or of any of our concerns; and in a ſimilar manner, we ſhall not rule over them by our dominion, nor know any thing divine through the aſſiſtance of our ſcience. And again, in conſequence of the ſame reaſoning, they will neither, though Gods [1], be our governors, nor have any knowledge of human concerns. But would not the diſcourſe be wonderful in the extreme, which ſhould deprive Divinity of knowledge? That Parmenides ſaid, Theſe, O Socrates, and many other conſequences beſides theſe, muſt neceſſarily [2] happen to forms, if they are the

of all dominion, whether they ſubſiſt in the Gods, or in the genera more excellent than our ſpecies, or in ſouls. And, perhaps, Parmenides here calls the genus of ſcience the intellection of thoſe forms, wiſhing to ſhow its comprehenſive and uniform nature; but prior to this, when he was ſpeaking of middle ideas, he alone denominated it ſpecies. For, from intelligible knowledge the middle orders are filled with the intelligence which they poſſeſs; and intelligence in the latter, has the ſame relation to that in the former, which ſpecies has to genus. If, alſo, the term *much more accurate*, is employed in ſpeaking of this ſcience, it is evident that ſuch an addition repreſents to us its more united nature. For this is the accurate, to comprehend all things, and leave nothing external to itſelf.

[1] *It is well obſerved here by Proclus, that the words "though Gods" contain an abundant indication of the preſent doubt. For every thing divine is good, and is willing to fill all things with good. How, therefore, can it either be ignorant of things pertaining to us, or not have dominion over ſecondary natures? How is it poſſible that it ſhould not govern according to its own power, and provide according to its own knowledge for things of which it is the cauſe? And it appears that Parmenides by theſe words evinces, that for the Divinities to be ignorant of our concerns over which they have dominion, is the moſt abſurd of all things, profoundly indicating that it eſpecially pertains to the Gods, ſo far as Gods, to know and provide for all things, according to *the one* by which they are characterized. For intellect, ſo far as intellect, has not a knowledge of all things, but of *wholes*, nor are ideas the cauſes of all things, but of ſuch as perpetually ſubſiſt according to nature; ſo that the aſſertion is not entirely falſe which deprives theſe of the knowledge and government of our concerns, ſo far as we rank among particulars, and not ſo far as we are men, and poſſeſs one form. But it is neceſſary that the Divinity and the Gods ſhould know all things, particulars, things eternal, and things temporal; and that they ſhould rule over all things, not only ſuch as are univerſal, but ſuch alſo as are partial: for there is one providence of them pervading to all things. Forms, therefore, ſo far as Gods, and intellect ſo far as a God, poſſeſs a knowledge of, and dominion over, all things. But intellect is a God according to *the one*, which is as it were the luminous flower of its eſſence; and forms are Gods, ſo far as they contain the light proceeding from *the good*.*

[2] Parmenides here indicates that what has been ſaid under the pretext of doubts, is after another manner true. For he ſays that theſe and many other conſequences muſt *neceſſarily* happen to forms, viz. the being unknown, and having no knowledge of our affairs. And, in ſhort,

the ideas of things, and if any one ſeparates each form apart from other things; ſo that any one who hears theſe aſſertions, may doubt and heſitate whether ſuch forms have any ſubſiſtence; or if they do ſubſiſt in a moſt eminent degree, whether it is not abundantly neceſſary that they ſhould be unknown [1] by the human nature. Hence he who thus ſpeaks may ſeem to ſay ſomething to the purpoſe; and as we juſt now ſaid, it may be conſidered as a wonderful [2] thing, on account of the difficulty of being perſuaded, and as the province of a man [3] of a very naturally good diſpoſition, to be able to perceive *that there is a certain genus of every thing, and an eſſence itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf:* but he will deſerve ſtill greater admiration, who, after having made this diſcovery, ſhall be able to teach another how to diſcern and diſtinguiſh all theſe in a becoming manner. That then Socrates ſaid, I aſſent to you, O Parmenides, for you entirely ſpeak agreeably to my opinion.

That Parmenides further added, But indeed, O Socrates, if any one on the contrary takes away the forms of things, regarding all that has now been

ſhort, he indicates that all the above-mentioned idioms are adapted to different orders of forms. For it is by no means wonderful that what is true of one order ſhould be falſe when extended to another.

[1] Theſe things alſo, ſays Proclus, are divinely aſſerted, and with a view to the condition of our nature. For neither does he who has arrived at the ſummit of human attainments, and who is the wiſeſt among men, poſſeſs ſcience perfectly indubitable concerning divine natures; for it is intellect alone which knows intelligibles free from doubt; nor is the moſt imperfect and earth-born character entirely deprived of the knowledge of a formal cauſe. For to what does he look when he ſometimes blames that which is apparent to ſenſe, as very mutable, if he does not contain in himſelf an unperverted preconception of an eſſence permanent and real?

[2] The ſimilar is every where naturally adapted to proceed to the ſimilar. Hence that which is obſcure to the eyes, and is only to be obtained by philoſophy, will not be apprehended by imperfect ſouls, but by thoſe alone who through phyſical virtue, tranſcendent diligence, and ardent deſire apply themſelves in a becoming manner to ſo ſublime an object of contemplation. For the ſpeculation of intelligibles cannot ſubſiſt in foreign habits; nor can things which have their eſſence and ſeat in a pure intellect become apparent to thoſe who are not purified in intellect; ſince the ſimilar is every where known by the ſimilar.

[3] By theſe words, ſays Proclus, Plato again teaches us who is a moſt fit hearer of this diſcourſe about ideas. Such a one he denominates a *man* (i. e. ανηρ, not ανθρωπος), not indeed in vain, but in order to indicate that ſuch a one according to the form of his life poſſeſſes much of the *grand, robuſt* and *elevated:* (ανδρα μεν ονομασας ου ματην, αλλ' ινα και κατα το ειδος της ζωης τοιουτος η, πολυ το ανδρον και υψηλον επιδεικνυμενος.)

been ſaid, and other things of the ſame kind, he will not find where to turn his dianoëtic [1] part, while he does not permit the idea of every thing which exiſts

επιδεικνυμενος.) For it is fit that he who is about to apprehend the Gods ſhould direct his attention to nothing ſmall and grovelling. But he calls him a man of a very naturally good diſpoſition, as being adorned with all the prerogatives of a philoſophic nature, and as receiving many viatica from nature, in order to the intellectual perception of divine natures. In addition to this, he alſo again reminds us who is the leader of the ſcience concerning theſe divine forms, and that he is prolific and inventive, and this with reſpect to teaching. For ſome have made ſuch a proficiency as is ſufficient for themſelves, but others are alſo able to awaken others to a recollection of the truth of things. Hence he ſays, that ſuch a one deſerves ſtill greater admiration. In the third place, he ſhows us what is the end of this teaching, viz. that the learner who poſſeſſes ſcience may be ſufficiently able to diſtinguiſh the genera of beings, and to ſurvey in perfection the definite cauſes of things; whence they originate; how many are their orders; how they ſubſiſt in every order of things; how they are participated; how they cauſally comprehend all things in themſelves; and, in ſhort, all ſuch particulars as have been diſcuſſed in the preceding notes.

Proclus adds, that by *a certain genus of every thing*, Plato ſignifies the primary cauſe preſubſiſting in divine natures of every ſeries. For idea compared with any other individual form in ſenſibles is a genus, as being more total than ſenſible forms, and as comprehending things which are not entirely of a ſimilar form with each other. For how can the terreſtrial man be ſaid to be entirely of a ſimilar form with the celeſtial, or with the man that is allotted a ſubſiſtence in any other element?

[1] Very ſcientifically, ſays Proclus, does Plato in theſe words remind us that there are ideas or forms of things. For if dianoëtic and intellectual are better than ſenſible knowledge, it is neceſſary that the things known by the dianoëtic power and by intellect ſhould be more divine than thoſe which are known by ſenſe: for as the gnoſtic powers which are coordinated to beings are to each other, ſuch alſo is the mutual relation of the things which are known. If, therefore, the dianoëtic power and intellect ſpeculate ſeparate and immaterial forms, and likewiſe things univerſal, and which ſubſiſt in themſelves, but ſenſe contemplates things partible, and which are inſeparable from ſubjects, it is neceſſary that the ſpectacles of the dianoëtic power and of intellect, ſhould be more divine and more eternal. Univerſals, therefore, are prior to particulars, and things immaterial to things material. Whence then does the dianoëtic power receive theſe? for they do not always ſubſiſt in us according to energy. It is however neceſſary, that things in energy ſhould precede thoſe in capacity, both in things intellectual and in eſſences. Forms, therefore, ſubſiſt elſewhere, and prior to us, in divine and ſeparate natures, through whom the forms which we contain derive their perfection. But theſe not ſubſiſting, neither would the forms in us ſubſiſt: for they could not be derived from things imperfect: ſince it is not lawful that more excellent natures ſhould be either generated or perfected from ſuch as are ſubordinate. Whence, too, is this multitude of forms in the multitude of ſouls derived? For it is every where neceſſary, prior to multitude, to conceive a monad from which the multitude proceeds. For as the multitude of ſenſibles was not generated, except from an unity, which is better than ſenſibles,

exiſts to be always the ſame, and by this means entirely deſtroys the dialectic power of the ſoul: but you alſo ſeem in this reſpect to perceive perfectly

and which gave ſubſiſtence to that which is common in particulars; ſo neither would the multitude of forms ſubſiſt in ſouls, ſuch as the juſt itſelf, the beautiful itſelf, &c. which ſubſiſt in all ſouls in a manner accommodated to the nature of ſoul, without a certain generating unity, which is more excellent than this animaſtic multitude: juſt as the monad from which the multitude of ſenſibles originates, is ſuperior to a ſenſible eſſence, comprehending unitedly all the variety of ſenſibles. Is it not alſo neceſſary, that prior to ſelf-motive natures, there ſhould be an immovable form? For as ſelf-motive reaſons tranſcend thoſe which are alter-motive, or moved by others, after the ſame manner immovable forms, and which energize in eternity, are placed above ſelf-motive forms, which are converſant with the circulations of time: for it is every where requiſite that a ſtable ſhould precede a movable cauſe. If, therefore, there are forms in ſouls which are many, and of a ſelf-motive nature, there are prior to theſe intellectual forms. In other words, there are immovable prior to ſelf-motive natures, ſuch as are monadic, prior to ſuch as are multiplied, and the perfect prior to the imperfect. It is alſo requiſite that they ſhould ſubſiſt in energy; ſo that if there are not intellectual, neither are there animaſtic forms: for nature by no means begins from the imperfect and the many; ſince it is neceſſary that multitude ſhould proceed about monads, things imperfect about the perfect, and things movable about the immovable. But if there are not forms eſſentially inherent in ſoul, there is no place left to which any one can turn his dianoëtic power as Parmenides juſtly obſerves: for phantaſy and ſenſe neceſſarily look to things connaſcent with themſelves. And of what ſhall we poſſeſs a dianoëtic or ſcientific knowledge, if the ſoul is deprived of forms of this kind? For we ſhall not make our ſpeculation about things of poſterior origin, ſince theſe are more ignoble than ſenſibles themſelves, and the univerſals which they contain. How then will the objects of knowledge, which are coordinate to the dianoëtic power, be ſubordinate to thoſe which are known by ſenſe? It remains, therefore, that we ſhall not know any thing elſe than ſenſibles. But if this be the caſe, whence do demonſtrations originate? Demonſtrations indeed, are from thoſe things which are the cauſes of the things demonſtrated, which are prior to them according to nature, and not with relation to us, and which are more honourable than the concluſions which are unfolded from them. But the things from which demonſtrations are formed are univerſals, and not particulars. Univerſals, therefore, are prior to, and are more cauſal and more honourable than, particulars. Whence likewiſe are definitions? For definition proceeds through the eſſential reaſon of the ſoul: for we firſt define that which is common in particulars, poſſeſſing within, that form, of which the ſomething common in theſe is the image. If, therefore, definition is the principle of demonſtration, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be another definition prior to this, of the many forms and eſſential reaſons which the ſoul contains. For ſince, as we have before ſaid, the juſt itſelf is in every ſoul, it is evident that there is ſomething common in this multitude of the juſt, whence every ſoul knowing the reaſon of the juſt contained in its eſſence, knows in a ſimilar manner that which is in all other ſouls. But if it poſſeſſes ſomething common, it is this ſomething common which we define, and this is the principle of demonſtration, and not that univerſal in the many, which is material, and in a certain

fectly the ſame with myſelf. That Socrates anſwered, You ſpeak the truth. What then will you do with reſpect to philoſophy? Where will you turn yourſelf,

certain reſpect mortal, being coordinated with the many: for in demonſtrations and definitions, it is requiſite that the whole of what is partial ſhould be comprehended in univerſal and definition. The definitions however of things common in particulars do not comprehend the whole of particulars: for, can it be ſaid that Socrates is the whole of rational mortal animal, which is the definition of man? ſince he contains many other particulars, which cauſe him to poſſeſs characteriſtic peculiarities. But the reaſon of man in the ſoul comprehends the whole of every individual: for it comprehends uniformly all the powers which are beheld about the particulars of the human ſpecies. And, in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to animal: for, indeed, the univerſal in particulars is leſs than the particulars themſelves, and is leſs than ſpecies; ſince it does not poſſeſs all differences in energy, but in capacity alone; whence alſo, it becomes as it were the matter of the ſucceeding formal differences. But the reaſon of man in our ſoul is better and more comprehenſive; for it comprehends all the differences of man unitedly, and not in capacity, like the univerſal in particulars, but in energy. If, therefore, definition is the principle of demonſtration, it is requiſite that it ſhould be the definition of a thing of that kind which is entirely comprehenſive of that which is more partial. But of this kind are the forms in our ſoul, and not the forms which ſubſiſt in particulars. Theſe, therefore, being ſubverted, neither will it be poſſible to define. Hence the definitive together with the demonſtrative art will periſh, abandoning the conceptions of the human mind. The diviſive art alſo, together with theſe, will be nothing but a name: for the whole employment of diviſion is, to ſeparate the many from the one, and to diſtribute things preſubſiſting unitedly in the whole, into their proper differences, not adding the differences externally, but contemplating them as inherent in the genera themſelves, and as dividing the ſpecies from each other. Where, therefore, will the work of this art be found, if we do not admit that there are eſſential forms in our ſoul? For he who ſuppoſes that this art is employed in things of poſterior origin, i. e. forms abſtracted from ſenſibles, perceives nothing of the power which it poſſeſſes: for to divide things of poſterior origin, is the buſineſs of the diviſive art, energizing according to opinion; but to contemplate the eſſential differences of the reaſons in the ſoul, is the employment of dianoëtic and ſcientific diviſion, which alſo unfolds united powers, and perceives things more partial branching forth from ſuch as are more total. By a much greater priority, therefore, to the definitive and demonſtrative arts will the diviſive be entirely vain, if the ſoul does not contain eſſential reaſons: for definition is more venerable, and ranks more as a principle than demonſtration, and again, diviſion than definition: for the diviſive gives to the definitive art its principles, but not vice verſa. The analytic art alſo, muſt periſh together with theſe, if we do not admit the eſſential reaſons of the ſoul. For the analytic is oppoſed to the demonſtrative method, as reſolving from things cauſed to cauſes, but to the definitive as proceeding from compoſites to things more ſimple, and to the diviſive, as aſcending from things more partial to ſuch as are more univerſal. So that thoſe methods being deſtroyed, this alſo will periſh. If, therefore, there are not forms or ideas, neither ſhall we contain the reaſons of things. And if we do not contain the reaſons of things, neither will there

yourſelf, being ignorant of theſe? Indeed I do not ſeem to myſelf to know at preſent. That Parmenides ſaid, Before you exerciſe [1] yourſelf in this affair,

be the dialectic methods according to which we obtain a knowledge of things, nor ſhall we know where to turn the dianoëtic power of the ſoul.

[1] Socrates was alone deficient in ſkill, whence Parmenides exhorts him to apply himſelf to dialectic, through which he would become much more ſkilful, being exerciſed in many things, and perceiving the conſequences of hypotheſes; and when he has accompliſhed this, Parmenides adviſes him to turn to the ſpeculation of forms. For ſuch particulars as are now dubious are very eaſy of ſolution to thoſe that are exerciſed in dialectic. And this is the whole end of the words. This exerciſe, however, muſt not be thought to be ſuch as that which is called by logicians the epichirematic or argumentative method. For that looks to opinion, but this deſpiſes the opinion of the multitude. Hence, to the many it appears to be nothing but words, and is on this account denominated by them garrulity. The epichirematic method, indeed, delivers many arguments about one problem; but this exerciſe delivers the ſame method to us about many and different problems; ſo that the one is very different from the other. The latter, however, is more beautiful than the former, as it uſes more excellent methods, beginning from on high, in order to accompliſh its proper work. For, as we have already obſerved in the Introduction to this dialogue, it employs as its inſtruments diviſion and definition, analyſis and demonſtration. If, therefore, we exerciſe ourſelves in this method, there is much hope that we ſhall genuinely apprehend the theory of ideas; diſtinctly evolving our confuſed conceptions; diſſolving apparent doubts; and demonſtrating things of which we are now ignorant. But till we can effect this, we ſhall not be able to give a ſcientific definition of every form.

Should it, however, be inquired whether it is poſſible to define forms or not, ſuch as the beautiful itſelf, or the juſt itſelf; for forms, as Plato ſays in his Epiſtles, are only to be apprehended by the ſimple viſion of intelligence; to this we reply, that the beautiful itſelf, the juſt itſelf, and the good itſelf, conſidered as ideas, are not only in intellect, but alſo in ſouls, and in ſenſible natures. And of theſe, ſome are definable, and others not. This being the caſe, intellectual forms, though they may be in many and partial natures, cannot be defined on account of their ſimplicity, and becauſe they are apprehended by intelligence, and not through compoſition; and likewiſe, becauſe whatever is defined ought to participate of ſomething common, which is, as it were, a ſubject, and is different from itſelf. But in divine forms there is nothing of this kind: for being, as Timæus ſays, does not proceed into any thing elſe, but though it makes a certain progreſſion from itſelf, yet after a manner it is the ſame with its immediate progeny, being only unfolded into a ſecond order. Forms, however, belonging to ſoul, and ſubſiſting in ſenſibles, can be defined; and, in ſhort, ſuch things as are produced according to a paradigmatic cauſe, and ſuch as are ſaid to participate of forms. Hence, dialectic ſpeculates the firſt forms by ſimple intuitions; but when it defines, or divides, it looks to the images of theſe. If, therefore, ſuch a ſcience is the pureſt part of intellect and prudence, it is evident that it employs pure intellections, through which it apprehends intelligibles, and multiform methods by which it binds the ſpectacles derived from

affair, O Socrates, you ſhould endeavour to define what *the beautiful*, *the juſt*, and *the good* are, and each of the other forms: for I before perceived the neceſſity of your accompliſhing this, when I heard you diſcourſing with Ariſtotle. Indeed that ardour of yours, by which you are impelled to diſputation, is both beautiful [1] and divine; but collect yourſelf together, and while

from intelligibles, and which ſubſiſt in ſecondary orders: and thus it appears that the aſſertions of Plato are true.

But it is by no means wonderful if we alſo define certain other particulars of which there are no ideas, ſuch as things artificial, parts, and things evil. For there are in us reaſons of wholes which are according to nature, and alſo of things good; and in conſequence of this, we know ſuch things as give completion to wholes, ſuch as imitate nature, and ſuch as have merely a ſhadowy ſubſiſtence. For ſuch as is each of theſe, ſuch alſo is it known and defined by us; and we diſcourſe about them from the definitely ſtable reaſons which we contain.

[1] Some, ſays Proclus, are neither impelled to, nor are aſtoniſhed about, the ſpeculation of beings: others again have obtained perfection according to knowledge: and others are impelled, indeed, but require perfection, logical ſkill, and exerciſe, in order to the attainment of the end. Among the laſt of theſe is Socrates; whence Parmenides, indeed, receives his impulſe, and calls it divine, as being philoſophic. For, to deſpiſe things apparent, and to contemplate an incorporeal eſſence, is philoſophic and divine; ſince every thing divine is of this kind, ſeparate from ſenſibles, and ſubſiſting in immaterial intellections. But Parmenides alſo calls the impulſe of Socrates beautiful, as leading to that which is truly beautiful, (which does not conſiſt in practical affairs, as the Stoics afterwards conceived it did, but in intellectual energies,) and as adapted to true love. For the amatory form of life eſpecially adheres to beauty. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides admit the impulſe of Socrates as *divine* and *beautiful*, as leading to *intellect* and *the one*. As *divine*, indeed, it vindicates to itſelf *the one*, but as *beautiful*, *intellect*, in which the beautiful firſt ſubſiſts; and as purifying the eye of the ſoul, and exciting its moſt divine part. But he extends the road through dialectic as irreprehenſible and moſt expedient; being connate, indeed, with things, but employing many powers for the apprehenſion of truth; imitating intellect, from which alſo it receives its principles, but beautifully extending through well-ordered gradations to true being, and giving reſpite to the wandering about ſenſibles; and laſtly, exploring every thing by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the occult reſidence of *the one* and *the good*.

But when Parmenides ſays, "if you do not truth will elude your purſuit," he manifeſts the danger which threatens us from raſh and diſordered impulſe to things inacceſſible to the unexerciſed, and this is no other than falling from the whole of truth. For an orderly progreſſion is that which makes our aſcent ſecure and irreprehenſible. Hence, Proclus adds, the Chaldæan oracle ſays, "that Divinity is never ſo much turned from man, and never ſo much ſends us novel paths, as when we make our aſcent to the moſt divine of ſpeculations or works in a confuſed and diſordered manner, and, as it adds, with unbathed feet, and with unhallowed lips. For, of thoſe

while you are young more and more exercise yourself in that science, which appears useless to the many, and is called by them empty loquacity; for if you do not, the truth will elude your pursuit.

That Socrates then said, What method of exercise[1] is this, O Parmenides? And that Parmenides replied, It is that which you have heard Zeno employing: but besides this, while you was speaking with Zeno, I admired your asserting that you not only suffered yourself to contemplate the *wandering*[2] which subsists about the objects of sight, but likewise that which takes place

that are thus negligent, the progressions are imperfect, the impulses are vain, and the paths are blind." Being persuaded, therefore, both by Plato and the oracles, we should always ascend through things more proximate to us to such as are more excellent, and from things more subordinate, through mediums, to such as are more elevated.

[1] If again, says Proclus, Parmenides calls this dialectic an exercise (γυμνασια), not being argumentative, we ought not to wonder. For every logical discursus, and the evolution itself of theorems, considered with reference to an intellectual life, is an exercise. For as we call endurance an exercise, with reference to fortitude, and continence, with respect to temperance, so every logical theory may be called an exercise with reference to intellectual knowledge. The scientific discursus, therefore, of the dianoëtic power, which is the business of dialectic, is a dianoëtic exercise preparatory to the most simple intellection of the soul.

[2] Again, in these words Parmenides evinces his admiration of the astonishment of Socrates about intelligibles and immaterial forms: for he says that he admires his transferring the dialectic power from sensibles to intelligibles; and he also adds the cause of this. For things which are especially apprehended by reason, or the summit of the dianoëtic part (for such is the meaning of reason in this place), are intelligibles; since Timæus also says that the reason about sensibles is not firm and stable, but conjectural, but that the reason which is employed about intelligibles is immovable and cannot be confuted. For sensibles are not accurately that which they are said to be; but intelligibles having a proper subsistence, are moreable to be known. But, after another manner, it may be said that intelligible forms are especially known by reason, and this by beginning from the gnostic powers. For sense has no knowledge whatever of these forms; the phantasy receives figured images of them; opinion logically apprehends them, and without figure, but at the same time possesses the various, and is, in short, naturally adapted alone to know *that*, and not *why*, they are. Hence, the summit of our dianoëtic part is the only sufficient speculator of forms: and hence Timæus says that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. So that forms, properly so called, are justly said to be especially apprehended by reason. For all sensible things are partial; since every body is partial: for no body is capable of being all things, nor of subsisting impartibly, in a multitude of particulars. Physical forms verge to bodies, and are divided about them; and the forms belonging to the soul participate of variety, and fall short of the simplicity of intellectual forms. Hence, such forms as are called intellectual and intelligible, and are most remote from matter are especially to be apprehended by reason.

place in ſuch things as are eſpecially apprehended by reaſon, and which ſome one may conſider as having a real ſubſiſtence. For it appears to me (ſaid Socrates), that after this manner it may without difficulty be proved, that there are both ſimilars and diſſimilars, or any thing elſe which it is the province of beings to ſuffer. That Parmenides replied, You ſpeak well: but it is neceſſary that, beſides this, you ſhould not only conſider *if each of the things ſuppoſed is* [1], what will be the conſequences from the hypotheſis, but likewiſe

reaſon. The dialectic wandering, therefore, is neceſſary to the ſurvey of theſe forms, exerciſing and fitting us, like the preparatory part of the myſteries, for the viſion of theſe ſplendid beings. Nor muſt we by this wandering underſtand, as we have before obſerved, a merely logical diſcurſus about matters of opinion, but the whole of dialectic, which Plato in the Republic calls the defenſive incloſure of diſciplines, and which, in the evolutions of arguments, exerciſes us to the more accurate intellection of immaterial and ſeparate natures.

Nor muſt we wonder, ſays Proclus, that Plato calls ſcientific theory wandering: for it is ſo denominated with reference to pure intelligence, and the ſimple apprehenſion of intelligibles. And what wonder is it, ſays he, if Plato calls a progreſſion of this kind wandering, ſince ſome of thoſe poſterior to him have not refuſed to denominate the variety of intellections in intellect a wandering; for though the intelligence in intellect is immutable, yet it is at the ſame time one and multiplied, through the multitude of intelligibles. And why is it requiſite to ſpeak concerning intellect, ſince thoſe who energize in the higheſt perfection from a divine afflatus, are accuſtomed to ſpeak of the wanderings of the Gods themſelves, not only of thoſe in the heavens, but alſo of thoſe that are denominated intellectual; obſcurely ſignifying by this their progreſſion, their being preſent to all ſecondary natures, and their prolific providence as far as to the laſt of things. For they ſay that every thing which proceeds into multitude wanders; but that the inerratic alone ſubſiſts in the ſtable and uniform. Wandering, indeed, appears to ſignify four things, either a multitude of energies, though they may all ſubſiſt together, or a tranſitive multitude, like the intellections of the ſoul, or a multitude proceeding from oppoſites to oppoſites, or a multitude of diſordered motions. The dialectic exerciſe is called a wandering according to the third of theſe, in conſequence of proceeding through oppoſite hypotheſes. So that if there is any thing which energizes according to one immutable energy, this is truly inerratic.

[1] It appears to me, ſays Proclus, to be well ſaid by the antients that Plato has given perfection in this dialogue to the writings both of Zeno and Parmenides, producing the dialectic exerciſe of the former to both oppoſites, and elevating the theory of the latter to true being. We ſhall find, therefore, the perfection of the writings of Parmenides in the following part of this dialogue, which contains nine hypotheſes concerning *the one*; but we may perceive the perfection of Zeno's writings in what is now ſaid. In addition, therefore, to what we have already delivered reſpecting the dialectic of Zeno in the preceding Introduction, we ſhall ſubjoin from Proclus the following obſervations. 'The diſcourſe of Zeno having ſuppoſed the multitude of forms ſeparate from *the one*, collects the abſurdities which follow from this hypotheſis, and this by conſidering what

likewiſe what will reſult from ſuppoſing that *it is not*, if you wiſh to be more exerciſed in this affair. How do you mean [1] (ſaid Socrates)? As if (ſaid Parmenides)

what follows, and what follows and does not follow: for he collects that they are ſimilar and not ſimilar; and proceeds in a ſimilar manner reſpecting *the one* and the many, motion and permanency. Parmenides, however, thinks it fit that in dialectic inveſtigations it ſhould not only be ſuppoſed if *the one* is, but alſo if it is not, and to ſpeculate what will happen from this hypotheſis; as, for inſtance, not only if ſimilitude is, but alſo if it is not, what will happen, either as conſequent, or as not conſequent, or as conſequent and at the ſame time not conſequent. But his reaſon for making ſuch an addition is this: if we only ſuppoſe that a thing is, and diſcover what will be the conſequence of the hypotheſis, we ſhall not entirely diſcover that of which the thing ſuppoſed is eſſentially the cauſe; but if we can demonſtrate in addition to this, that if it is not, this very ſame thing will no longer follow which was the conſequence of its being ſuppoſed to have a ſubſiſtence, then it becomes evident to us that if the one is, the other is alſo.

Some

[1] Socrates not being able to apprehend the whole method ſynoptically delivered, through what has been previouſly ſaid, requeſts Parmenides to unfold it more clearly. Parmenides accordingly again gives a ſpecimen of this method logically and ſynoptically: comprehending in eight the four and twenty modes which we have already mentioned in the Introduction to this dialogue. For, he aſſumes, if it happens, and if it follows and does not follow, and both theſe conjoined; ſo that again we may thus be able to triple the eight modes. But let us conciſely conſider, with Proclus, theſe eight modes in the hypotheſis of Zeno:—If, then, the many have a ſubſiſtence, there will ſimply happen to the many with reſpect to themſelves to be ſeparated, not to be principles, to ſubſiſt diſſimilarly. But to the many with reſpect to *the one* there will happen, to be comprehended by *the one*, to be generated by it, and to participate of ſimilitude and union from it. To *the one* there will happen, to have dominion over the many, to be participated by them, to ſubſiſt prior to them; and this with reſpect to the many. But to *the one* with reſpect to itſelf there will happen the impartible, the unmultiplied, that which is better than being, and life, and knowledge; and every thing of this kind.

Again, if the many is not, there will happen to the many with reſpect to themſelves the unſeparated and the undivided from each other: but to the many with reſpect to *the one*, a ſubſiſtence unproceeding from *the one*, a privation of difference with reſpect to *the one*. To *the one* with reſpect to itſelf there will happen the poſſeſſion of nothing efficacious and perfect in its own nature; for if it poſſeſſed any thing of this kind it would generate the many. To *the one* with reſpect to the many, not to be the leader of multitude, and not to operate any thing in the many.

Hence, we may conclude, that *the one* is every where that which makes multitude to be one thing, is the cauſe of, and has dominion over, multitude. And here you may ſee that the tranſition is from the object of inveſtigation to its cauſe; for ſuch is *the one*. It is requiſite, therefore, that always after many diſcuſſions and hypotheſes there ſhould be a certain ſummary deduction, (κεφαλαιουμενον.) For thus Plato, through all the intellectual conceptions, ſhows that *the one* gives ſubſiſtence to all things, and to the unities in beings, which we ſay is the end of the dialogue.

Parmenides) you ſhould wiſh to exerciſe yourſelf in this hypotheſis of Zeno, *if there are many things*, what ought to happen both to *the many* with reference to themſelves, and to *the one*; and to *the one* with reſpect to itſelf, and to *the many*: and again, *if many are not*, to conſider what will happen both to *the one* and to *the many*, as well to themſelves as to each other. And again, if he ſhould ſuppoſe *if ſimilitude* [1] *is*, or *if it is not*, what will happen from

Some one, however, may probably inquire how it is poſſible for any thing to happen to that which is not. And how can that be the recipient of any thing which has no ſubſiſtence whatever? To this we reply, that *non-being*, as we learn in the Sophiſta, is either that which in no reſpect has a ſubſiſtence (το μηδαμη μηδαμως ον), or it is privation, for by itſelf it is not, but has an accidental being; or it is matter, for this is not, as being formleſs, and naturally indefinite; or it is every thing material, as that which has an apparent being, but properly is not; or, further ſtill, it is every thing ſenſible, for this is continually converſant with generation and corruption, but never truly is. Prior to theſe, alſo, there is non-being in ſouls, according to which they are likewiſe ſaid to be the firſt of generated natures, and not to belong to thoſe true beings which rank in intelligibles. And prior to ſouls, there is the non-being in intelligibles themſelves, and this is the firſt *difference* of beings, as we are taught by the Sophiſta, and which as we there learn is not leſs than being itſelf. Laſtly, beyond all theſe is the non-being of that which is prior to being, which is the cauſe of all beings, and is exempt from the multitude which they contain. If, therefore, non-being may be predicated in ſo many ways, it is evident that what has not in any reſpect being, can never become the ſubject of hypotheſis: for it is not poſſible to ſpeak of this, nor to have any knowledge of it, as the Eleatean gueſt in the Sophiſta ſhows, confirming the aſſertion of Parmenides concerning it. But when we ſay that the many is not, or that *the one* is not, or that ſoul is not, we ſo make the negation, as that each of theſe is ſomething elſe, but is not that particular thing, the being of which we deny. And thus the hypotheſis does not lead to that which in no reſpect has a ſubſiſtence, but to that which partly is, and partly is not: for, in ſhort, negations are the progeny of intellectual difference. Hence, a thing is not a horſe, becauſe it is another thing; and, through this, it is not man, becauſe it is ſomething elſe. And Plato in the Sophiſta on this account ſays, that when we ſay non-being, we only aſſert an ablation of being, but not the contrary to being, meaning by contrary, that which is moſt diſtant from being, and which perfectly falls from it. So that when we ſay a thing is not, we do not introduce that which in no reſpect has a being, nor when we make non-being the ſubject of hypotheſis do we ſuppoſe that which is in no reſpect is, but we ſignify as much of non-being as is capable of being known and expreſſed by words.—For an account of the Eleatic method of reaſoning which Plato here delivers, ſee the Introduction to this dialogue.

[1] If ſimilitude is, ſays Proclus, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the monadic, the perpetual, the prolific, and the primary. But, with reſpect to ſenſibles, the aſſimilation of them to intelligibles, the not ſuffering them to fall into the place of diſſimilitude, and the conjunction of parts with their wholeneſſes. To ſenſibles with reſpect to themſelves there will happen,

from each hypotheſis, both to the things ſuppoſed and to others, and to themſelves and to each other; and the ſame method of proceeding muſt take place concerning *the diſſimilar*, *motion* [1] and *permanency*, *generation*

pen, a communion with each other, a participation of, and a rejoicing in, each other. For ſimilars rejoice in, are copaſſive, and are mingled with ſimilars. But with reſpect to ſimilitude there will happen a participation of it, an aſſimilation with, and union according to, it.

But if ſimilitude is not, there will happen to itſelf according to itſelf the uneſſential, the neither poſſeſſing prolific power, nor a primary eſſence. But with reſpect to others not to have dominion over them, not to make them ſimilar to themſelves according to form, but rather in conjunction with itſelf to take away the ſimilar which is in them; for the principle of ſimilars not having a ſubſiſtence, neither will theſe be ſimilar. But to ſenſibles with reſpect to themſelves there will happen the immovable, the unmingled, the unſympathetic. But with reſpect to it, neither to be faſhioned by form according to it, nor to be connected by it.

In like manner we ſay with reſpect to the diſſimilar. For if diſſimilitude is, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf to be a form pure, immaterial and uniform, poſſeſſing multitude together with unity; but with reſpect to other things, I mean ſenſibles, a cauſe of the definite circumſcription and diviſion in each. To other things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, that each will preſerve its proper idiom and form without confuſion; but with reſpect to it, to be ſuſpended from it, and to be adorned both according to wholes and parts by it. But if diſſimilitude is not, it will neither be a pure and immaterial form, nor, in ſhort, one and not one, nor will it poſſeſs, with reſpect to other things, a cauſe of the ſeparate eſſence of each; and other things will poſſeſs an all-various confuſion in themſelves, and will not be the participants of one power which gives ſeparation to wholes.

From theſe things, therefore, we collect that ſimilitude is the cauſe of communion, ſympathy, and commixture to ſenſibles; but diſſimilitude of ſeparation, production according to form, and unconfuſed purity of powers in themſelves. For theſe things follow the poſitions of ſimilitude and diſſimilitude, but the contraries of theſe from their being taken away.

[1] If motion is, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf the eternal, and the poſſeſſion of infinite power; but to itſelf, with reſpect to things which are here, to be motive of them, the vivific, the cauſe of progreſſion, and of various energies. But to theſe things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, the energetic, the vivific, the mutable; for every thing material paſſes from a ſubſiſtence in capacity, to a ſubſiſtence in energy. To other things with reſpect to motion there will happen, to be perfected by it, to partake of its power, to be aſſimilated through it to things eternally ſtable. For things which are incapable of obtaining good ſtably, participate of it through motion.

But if motion is not, it will be ineffıcacious, ſluggiſh, and without power; it will not be a cauſe of things which are here; will be void of motive powers, and a producing eſſence. And things which are here will be uncoördinated, indefinite and imperfect, firſt motion not having a ſubſiſtence.

In like manner with reſpect to permanency, if it is, there will happen to itſelf with reference

tion [1] and *corruption*, *being* and *non-being*: and, in one word, concerning every

to itſelf, the ſtable, the eternal, and the uniform. But to other things with reſpect to themſelves, that each will abide in its proper boundaries, and will be firmly eſtabliſhed in the ſame places or meaſures. To other things with reſpect to it there will happen, to be every way bounded and ſubdued by it, and to partake of ſtability in being. But if it is not, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the inefficacious, and the unſtable. To itſelf with reference to other things, not to afford them the ſtable, the ſecure, and the firm; but to other things with reſpect to themſelves the much wandering, the uneſtabliſhed, the imperfect, and the being deprived of habitation; and to other things with reſpect to it, neither to be ſubſervient to its meaſures, nor to partake of being according to it, but to be borne along in a perfectly diſordered manner, that which connects and eſtabliſhes them, not having a ſubſiſtence. Motion itſelf, therefore, is the ſupplier of efficacious power, and multiform life and energy; but permanency, of firmneſs and ſtability, and an eſtabliſhment in proper boundaries.

[1] Let us now conſider, ſays Proclus, prior to theſe, whence generation and corruption originate, and if the cauſes of theſe are to be placed in ideas. Or is not this indeed neceſſary, not only becauſe theſe rank among things perpetual (for neither is it poſſible for generation not to be, nor for corruption to be entirely diſſolved, but it is neceſſary that theſe ſhould conſubſiſt with each other in the univerſe, ſo far as it is perpetual) but this is alſo requiſite, becauſe generation participates of eſſence and being, but corruption of non-being. For every thing ſo far as it is generated is referred to eſſence, and partakes of being, but ſo far as it is corrupted, it is referred to non-being, and a mutation of the *is* to another form. For through this it is corrupted from one thing into another; becauſe non-being preſubſiſts which gives diviſion to forms. And as in intelligibles, non-being is not leſs than being, as is aſſerted by the Eleatean gueſt, ſo here corruption is not leſs than generation, nor does it leſs contribute to the perfection of the univerſe. And as there, that which participates of being enjoys alſo non-being, and non-being partakes of being, ſo here that which is in generation, or in paſſing into being, is alſo the recipient of corruption, and that which is corrupting, of generation. Being, therefore, and non-being, are the cauſes of generation and corruption.

But it is requiſite to exerciſe ourſelves after the ſame manner with reſpect to theſe. In the firſt place, then, if generation is, it is in itſelf imperfect, and is the cauſe to others of an aſſimilation to eſſence. But there will happen to other things with reſpect to themſelves, a mutation from each other: and to other things with reſpect to generation, there will happen a perpetual participation of it, in conſequence of its ſubſiſting in them. But if generation is not, it will be itſelf, not the object of opinion; and with reſpect to other things it will not be the form of any thing, nor the cauſe of order and perfection to any thing; but other things will be unbegotten and impaſſive, and will have no communion with it, nor participate through it of being.

In like manner with reſpect to corruption: If corruption is, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the never failing, infinite power, and a fullneſs of non-being; but to itſelf with reſpect to other things, the giving meaſure to being, and the cauſe of perpetual generation. But to other things with reſpect to themſelves, there will happen a flowing into each other, and an inability of connecting themſelves. And to other things with reſpect to corruption there will

every thing which is ſuppoſed either to be [1] or nor to be, or influenced in any manner by any other paſſion, it is neceſſary to conſider the conſequences

happen, to be perpetually changed by it, to have non-being conjoined with being, and to participate of corruption totally. But if corruption is not, there will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, that it will not be ſubvertive of itſelf; for not having a ſubſiſtence, it will ſubvert itſelf with reſpect to other things. To itſelf, with reference to other things there will happen, that it will not diſſipate them, nor change them into each other, nor dilacerate being and eſſence. To other things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, the not being changed into each other, the not being paſſive to each other, and that each will preſerve the ſame order. But to other things with reſpect to it there will happen, the not being paſſive to it. The peculiarity, therefore, of generation is to move to being, but of corruption to lead from being. For this we infer from the preceding hypotheſes, ſince it has appeared to us that admitting their exiſtence, they are the cauſes of being and non-being to other things; and that being ſubverted they introduce a privation of motion and mutation.

[1] We engage, ſays Proclus, in the inveſtigation of things in a twofold reſpect, contemplating at one time if a thing is or is not, and at another time, if this particular thing is preſent with it, or is not preſent, as in the inquiry if the ſoul is immortal. For here we muſt not only conſider all that happens to the thing ſuppoſed, with reſpect to itſelf and other things, and to other things with reſpect to the thing ſuppoſed, but alſo what happens with reference to ſubſiſtence and non-ſubſiſtence. Thus, for inſtance, if the ſoul is immortal, its virtue will have a connate life, ſufficient to felicity; and this will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf. But to itſelf with reſpect to other things there will happen, to uſe them as inſtruments, to provide for them ſeparately, to impart life to them. In the ſecond place, to other things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, that things living and dead will be generated from each other, the poſſeſſion of an adventitious immortality, the circle of generation; but to other things with reſpect to it, to be adorned by it, to participate of a certain ſelf-motion, and to be ſuſpended from it, in living.

But if the ſoul is not immortal, it will not be ſelf-motive, it will not be intellectual eſſentially, it will not be ſelf-vital; nor will its diſciplines be reminiſcences. It will be corrupted by its own proper evil, and will not have a knowledge of true beings. And theſe things will happen to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf. But to itſelf with reſpect to others there will happen, to be mingled with bodies and material natures, to have no dominion over itſelf, to be incapable of leading others as it pleaſes, to be ſubſervient to the temperament of bodies; and all its life will be corporeal, and converſant with generation. To other things with reſpect to themſelves there will happen, ſuch a habit as that which conſiſts from entelecheia and body. For there will alone be animals compoſed from an indefinite life and bodies. But to other things with reſpect to it there will happen, to be the leaders of it, to change it together with their own motions, and to poſſeſs it in themſelves, and not externally governing them, and to live in conjunction with and not from it. You ſee, therefore, that after this manner we diſcover by the dialectic art the mode, not only how we may be able to ſuppoſe if a thing is and is not, but any other paſſion which it may ſuffer, ſuch as the being immortal or not immortal.

Since,

quences both to itſelf and to each individual of other things, which you may ſelect for this purpoſe, and towards many, and towards all things in a ſimilar manner; and again, how other things are related to themſelves, and to another which you eſtabliſh, whether you conſider that which is the ſubject

Since, however we may conſider the relation of one thing to another variouſly; for we may either conſider it with reference to one thing only, as for inſtance, how ſimilitude, if it is ſuppoſed to be, ſubſiſts with reſpect to diſſimilitude; or, we may conſider it with reſpect to more than one thing, as for inſtance, how eſſence, if ſuppoſed to be, is with reference to permanency and motion; or with reſpect to all things, as, if *the one* is, how it ſubſiſts with reference to all things,—this being the caſe, Plato does not omit this, but adds, That it is requiſite to conſider the conſequences with reſpect to one thing only, which you may ſelect for this purpoſe, and towards many, and towards all things in a ſimilar manner.

It is neceſſary indeed that this one, or thoſe many ſhould be allied to the thing propoſed, for inſtance, as the ſimilar to the diſſimilar: for theſe are coordinate to each other. And motion and reſt to eſſence: for theſe are contained in and ſubſiſt about it. But if the difference with reſpect to another thing, is with reſpect to one thing, to many things, and to all things, and we ſay there are twenty four modes, aſſuming in one way only a ſubſiſtence with reference to another, this is not wonderful. For difference with reſpect to another thing pertains to matter; but we propoſe to deliver the form of the dialectic method, and the formal but not the material differences which it contains.

Obſerve, too, that Plato adds, that the end of this exerciſe is the perception of truth. We muſt not, therefore, conſider him as ſimply ſpeaking of ſcientific truth, but of that which is intelligible, or which in other words, ſubſiſts according to a ſupereſſential characteriſtic: for the whole of our life is an exerciſe to the viſion of this, and the wandering through dialectic haſtens to that as its port. Hence Plato in a wonderful manner uſes the word διοψεσθαι *to look through*: for ſouls obtain the viſion of intelligibles through many mediums.

But again, that the method may become perſpicuous to us from another example, let us inveſtigate the four-and-twenty modes in providence. If then providence is, there will follow to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the beneficent, the infinitely powerful, the efficacious; but there will not follow, the ſubverſion of itſelf, the privation of counſel, the unwilling. That which follows and does not follow is, that it is one and not one. There will follow to itſelf with reſpect to other things, to govern them, to preſerve every thing, to poſſeſs the beginning and the end of all things, and to bound the whole of ſenſibles. That which does not follow is, to injure the objects of its providential care, to ſupply that which is contrary to expectation, to be the cauſe of diſorder. There will follow and not follow, the being preſent to all things, and an exemption from them; the knowing and not knowing them: for it knows them in a different manner, and not with powers coordinate to the things known. There will follow to other things with reſpect to themſelves, to ſuffer nothing caſually from each other, and that nothing will be injured by any thing. There will not follow, that any thing pertaining to them will be from

ſubject of your hypotheſis as having a ſubſiſtence or as not ſubſiſting; if, being perfectly exerciſed, you deſign through proper media to perceive the truth.

That Socrates then ſaid, You ſpeak, O Parmenides, of an employment which it is impoſſible to accompliſh, nor do I very much underſtand what you mean; but why do you not eſtabliſh a certain hypotheſis yourſelf, and enter on its diſcuſſion, that I may be the better inſtructed in this affair?

fortune, and the being uncoordinated with each other. There will follow and not follow, that all things are good; for this will partly pertain to them and partly not. To other things with reſpect to it there will follow, to be ſuſpended from it, on all ſides to be guarded and benefited by it. There will not follow, an oppoſition to it, and the poſſibility of eſcaping it. For there is nothing ſo ſmall that it can be concealed from it, nor ſo elevated that it cannot be vanquiſhed by it. There will follow and not follow, that every thing will participate of providence: for in one reſpect they partake of it, and in another not of it, but of the goods which are imparted to every thing from it.

But let providence not have a ſubſiſtence, again there will follow to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, the imperfect, the unprolific, the inefficacious, a ſubſiſtence for itſelf alone. There will not follow, the unenvying, the tranſcendently full, the ſufficient, the aſſiduous. There will follow and not follow, the unſolicitous, and the undiſturbed: for in one reſpect theſe will be preſent with that which does not providentially energize, and in another reſpect will not, in conſequence of ſecondary natures not being governed by it. But it is evident that there will follow to itſelf with reſpect to other things, the unmingled, the privation of communion with all things, the not knowing any thing. There will not follow, the aſſimilating other things to itſelf, and the imparting to all things the good that is fit. There will follow and not follow, the being deſirable to other things: for this in a certain reſpect is poſſible and not poſſible. For, if it ſhould be ſaid, that through a tranſcendency exempt from all things, it does not providentially energize, nothing hinders but that it may be an object of deſire to all ſecondary natures; but yet, conſidered as deprived of this power, it will not be deſirable. To other things with reſpect to themſelves there will follow, the unadorned, the caſual, the indefinite in paſſivity, the reception of many things adventitious in their natures, the being carried in a confuſed and diſordered manner. There will not follow, an allotment with reſpect to one thing, a diſtribution according to merit, and a ſubſiſtence according to intellect. There will follow and not follow, the being good: for, ſo far as they are beings, they muſt neceſſarily be good: and yet, providence not having a ſubſiſtence, it cannot be ſaid whence they poſſeſs good. But to other things with reſpect to providence there will follow, the not being paſſive to it, and the being uncoordinated with reſpect to it. There will not follow, the being meaſured and bounded by it. There will follow and not follow, the being ignorant of it: for it is neceſſary they ſhould know that it is not, if it is not. And it is alſo neceſſary that they ſhould not know it; for there is nothing common to them with reſpect to providence.

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That Parmenides replied, You aſſign, O Socrates, a mighty labour [1] to a man ſo old as myſelf! Will you, then, O Zeno (ſaid Socrates), diſcuſs ſomething

[1] By this Plato indicates that the enſuing diſcourſe contains much truth, as Proclus well obſerves: and if you conſider it with relation to the ſoul, you may ſay that it is not proper for one who is able to perceive intellectually divine natures, to energize through the garrulous phantaſy and body, but ſuch a one ſhould abide in his elevated place of ſurvey, and in his peculiar manners. It is laborious, therefore, for him who lives intellectually to energize logically and imaginatively, and for him who is converted to himſelf, to direct his attention to another; and to ſimplicity of knowledge the variety of reaſons is arduous. It is alſo laborious to an old man to ſwim through ſuch a ſea of arguments. The aſſertion alſo has much truth, if the ſubjects themſelves are conſidered. For frequently univerſal canons are eaſily apprehended, but no ſmall difficulty preſents itſelf to thoſe that endeavour to uſe them; as is evident in the lemmas of geometry, which are founded on univerſal aſſertions. Proclus adds, that the difficulty of this dialectic method in the uſe of it is evident, from no one after Plato having profeſſedly written upon it; and on this account, ſays he, we have endeavoured to illuſtrate it by ſo many examples.

For the ſake of the truly philoſophic reader, therefore, I ſhall ſubjoin the following ſpecimen of the dialectic method, in addition to what has been already delivered on the ſubject. The importance of ſuch illuſtrations, and the difficulty with which the compoſition of them is attended, will, I doubt not, be a ſufficient apology for its appearing in this place. It is extracted, as well as the preceding, from the admirable MS. commentary of Proclus on this dialogue.

Let it then be propoſed to conſider the conſequences of admitting or denying the perpetual exiſtence of ſoul.

If then ſoul always is, the conſequences *to itſelf, with reſpect to itſelf*, are, the ſelf-motive, the ſelf-vital, and the ſelf-ſubſiſtent: but *the things which do not follow to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf*, are, the deſtruction of itſelf, the being perfectly ignorant, and knowing nothing of itſelf. The conſequences which *follow* and *do not follow* are the indiviſible and the diviſible*, (for in a certain reſpect it is diviſible, and in a certain reſpect *indiviſible*), perpetuity and non-perpetuity of being; for ſo far as it communicates with intellect, it is eternal, but ſo far as it verges to a corporeal nature, it is mutable.

Again, *if ſoul is*, the conſequences *to itſelf with reſpect to other things*, i. e. bodies, are communication of motion, the connecting of bodies, as long as it is preſent with them, together with dominion over bodies, according to nature. *That which does not follow*, is to move externally; for it is the property of animated natures to be moved inwardly; and to be the cauſe of reſt and immutability to bodies. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow*, are, to be preſent to bodies, and yet to be preſent ſeparate from them; for ſoul is preſent to them, by its *providential energies*, but is exempt from them by its *eſſence*, becauſe this is *incorporeal*. And this is the firſt hexad.

The ſecond hexad is as follows: *if ſoul is*, the conſequence *to other things*, i. e. *bodies with reſpect to themſelves*, is ſympathy; for, according to a vivific cauſe, bodies ſympathize with each other.

* For ſoul, according to Plato, ſubſiſts between *intellect* and a corporeal nature; the former of which is perfectly *indiviſible*, and the latter perfectly *diviſible*.

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ſomething for us? And then Pythodorus related that Zeno, laughing, ſaid—We muſt requeſt Parmenides, O Socrates, to engage in this undertaking; for,

But that which does not follow, is the non-ſenſitive; for, in conſequence of there being ſuch a thing as ſoul, all things muſt neceſſarily be ſenſitive: ſome things peculiarly ſo, and others as parts of the whole. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow to bodies with reſpect to themſelves* are, that in a certain reſpect they move themſelves, through being animated, and in a certain reſpect do not move themſelves: for there are many modes of ſelf-motion.

Again, *if ſoul is, the conſequences to bodies with reſpect to ſoul* are, to be moved internally and viviſied by ſoul, to be preſerved and connected through it, and to be entirely ſuſpended from it. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, to be diſſipated by ſoul, and to be filled from it with a privation of life; for bodies receive from ſoul life and connection. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow* are, that bodies participate, and do not participate of ſoul; for ſo far as ſoul is preſent with bodies, ſo far they may be ſaid to participate of ſoul; but ſo far as it is ſeparate from them, ſo far they do not participate of ſoul. And this forms the ſecond hexad.

The third hexad is as follows: *if ſoul is not*, the conſequences *to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf* are, the non-vital, the uneſſential, and the non-intellectual; for, not having any ſubſiſtence, it has neither eſſence, nor life, nor intellect. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, the ability to preſerve itſelf, to give ſubſiſtence to, and be motive of, itſelf, with every thing elſe of this kind. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow* are, the unknown and the irrational. For not having a ſubſiſtence, it is in a certain reſpect unknown and irrational with reſpect to itſelf, as neither reaſoning nor having any knowledge of itſelf; but in another reſpect, it is neither irrational nor unknown, if it is conſidered as a certain nature, which is not rational, nor endued with knowledge.

Again, *if ſoul is not, the conſequences which follow to itſelf with reſpect to bodies* are, to be unprolific of them, to be unmingled with, and to employ no providential energies about, them. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, to move, vivify, and connect bodies. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow* are, that it is different from bodies, and that it does not communicate with them. For this in a certain reſpect is true, and not true; if that which is not ſoul is conſidered as having indeed a being, but unconnected with ſoul: for thus it is different from bodies, ſince theſe are perpetually connected with ſoul. And again, it is not different from bodies, ſo far as it has no ſubſiſtence, and is not. And this forms the third hexad.

In the fourth place, then, *if ſoul is not, the conſequences to bodies with reſpect to themſelves* are, the immovable, privation of difference according to life, and the privation of ſympathy to each other. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, a ſenſible knowledge of each other, and to be moved from themſelves. *That which follows and does not follow* is, to be paſſive to each other; for in one reſpect they would be paſſive, and in another not; ſince they would be alone corporeally and not vitally paſſive.

Again, *if ſoul is not, the conſequences to other things with reſpect to it* are, not to be taken care of, nor to be moved by ſoul. *The conſequences which do not follow* are, to be viviſied and connected by ſoul. *The conſequences which follow and do not follow* are, to be aſſimilated and not aſſimilated

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for, as he ſays, it is no trifling matter; or do you not ſee the prodigious labour of ſuch a diſcuſſion? If, therefore, many [1] were preſent, it would not

to ſoul: for, ſo far as ſoul having no ſubſiſtence, neither will bodies ſubſiſt, ſo far they will be aſſimilated to ſoul; for they will ſuffer the ſame with it; but ſo far as it is impoſſible for that which is not to be ſimilar to any thing, ſo far bodies will have no ſimilitude to ſoul. And this forms the fourth and laſt hexad.

Hence we conclude, that *ſoul* is the cauſe of life, ſympathy, and motion to bodies; and, in ſhort, of their being and preſervation: for ſoul ſubſiſting, theſe are at the ſame time introduced; but not ſubſiſting, they are at the ſame time taken away.

[1] It it unneceſſary to obſerve, that the moſt divine of dogmas are unadapted to the ears of the many, ſince Plato himſelf ſays that all theſe things are ridiculous to the multitude, but thought worthy of admiration by the wiſe. Thus alſo, ſays Proclus, the Pythagoreans aſſert, that of diſcourſes, ſome are myſtical, and others to be expoſed in open day; and the Peripatetics, that ſome are eſoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himſelf wrote ſome things according to truth, and others according to opinion; and Zeno calls ſome diſcourſes true, and others uſeful. Ουτω δε και οι Πυθαγορειοι των λογων, τους μεν εφασκον ειναι μυστικους, τους δε υπαιθριους, και οι εκ του περιπατου, τους μεν εσωτερικους, τους δε εξωτερικους, και αυτος Παρμενιδης, τα μεν προς αληθειαν εγραψε, τα δε προς δοξαν, και ο Ζηνων δε τους μεν αληθεις εκαλει των λογων, τους δε χρειωδεις.

The multitude therefore, ſays Proclus, are ignorant how great the power is of dialectic, and that the end of this wandering is truth and intellect. For it is not poſſible for us to recur from things laſt to ſuch as are firſt, except by a progreſſion through the middle forms of life. For, as our deſcent into the realms of mortality was effected through many media, the ſoul always proceeding into that which is more compoſite, in like manner our aſcent muſt be accompliſhed through various media, the ſoul reſolving her compoſite order of life. In the firſt place, therefore, it is requiſite to deſpiſe the ſenſes, as able to know nothing accurate, nothing ſane, but poſſeſſing much of the confuſed, the material, and the paſſive, in conſequence of employing certain inſtruments of this kind. After this it follows, that we ſhould diſmiſs imaginations, thoſe winged ſtymphalidæ of the ſoul, as alone poſſeſſing a *figured* intellection of things, but by no means able to apprehend unfigured and impartible form, and as impeding the pure and immaterial intellection of the ſoul, by intervening and diſturbing it in its inveſtigations. In the third place, we muſt entirely extirpate multiform opinions, and the wandering of the ſoul about theſe; for they are not converſant with the cauſes of things, nor do they procure for us ſcience, nor the participation of a ſeparate intellect. In the fourth place, therefore, we muſt haſtily return to the great ſea of the ſciences, and there, by the aſſiſtance of dialectic, ſurvey the diviſions and compoſitions of theſe, and, in ſhort, the variety of forms in the ſoul, and through this ſurvey, unweaving our vital order, behold our dianoëtic part. After this, in the fifth place, it is requiſite to ſeparate ourſelves from compoſition, and contemplate by intellectual energy true beings: for intellect is more excellent than ſcience; and a life according to intellect is preferable to that which is according to ſcience. Many, therefore, are the wanderings of the ſoul: for one of theſe is in imaginations, another in opinions, and a third in the dianoëtic power. But a life according to intellect

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not be proper to make ſuch a requeſt; for it is unbecoming, eſpecially for an old man, to diſcourſe about things of this kind before many witneſſes. For the many are ignorant that, without this diſcurſive progreſſion and wandering through all things, it is impoſſible, by acquiring the truth, to obtain the poſſeſſion of intellect. I, therefore, O Parmenides, in conjunction with Socrates, beg that you would undertake a diſcuſſion, which I have not heard for a long time. But Zeno having made this requeſt, Antiphon ſaid that Pythodorus related that he alſo, and Ariſtotle, and the reſt who were preſent, entreated Parmenides to exhibit that which he ſpoke of, and not to deny their requeſt. That then Parmenides ſaid, It is neceſſary to comply with your entreaties, though I ſhould ſeem to myſelf to meet with the fate of the Ibycean [1] horſe, to whom as a courſer, and advanced in years, when about to contend in the chariot races, and fearing through experience for the event, Ibycus comparing himſelf, ſaid—*Thus alſo I that am ſo*

is alone inerratic. And this is the myſtic port of the ſoul, into which Homer conducts Ulyſſes, after an abundant wandering of life.

[1] Parmenides, as Proclus beautifully obſerves, well knew what the wandering of the ſoul is, not only in the ſenſes, imaginations, and opinions, but alſo in the dianoëtic evolutions of arguments. Knowing this, therefore, and remembering the labours he had endured, he is afraid of again deſcending to ſuch an abundant wandering; like another Ulyſſes, after paſſing through various regions, and being now in poſſeſſion of his proper good, when called to certain ſimilar barbaric battles, he is averſe, through long experience, to depart from his own country, as remembering the difficulties which he ſuſtained in war, and his long extended wandering. Having, therefore, aſcended to reaſoning from phantaſies and the ſenſes, and to intellect from reaſoning, he is very properly afraid of a deſcent to reaſoning, and of the wandering in the dianoëtic part, leſt he ſhould in a certain reſpect become oblivious, and ſhould be drawn down to phantaſy and ſenſe. For the deſcent from intellect is not ſafe, nor is it proper to depart from things firſt, leſt we ſhould unconſciouſly abide in thoſe of a ſubordinate nature. Parmenides, therefore, being now eſtabliſhed in the port of intellect, is averſe again to deſcend to a multitude of reaſonings from an intellectual and ſimple form of energy. At the ſame time, however, he does deſcend for the ſake of benefitting ſecondary natures; for the very grace (χαρις) itſelf is an imitation of the providence of the Gods. Such, therefore, ought the deſcents of divine ſouls from the intelligible to be, coming from divine natures, knowing the evils ariſing from wandering, and deſcending for the benefit alone of fallen ſouls, and not to fill up a life enamoured with generation, nor falling profoundly, nor agglutinating themſelves to the indefinite forms of life. I only add, that Ibycus, from whom Parmenides borrows his ſimile of a horſe, was a Rheginenſian poet, and is mentioned by Cicero in Tuſcul. Quæſtion. lib. 4. Pauſan. Corinth. lib. 2. Suidas and Eraſmus in Adagiis. There are alſo two epigrams upon him in the Anthologia.

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old, am compelled to return to the ſubjects of my love; in like manner, I appear to myſelf to dread vehemently the preſent undertaking, when I call to mind the manner in which it is requiſite to ſwim over ſuch, and ſo great a ſea of diſcourſe: but yet it is neceſſary to comply, eſpecially as it is the requeſt of Zeno, for we are one and the ſame. Whence then ſhall we begin [1]; and what ſhall we firſt of all ſuppoſe? Are you willing, ſince it ſeems we muſt play a very ſerious game, that I ſhould begin from myſelf, and my own [2] hypotheſis, ſuppoſing concerning *the one itſelf, whether the one*

[1] Parmenides, ſays Proclus, deſcending to the evolution of arguments, and to ſcientifically-diſcurſive energies from his intellectual place of ſurvey, and from a form of life without, to one with habitude, aſks his participants whence he ſhall begin, and from what hypotheſis he ſhall frame, his diſcourſe; not ſuſpending his intellect from their judgment; for it is not lawful that the energy of more excellent natures ſhould be meaſured from that of ſuch as are ſubordinate; but converting them to himſelf, and exciting them to a perception of his meaning, that he may not inſert arguments in the ſtupid, as nature implants productive principles in bodies, but that he may lead them to themſelves, and that they may be impelled to *being* in conjunction with him. For thus intellect leads ſouls, not only elevating them together with itſelf, but preparing them to aſſiſt themſelves. He exhorts, therefore, his participants to attend to themſelves, and to behold whence he begins, and through what media he proceeds, but does not ſeek to learn from them what is proper on the occaſion. That this is the caſe is evident from hence, that he does not wait for their anſwer, but diſcourſes from that which appears to him to be beſt.

[2] The one method of Parmenides aſſumes one hypotheſis, and according to it frames the whole diſcourſe, this hypotheſis not being one of many, as it may appear to ſome, but that which is comprehenſive of all hypotheſes, and is one prior to the many. For it unfolds all beings, and the whole order of things, both intelligible and ſenſible, together with the unities of them, and the one ineffable unity, the fountain of all theſe. For *the one* is the cauſe of all things, and from this all things are generated in a conſequent order from the hypotheſis of Parmenides. But perhaps, ſays Proclus, ſome one may aſk us how Parmenides, who in his poems ſings concerning true or the one being, (το ἐν ον), calls *the one* his hypotheſis, and ſays that he ſhall begin from this his proper principle. Some then have ſaid that, Parmenides making *being* the whole ſubject of his diſcuſſion, Plato, finding that *the one* is beyond being and all eſſence, corrects Parmenides, and repreſents him beginning from *the one*. For, ſay they, as Gorgias and Protagoras, and each of the other perſons in his dialogues, ſpeak better in thoſe dialogues than in their own writings, ſo, likewiſe, Parmenides is more philoſophic in Plato, and more profound, than in his own compoſitions; ſince in the former he ſays, if *the one* is, it is not *one being*, as alone diſcourſing concerning *the one*, and not concerning *one being*, or *being* characterized by *the one*; and in the following hypotheſes he ſays, if *the one* is not; and laſtly, infers that if *the one* is, or is not, all things are, and are not. Parmenides, therefore, being Platonic, calls that his hypotheſis which ſuppoſes

one is, or *whether it is not*, what ought to be the conſequence? That Zeno ſaid, By all means. Who then (ſaid Parmenides) will anſwer to me? Will the

the one. In anſwer to this it may be ſaid that it is by no means wonderful if Parmenides in his poems appears to aſſert nothing concerning *the one*: for it is ineffable, and he in his poems generates all beings from the firſt being; but he might indicate ſomething concerning it, ſo far as this can be effected by diſcourſe, in his unwritten converſations with Zeno. Very properly, therefore, does he call this buſineſs concerning *the one* his own hypotheſis. Proclus adds—if, however, it be requiſite to ſpeak more truly, we may ſay, with our preceptor Syrianus, that Parmenides begins indeed from *one being*; (for the hypotheſis, if *the one is*, having the *is* together with *the one*, belongs to this order of things); but that he recurs from one being to *the one*, clearly ſhowing that *the one*, properly ſo called, wills this alone, to be *the one*, and haſtily withdraws itſelf from being. He alſo ſhows that *one being* is the ſecond from this, proceeding to being through ſubjection, but that *the one* itſelf is better than the *is*, and that if it *is*, together with the *is*, it no longer remains that which is properly *the one*. Hence, it is true that Parmenides makes *true being*, or *the one being*, the ſubject of his hypotheſis, and alſo, that through this hypotheſis he aſcends to *the one* itſelf, which Plato in the Republic denominates unhypothetic; for it is neceſſary, ſays he, always to proceed through hypotheſes, that aſcending, we may at length end in the unhypothetic one; ſince every hypotheſis is from a certain other principle. But if any one ſhould make the hypotheſis the principle, we may ſay to ſuch a one, with Plato, that where the principle is unknown, and the end and middle alſo conſiſt from things that are unknown, it is not poſſible that a thing of this kind can be ſcience. *The one* alone, therefore, is the principle, and is unhypothetic; ſo that what is made the ſubject of hypotheſis is ſomething elſe, and not *the one*. But Plato aſcends from this to *the one*, as from hypotheſis to that which is unhypothetic. Whence alſo it appears that the manner in which Parmenides manages the diſcourſe is admirable. For, if he had aſſumed the unhypothetic as an hypotheſis, and that which is without a principle as from a principle, he would not have followed the method which ſays it is entirely neceſſary to conſider what is conſequent to the hypotheſis. Or, if he had not aſſumed *the one* as an hypotheſis, but ſome one of the things more remote from *the one*, he could not eaſily have made a tranſition to it, nor would he have unfolded to us ſpontaneouſly and without violence the cauſe prior to being. That *the one*, therefore, might remain unhypothetic, and that at the ſame time he might recur from a certain proper hypotheſis to *the one*, he makes *the one being* the ſubject of his hypotheſis, which proximately ſubſiſts after *the one*, and in which, perhaps, that which is properly *the one* primarily ſubſiſts, as we ſhall ſhow at the end of the firſt hypotheſis of this dialogue. And thus he ſays that he begins from his own hypotheſis, which is *the one being*, and this is, "if *the one is*," and transferring himſelf to the unhypothetic, which is near to this, he unfolds the ſubſiſtence of all beings from the unity which is exempt from all things. Whence, ſaying that he ſhall make his own one the ſubject of hypotheſis, in evincing what things follow, and what do not follow, at one time as uſing *the one* alone, he demonſtrates the *is*, employing affirmations; but at another time he aſſumes, together with *the one*, the conception of the *is*. But he every where

the youngeſt among you do this? For the labour will be very little for him to anſwer what he thinks; and his anſwer will at the ſame time afford me a time for breathing in this arduous inveſtigation. That then Ariſtotle ſaid, I am prepared to attend you, O Parmenides; for you may call upon me as being the youngeſt. Aſk me, therefore, as one who will anſwer you.

That Parmenides ſaid, Let us then begin. If *one* [1] is, is it not true that *the*

where reaſons as looking to *the one*, either unparticipated, or participated, that he may ſhow that all things are through *the one*, and that ſeparate from *the one*, they and their very being are obliterated.

[1] In the Introduction to this Dialogue we have ſpoken concerning the number, and unfolded the meaning of the hypotheſis about *the one*; let us, therefore, with Proclus, diſcuſs a few particulars reſpecting principle, that we may more accurately underſtand the nature of *the one*. The principle, therefore, of all beings and non-beings is called *the one*, ſince to be united is good to all things, and is the greateſt of goods; but that which is entirely ſeparated from *the one* is evil, and the greateſt of evils. For diviſion becomes the cauſe of diſſimilitude, and a privation of ſympathy, and of a departure from a ſubſiſtence according to nature. Hence the principle of wholes, as ſupplying all things with the greateſt of goods, is the ſource of union to all things, and is on this account called *the one*. Hence, too, we ſay that every principle, ſo far as it is allotted this dignity in beings, is a certain *enad* or unity, and that what is moſt united in every order ranks as firſt, placing this principle not in parts, but in wholes, and not in ſome one of the many, but in the monads connective of multitude; and, in the next place, eſpecially ſurveying it in the ſummits, and that which is moſt united in monads, and according to which they are conjoined with *the one*, are deified, and ſubſiſt without proceeding, in the one principle of all things.

Thus, for inſtance, (that we may illuſtrate this doctrine by an example,) we perceive many cauſes of light, ſome of which are celeſtial, and others ſublunary; for light proceeds to our terreſtrial abode from material fire, from the moon, and from the other ſtars, and this, ſo as to be different according to the difference of its cauſe. But if we explore the one monad of all mundane light, from which other lucid natures and ſources of light derive their ſubſiſtence, we ſhall find that it is no other than the apparent orb of the ſun; for this orbicular body proceeds, as it is ſaid, from an occult and ſupermundane order, and diſſeminates in all mundane natures a light commenſurate with each.

Shall we ſay then that this apparent body is the principle of light? But this is endued with interval, and is diviſible, and light proceeds from the different parts which it contains; but we are at preſent inveſtigating the one principle of light. Shall we ſay, therefore, that the ruling ſoul of this body generates mundane light? This indeed, produces light, but not primarily, for it is itſelf multitude: and light contains a repreſentation of a ſimple and uniform ſubſiſtence. May not intellect, therefore, which is the cauſe of ſoul, be the fountain of this light? Intellect, indeed, is more united than ſoul, but is not that which is properly and primarily the principle of light. It remains, therefore, that *the one* of this intellect, its ſummit, and as it were flower, muſt be the principle of mundane light: for this is properly the ſun which reigns over the viſible place,

the one will not be many? For how can it be? It is neceſſary, therefore, that

and, according to Plato in the Republic, is the offspring of *the good*; ſince every unity proceeds from thence, and every deity is the progeny of the unity of unities, and the fountain of the Gods. And as *the good* is the principle of light to intelligibles, in like manner the unity of the ſolar order is the principle of light to all viſible natures, and is analogous to *the good*, in which it is occultly eſtabliſhed, and from which it never departs.

But this unity having an order prior to the ſolar intellect, there is alſo in intellect, ſo far as intellect, an unity participated from this unity, which is emitted into it like a ſeed, and through which intellect is united with the unity or deity of the ſun. This, too, is the caſe with the ſoul of the ſun; for this through *the one* which ſhe contains, is elevated through *the one* of intellect as a medium, to the deity of the ſun. In like manner, with reſpect to the body of the ſun, we muſt underſtand that there is in this a certain echo as it were, of the primary ſolar *one*. For it is neceſſary that the ſolar body ſhould participate of things ſuperior to itſelf; of ſoul according to the life which is diffeminated in it; of intellect according to its form; and of unity according to its one, ſince ſoul participates both of intellect and this one, and participations are different from the things which are participated. You may ſay, therefore, that the proximate cauſe of the ſolar light is this *unity* of the ſolar orb.

Again, if we ſhould inveſtigate the root as it were of all bodies, from which celeſtial and ſublunary bodies, wholes and parts, bloſſom into exiſtence, we may not improperly ſay that this is *Nature*, which is the principle of motion and reſt to all bodies, and which is eſtabliſhed in them, whether they are in motion or at reſt. But I mean by *Nature*, the one life of the world, which being ſubordinate to intellect and ſoul, participates through theſe of generation. And this indeed is more a principle than many and partial natures, but is not that which is properly the principle of bodies; for this contains a multitude of powers, and through ſuch as are different, governs different parts of the univerſe: but we are now inveſtigating the one and common principle of all bodies, and not many and diſtributed principles. If, therefore, we wiſh to diſcover this one principle, we muſt raiſe ourſelves to that which is moſt united in Nature, to its flower, and that through which it is a deity, by which it is ſuſpended from its proper fountain, connects, unites, and cauſes the univerſe to have a ſympathetic conſent with itſelf. This *one*, therefore, is the principle of all generation, and is that which reigns over the many powers of Nature, over partial natures, and univerſally over every thing ſubject to the dominion of Nature.

In the third place, if we inveſtigate the principle of knowledge, we ſhall find that it is neither phantaſy nor ſenſe; for nothing impartible, immaterial, and unfigured is known by theſe. But neither muſt we ſay that doxaſtic or dianoëtic knowledge is the principle of knowledge; for opinion does not know the cauſes of things, and the dianoëtic power, though it knows cauſes, yet apprehends the objects of its perception partially, and does not view the whole at once, nor poſſeſs an energy collective and ſimple, and which eternally ſubſiſts according to the ſame. Nor yet is intellect the principle of knowledge: for all the knowledge which it contains ſubſiſts indeed, at once, and is intranſitive and impartible. But if the knowledge of intellect was entirely without multiplication, and profoundly one, perhaps we might admit that it is the principle of knowledge.

that there ſhould neither be any part belonging to it, nor that it ſhould be a whole.

knowledge. Since however, it is not only one but various, and contains a multitude of intellections; for as the objects of intellect are ſeparated from each other, ſo alſo intellectual conceptions,—this being the caſe, intellect is not the principle of knowledge, but this muſt be aſcribed to *the one* of intellect, which is generative of all the knowledge it contains, and of all that is beheld in the ſecondary orders of beings. For this being exempt from the many, is the principle of knowledge to them, not being of ſuch a nature as the ſameneſs of intellect; ſince this is coordinate to *difference*, and is ſubordinate to eſſence. But *the one* tranſcends and is connective of an intellectual eſſence. Through this *one* intellect is a God, but not through ſameneſs, nor through eſſence: for in ſhort intellect ſo far as intellect is not a God; ſince otherwiſe a partial intellect would be a God. And the peculiarity of intellect is to underſtand and contemplate beings, and to judge; but of a God to confer unity, to generate, to energize providentially, and every thing of this kind. Intellect, therefore, by that part of itſelf which is not intellect is a God, and by that part of itſelf which is not a God, it is a divine intellect. And this unity of intellect knows itſelf indeed, ſo far as it is intellectual, but becomes intoxicated as it is ſaid with nectar, and generates the whole of knowledge, ſo far as it is the flower of intellect, and a ſupereſſential one. Again, therefore, inveſtigating the principle of knowledge, we have aſcended to *the one*; and not in theſe only, but in every thing elſe in a ſimilar manner, we ſhall find monads the leaders of their proper numbers, but the unities of monads ſubſiſting as the moſt proper principles of things. For every where *the one* is a principle, and you may ſay concerning this principle, what Socrates ſays in the Phædrus, viz. "a principle is unbegotten." For if no one of total forms can ever fail, by a much greater neceſſity the one principle of each muſt be preſerved, and perpetually remain, that about this every multitude may ſubſiſt, which originates in an appropriate manner from each. It is the ſame thing, therefore, to ſay unity and principle, if principle is every where that which is moſt characterized by unity. Hence he who diſcourſes about every *one*, will diſcourſe about principles. The Pythagoreans, therefore, thought proper to call every incorporeal eſſence *one*; but a corporeal and in ſhort partible eſſence, they denominated *other*. So that by conſidering *the one*, you will not deviate from the theory of incorporeal eſſences, and unities which rank as principles. For all the unities ſubſiſt in, and are profoundly united with each other; and their union is far greater than the communion and ſameneſs which ſubſiſt in beings. For in theſe there is indeed a mutual mixture of forms, ſimilitude and friendſhip, and a participation of each other; but the union of the Gods, as being a union of unities, is much more uniform, ineffable and tranſcendent: for here *all are in all*, which does not take place in forms or ideas *; and their unmingled purity and the characteriſtic of each, in a manner far ſurpaſſing the diverſity in ideas, preſerve their natures unconfuſed, and diſtinguiſh their peculiar powers. Hence ſome of them are more univerſal, and others more partial; ſome of them are characterized according to permanency, others according to progreſſion, and others according to converſion. Some again, are generative, others anagogic, or endued with a power of leading things back to their cauſes, and others demiurgic; and, in ſhort, there are different

* For in theſe all are in each, but not all in all.

whole [2]. Why? Is not a part a part of a whole? Certainly. But what is

characteriſtics of different Gods, viz. the connective, perfective, demiurgic, aſſimilative, and ſuch others as are celebrated poſterior to theſe, ſo that all are in all, and yet each is at the ſame time ſeparate and diſtinct.

Indeed, Proclus adds, we obtain a knowledge of their union and characteriſtics from the natures by which they are participated: for, with reſpect to the apparent Gods, we ſay that there is one ſoul of the ſun, and another of the earth, directing our attention to the apparent bodies of theſe divinities, which poſſeſs much variety in their eſſence, powers, and dignity among wholes. As, therefore, we apprehend the difference of incorporeal eſſences from ſenſible inſpection, in like manner, from the variety of incorporeal eſſences, we are enabled to know ſomething of the unmingled ſeparation of the firſt and ſupereſſential unities, and of the characteriſtics of each; for each unity has a multitude ſuſpended from its nature, which is either intelligible alone, or at the ſame time intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual alone; and this laſt is either participated or not participated, and this again is either ſupermundane or mundane: and thus far does the progreſſion of the unities extend. Surveying, therefore, the extent of every incorporeal hypoſtaſis which is diſtributed under them, and the mutation proceeding according to meaſure from the occult to that which is ſeparated, we believe that there is alſo in the unities themſelves idiom and order, together with union: for, from the difference of the participants, we know the ſeparation which ſubſiſts in the things participated; ſince they would not poſſeſs ſuch a difference with reſpect to each other if they participated the ſame thing without any variation. And thus much concerning the ſubſiſtence of the firſt unities, and their communion with, and ſeparation from, each other, the latter of which was called by the antient philoſophers, idiom, and the former, union, contradiſtinguiſhing them by names derived from the ſameneſs and difference which ſubſiſt in eſſences. For theſe unities are ſupereſſential, and, as ſome one ſays, are flowers and ſummits. However, as they contain, as we have obſerved, both union and ſeparation, Parmenides, diſcuſſing this, that he may ſupernally unfold all their progreſſion from the exempt unity, the cauſe of all things, aſſumes as an hypotheſis his own one. But this is *the one* which is beheld in beings, and this is beheld in one reſpect as *the one*, and in another as participated by being. He alſo preſerves that which has a leading dignity, ſurveying it multifariouſly, but varies that which is conſequent, that through the ſameneſs of that which leads, he may indicate the union of the divine unities: for whichever of theſe you receive, you will receive the ſame with the reſt; becauſe all are in each other, and are rooted in *the one*. For as trees by their ſummits are rooted in the earth, and are earthly according to theſe, after the ſame manner, divine natures are by their ſummits rooted in *the one*, and each of them is an enad and one, through unconfuſed union with *the one*. But through the mutation of that which is conſequent, Parmenides at one time aſſumes *whole*, at another time *figure*, and at another ſomething elſe, and theſe either affirmatively or negatively, according to the ſeparation and idiom of each of the divine orders. And, through that which is conjoined from *enad* and what is conſequent, he indicates the communion, and at the ſame time unmingled purity of each of the divine natures. Hence, one thing is the leader, but many the things conſequent, and many are the things conjoined, and many the hypotheſes.

Parmenides,

is a whole? Is not that to which no part is wanting a whole? Entirely ſo. From

Parmenides, alſo, through the hypotheſis of the one being, at one time recurs to *the one* which is prior to the participated unities, at another time diſcuſſes the extent of the unities which are in beings, and at another time diſcovers that ſubſiſtence of them which is ſubordinate to being.

Nor muſt we wonder that there ſhould be this union, and at the ſame time ſeparation, in the divine unities. For thus alſo we are accuſtomed to call the whole of an intellectual eſſence impartible and one, and all intellects one, and one all, through fameneſs which is collective and connective of every intellectual hypoſtaſis. But if we thus ſpeak concerning theſe, what ought we to think of the unities in beings? Muſt it not be that they are tranſcendently united? that their commixture cannot be ſurpaſſed? that they do not proceed from the ineffable adytum of *the one?* and that they all poſſeſs the form of *the one?* Every where, therefore, things firſt poſſeſs the form of their cauſe. Thus, the firſt of bodies is moſt vital, and is ſimilar to ſoul; the firſt of ſouls has the form of intellect; and the firſt intellect is a God. So that the firſt of numbers is uniform and enadic, or characterized by unity, and is ſupereſſential as *the one.* Hence, if they are unities and number, there is there both multitude and union.

Again, the ſcope of this firſt hypotheſis, as we have obſerved in the Introduction, is concerning the firſt God alone, ſo far as he is generative of the multitude of Gods, being himſelf exempt from this multitude, and uncoordinated with his offſpring. Hence, all things are denied of this one, as being eſtabliſhed above, and exempt from, all things, and as ſcattering all the idioms of the Gods, at the ſame time that he is uncircumſcribed by all things. For he is not a certain one, but ſimply one, and is neither intelligible nor intellectual, but the ſource of the ſubſiſtence of both the intelligible and intellectual unities. For it is requiſite in every order which ranks as a principle that imparticipable and primary form ſhould be the leader of participated multitude. Thus, immaterial are prior to material forms. Thus, too, a ſeparate life, unmingled, and ſubſiſting from itſelf, is prior to the life which ſubſiſts in another; for every where things ſubſiſting in themſelves precede thoſe which give themſelves up to ſomething elſe. Hence, imparticipable ſoul, which revolves in the ſuperceleſtial place, is the leader, according to eſſence, of the multitude of ſouls, and of thoſe which are diſtributed in bodies. And one, imparticipable intellect, ſeparate, eternally eſtabliſhed in itſelf, and ſupernally connecting every intellectual eſſence, precedes the multitude of intellects. The firſt intelligible alſo, unmingled, and uniformly eſtabliſhed in itſelf, is expanded above the multitude of intelligibles. For the intelligible which is in every intellect is different from that which is eſtabliſhed in itſelf; and the latter is intelligible alone, but the former is intelligible as in intellectuals. The imparticipable one, therefore, is beyond the many and participated unities, and is exempt, as we have before ſaid, from all the divine orders Such, then, is the ſcope of the firſt hypotheſis, viz. to recur from the one being, or in other words, the firſt and higheſt being, to that which is truly the one, and to ſurvey how he is exempt from wholes, and how he is connumerated with none of the divine orders.

In the next place, let us conſider what mode of diſcourſe is adapted to ſuch a theory, and how the interpretation of what is before us may be properly undertaken. It appears, then, that this

can

From both theſe conſequences, therefore, *the one* would be compoſed of parts,

can only be effected by energizing logically, intellectually, and at the ſame time divinely, that we may be able to apprehend the demonſtrative power of Parmenides, may follow his intuitive perceptions which adhere to true beings, and may in a divinely inſpired manner recur to the ineffable and uncircumſcribed coſenſation of *the one*. For we contain the images of firſt cauſes, and participate of total ſoul, the intellectual extent, and of divine unity. It is requiſite, therefore, that we ſhould excite the powers of theſe which we contain, to the apprehenſion of the things propoſed. Or how can we become near to *the one*, unleſs by exciting *the one* of our ſoul, which is as it were an image of the ineffable one? And how can we cauſe this one and flower of the ſoul to diffuſe its light, unleſs we firſt energize according to intellect? For intellectual energy leads the ſoul to the tranquil energy according to *the one* which we contain. And how can we perfectly obtain intellectual energy, unleſs we proceed through logical conceptions, and prior to more ſimple intellections, employ ſuch as are more compoſite? Demonſtrative power, therefore, is requiſite in the aſſumptions; but intellectual energy in the inveſtigations of beings; (for the orders of being are denied of *the one*) and a divinely-inſpired impulſe in the coſenſation of that which is exempt from all beings, that we may not unconſciouſly, through an indefinite phantaſy, be led from negations to non-being, and its dark immenſity. Let us, therefore, by exciting *the one* which we contain, and through this, cauſing the ſoul to revive, conjoin ourſelves with *the one itſelf*, and eſtabliſh ourſelves in it as in a port, ſtanding above every thing intelligible in our nature, and diſmiſſing every other energy, that we may aſſociate with it alone, and may, as it were, dance round it, abandoning thoſe intellections of the ſoul which are employed about ſecondary concerns. The mode of diſcourſe, then, muſt be of this kind, viz. logical, intellectual, and entheaſtic: for thus only can the propoſed hypotheſis be apprehended in a becoming manner.

In the third place, let us conſider what the negations are, and whether they are better or worſe than affirmations: for affirmation appears to all men to be more venerable than negation; negation, ſay they, being a privation, but affirmation the preſence and a certain habit of form. To forms, indeed, and to things inveſted with form, affirmation is better than negation; for it is neceſſary that their own habit ſhould be preſent with forms, and that privation ſhould be abſent, and, in ſhort, to be is more accommodated to beings than not to be, and affirmation than negation: for being is the paradigm of affirmation, but non-being of negation. But it is not immanifeſt how Plato in the Sophiſta ſays that *non-being*, by which he means *difference*, is related to being, and that it is not leſs than being. Since, however, *non-being* is multifarious, one kind ſubſiſting as more excellent than, another as coordinated with, and a third as a privation of, *being*, it is evident that we may alſo ſpeculate three ſpecies of negations; one above affirmation, another inferior to affirmation, and a third in a certain reſpect equal to it. Affirmation, therefore, is not always uniformly more excellent than negation, ſince, when negation ſpeaks of that non-being which is above being, affirmation is allotted the ſecond order. But ſince this non-being is alſo twofold, one kind being participated by being, viz. the divine unities; the immediate progeny of *the one*, and the other, viz. the ineffable principle of things, not being connumerated with

parts, being a whole and poſſeſſing parts? It is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo. And

with any being, it is evident that to this latter affirmation is not by any means adapted, and that to the former negation more properly belongs than affirmation; though in a certain reſpect affirmation is adapted to this ſo far as it communicates with being. However, though nothing can be truly ſaid of that non-being which is uncoordinated with being, yet negation may be more properly aſſerted of it than affirmation; for, as affirmations belong to beings, ſo negations to non-being. In ſhort, affirmation wiſhes to be converſant with a certain form; and when the ſoul ſays that one thing is preſent to another, and makes an affirmation, it adduces ſome of the kindred natures which it contains. But the firſt cauſe of all is above form, and it is not proper to introduce to it any thing belonging to ſecondary natures, nor transfer to it things adapted to us: for we ſhall thus deceive ourſelves, and not aſſert what the firſt is. We cannot, therefore, in a becoming manner employ affirmations in ſpeaking of this cauſe, but rather negations of ſecondary natures; for affirmations haſten to know ſomething of one thing as preſent with another. But that which is firſt is unknown by the knowledge which is connate with beings, and nothing can be admitted as belonging to, or preſent with, it, but rather as not preſent: for it is exempt from all compoſition and participation. To which we may add, that affirmations manifeſt ſomething definite; for non-man is more infinite than man. The incomprehenſible and uncircumſcribed nature of *the one* is therefore more adapted to be manifeſted through negations: for affirmations may be ſaid to vanquiſh beings, but negations poſſeſs a power of expanding from things circumſcribed to the uncircumſcribed, and from things diſtributed in proper boundaries to the indefinite. Can it, therefore, be ſaid that negations are not more adapted to the contemplation of *the one?* For its ineffable, incomprehenſible, and unknown nature can alone through theſe be declared, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, to partial intellectual conceptions ſuch as ours. Negations, therefore, are better than affirmations, and are adapted to ſuch as are aſcending from the partial to the total, from the coordinated to the uncoordinated, and from the circumſcribed and vanquiſhed form of knowledge to the uncircumſcribed, ſingle, and ſimple form of energy.

In the fourth place, let us conſider how, and after what manner, negations are adapted to the firſt cauſe. They muſt not then be adapted as in things capable of receiving negation, but yet which do not receive it, as if we ſhould ſay that Socrates is not white: for, in ſhort, *the one* does not receive any thing, but is exempt from every being, and all participation. Nor, again, muſt negation be adapted to *the one*, as in that which in no reſpect receives negation, which poſſeſſes a privation of it, and is unmingled with form; as if any one ſhould ſay that a line is not white, becauſe it is without any participation of whiteneſs. For that which is firſt is not ſimply divulſed from its negations; nor are theſe entirely void of communion with *the one*, but they are thence produced: nor can it be ſaid that, as whiteneſs neither generates a line, nor is generated by it, ſo things poſterior to *the one* neither generate *the one*, nor are generated by it; for they thence derive their ſubſiſtence. Nor yet muſt negation be applied according to that middle mode, in which we ſay, that things do not receive indeed, but are the cauſes to others in which they are inherent, of receiving affirmation; as, for inſtance, motion is not moved, but that which is in motion. Negation, therefore, is predicated of it, viz. the not being moved, though other things

And ſo both ways *the one* will be many, and not one. True. But it is neceſſary

are moved through it. And, in ſhort, every paſſion is itſelf impaſſive; ſince, being ſimple, it either is or is not. But that which ſuffers, or the paſſive ſubject, is through paſſion a compoſite. Negations, therefore, are not after this manner denied of *the one*; for neither is *the one* ingenerated in any thing, but is the cauſe of all the affirmations, the negations of which we introduce to it; but it is by no means ingenerated in thoſe things of which it is the cauſe. It may be concluded, therefore, that as *the one* is the cauſe of wholes, ſo negations are the cauſes of affirmations; whence ſuch things as the ſecond hypotheſis affirms, the firſt denies. For all thoſe affirmations proceed from theſe negations; and *the one* is the cauſe of all things, as being prior to all things: for, as ſoul, being incorporeal, produces body, and as intellect, by not being ſoul, gives ſubſiſtence to ſoul, ſo *the one*, being void of multitude, gives ſubſiſtence to all multitude, and, being without number and figure, produces number and figure; and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other things: for it is no one of the natures which it produces; ſince neither is any other cauſe the ſame with its progeny. But if it is no one of the natures to which it gives ſubſiſtence, and at the ſame time gives ſubſiſtence to all things, it is no one of all things. If, therefore, we know all things affirmatively, we manifeſt *the one* negatively, by denying every thing of it; and ſo this form of negation is generative of the multitude of affirmations. Thus, the unfigured, when applied to *the one*, is not like that of matter, which is beheld according to a privation of figure, but it is that which generates and produces the order which ſubſiſts according to figure.

With reſpect to matter, therefore, negations are worſe than affirmations, becauſe they are privations, but affirmations are participations of which matter is eſſentially deprived. But, with reſpect to beings, negations are conjoined with affirmations: and when applied to *the one*, they ſignify tranſcendency of cauſe, and are better than affirmations. Hence, negations of things ſubordinate are verified in cauſes poſterior to *the one*. Thus, when we ſay that the ſoul neither ſpeaks nor is ſilent, we do not aſſert theſe things reſpecting it as of ſtones and pieces of wood, or any other inſenſible thing, but as of that which is generative in an animal of both voice and ſilence. And again, we ſay that nature is neither white nor black, but uncoloured, and without interval. But is ſhe without theſe in the ſame manner as matter? By no means: for ſhe is better than the things denied. But ſhe is uncoloured, and without interval, as generative of all various colours and intervals. In the ſame manner, therefore, we ſay that the monad is without number, not as being ſubordinate to numbers and indefinite, but as generating and bounding numbers. I mean the firſt monad, and that which we ſay contains all the forms of numbers. All, therefore, that is denied of *the one*, proceeds from it: for it is neceſſary that it ſhould be none of all things, that all things may be its offspring. Hence, it appears that Plato often denies of *the one* things which are oppoſite to each other, ſuch as that it is neither *whole* nor *part*, neither *ſame* nor *different*, neither *permanent* nor in *motion*: for it is expanded above all habitude, and is pure from every duad, being the cauſe of all the multitude of theſe, of twofold coordinations, of the firſt duad, and of all habitude and oppoſition. For nature is the cauſe of all corporeal oppoſitions, the ſoul of all vital cauſes, and intellect of the genera pertaining to ſoul. But *the one* is ſimply the cauſe of all diviſions: for it cannot be ſaid that it is the cauſe of ſome, and not the

cauſe

ceſſary that it ſhould not be many, but one. It is neceſſary [3]. Hence, it will

cauſe of others. The cauſe, however, of all oppoſition is not itſelf oppoſed to any thing: for, if it were, it would be requiſite that there ſhould be ſome other cauſe of this oppoſition, and *the one* would no longer be the cauſe of all things. Hence, negations are generative of affirmations: thoſe which are aſſumed in the firſt hypotheſis of thoſe which are inveſtigated in the ſecond: for whatever the firſt cauſe generates in the firſt hypotheſis is generated and proceeds in its proper order in the ſecond. And thus the order of the Gods ſubſiſting from exempt unity is demonſtrated.

But here, perhaps, ſome one may aſk us whether we uſe negations through the imbecility of human nature, which is not able firmly to apprehend the ſimplicity of *the one*, through a certain projection of intellect, and adheſive viſion and knowledge? or whether natures better than our ſoul know *the one* negatively in an analogous manner? We reply, therefore, that intellect by its perceptions which are conjoined with forms, knows forms, and comprehends intelligibles, and this is a certain affirmative knowledge: for *that which is*, approaches to *that which is*, and intellect is that which it underſtands through the intellectual perception of itſelf. But, by an unity above intellect, it is conjoined with *the one*, and through this union knows *the one*, by not being that which is *being*. Hence, it knows *the one* negatively: for it poſſeſſes a twofold knowledge, one kind as intellect, the other as not intellect; one as knowing itſelf, the other becoming inebriated, as ſome one ſays, and agitated with divine fury from nectar; and one ſo far as it is, but the other ſo far as it is not, Much-celebrated intellect itſelf, therefore, poſſeſſes both a negative and affirmative knowledge of *the one*. But if intellect, divine ſouls alſo, according to their ſummits and unities, energize enthuſiaſtically about *the one*, and are eſpecially *divine* ſouls on account of this energy; but, according to their *intellectual* powers, they are ſuſpended from intellect, round which they harmonically dance. According to their *rational* powers they know themſelves, preſerve their own eſſence with purity, and evolve the productive principles which they contain; but, according to thoſe powers which are characterized by *opinion*, they comprehend and govern in a becoming manner all ſenſible natures. And all the other kinds of knowledge which they poſſeſs are indeed affirmative: for they know beings as they are; and this is the peculiarity of affirmation. But the enthuſiaſtic energy about *the one* is in theſe a negative knowledge: for they do not know that *the one* IS, but that he IS NOT, according to that which is better than the IS. The intellection, however, of that which is not, is negation. If, therefore, both divine ſouls and much celebrated intellect itſelf knew *the one* through negation, what occaſion is there to deſpiſe the imbecility of our ſoul, earneſtly endeavouring to manifeſt negatively its uncircumſcribed nature? For nothing pertaining to *the firſt* is ſuch as we are accuſtomed to know, i. e. a certain quality of a thing, as Plato ſays in his ſecond Epiſtle. This, however, is the cauſe of every thing beautiful in the ſoul, viz. to inveſtigate the characteriſtic of the firſt, to commit in a becoming manner the knowledge of him to the reaſoning power, and to excite *the one* which we contain, that, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, we may know the ſimilar by the ſimilar, ſo far as it is poſſible to be known by our order: for, as by opinion we know the objects of opinion, and by the dianoëtic

will neither be a whole, nor poſſeſs parts, if *the one* is one. It will not. If,

power dianoëtic objects, and as by our intellectual part we know that which is intelligible, ſo by our *one* we know *the one*.

Again, in the fifth place, let us conſider whether Plato denies all things of *the one*, or, if not all, what thoſe are which he denies, and why he proceeds as far as to theſe. But in the firſt place, it will, perhaps, be proper to enumerate all the particulars which in the firſt hypotheſis are denied of *the one*. Theſe then are in order as follow: that it is not many; that it is neither whole nor part; that it has neither a beginning, nor middle, nor end; that it has no boundary; that it is without figure; is neither in another nor in itſelf; is neither in motion nor at reſt; is neither ſame nor different; is neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar; is neither equal, nor greater nor leſſer; is neither older nor younger; that it participates in no reſpect of generation or time; that neither does it participate of being; that it cannot be named, and is not effable; and that it is neither the object of opinion nor ſcience. Theſe, then, are briefly what the firſt hypotheſis denies of *the one*; but why theſe alone, we now propoſe to inveſtigate: for Proclus informs us, that to ſome philoſophers prior to him this was a ſubject of much doubt. Some, ſays he, were of opinion, that whatever the ten categories of Ariſtotle contain is enumerated in theſe negations. However, as he juſtly obſerves, not theſe alone, but many other things are contained under the ten categories, which are not mentioned by Parmenides. Others aſſerted, that theſe negations were comprehended in the five genera of being, viz. eſſence, ſameneſs, and difference, motion and permanency. However, not theſe only are denied of *the one*, but likewiſe *figure*, *the whole*, *time*, *number*, and the ſimilar, and the diſſimilar, which are not genera of being. But thoſe, ſays he, ſpeak the moſt probably who wiſh to ſhow that all theſe negations ſubſiſt in the monad. For the monad contains occultly many things, ſuch as whole, and parts, and figures, and is both in itſelf and in another, ſo far as it is preſent to whatever proceeds from itſelf. It alſo is permanent and is moved, abiding and at the ſame time proceeding, and, in being multiplied, never departing from itſelf: and in a ſimilar manner other things may be ſhown to belong to the monad. That theſe things indeed ſubſiſt in the monad may be readily granted, and alſo, that the monad is an imitation of intellect, ſo that by a much greater priority all theſe are cauſally comprehended in intellect. Hence, theſe things are denied of *the one*, becauſe it is above intellect and every intellectual eſſence. For theſe things, ſays Proclus, Parmenides alſo ſurveying in his verſes concerning true being, ſays, that it contains the ſphere, and the whole, the ſame, and the different. For he celebrates true being as ſimilar to a perfect ſphere, every where equal from the middle, and rejoicing in revolving manſion. He alſo denominates it perfectly entire and unmoved. So that all theſe ſubſiſt primarily in intellect, but ſecondarily, and after the manner of an image, in the monad, and every thing ſenſible, phyſically in this, and mathematically in that. For intellect is an intelligible ſphere, the monad a dianoëtic ſphere, and this world a ſenſible ſphere, bearing in itſelf the images of the perpetual Gods.

However, the patrons of this opinion cannot aſſign the cauſe why the particulars which Parmenides denies are alone aſſumed, but by no means neither more nor leſs. For neither are theſe things

If, therefore, it has no part, it neither poſſeſſes beginning, middle, nor end;

things alone in the monad, but many others alſo may be found, ſuch as the even and the odd, and each of the forms ſubſiſting under theſe. Why, therefore, theſe alone from among all are aſſumed, they aſſign no clear reaſon. Our preceptor, therefore, Syrianus, ſays Proclus, is the only one we are acquainted with who perfectly accords with Plato in the knowledge of divine concerns. He therefore perceived, that all ſuch things * as are affirmed in the ſecond are denied of *the one* in the firſt hypotheſis; and that each of theſe is a ſymbol of a certain divine order; ſuch as the many, the whole, figure, the being in itſelf and in another, and each of the conſequent negations. For all things are not ſimilarly apparent in every order of being; but in one multitude, and in another a different idiom of divine natures is conſpicuous. For, as we learn in the Sophiſta, *the one being*, or, in other words, the higheſt being, has the firſt rank, *whole* the ſecond, and *all* the third. And in the Phædrus, after the intelligible Gods, an eſſence without *colour*, without *figure*, and without *touch*, is the firſt in order, *colour* is the ſecond, and *figure* the third; and in other things, in a ſimilar manner, an unfolding of different things takes place in a different order of being. If, therefore, all theſe things manifeſt the extent of the firſt being, but, according to Plato, *the one* is beyond all beings, with great propriety are theſe things alone denied of *the one*. How each of theſe is diſtributed in the divine orders, we ſhall know more accurately in the ſecond hypotheſis. It is apparent, therefore, what are the particulars which are denied of *the one*, and that ſo many alone are neceſſarily denied: for ſo many are the enumerated orders of true beings. Thus much, however, is now evident, that all the negations are aſſumed from the idiom of being, and not from the idiom of knowledge. For to will, and to deſire, and every thing of this kind, are the peculiarities of vital beings; but to perceive intellectually, or dianoëtically, or ſenſibly, is the idiom of gnoſtic beings. But theſe negations are common to all beings whatever. For the hypotheſis was, If *the one* is, ſo many things will follow as negations of *the one*, that at laſt it may be inferred if *the one* is, this *one is* not, as being better than the *is*: for it is the recipient of nothing, which is conſequent to the *is*. And it appears that thoſe alone are the things which belong to beings, ſo far as they are beings; which the ſecond hypotheſis affirms, and the firſt denies; and we ſhall not find things common to all beings, except theſe. But, of theſe, the higher are more total, but the others more partial. Hence, by taking away the higher, Plato alſo takes away thoſe in a following order, according to the hypotheſis. He has, therefore, in a wonderful manner diſcovered what are the things conſequent to being, ſo far as being, as he was willing to ſhow that *the one* is beyond all beings.

But if any one ſhould think that this hypotheſis collects things impoſſible, he ſhould call to mind what is written in the Sophiſta, in which the Eleatean gueſt examines the aſſertion of Parmenides concerning being, and clearly ſays that *the one* truly ſo called muſt *neceſſarily* be impartible, or without parts (αμερες γαρ δει το ως αληθως εν). So that, this being granted, all the concluſions of the firſt hypotheſis muſt unavoidably follow, as in every reſpect true, and as alone according with that which is truly *the one*. For it is abſurd to admit that true being has a ſubſiſtence, and

* Viz. Such things as are reſpectively characteriſtic of the divine orders.

not

end[4]; for ſuch as theſe would be its parts? Right. But end and beginning

not only true being, but alſo the truly equal, the truly beautiful, and every other form, but that the true one ſhould no where ſubſiſt, but ſhould be a name alone, though by this all beings are preſerved and have a ſubſiſtence. But if it is, it is evident that it is not many: for it would not be the true one, if it were replete with any thing; ſince the many are not one. If, therefore, it is not many, again the whole of the firſt hypotheſis will follow, this being aſſumed; and it is by no means proper to accuſe it as aſſerting impoſſibilities.

Again, in the ſixth place, let us conſider concerning the order of the negations: for, if they originate ſupernally and from things firſt, how does he firſt of all take away the many, and, in the laſt place, being, and even *the one* itſelf? *The one*, therefore, appears to us to be more venerable than multitude, and *being* itſelf as among beings is moſt venerable. But if they originate from things laſt, how, after the genera of being, does he aſſume the ſimilar and diſſimilar, the equal and unequal, the greater and the leſſer? For theſe are ſubordinate to the genera of being. It is better, therefore, to ſay, that he begins ſupernally, and proceeds through negations as far as to the laſt of things. For thus alſo in the Phædrus, denying of the ſummit of the intellectual orders, things conſequent to, and proceeding from it, he makes the ablation, beginning ſupernally; in the firſt place, aſſerting that it is without colour, in the next place, without figure, and, in the third place, without contact. For here *colour* ſymbolically ſignifies that middle order of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual Gods, which is called by theologiſts *ſynochike* (συνοχικη) or *connective*; but *figure* indicates the extremity of that order, which is denominated *teleſiurgic*, (τελεσιουργικη) or *the ſource of perfection*; and *contact* ſignifies the intellectual order. In like manner here alſo the negations begin ſupernally, and proceed together with the ſeries of the divine orders, of all which *the one* is the generative ſource. But that at the end he ſhould take away *the one* itſelf, and being, is by no means wonderful. For, if we follow the whole order of the diſcourſe, this will become moſt apparent. For it is immediately evident, that in affirmative concluſions it is requiſite to begin from things moſt allied, and through theſe to evince things leſs allied, which are conſequent; but in negative concluſions it is neceſſary to begin from things moſt foreign, and through theſe to ſhow things leſs foreign, which are not conſequent to the hypotheſis. For it is requiſite, ſays Plato, that thoſe who uſe this method ſhould begin from things moſt known. Hence he firſt denies *many* of the one, and laſt of all *the one* that *is*, which is by poſition moſt allied to *the one*, but is participated by eſſence, and on this account is a certain one, and not ſimply one. Hence it is neceſſary, ſince the concluſions are negative, that the beginning of all the hypotheſis ſhould be *not many*, and the end *not one*.

In the ſeventh place, let us conſider what we are to underſtand by the *many*, which Plato firſt denies of *the one*. Some of the antients then, ſays Proclus, aſſert that multitude of every kind is here taken away from *the one*, becauſe *the one* tranſcends all multitude, both intelligible and ſenſible. But theſe ſhould recollect, that in the ſecond hypotheſis *the many* is affirmed. What ſenſible multitude then can we behold there? For all things are aſſerted of true beings, becauſe *the one* is there equal to *being*. Others more venerable than theſe aſſert that *intellectual multitude* is denied of *the one*. For the firſt cauſe, ſay they, is one without multitude; intellect, *one many*;

foul,

ning are the bounds of every thing? How ſhould they not? *The one*, therefore,

ſoul, *one* and *many*, through its diviſible nature, being indigent of copula; body, *many* and *one*, as being a diviſible nature characterized by multitude; and matter, *many* alone. This *many*, therefore, viz. intellectual multitude, Parmenides takes away from the firſt cauſe, that he may be one alone, and above intellect. It is proper, therefore, to aſk theſe, what intellect they mean? For, if that which is properly intellect, and which is ſecondary to the intelligible, not only *the one* is beyond intellectual multitude, but the intelligible alſo, as being better than intellect. But if they call the whole of an intelligible eſſence intellect, as was the caſe with the followers of Plotinus, they are ignorant of the difference which ſubſiſts in the Gods, and of the generation of things proceeding according to meaſure. Other philoſophers, therefore, more entheaſtic than theſe, diſmiſſing ſenſible, and not even admitting intellectual multitude, ſay that prior to the intellectual numbers are the intelligible monads, from which every intellectual multitude and the many divided orders are unfolded into light. Plato, therefore, takes away from *the one*, the multitude which is intelligible, as ſubſiſting proximately after *the one*, but he does not take away intellectual multitude. For it is by no means wonderful that *the one* ſhould be exempt from intellectual multitude, above which the intelligible monads alſo are expanded. And hence the diſcourſe, being divine, recurs to certain more ſimple cauſes. It is neceſſary however to underſtand that there are many orders in intelligibles, and that three triads are celebrated in them by theologiſts, as we ſhall ſhow when we come to the ſecond hypotheſis. But, if this be admitted, it is evident that theſe *many* muſt be the firſt and intelligible multitude: for theſe ſo far as many alone ſubſiſt from *the one*; and from theſe the triadic ſupernally proceeds as far as to the laſt of things in the intellectual, ſupermundane, and ſenſible orders; and whatever is allotted a being participates of this triad. Hence, ſome of the antients, aſcending as far as to this order, conſidered its ſummit as the ſame with *the one*. We muſt either, therefore, admit that *the many* which are now denied of *the one* ſubſiſt according to the intelligible multitude, or that they are the firſt multitude in the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual orders. Indeed, the many unities are not in the intelligible Gods, but in thoſe immediately poſterior to them. For there is one unity in each intelligible triad; but the multitude of unities is firſt apparent in the firſt order of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual Gods. Thus much, therefore, muſt now be admitted, that Plato exempts *the one* from all the multitude of theſe unities, as being generative of and giving ſubſiſtence to it; and this he does, by aſſuming from our common conceptions that *the one* is not many. But at the end of the hypotheſis, he takes away intelligible multitude itſelf from *the one*, conjoining the end with the beginning: for he there ſhows that *the one* is not *being*, according to which the intelligible order is characterized.

It is likewiſe neceſſary to obſerve, that Plato does not think that the aſſertion, '*the one* is not many,' requires demonſtration, or any confirmation of its truth; but he aſſumes it according to common and unperverted conception. For, in ſpeculations concerning the firſt cauſe of all things, it is eſpecially neceſſary to excite common conceptions; ſince all things are ſpontaneouſly arranged after it, and without labour, both ſuch as energize according to intellect, and thoſe that energize according to nature only. And, in ſhort, it is neceſſary that the indemonſtrable

ſhould

therefore, is infinite[5], if it has neither beginning nor end? Infinite. And without

ſhould be the principle of all demonſtration, and that common conceptions ſhould be the leaders of demonſtrations, as alſo geometricians aſſert. But there is nothing more known and clear to us than that *the one* is not *many*.

[2] It is neceſſary, ſays Proclus, that the firſt negation of *the one* ſhould be that it is not *many*; for *the one* is firſt generative of *the many*; ſince, as we have before obſerved, the firſt and the higheſt multitude proceeds from *the one*. But the ſecond negation after this is, that *the one* is neither a whole, nor has any part: for it gives ſubſiſtence to this order, in the ſecond place, after the firſt multitude. This will be evident from conſidering in the firſt place logically, that in negative concluſions, when through the ablation of that which precedes we collect a negative concluſion, that which precedes is more powerful; but that when through the ablation of that which is conſequent we ſubvert that which precedes, that which is conſequent; and, in ſhort, that which by the ſubverſion of itſelf takes away that which remains, whether it precedes or follows, is more powerful. Thus, if we ſay, If there is not *being*, there is not *man*; but alſo, If there is not animal, there is not man: animal, therefore, is more univerſal than man. Let this then be one of the things to be granted; but another which muſt be admitted is as follows:—Every thing which is more comprehenſive than another according to power, is nearer to *the one*. For, ſince *the one itſelf* is, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, the moſt comprehenſive of all things, and there is nothing which it does not ineffably contain, not even though you ſhould adduce privation itſelf, and the moſt evaneſcent of things, ſince, if it has any ſubſiſtence, it muſt neceſſarily be in a certain reſpect one;—this being the caſe, things alſo which are nearer to *the one* are more comprehenſive than thoſe which are more remote from it; imitating the uncircumſcribed cauſe, and the infinite tranſcendency of *the one*. Thus *being*, as it is more comprehenſive than life and intellect, is nearer to *the one*; and life is nearer to it than intellect. Theſe two axioms being admitted, let us ſee how Parmenides ſyllogizes. If *the one*, ſays he, is a whole, or has parts, it is many; but it is not many, as was before ſaid: neither, therefore, will it be a whole, nor will it have parts. And again, If *the one* is not many, it is neither a whole, nor has parts. In both theſe inſtances, by the ſubverſion of the many, *parts* alſo and *whole* are ſubverted. But our poſition is, that whatever together with itſelf ſubverted that which remains in things conjoined, is more powerful and more comprehenſive; but that which is more comprehenſive is nearer to *the one*. Hence, *many* is nearer to *the one* than *parts* and *whole*. For *parts* are *many*, but *many* are not entirely *parts*. So that *the many* are more comprehenſive than *parts*, and are therefore beyond them. *The many*, therefore, firſt ſubſiſt in beings; and in the ſecond place, whole and parts. Hence, *the one* produces the firſt by itſelf alone, but the ſecond through the many. For firſt natures, in proceeding from their cauſes, always produce, together with their cauſes, things conſequent. Since, therefore, the negations generate the affirmations, it is evident that the firſt generates ſuch of theſe as are firſt, but the ſecond ſuch as are ſecond. We may alſo ſee the geometrical order which Plato here obſerves: for that *the one* is not many, is aſſumed as an axiom, and as a common conception; but that it is neither a whole, nor has parts, is collected through this common conception. And again, that *the one* has neither beginning nor end, is demonſtrated through the prior con-

6 cluſion;

without figure [6], therefore, for it neither participates of the round [7] figure nor

cluſion; and thus always in ſucceſſion according to the truly golden chain of beings, in which all things are indeed from *the one*, but ſome immediately, others through one medium, others through two, and others through many. After this manner, therefore, it may be logically demonſtrated that theſe *many* are prior to *whole* and parts.

If we wiſh, however, to ſee this in a manner more adapted to things themſelves, we may ſay that the many, ſo far as many, have one cauſe, *the one*: for all multitude is not derived from any thing elſe than *the one*; ſince alſo, with reſpect to the multitude of beings, ſo far as they are intelligible, they are from being, but, ſo far as they are multitude, they ſubſiſt from *the one*. For, if multitude was derived from any other cauſe than *the one*, that cauſe again muſt neceſſarily either be one, or nothing, or not one. But if nothing, it could not be a cauſe. And if it was not one, not being one, it would in no reſpect differ from the many, and therefore would not be the cauſe of the many, ſince cauſe every where differs from its progeny. It remains, therefore, either that the many are without cauſe, and are uncoordinated with each other, and are infinitely infinite, having no *one* in them, or that *the one* is the cauſe of being to the many. For either each of *the many* is not one, nor that which ſubſiſts from all of them, and thus all things will be infinitely infinite; or each is indeed one, but that which conſiſts from all is not one: and thus they will be uncoordinated with each other; for, being coordinated, they muſt neceſſarily participate of *the one*: or, on the contrary, that which conſiſts from all is one, but each is not one, and thus each will be infinitely infinite, in conſequence of participating no *one*: or, laſtly, both that which conſiſts from all and each muſt participate of *the one*, and in this caſe, prior to them, there muſt neceſſarily be that which is the ſource of union both to the whole and parts, and which is itſelf neither a whole, nor has parts; for, if it had, this again would be indigent of *the one*; and if we proceed to infinity, we ſhall always have *the one* prior to whole and parts. To this we may alſo add, that if there was another cauſe of the many beſides *the one*, there would be no multitude of unities. If, therefore, there are many unities, the cauſe of this multitude ſo far as multitude is *the one*: for the primary cauſe of unities is *the one*, and on this account they are called unities. But the multitude of beings is from the multitude of unities; ſo that all multitude is from *the one*. But whole and parts belong to beings: for, though *whole* ſhould be *the one being*, it is evident that, together with being, it is a *whole*, though it ſhould be *the participated one*. This alſo entirely conſubſiſts with being; and though it ſhould be *being* alone, this is immediately eſſence. If, therefore, whole and part are beings, either eſſentially or according to participation, theſe alſo will indeed be produced from *the one*, but from eſſence alſo, if whole and part belong to beings. Hence, *whole* is a certain being. For all ſuch things as participate of eſſential wholeneſs, theſe alſo participate of eſſence, but not all ſuch things as participate of eſſence participate alſo of wholeneſs. Thus, for inſtance, parts, ſo far as they are parts, partake of eſſence, but ſo far as they are parts they do not participate of wholeneſs. But if this be the caſe, eſſence is beyond eſſential wholeneſs. And hence, the eſſential whole participates of eſſence, and is not the ſame with it. Thus, alſo, if there is any wholeneſs which is characterized by unity, it participates of *the one*: a part however characterized by unity muſt indeed

nor the ſtraight. Why not? For the round figure is that, the extremities of

neceſſarily participate of *the one*, but is not neceſſarily a whole; ſince indeed it is impoſſible it ſhould be, ſo far as it is a part. Whole and part, therefore, are either eſſential or characterized by unity: for whole and part ſubſiſt both in eſſences and in unities. *The one*, therefore, is beyond whole and parts, both the eſſential, and thoſe characterized by *the one*: and not this only, but the many alſo ſubſiſt prior to whole and parts. For each, as we have ſhown, is in a certain reſpect many; but the firſt *many* alone participate of *the one*. *The many*, therefore, are beyond *whole* and *parts*.

And here it is neceſſary to obſerve, that in the firſt part of this firſt hypotheſis Plato aſſumes ſuch things as do not follow to *the one* conſidered with reſpect to itſelf. For we aſſert, that *the one* itſelf by itſelf is without multitude, and is not a whole, though there ſhould be nothing elſe. But in the middle of the hypotheſis ſuch things are aſſumed as do not follow, neither to itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, nor to other things; ſuch, for inſtance, as that it is neither the ſame with itſelf, nor different from itſelf, nor is the ſame with others, nor different from others: and after the ſame manner that it is neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar, &c. And at the end ſuch things are aſſumed as do not follow to *the one* with reſpect to others alone; where it is alſo ſhown that it is neither effable, nor the object of opinion or ſcience, nor is, in ſhort, known by any other gnoſtic power, but is itſelf exempt from all other things, both knowledges and objects of knowledge. When, therefore, he ſays *the one* is not *many*, he does not ſay that things different from *the one* are not *the one*, as denying them of *the one*, but that it has not multitude in itſelf; and that *the one* is not alſo multitude together with *the one*, but that it is alone *one*, and one itſelf exempt from all multitude.

[3] The caution of Plato here, ſays Proclus, deſerves to be remarked: for he does not ſay that *the one* is *impartible*, (αμερες), but *that it has no parts* (μερη μη εχον). For the *impartible* is not the ſame with the *non-poſſeſſion of parts*; ſince the latter may be aſſerted of *the one*, but the *impartible* not entirely. Thus the *impartible* ſometimes ſignifies a certain nature, and, as it were, a certain form. Or rather, it is nothing elſe than a form characterized by unity; and in this ſenſe it is uſed by Timæus when he is deſcribing the generation of the ſoul. But in the Sophiſta he calls that which is truly one impartible: "for it is neceſſary (ſays he) that *the truly one* ſhould be impartible." So that he there calls the ſame thing *impartible* which he ſays here *has no parts*. Hence, if any thing has no parts, it is impartible, according to Plato; but it no longer follows, that what is impartible has no parts, if each of the genera of being is either impartible, or partible, or a medium between both. Thus, a point is impartible, not having parts, ſuch as that which is endued with interval poſſeſſes: but it is not ſimply impartible, as having no part; for the definition of a point receives its completion from certain things. But all ſuch things as complete, have the order of parts, with reſpect to that which is completed by them. Thus, alſo, the monad is impartible, becauſe it is not compoſed from certain divided parts, as is every number which proceeds from it. Becauſe, however, it conſiſts of certain things which make it to be the monad, and to be different from a point, theſe may be ſaid to be the parts of the definition of the monad. For ſuch things as contribute to the definition of every form are entirely parts of it, and ſuch form

is

of which are equally diſtant from the middle. Certainly. And the ſtraight figure

is a certain whole paſſive to *the one*, but is not *the one itſelf*. But *the ſimply one* alone neither ſubſiſts from parts as connecting, nor as dividing, nor as giving completion to it; being alone *the one*, and ſimply one, but not that which is united.

Plato alſo indicates concerning theſe negations, that they are not privative, but that they are exempt from affirmations according to tranſcendency: "for it is *neceſſary* (ſays he) that it ſhould not be many, but one." By this word *neceſſary*, therefore, he indicates tranſcendency according to the good. As a proof of this, we do not add the word *neceſſary* to things deprived of any thing. For who would ſay it is neceſſary that the ſoul ſhould be ignorant of itſelf? for ignorance is a privation to gnoſtic natures. Thus alſo, in the Theætetus, Plato ſpeaking of evils ſays, "it is *neceſſary* that they ſhould have a ſubſiſtence." At the ſame time, alſo, by this word Plato indicates that he is diſcourſing about ſomething which has a ſubſiſtence, and not about a non-ſubſiſting thing. For who would ſay, about that which has no ſubſiſtence, that it is *neceſſary* it ſhould be?

4 Here again we may obſerve how Plato collects that *the one* neither poſſeſſes beginning, nor middle, nor end, from the concluſion prior to this, following demonſtrative canons. For, if *the one* has no parts, it has no beginning, nor middle, nor end; but that which precedes is true, and conſequently that alſo which follows. By taking away, therefore, that which precedes, he takes away that which is conſequent. Hence, beginning, middle, and end, are ſymbols of a more partial order: for that which is more univerſal is more cauſal; but that which is more partial is more remote from the principle. Thus, with reſpect to that which has parts, it is not yet evident whether it has a beginning, middle, and end. For, what if it ſhould be a whole conſiſting only of two parts? For the duad is a whole after a certain manner, and ſo as the principle of all partible natures; but that which has a beginning, middle, and end, is firſt in the triad. But if it ſhould be ſaid that every whole is triadic, in this caſe nothing hinders but that a thing which poſſeſſes parts may not yet be perfect, in conſequence of ſubſiſting prior to the perfect and the whole. Hence, Plato does not form his demonſtration from *whole*, but from *having parts*.

And here it is neceſſary to obſerve, with Proclus, that *part* is multifariouſly predicated. For we call that a part which is in a certain reſpect the ſame with the whole, and which poſſeſſes all ſuch things partially as the whole poſſeſſes totally. Thus, each of the multitude of intellects is a part of total intellect, though all things are in every intellect. And the inerratic ſphere is a part of the univerſe, though this alſo comprehends all things, but in a manner different from the world, viz. more partially. In the ſecond place, that is ſaid to be a part which is completive of any thing. Thus the total ſpheres of the planets and elements are ſaid to be parts of the univerſe; and the dianoëtic and doxaſtic powers are ſaid to be parts of the ſoul: for the former give completion to the univerſe, and the latter to the ſoul. In the third place, according to a common ſignification, we call a part every thing which is in any way coordinated with certain things to the conſummation of one thing: for thus each of us may be ſaid to be a part of the world: not that the univerſe receives its completion, as the univerſe, through us; for it would not become imperfect from the corruption of any one of us; but becauſe we alſo are coarranged with the total parts of the univerſe, are governed in conjunction with all other things, are in the world as in

figure is that, the middle part of which is ſituated before, or in the view of both

one animal, and give completion to it, not ſo far as it is, but ſo far as it is prolific. Part, therefore, being triply predicated, Plato, having before ſaid that *the one* has no part, evidently takes away from it all the conceptions of part. For whatever has parts has multitude; but *the one* has no multitude, and conſequently has no parts whatever. But, if this be the caſe, it has no beginning, nor middle, nor end: for theſe may be ſaid to be the parts of the things that poſſeſs them, according to the third ſignification of part, in which every thing coordinated with certain things is ſaid to be a part of that which receives its completion through the coordination of thoſe things.

5 Plato might here have ſhown, as Proclus well obſerves, that *the one* is without beginning and end, from its not poſſeſſing extremes, and its not poſſeſſing extremes from its not poſſeſſing parts; but his reaſoning proceeds through things more known. For, from its non-poſſeſſion of parts, he immediately demonſtrates that it is without beginning and end, transferring beginning and end to bound, which is the ſame with extreme. Infinite, therefore, in this place does not ſimply ſignify that which is negative of bound, but that which is ſubverſive of extremes. As in the ſecond hypotheſis, therefore, he affirms the poſſeſſion of extremes, he very properly in this hypotheſis, where he denies it, demonſtrates *the one* to be infinite, as not having extremes, which are accuſtomed to be called terms or limits.

But in order to underſtand how *the one* is infinite, it will be neceſſary to conſider, with Proclus, how many orders there are in beings of *the infinite*, and afterwards, how many progreſſions there are oppoſite to theſe of *bound*. *Infinite*, therefore, that we may begin downwards, is beheld in matter, becauſe it is of itſelf indefinite and formleſs; but forms are the bounds of matter. It is alſo beheld in body devoid of quality, according to diviſion ad infinitum: for this body is infinitely diviſible, as being the firſt thing endued with interval. It is alſo beheld in the qualities which firſt ſubſiſt about this body, which is itſelf devoid of quality, in which qualities the more and the leſs are firſt inherent: for by theſe Socrates in the Philebus characterizes the infinite. It is alſo beheld in the whole of a generated nature, i. e. in every thing which is an object of ſenſe: for this poſſeſſes the infinite according to perpetual generation, and its unceaſing circle, and according to the indefinite mutations of generated natures, which are always riſing into being and periſhing, in which alſo infinity according to multitude exiſts, alone poſſeſſing its ſubſiſtence in becoming to be. But prior to theſe, the infinite is beheld in the circulation of the heavens: for this alſo has the infinite, through the infinite power of the mover; ſince body ſo far as body does not poſſeſs infinite power; but through the participation of intellect body is perpetual, and motion infinite. Prior alſo to theſe, the infinite muſt be aſſumed in ſoul: for in its tranſitive intellections it poſſeſſes the power of unceaſing motion, and is always moved, conjoining the periods of its motions with each other, and cauſing its energy to be one and never-failing. Again, prior to ſoul, the infinite is ſeen in time, which meaſures every period of the ſoul. For time is wholly infinite, becauſe its energy, through which it evolves the motions of ſouls, and through which it meaſures their periods, proceeding according to number, is infinite in power: for it never ceaſes abiding and proceeding, adhering to *the one*, and unfolding the number which

meaſures

both the extremes? It is ſo. Will not, therefore, *the one* conſiſt of parts [8], and

meaſures the motions of wholes. Prior to time, alſo, we may ſurvey the infinite in intellect, and intellectual life: for this is intranſitive, and the whole of it is preſent eternally and collectively. That which is immovable, too, and never failing in intellect, is derived from an eſſence and power which never deſert it, but which eternally poſſeſs a ſleepleſs life; through which alſo every thing that is always moved, is able to be always moved, participating in motion of ſtable infinity. Nor does the infinite alone extend as far as to theſe: but prior to every intellect is much-celebrated eternity, which comprehends every intellectual infinity. For, whence does intellect derive its eternal life, except from eternity? This, therefore, is infinite according to power prior to intellect; or rather, other things are indeed infinite according to power, but eternity is primarily power itſelf. From this firſt fountain then of the infinite, it remains that we aſcend to the occult cauſe of all infinites whatever, and, having aſcended, that we behold all infinites ſubſiſting according to the power which is there. For ſuch is the infinite itſelf; and ſuch is the chaos of Orpheus, which he ſays has no bound. For eternity, though it is infinite through the ever, yet, ſo far as it is the meaſure of things eternal, it is alſo a bound. But chaos is the firſt infinite, is alone infinite, and is the fountain of all infinity, intelligible, intellectual, that which belongs to ſoul, that which is corporeal, and that which is material. And ſuch are the orders of the infinite, in which ſuch as are ſecond are always ſuſpended from thoſe prior to them. For material infinity is connected through the perpetuity of generation. The perpetuity of generation is never-failing, through the perpetual motion of æther; and the perpetual motion of æther is effected through the unceaſing period of a divine ſoul; for of this it is an imitation. The period alſo of a divine ſoul is unfolded through the continued and never-failing power of time, which makes the ſame beginning and end, through the temporal *inſtant* or *nozy*. And time energizes infinitely, through intellectual infinity, which is perpetually permanent. For that which proceeds according to time, when it is infinite, is ſo through a cauſe perpetually abiding, about which it evolves itſelf, and round which it harmonically moves in a manner eternally the ſame. Intellect alſo lives to infinity through eternity. For the eternal is imparted to all things from eternity and being; whence all things derive life and being, ſome more clearly, and others more obſcurely. And eternity is infinite, through the fountain of infinity, which ſupernally ſupplies the never-failing to all eſſences, powers, energies, periods, and generations. As far as to this, therefore, the order of infinites aſcends, and from this deſcends. For the order of things beautiful is from the beautiful itſelf, that of equals from the firſt equality, and that of infinites from the infinite itſelf. And thus much concerning the orders of *the infinite*.

Let us now conſider ſupernally the ſeries of bound which proceeds together with the infinite: for divinity produced theſe two cauſes, bound and infinity, together, or in other words, ſpeaking Orphically, æther and chaos. For *the infinite* is *chaos*, as diſtributing all power, and all infinity, as comprehending other things, and as being as it were the moſt infinite of infinites. But bound is æther, becauſe æther itſelf bounds and meaſures all things. The firſt bound, therefore, is bound itſelf, and is the fountain and baſis of all bounds, intelligible, intellectual, ſupermundane, and mundane, preſubſiſting as the meaſure and limit of all things. The ſecond is

that

and be many, whether it participates of a ſtraight or round figure? Entirely

that which ſubſiſts according to eternity. For eternity, as we have before obſerved, is characterized both by infinity and bound; ſince, ſo far as it is the cauſe of never-failing life, and ſo far as it is the ſupplier of *the ever*, it is *infinite*; but ſo far as it is the meaſure of all intellectual energy, and the boundary of the life of intellect, terminating it ſupernally, it is *bound*. And, in ſhort, it is itſelf, the firſt of the things mingled from bound and infinity. The third proceſſion of bound is beheld in intellect. For, ſo far as it abides in ſameneſs according to intellection, and poſſeſſes one life, eternal and the ſame, it is bounded and limited. For the immutable and the ſtable belong to a bounded nature; and, in ſhort, as it is number, it is evident that in this reſpect it participates of bound. In the fourth place, therefore, time is bound, both as proceeding according to number, and as meaſuring the periods of ſouls. For every where that which meaſures, ſo far as it meaſures and limits other things, effects this through participating of the cauſe of bound. In the fifth place, the period of the ſoul, and its circulation, which is accompliſhed with invariable ſameneſs, is the unapparent meaſure or evolution of all alter-motive natures. In the ſixth place, the motion of æther, ſubſiſting according to the ſame, and in the ſame, and about the ſame, *bounds* on all ſides that which is diſordered in material natures, and convolves them into one circle; and is itſelf bounded in itſelf. For the infinity of it conſiſts in *the again*, (εν τῳ παλιν), but not in not reverting, (ου τῳ μη ανακαμπτειν): nor is the infinity of it ſuch as that which ſubſiſts according to a right line, nor as deprived of bound. For the one period of æther is infinite by frequency (τῳ πολλακις εστιν απειρος). In the ſeventh place, the never-failing ſubſiſtence of material forms, the indeſtructibility of wholes, and all things being bounded, particulars by things common, and parts by wholes, evince the oppoſition in theſe of bound to the infinite. For, generated natures being infinitely changed, forms at the ſame time are bounded, and abide the ſame, neither becoming more nor leſs. In the eighth place, all quantity in things material may be called bound, in the ſame manner as, we before obſerved, quality is infinite. In the ninth place, the body without quality, which is the laſt of all things except matter, as a whole is *bound*: for it is not infinite in magnitude, but is as much extended in quantity as the univerſe. For it is neceſſary to call this body the whole ſubject of the univerſe. In the tenth place, the material form which detains matter, and circumſcribes its infinity, and formleſs nature, is the progeny of *bound*, to which ſome alone looking, refer bound and the infinite to *matter* alone and *form*. And ſuch and ſo many are the orders of bound.

The *infinite*, therefore, which is here denied of *the one*, is the ſame as *the not having a bound*, in the ſame manner as *the not having parts* is the ſame with the *impartible*, when the impartible is aſſerted of *the one*. But if *the one* is neither from any other cauſe, and there is no *final* cauſe of it, it is very properly ſaid to be *infinite*. For every thing is bounded by its cauſe, and from it obtains its proper end. Whether, therefore, there is any intelligible or intellectual bound, *the one* is beyond all the ſeries of bound. But if the firſt God, in the Laws, is ſaid to be the meaſure of all things, it is not wonderful: for there he is ſo denominated, as the object of deſire to all things, and as limiting the being, power, and perfection of all things; but here he is ſhown to be infinite, as being indigent of no bound or part. For all things are denied of him in this place, as

tirely ſo. It is, therefore, neither ſtraight nor circular, ſince it is without parts.

of himſelf with reſpect to himſelf. *The one*, therefore, is *infinite*, as *above all bound*. Hence this *infinite* muſt be conſidered as the ſame with the *non-poſſeſſion of extremes*; and the poſſeſſion of extremes is, therefore, denied of *the one*, through the infinite. For neither power muſt be aſcribed to it, nor indefinite multitude, nor any thing elſe which is ſignified by the infinite.

[6] Parmenides firſt takes away *many* from *the one*; and this as from common conception: in the ſecond place, he takes away *whole*, and *the having parts*; and this through *the one* not being *many*: in the third place, *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*; and this through not having parts. He alſo aſſumes as a conſequent corollary, that *the one* is beyond bound, which is coordinated with parts, and which makes the poſſeſſion of *extremes*. But bound is twofold: for it is either beginning or end. In the fourth place, therefore, he now takes away the *ſtraight* and the *round*, which in the ſecond hypotheſis he arranges after the poſſeſſion of extremes, and after the poſſeſſion of beginning, middle, and end. But before he ſyllogiſtically demonſtrates the fourth, he enunciates the concluſion; for he ſays, "without figure therefore." For it is requiſite that intellectual projections, or, in other words, the immediate and direct viſion of intellect, ſhould be the leader of ſcientific ſyllogiſms; ſince intellect alſo comprehends the principles of ſcience. The preaſſumption, therefore, of the concluſion imitates the collected viſion of intellect; but the proceſſion through ſyllogiſms imitates the evolution of ſcience from intellect. And here we may perceive alſo, that the concluſion is more common than the ſyllogiſms: for the latter receive the ſtraight and the round ſeparately, and thus make the negation; but the former ſimply aſſerts that *the one* is without figure. But theſe are the forms common to all intervals. For lines are divided into the ſtraight, the round, and the mixed; and, in a ſimilar manner, ſuperficies and ſolids; except that in lines the ſtraight and the round are without figure; but in ſuperficies or ſolids they are receptive of figure. Hence ſome of theſe are called right-lined, others curve-lined, and others mixed from theſe. As it has been ſhown, therefore, that *the one* is without bounds or extremities, it was neceſſary that Parmenides ſhould deny of it the ſtraight, and the poſſeſſion of extremes. But that which is figured is a thing of this kind: for he aſſumes boundaries comprehenſive of the things bounded, which alone belong to things figured. There is alſo another accuracy in the words, ſays Proclus, which is worthy of admiration. For he does not ſay that *the one* is neither ſtraight nor round; ſince he has not yet collected that it is without figure. For what would hinder it from having ſome one of the middle figures, ſuch as that of the cylinder or cone, or ſome other of thoſe that are mixed? For, if we ſhould give to *the one* ſome figure from thoſe that are mixed, it would participate both of the ſtraight and the round. Thus, for inſtance, if we ſhould inquire whether nature is white or black, and ſhould find that it is neither white nor black, it would not follow from this, that it is entirely void of colour: for, by the participation of both theſe, it would poſſeſs ſome one of the middle colours; ſince the media are from the extremes. Plato therefore ſays, that *the one* neither participates of the *round* nor the *ſtraight*, that it may not have either of theſe, nor any one of the media. This alſo is evident, that this concluſion is more partial than that which is prior to it. For, if any thing participates of figure, it has alſo extremes and a middle; but not every thing which has extremes and

parts. Right. And indeed, being ſuch, it will be no where [9]; for it will neither

and a middle participates of figure. For a line, number, time and motion, may poſſeſs extremes, all which are without figure. A tranſition likewiſe is very properly made from figure to the ſtraight and the round. For it is poſſible univerſally to deny figure of *the one*, by ſhowing that figure has bound and limitation. But *the one* does not receive any bound. Plato however was willing to deduce his diſcourſe ſupernally, according to two coordinations; and hence from the beginning he aſſumes after *many*, *whole* and *parts*, and again *extremes* and *middle*, *ſtraight* and *round*, *in itſelf* and *in another*, *abiding* and *being moved*, &c. through this aſſumption indicating that *the one* is none of theſe. For it is not poſſible that it can be both oppoſites, ſince it would no longer remain one according to the hypotheſis; nor can it be either of theſe, for thus it would have ſomething hoſtile and oppoſed to itſelf. It is however neceſſary that *the one* ſhould be prior to all oppoſition, or it will not be the cauſe of all things; ſince it will not be the cauſe of thoſe things which its oppoſite produces. Proceeding, therefore, according to the two ſeries of things, he very properly now paſſes from figure to *the ſtraight* and *the round*.

But ſince in the Phædrus Plato denominates the intelligible ſummit of intellectuals, which he there calls the ſuperceleſtial place, uncoloured, unfigured, and untouched, muſt we ſay that that order and *the one* are ſimilarly unfigured? By no means: for neither is there the ſame mode of negation in both. For of that order Plato denies ſome things, and affirms others. For he ſays that it is eſſence and true eſſence, and that it can alone be ſeen by intellect, the governor of the ſoul; and likewiſe that the genus of true ſcience ſubſiſts about it; becauſe there is another, viz. the intelligible order prior to it, and it is exempt from ſome things, but participates of others. But he denies all things, and affirms nothing of *the one*: for there is nothing prior to *the one*, but it is ſimilarly exempt from all beings. The mode, therefore, of ablation is different; and this, as Proclus well obſerves, Plato indicates by the very words themſelves. For he calls the intelligible ſummit of intellectuals *unfigured*; but he ſays that *the one* participates of *no figure*. But the former of theſe is not the ſame with the latter, as neither is the *impartible* the ſame with that which has no part. After the ſame manner, therefore, he calls that eſſence *unfigured*, but aſſerts that the one participates of no figure. Hence it appears that the former, as producing, and as being more excellent than intellectual figure, is called *unfigured*. This, therefore, was ſubordinate to another figure, viz. the intelligible: for intelligible intellect comprehends the intelligible cauſes of figure and multitude, and all things; and there are figures perfectly unknown and ineffable, which are firſt unfolded into light from intelligibles, and which are only known to intelligible intellect. But the ſuperceleſtial place, being the ſummit in intelligibles, is the principle of all intellectual figures; and hence it is *unfigured*, but is not ſimply exempt from all figure. *The one*, however, is exempt from every order of theſe figures, both the occult and intellectual, and is eſtabliſhed above all unknown and known figures.

[7] The *ſtraight* and the *round* here are to be conſidered as ſignifying progreſſion and converſion: for progreſſion is beheld according to the ſtraight, which alſo it makes the end of itſelf. Every intellectual nature, therefore, *proceeds* to all things according to the ſtraight, and is *converted* to its own good, which is the middle in each; and this is no other than the intelligible which it contains. But things are ſeparated from each other according to progreſſion, the *proceeding* from the

neither be in another, nor in itſelf. How ſo? For, being in another, it would

the *abiding*, and the *multiplied* from the *united*. For *progreſſion* is that which makes ſome things firſt, others middle, and others laſt; but *converſion* again conjoins all things, and leads them to one thing, the common object of deſire to all beings. In theſe two, therefore, each of theſe definitions is to be found, of which the intellectual Gods firſt participate: for theſe are eſpecially characterized by converſion. In the ſecond place from theſe, ſouls participate of the ſtraight and the round; proceeding, indeed, after the manner of a line, but being again inflected into circles, and converting themſelves to their principles. But ſenſibles participate of theſe in the laſt place: for right-lined figures ſubſiſt in theſe with interval, and partibly, and the ſpheric form, which is comprehenſive of all mundane figures. Hence, Timæus makes the whole world to be a ſphere; but through the five figures, which are the only figures that have equal ſides and angles, he adorns the five parts of the world, inſcribing all theſe in the ſphere, and in each other, by which he manifeſts that theſe figures are ſupernally derived from a certain elevated order.

Theſe two alſo may be perceived in generation: the *round* according to the circulation in things viſible; for generation circularly returns to itſelf, as it is ſaid in the Phædrus. But the *ſtraight* is ſeen according to the progreſſion of every thing, from its birth to its acme; and acme is here the middle darkening the extremes; for through this there is a tranſition to the other of the extremes, juſt as, in a right line, the paſſage from one extreme to the other is through the middle. Theſe two, therefore, ſupernally pervade from intellectual as far as to generated natures; the *ſtraight* being the cauſe of progreſſion, but the *round* of converſion. If, therefore, *the one* neither proceeds from itſelf, nor is converted to itſelf—for that which proceeds is ſecond to that which produces, and that which is converted is indigent of the deſirable—it is evident that it neither participates of the *ſtraight*, nor of the *round* figure. For how can it proceed, having no producing cauſe of itſelf, neither in nor prior to itſelf, leſt it ſhould be deprived of *the one*, being ſecond, or having the form of the duad? How, alſo, can it be converted, having no end, and no object of deſire? Here, likewiſe, it is again evident that Plato collects theſe concluſions from what precedes, viz. from *the one* neither poſſeſſing beginning, nor middle, nor end; always geometrically demonſtrating things ſecond through ſuch as are prior to them, imitating the orderly progreſſion of things, which ever makes its deſcent from primary to ſecondary natures.

[8] As the whole middle order of the Gods called intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual, is ſymbolically ſignified in theſe words, Plato very properly in the concluſion converts the whole of it. For, if *the one* has *figure*, it will be *many*. He therefore conjoins figure to *many* through *parts*; but demonſtrates that all theſe genera are ſecondary to *the one*. So great, however, ſays Proclus, is the ſeparation of the divine orders, that Plato does not attempt to connect the negations that follow in a regular ſucceſſion till he has firſt converted this order to itſelf; conjoining *figure* to *many*, and indicating the alliance of all the aforeſaid genera. In what order of things, however, the *ſtraight* and the *round* ſubſiſt, will be more clearly known in the ſecond hypotheſis.

[9] The diſcourſe paſſes on to another order, viz. to the ſummit of thoſe Gods that are properly called intellectual: and this he denies of *the one*, demonſtrating that *the one* is no where; neither as comprehended in another cauſe, nor as itſelf comprehended in itſelf. Before he ſyllogizes, however,

would after a manner be circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and

however, he again previouſly announces the concluſion, employing intellectual projections prior to ſcientific methods; and this he conſtantly does in all that follows.

It is here, however, neceſſary to obſerve, that *no where* is predicated moſt properly and ſimply of the firſt cauſe. For the ſoul is frequently ſaid to be no where, and particularly, the ſoul which has no habitude or alliance with body: for it is not detained by any ſecondary nature, nor is its energy circumſcribed through a certain habitude, as if it were bound by ſuch habitude to things poſterior to itſelf. Intellect alſo is ſaid to be no where: for it is in a ſimilar manner every where, and is equally preſent to all things. Or rather, through a preſence of this kind it is detained by no one of its participants. Divinity alſo is ſaid to be no where, becauſe he is exempt from all things, becauſe he is imparticipable, or, in other words, is not conſubſiſtent with any thing elſe; and becauſe he is better than all communion, all habitude, and all coordination with other things. There is not, however, the ſame mode of the *no where* in all things. For ſoul indeed is *no where* with reſpect to the things poſterior to itſelf, but is not ſimply no where; ſince it is in itſelf, as being ſelf-motive, and likewiſe in the cauſe whence it originates. For every where the cauſe preaſſumes and uniformly comprehends the power of its effect. Intellect is alſo *no where* with reſpect to the things poſterior to itſelf, but it is in itſelf, as being ſelf-ſubſiſtent, and, further ſtill, is comprehended in its proper cauſe. Hence, it is falſe to ſay that intellect is abſolutely *no where*; for *the one* alone is ſimply no where. For it is neither in things poſterior to itſelf, as being exempt from all things; (ſince neither intellect nor ſoul, principles poſterior to *the one*, are in things poſterior to themſelves,) nor is it in itſelf, as being ſimple and void of all multitude; nor is it in any thing prior to itſelf, becauſe there is nothing better than *the one*. This, therefore, is ſimply *no where*; but all other things have the *no where* ſecondarily, and are in one reſpect *no where*, and in another not. For, if we ſurvey all the order of beings, we ſhall find material forms ſubſiſting in others only, and eſtabliſhed in certain ſubjects: for they verge to bodies, and are in a certain reſpect in a ſubject, bearing an echo, as it were, and image of a thing ſubſiſting in itſelf, ſo far as they are certain lives and eſſences, and in conſequence of one part ſuffering they are copaſſive with themſelves. With reſpect to ſouls that ſubſiſt in habitude or alliance to body, theſe, ſo far as they have habitude, are in another: for habitude to ſecondary natures entirely introduces, together with itſelf, ſubſiſtence in another; but ſo far as they are able to be converted to themſelves, they are purified from this, ſubſiſting in themſelves. For natures indeed extend all their energies about bodies, and whatever they make they make in ſomething elſe. Souls employ, indeed, ſome energies about bodies; but others are directed to themſelves, and through theſe they are converted to themſelves. But ſouls that are without habitude to body are not in other things that are ſecondary or ſubordinate to them, but are in others that are prior to them. For a ſubſiſtence in another is twofold, one kind being ſubordinate to the ſubſiſtence of a thing in itſelf, and ariſing from a habitude to things ſecondary, but the other being better than ſuch a ſubſiſtence; and the former extends as far as to ſouls that ſubſiſt in habitude to body; but the latter only originates from divine natures, and, in ſhort, from ſuch as ſubſiſt without habitude. Divine ſouls, therefore, are alone in the natures prior to them, as, for inſtance, in the intellects from

and would be touched to by it in many places: but it is impoſſible that *the one*

from which they are ſuſpended; but intellect is both in itſelf, and in that which is prior to itſelf, viz. in the unity which it derives from *the one*, and which is the vertex and flower of its eſſence. This *no where*, therefore, is by no means ſubordinate to the ſubſiſtence of a thing in itſelf. For how can *the no where* which oppoſes a ſubſiſtence in ſome particular thing be adapted to things which have their being in another? But to thoſe that have a ſubſiſtence in themſelves better than a ſubſiſtence in another, *the no where* is preſent indeed, but not ſimply: for each of theſe is in its proper cauſe. But to *the one* alone *the no where* primarily and ſimply belongs. For *the one* is not in things poſterior to itſelf, becauſe it is without habitude or alliance; nor in itſelf, becauſe it is *the one*; nor in any thing prior to itſelf, becauſe it is the firſt.

In the next place, let us conſider *the every where*, and whether it is better and more perfect than *the no where*, or ſubordinate to it. For, if better, why do we not aſcribe that which is better to the firſt, inſtead of ſaying that *the one* is alone *no where?* But, if it is ſubordinate, how is it not better not to energize providentially, than ſo to energize? May we not ſay, therefore, that the *every where* is twofold? one kind taking place, when it is conſidered with reference to things poſterior to it, as when we ſay that providence is every where, that it is not abſent from any ſecondary natures, but that it preſerves, connects and adorns all things, pervading through them by its communications. But the other kind of *every where* ſubſiſts as with relation to all things prior and poſterior to it. Hence that is properly *every where* which is in things ſubordinate, in itſelf, and in things prior to itſelf. And of this *every where* the *no where* which is now aſſumed is the negation, as being neither in itſelf, nor in any thing prior to itſelf. This *no where* alſo is better than *the every where*, and is alone the prerogative of *the one*. But there is another *no where* coordinate with *the every where*, and which is alone predicated with reference to things ſecondary, ſo that each is true in conſequence of that which remains. For *being* is *no where* becauſe it is *every where*. For that which is detained in ſome particular place, is in a certain thing; but that which is ſimilarly preſent to all things is definitely *no where*: and again, becauſe *no where*, on this account it is *every where*. For, in conſequence of being ſimilarly exempt from all things, it is ſimilarly preſent to all things, being as it were equally diſtant from all things. Hence, this *no where* and this *every where* are coordinate with each other. But the other *no where* is better than every *every where*, and can alone be adapted to *the one*, as being a negation of every ſubſiſtence in any thing. For, whether the ſubſiſtence is as in *place*, or as in *whole*, or as the *whole* in its *parts*, or as in the *end*, or as *things governed* in *the governing principle*, or as *genus* in *ſpecies*, or as *ſpecies* in *genera*, or as in *time*, *the one* is ſimilarly exempt from all theſe. For neither is it comprehended in place, leſt it ſhould appear to be multitude. Nor is it any comprehending whole, leſt it ſhould conſiſt of parts. Nor is it a part of any thing, leſt, being in the whole of which it is a part, it ſhould be a paſſive one. For every whole which is paſſive to *the one*, is indigent of that which is truly one. Nor is it in parts: for it has no parts. Nor is there any end of it: for it has been ſhown that it has no end. Nor does it ſubſiſt as in the governing *principle*: for it has been ſhown that it has not any *beginning*. Nor is it as genus in ſpecies, leſt again multitude ſhould happen about it, through the comprehenſion of ſpecies;

one which is without parts, and which does not participate of a circle, ſhould

nor as ſpecies in genera; for, of what will it be the ſpecies, ſince nothing is more excellent than itſelf? Nor is it as in time: for thus it would be multitude; ſince every thing which is in time flows; and every thing that flows conſiſts of parts. *The one*, therefore, is better than all the modes of a ſubſiſtence in any thing. Hence the negation of *no where* is true: for a ſubſiſtence *in ſome particular thing* is oppoſed to *no where*; juſt as *ſome one* is oppoſed to *no one*: ſo that *the one* will be *no where*.

Again, too, Plato gives a twofold diviſion to a ſubſiſtence in ſomething; viz. into a ſubſiſtence in another, and into a ſubſiſtence in itſelf; comprehending in theſe two all the abovementioned celebrated modes which are enumerated by Ariſtotle in his Phyſics; that if he can ſhow that *the one* is neither in itſelf, nor in another, he may be able to demonſtrate that it is *no where*. But this being ſhown, it will appear that *the one* is exempt from that order to which the ſymbol of being *in itſelf* and *in another* pertains. It will alſo appear from hence that intellect is not the firſt cauſe: for the peculiarity of intellect is a ſubſiſtence in itſelf, in conſequence of being converted to itſelf, at the ſame time that its energy is directed to ſuch things as are firſt, viz. to intelligibles and *the one*.

[10] Let us here conſider how according to Plato every thing which is in another, is after a manner circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and is touched by it in many places. Of thoſe prior to us then, ſays Proclus, ſome have conſidered the ſubſiſtence of *the one* in ſomething elſe, more partially, alone aſſuming a ſubſiſtence in place, and in a veſſel, and to theſe adapting the words. For that which is in place in a certain reſpect touches place, and alſo that which is in a veſſel touches the veſſel, and is on all ſides comprehended by it. This, therefore, ſay they, is what Plato demonſtrates to us, that *the one* is not in place, ſince that which is in place muſt neceſſarily be many, and muſt be touched by it in many places; but it is impoſſible that *the one* ſhould be *many*. There is however nothing venerable in the aſſertion that *the one* is not in place, ſince this is even true of partial ſouls like ours; but it is neceſſary that what is here ſhown ſhould be the prerogative of *the one*, and of that cauſe which is eſtabliſhed above all beings. But others looking to things ſay, that every thing which being in a certain thing is comprehended by it, is denied of *the one*: and their aſſertion is right. For *the one* is in no reſpect in any thing, as has been before ſhown. But how does this adapt the words to the various modes of a ſubſiſtence in ſomething? For a point is evidently ſaid to be in a line as in *another*; ſince a point is different from a line; and it does not follow, becauſe it is in another, that on this account it is on all ſides comprehended by the line, and is touched by many of its parts. It may indeed be ſaid, in anſwer to this, that though the line does not circularly contain the point according to interval, yet it comprehends it after another manner: for it embraces its idioms. For a point is a boundary only; but a line is both a boundary and ſomething elſe, being a length without a breadth. A point alſo is without interval; but a line poſſeſſes interval according to length, though not according to breadth and depth. For, in ſhort, ſince a point is not the ſame with *the one*, it is neceſſary that the point ſhould be *many*, not as containing parts after the manner of interval, for in this reſpect it is impartible, but as containing many idioms

ſhould be touched by a circle in many places. Impoſſible. But if it were in itſelf it would alſo contain itſelf, ſince it is no other than itſelf which ſubſiſts in itſelf: for it is impoſſible that any thing ſhould not be comprehended [11] by

which have the relation of parts, and which the line comprehending, may be ſaid to touch the point in many places. But that the point is not the ſame with *the one* is evident; for the latter is the principle of all things, but the former of magnitudes alone. Nor is the point prior to *the one:* for the monad is one, and the impartible in time, or the now. It remains, therefore, that the point is poſterior to *the one*, and participates of it. But, if this be the caſe, it may poſſeſs many incorporeal idioms, which are in the line, and are comprehended by it.

Thoſe however who thus interpret the preſent paſſage do not perceive how Plato aſſumes a ſubſiſtence in a certain thing, and what he looks to among beings, when he denies this of *the one*. It is better, therefore, ſays Proclus, to ſay with our preceptor Syrianus, conformably to that moſt prudent and ſafe mode of interpretation, that Plato denies theſe things of *the one*, which in the ſecond hypotheſis he affirms of *the one being*, and that he ſo denies as he there affirms. In the ſecond hypotheſis, therefore, Plato indicating the ſummit of the intellectual order, ſays that *the one* is in itſelf and in another; which evidently applies to that order, becauſe it is converted to itſelf intellectually, and abides eternally with a monadic ſubſiſtence in its cauſes. For it is the monad of the intellectual Gods; abiding indeed, according to its tranſcendency, in the intellectual Gods, prior to, but unfolding into light the intellectual idiom, according to an energy in and about, itſelf. The ſubſiſtence, therefore, in another is of ſuch a kind as an abiding in cauſe, and being comprehended in its proper cauſe. This, therefore, is the circular comprehenſion, and the being touched in many places, of which Plato now ſpeaks. For, as this order is contained in its cauſe, it is more partial than it. But every thing more partial is more multiplied than its more comprehenſive cauſe; and, being more multiplied, it is conjoined with it by the various powers of itſelf, and differently with different powers. For this is what is implied by the words "*in many places*;" ſince according to different powers it is differently united to the intelligible prior to itſelf. To this order of beings, alſo, a ſubſiſtence in itſelf accords together with a ſubſiſtence in another. The multitude likewiſe of this order is numerous: for it participates of intelligible multitude, and has parts; ſince it participates of the middle genera in the cauſes prior to itſelf. It is alſo in a certain reſpect circular; for it participates of the extremity of the middle orders, viz. of the figure which is there. Hence, it is neither one ſimply, but many, nor impartible, but having parts, viz. incorporeal idioms; nor is it beyond all figure, but is circular. And ſo far as it is many, it is able to be touched in many things by the natures prior to itſelf; but ſo far as it has parts, it is able to communicate with them in many places, and in a remarkable degree; and ſo far as it is figured, it is circularly comprehended by them. For every thing figured is comprehended by figure. But *the one* neither has parts, nor participates of the circle; ſo that there cannot be a cauſe prior to it, which circularly touches it and in many places; but it is beyond all things, as having no cauſe better than itſelf.

[11] Let us here conſider with Proclus how that which is in itſelf poſſeſſes both that which comprehends,

by that in which it is. It is impoſſible. Would not, therefore, that which contains be one thing, and that which is contained another? For the ſame whole [12] cannot at the ſame time ſuffer and do both theſe: and thus the

comprehends, and that which is comprehended; and what both theſe are. Every thing, therefore, which is the cauſe of itſelf, and is ſelf-ſubſiſtent, is ſaid to be in itſelf. For, as ſelf-motive rank prior to alter-motive natures, ſo things ſelf-ſubſiſtent are arranged prior to ſuch as are produced by another. For, if there is that which perfects itſelf, there is alſo that which generates itſelf. But if there is that which is ſelf-ſubſiſtent, it is evident that it is of ſuch a kind as both to produce and be produced by itſelf. As, therefore, producing power always comprehends according to cauſe that which it produces, it is neceſſary that whatever produces itſelf ſhould comprehend itſelf ſo far as it is a cauſe, and ſhould be comprehended by itſelf ſo far as it is cauſed; but that it ſhould be at once both cauſe and the thing cauſed, that which comprehends and that which is comprehended. If, therefore, a ſubſiſtence in another ſignifies the being produced by another more excellent cauſe, a ſubſiſtence in ſelf muſt ſignify that which is ſelf-begotten, and produced by itſelf.

[12] Let us conſider how it is impoſſible for the ſame whole, at the ſame time, both to do and ſuffer: for this Plato aſſumes as a thing common and univerſally acknowledged. Will it not follow, therefore, if this be granted, that the ſelf-motive nature of the ſoul will no longer remain? For, in things ſelf-moved, that which moves is not one thing, and that which is moved another; but the whole is at the ſame time moving and moved. To this it may be replied as follows: Of the powers of the ſoul ſome are generative, and others converſive of the ſoul to herſelf. The generative powers, therefore, beginning from the ſoul produce its life; but the converſive convolve the ſoul to itſelf, according to a certain vital circle, and to the intellect which is eſtabliſhed prior to ſoul. For, as the generative powers produce a twofold life, one kind abiding, but the other proceeding into body and ſubſiſting in a ſubject, ſo the converſive powers make a twofold converſion, one of the ſoul to herſelf, the other to the intellect which is beyond her. Of theſe powers, therefore, the whole ſoul participates, becauſe they proceed through each other, and energize together with each other; whence every rational ſoul is ſaid to generate herſelf. For the whole participates through the whole of generative powers, and ſhe converts as it were herſelf to herſelf; and neither is that which generates without converſion, nor is that which converts unprolific, but a participation through each other is effected. Hence both aſſertions are true, viz. that the ſoul generates herſelf, and that it is not poſſible for the whole of a thing at the ſame time both to do and ſuffer. For though that which produces and that which is produced are one thing, yet together with union there is alſo difference, through which a thing of this kind does not remain unmultiplied. For the whole ſoul is indeed produced, but not ſo far as it produces is it alſo according to this produced; ſince that which primarily produces is the generative power of the ſoul. Since however it is poſſible in ſome things for a certain part to generate, and a part to be generated, as in the world that which is celeſtial is ſaid to generate and fabricate, and that which is ſublunary to be generated; and again, not for a part, but the whole to be generated and generate in different times; and laſtly, for the whole

5 both

the one would no longer be one, but two. It certainly would not. *The one*, therefore, is not any where [13], ſince it is neither in itſelf nor in another. It

both to do and ſuffer in the ſame time, but to do one thing, and ſuffer another, and not the ſame: for what if a thing ſhould impart heat, and at the ſame time receive cold, or ſhould whiten and be at the ſame time blackened?—on this account, Plato taking away all ſuch objections accurately adds the words, *the whole, at the ſame time, the ſame thing*, that it may not act in one part and ſuffer in another, nor at different times, nor do one thing and ſuffer another.

Hence, ſince that which is ſelf-ſubſiſtent is neceſſarily diviſible into that which is more excellent, and that which is ſubordinate, for ſo far as it produces it is more excellent, but ſo far as it is produced ſubordinate, it follows that *the one* is beyond a ſelf-ſubſiſtent nature: for *the one* does not admit of diviſion, with which a ſelf-ſubſiſtent nature is neceſſarily connected. Indeed *the one* is better than every paternal and generative cauſe, as being exempt from all power. For though according to Plato it is the cauſe of all beautiful things, yet it is not the cauſe in ſuch a manner as if it employed power, through which it is productive of all things: for power ſubſiſts together with hyparxis or the ſummit of eſſence, to which it is at the ſame time ſubordinate. But of the natures poſterior to *the one*, ſome being moſt near to, and ineffably and occultly unfolded into light from it, have a paternal and generative dignity with relation to all beings, and produce other things from themſelves by their own powers. In this, therefore, they abound more than, and conſequently fall ſhort of the ſimplicity of, *the one*, that they generate ſelf-ſubſiſtent natures: for additions in things divine are attended with diminution of power. Other natures, therefore, poſterior to *the one*, being now ſeparated and multiplied in themſelves, are allotted the power of things ſelf-ſubſiſtent; ſubſiſting indeed from primary cauſes, but produced alſo from themſelves. Theſe, therefore, are ſuſpended from the paternal and generative cauſes of forms, but paternal cauſes from *the one*, which is more excellent than every cauſe of this kind, and which in a manner unknown to all things unfolds beings from itſelf, according to the principles of things. Hence, if this be the caſe, it is evident that every thing which gives ſubſiſtence to itſelf is alſo productive of other things. For ſelf-ſubſiſtent natures are neither the firſt nor the laſt of things. But that which produces other things without producing itſelf is twofold; one of theſe being better, and the other worſe, than things ſelf-ſubſiſtent. Such, therefore, are producing natures. But of things produced from a generating cauſe, ſelf-ſubſiſtent natures firſt proceed, being produced indeed, but ſubſiſting ſelf-begotten from their proper cauſes. For they proceed from their cauſe in a way ſuperior to a ſelf-begetting energy. The next in order to theſe are the natures which are ſuſpended from another producing cauſe, but which are incapable of generating and being generated from themſelves. And this order of things has its progreſſion ſupernally as far as to the laſt of things. For if, among generating natures, that which generates itſelf alſo generates other things, but that which generates other things does not neceſſarily generate itſelf, it follows that things generative of others are prior to ſuch as generate themſelves: for things more comprehenſive rank more as principles.

[13] Plato very geometrically, in each of the theorems, firſt enunciates the propoſition, afterwards gives the demonſtration, and, in the laſt place, the concluſion; through the propoſition imitating

It is not. But conſider whether thus circumſtanced it can either ſtand or be moved [14]. Why can it not? Becauſe whatever is moved is either locally moved, or ſuffers alteration [15]; for theſe alone are the genera of motion.

imitating the collected and ſtable energy of intellect; through the demonſtration, the progreſſion of intellections evolving itſelf into multitude; and through the concluſion, the circular motion of intellect to its principle, and the one perfection of all intellectual energy. This, therefore, which he does in the preceding theorems, he particularly does in this. For it pertains to this order, both to ſubſiſt from itſelf, and to abide in the natures prior to itſelf. The logical diſcurſus, therefore, imitates the ſubſiſtence of this order in itſelf, but the concluſion, and a returning to the principle, a ſubſiſtence in another.

[14] Parmenides here proceeds to another order, viz. the vivific, from the intellectual monad, and evinces that *the one* is exempt from this. The idioms, therefore, of this vivific order are *motion* and *permanency*; the former unfolding into light the fountains of life, and the latter firmly eſtabliſhing this life exempt from its proper rivers. That it is not requiſite, however, alone to take away phyſical motions from *the one*, Plato himſelf manifeſts, by ſaying, "*the one* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion." But all energy, according to him, is motion. *The one* therefore is prior to energy. Hence alſo it is prior to power, leſt it ſhould poſſeſs power imperfect and unenergetic. Should it be aſked why Plato places *motion* before *ſameneſs* and *difference?* we reply, that motion and permanency are beheld in the eſſences and energies of things: for proceſſion is eſſential motion, and permanency an eſſential eſtabliſhment in cauſes; ſince every thing at the ſame time that it abides in, alſo proceeds from, its cauſe. Eſſential *motion* and *permanency*, therefore, are prior to *ſameneſs* and *difference*: for things in proceeding from their cauſes become *ſame* and *different*; *different* by proceeding, but *ſame* by converting themſelves to that which abides. Hence *motion* and *permanency* rank prior to *ſameneſs* and *difference*, as originating prior to them. On this account, in the Sophiſta, Plato arranges *motion* and *permanency* after *being*, and next to theſe *ſame* and *different*.

[15] Plato, in the tenth book of his Laws, makes a perfect diviſion of all motions into ten, eight of which are paſſive. The ninth of theſe is indeed energetic, but is both motive and moved, moving other things, and being moved by a cauſe prior to itſelf; and the tenth is energetic from itſelf, in that which is moved poſſeſſing alſo that which moves, being no other than a ſelf-motive nature. It is however now requiſite to make a more ſynoptical diviſion, that we may not phyſiologize in diſcourſes about divine natures. Hence Plato conciſely diſtributes all motions into two. For that it is requiſite not only to conſider the propoſed motions as corporeal, but likewiſe as comprehenſive of all incorporeal motions, is evident from his ſaying, "for theſe are the only motions." Both the motions of ſoul, therefore, and ſuch as are intellectual, are comprehended in theſe two, viz. lation and alteration, or internal motion. It is alſo evident that every vivific genus of the Gods belongs to theſe motions, ſince all life is motion according to Plato, and every motion is comprehended in the two which are here mentioned. Let us therefore conſider every thing which is moved; and firſt of all let us direct our attention to bodies, either as ſuffering ſome internal or ſome external change: for that which changes one place for another ſuſtains

motion. Certainly. But if *the one* ſhould be altered from itſelf, it is impoſſible that it ſhould remain in any reſpect the one. Impoſſible. It will not therefore be moved according to alteration? It appears that it will not.

tains a mutation of ſomething belonging to things external; but that which is generating or corrupting, or increaſing, or diminiſhing, or mingling, ſuffers a mutation of ſomething inward. Hence that which is changed according to the external is ſaid to be moved according to lation: for a motion of this kind is local, place being external to bodies. But that which is moved according to ſome one of the things within it is ſaid to ſuffer internal change, whether it ſuſtains generation, or corruption, or increaſe, or diminution, or mixture. Local motion, therefore, is preſent with divine bodies, ſuch as thoſe of the ſtars, but they have no mutation according to eſſence. For it is neceſſary, indeed, that theſe ſhould be locally moved, becauſe, as Plato ſays in the Politicus, always to ſubſiſt according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner, belongs to the moſt divine of things alone; but the nature of body is not of this order. The celeſtial bodies, however, being the firſt of things viſible, poſſeſs a perpetual ſubſiſtence: for ſuch things as are firſt in every order poſſeſs the form of natures prior to themſelves. Hence theſe bodies are moved according to this motion alone, which preſerves the eſſence of the things moved unchanged. But, aſcending from bodies to ſouls, we may ſee that which is analogous in theſe to local motion, and that which correſponds to internal change. For, ſo far as at different times they apply themſelves to different forms, and through contact with theſe become aſſimilated to their proper intelligibles, or the objects of their intellectual viſion, they alſo appear in a certain reſpect to be multiform, participating by their energies of theſe intelligibles, which are always different, and being diſpoſed together with them. So far, therefore, as this is effected, they may be ſaid to be internally changed. But again, ſo far as they energize about the intelligible place, and pervade the whole extent of forms, being as it were external to them, and comprehending them on all ſides, ſo far they may be ſaid to be locally moved; Plato alſo in the Phædrus calling the energy of the ſoul about the intelligible place, a period and circulation. Souls, therefore, are both internally changed and locally moved; being internally changed according to that which is vital, for it is this which is diſpoſed together with, and is aſſimilated to, the viſions of the ſoul; but, according to that which is gnoſtic, paſſing on locally from one intelligible to another, revolving round theſe by its intellections, and being reflected from the ſame to the ſame. Or we ſhould rather ſay, that ſouls comprehend in themſelves the cauſes of internal change, and of mutation according to place. In much celebrated intellect, alſo, we ſhall find the paradigms ſubſiſting intellectually of theſe two ſpecies of motion. For by participating the nature of the intelligible in intellection, and becoming through intelligence a certain intelligible itſelf, it is internally changed about the intellectual idiom. For participations are ſaid to impart ſomething of their own nature to their participant. But by intellectually perceiving in the ſame, according to the ſame things, and after the ſame manner, and by energizing about its own intelligible as about a centre, it previouſly comprehends the paradigm of local circulation. Every where, therefore, we ſhall find that motions are internal changes and lations, ſubſiſting intellectually in intellect, pſychically in ſoul, and corporeally and diviſibly in ſenſibles; ſo that we ought not to wonder if theſe are the only motions; for all others are comprehended in theſe.

But will it be moved locally[16]? Perhaps ſo. But indeed if *the one* is moved locally,

[16] Parmenides paſſes on to the other form of motion, viz. lation, and ſhows that neither is *the one* moved according to this. He alſo divides lation into motion about the ſame place, and into a mutation from one place to another. For every thing which is moved according to place, either preſerves the ſame place, ſo that the whole remains intranſitive, and the thing itſelf is only moved in its parts; or it is moved both in the whole and the parts, and paſſes from one place to another. For there are theſe four caſes: a thing is neither moved in the whole, nor in the parts; or it is moved in the whole, and not in the parts; or it is moved in the parts, and not in the whole; or it is moved both in the whole and in the parts. But, of theſe four, it is impoſſible for the whole to be moved, the parts remaining immovable; ſince the parts from which the whole conſiſts are moved together with the whole. To be moved neither in the whole nor in the parts belongs to things which ſtand ſtill. It remains, therefore, either that the whole is not moved, the parts being moved, or that both the whole and the parts are moved. The former of theſe motions is produced by a ſphere or cylinder, when theſe are moved about their axes; but the latter is effected by a tranſition from one place to another, when the whole changes its place. It is evident, therefore, from this diviſion, that ſuch are the neceſſary differences of motion.

Theſe two motions are not only apparent in ſenſibles, viz. the circular in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and a motion both according to whole and parts in the ſublunary region, but they alſo ſubſiſt in the natures beyond thoſe. For a partial ſoul, through its aſcents and deſcents, and its tranſitive energy according to length, contains the paradigm of motions both according to the whole and parts; and intellect, through its intranſitive revolution about the intelligible, cauſally contains the circular motion. And not only intellect, but alſo every divine ſoul, through its meaſured motion about intellect, receives an incorporeal circulation. Parmenides alſo, ſays Proclus, when he calls being a ſphere, in his poems, and ſays that it perceives intellectually, evidently calls its intellection ſpheric motion. But Timæus, bending the progreſſion of the ſoul according to length, into circles, and making one of theſe circles external and the other internal, confers both theſe eternally on the ſoul according to a demiurgic cauſe, and an intellectual period prior to that of bodies. Theologiſts alſo, Proclus adds, were well acquainted with incorporeal circulation. For the theologiſt of the Greeks (Orpheus) ſpeaking concerning that firſt and occult God * who ſubſiſts prior to Phanes, ſays, "that he moves in an infinite circle with unwearied energy."

Ὁ δ' ἀπειρεσιον κατα κυκλον ἀτρυτως φοροιτο.

And the Chaldæan Oracles aſſert that all fountains and principles abide in an *unſluggiſh* revolution. For, ſince every thing which is moved in a circle has permanency mingled with motion, they are very properly ſaid always to abide in circulation, the *unſluggiſh* here ſignifying *immateriality*. The motions, therefore, of incorporeal natures are comprehended in this diviſion; and ſo *the one*

* Viz. the το ὄ or the firſt being of Plato, the ſummit of the intelligible order.

is

locally, it will either be carried round in the ſame circle, or it will change one place for another. Neceſſarily ſo. But ought not that which is carried round in a circle to ſtand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itſelf rolled about the middle? And can any method be deviſed by which it is poſſible that a nature which has neither middle nor parts can be circularly carried about the middle? There cannot be any. But if it changes its place[17], would it not become ſituated elſewhere, and thus be moved? In this caſe it would. Has it not appeared to be impoſſible that *the one* ſhould be in any thing? It has. Is it not much more impoſſible that it ſhould *become ſituated* in

is ſhown to be immovable, as being eſtabliſhed above all motion, and not as being partly immovable and partly movable.

[17] That it is impoſſible for *the one* to paſs from one place to another is evident. For either the whole muſt be within both places; or the whole muſt be without both; or this part of it muſt be here, and that in the other place. But if the whole being without is in neither, it cannot be moved from one place to another. If again the whole is within both, neither again will it be moved from the former to the following place. And if one part of it is in this, and another in the remaining place, it will be partible, or conſiſt of parts. But *the one* is not partible; and conſequently it cannot be in any thing. And here obſerve, that though there may be ſomething which is neither without nor within a certain thing, but is both without and within (for thus ſoul and intellect are ſaid to be in the world and out of it), yet it is impoſſible for the whole of a thing to be in ſomething, and yet be neither without nor within it. Regarding, therefore, the partible nature of ſoul, not only ours, but alſo that which is divine, we may ſay that it poſſeſſes the cauſe of a motion of this kind, ſince it is neither wholly within nor yet perfectly without that which is the object of its energy. For the whole of it does not at once apply itſelf to the conceptions of intellect, ſince it is not naturally adapted to ſee theſe collectively; nor is it wholly ſeparated from intellect, but according to its own different intellections it becomes in a certain reſpect ſituated in the different forms of intellect, and introduces itſelf as it were into its intellections, as into its proper place. Hence Timæus does not refuſe to call the ſoul generated, as he had previouſly denominated it partible. For ſoul does not poſſeſs a collective intelligence, but all its energies are generated; and in conſequence of this its intellections are eſſentialized in tranſitions. Hence alſo time is ſo intimately connected with ſoul, that it meaſures its firſt energies. Intellect, therefore, appears genuinely to contain the paradigm of a circular motion, poſſeſſing as a centre that part of itſelf which abides, and which is the intelligible of intellect, but the many progreſſions of forms from this Veſta as it were of itſelf, as right lines from the centre. But all its energies, which are intellective of intelligibles, have the relation of the one ſuperficies running round the lines from the centre, and the centre itſelf. A divine ſoul, however, contains the paradigm both of a right-lined and circular progreſſion; of the former, as proceeding about the intelligible place, abiding indeed as a whole, but evolving the intelligible by its tranſitions; but of the latter, as always fixing the whole of itſelf in the object of intellection: for, as

in any thing? I do not underſtand how you mean. If any thing is *becoming to be* in any thing, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould not yet *be* in it, ſince it is *becoming to be*; nor yet entirely out of it, ſince it has already *become?* It is neceſſary. If therefore this can take place in any other thing, it muſt certainly happen to that which poſſeſſes parts; for one part of it will be in this thing, but another out of it: but that which has no parts cannot by any means be wholly within or without any thing. It is true. But is it not much more impoſſible that that which neither has parts nor is a whole can be *becoming to be* in any thing; ſince it can neither ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* according to parts, nor according to a whole? So it appears. Hence it will neither change its place by going any where [18], nor that it may *become ſituated* in any thing; nor, through being carried round in that which is the ſame, will it ſuffer any alteration. It does not appear that it can. *The one* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion. Immovable. But we have likewiſe aſſerted [19] that it is impoſſible for

a whole, it both abides and is moved. And in the laſt place, a partial ſoul, by its motions according to length, clearly produces the incorporeal cauſe of a right-lined motion.

[18] Plato here collects all the aforeſaid concluſions about motion; and having before enumerated them in a divided manner, he makes one univerſal concluſion, teaching us through this aſcent how it is always requiſite in the viſion of *the one* to contract multitude into that which is common, and to comprehend parts through the whole. For the things which he had before divided into parts receiving three motions, viz. internal mutation, the right-lined and circular progreſſion, theſe he now ſeparately enumerates, by ſaying, that *the one* neither proceeds, nor is circularly borne along, nor is altered; and making an orderly enumeration, he recurs from things proximately demonſtrated to ſuch as are prior to them, that he may conjoin the beginning to the end, and may imitate the intellectual circle. And here we may again ſee that the propoſition and the concluſion are univerſal, but that the demonſtrations proceed together with diviſions. For ſtable intellections and converſions contract multitude; but thoſe which ſubſiſt according to progreſſion divide the whole into parts, and *the one* into its proper number.

[19] The thing propoſed to be ſhown from the firſt was to demonſtrate that *the one* is unindigent of permanency and motion, and that it is beyond and the cauſe of both. For the negation of permanency and motion cannot be applied to *the one* in the ſame manner as to matter. For matter participates of theſe merely in appearance. It is therefore applied to *the one*, as being better than both theſe. For, as ſome one prior to us, ſays Proclus, obſerves, becauſe *the one* does not abide, *being* is moved, and becauſe it is not moved, *being* is permanent. For *being* by its ſtability imitates the immobility of *the one*, and, by its efficacious energy, that which in *the one* is above tenſion and an eſtabliſhment in itſelf. And through both theſe it is aſſimilated to *the one*, which is neither.

It

for *the one* to be in any thing. We have ſaid ſo. It can never therefore be in *ſame*. Why? Becauſe it would now be in that in which *ſame* is. Entirely ſo. But the one can neither be in itſelf nor in another. It cannot. The one therefore is never in *ſame*. It does not appear that it is. But as it is never in *ſame*, it can neither be at reſt nor ſtand ſtill. In this caſe it cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, neither ſtands ſtill nor is moved. It does not appear that it can. Nor will it be the ſame either with another[20], or with itſelf; nor again different either from itſelf or from another.

It is alſo beautifully obſerved here by Proclus, that a thing appears to ſtand ſtill, which is eſtabliſhed in *another*, but *to be at reſt*, which is able to abide in *itſelf*. But Parmenides denies both theſe of *the one*, as not being in another nor in itſelf. Whether, therefore, there is a certain intellectual tranquillity which is celebrated by the wiſe, or myſtic port, or paternal ſilence, it is evident that *the one* is exempt from all ſuch things, being beyond energy, ſilence and quiet, and all the ſtable ſignatures which belong to beings.

But here, perhaps, ſome one may ſay, it has been ſufficiently ſhown that *the one* is neither moved nor ſtands ſtill, yet nothing hinders but that he may be called *ſtability* or motion. To this we reply, that *the one*, as we have before obſerved, is neither both of two oppoſites, leſt he ſhould become not one, and there ſhould be prior to it that which mingles the oppoſites; nor is it the better of the two, leſt it ſhould have ſomething which is oppoſed, and thus, in conſequence of containing a property oppoſite to ſomething elſe, ſhould again be not one, and not being one ſhould conſiſt of infinite infinites; nor is it the worſe of the two, leſt it ſhould have ſomething better than itſelf, and this ſomething better ſhould again in like manner conſiſt of infinite infinites. Hence Plato at length even denies *the one* of it, becauſe that which is firſt is beyond all oppoſition, and *the one* is oppoſed to *the many*.

Let it alſo be obſerved that the firſt permanency and the firſt motion originate from themſelves, the one deriving from itſelf ſtable power, and the other efficacious energy; in the ſame manner as every thing elſe which is firſt begins its own energy from itſelf. So that, when it is ſaid *the one* does not ſtand, and is not moved, this alſo implies that it is not permanency, and that it is not motion. Hence, neither muſt it be ſaid that *the one* is the moſt firm of all ſtable things, and the moſt energetic of every thing that is in motion: for tranſcendencies of participations do not take away, but ſtrengthen the participations. If, therefore, *the one* does not in ſhort *ſtand*, it is not *moſt firm*. For either *moſt firm* is only a name, and aſſerts nothing concerning *the one*, or it manifeſts that it is moſt ſtable. And if it is not in any reſpect moved, it is not *moſt energetic*. For, if theſe words ſignify nothing, they aſſert nothing concerning *the one*; but, if they ſignify that which in the moſt eminent degree participates of motion, *the one* will not be moſt energetic. For energy is a certain motion.

[20] Plato here appears to characteriſe for us the whole demiurgic order, in the ſame manner as the words prior to theſe characteriſe the vivific order, and thoſe again prior to theſe, that which ranks as the ſummit in intellectuals. Theſe things, indeed, as Proclus well obſerves, appear in a moſt eminent degree to pertain to the demiurgic ſeries, according to the Platonic narrations concerning

another. How ſo? For, if different from itſelf[21], it would be different from

cerning it, and thoſe of other theologiſts; though, ſays he, this is dubious to ſome, who alone conſider *permanency* and *motion*, *ſameneſs* and *difference*, philoſophically, and do not perceive that theſe things are firſt beheld about *the one*, and not about *being*; and that, as there is a twofold number, viz. ſupereſſential and eſſential, in like manner each of theſe genera of being firſt ſubſiſt in the divine unities, and afterwards in beings. They likewiſe do not ſee that theſe are ſigns of the divine and ſelf-perfect orders, and not of the genera or ſpecies only of being.

Let it alſo be obſerved that the genera of being ſubſiſt both in the intelligible and intellectual orders, intelligibly in the former, and intellectually in the latter; and this is juſt the ſame as to aſſert that in intelligibles they ſubſiſt abſorbed in unity, and without ſeparation, but in intellectuals with ſeparation according to their proper number. So that it is by no means wonderful if the intelligible monad comprehends the whole intellectual pentad, viz. eſſence, motion, permanency, ſameneſs and difference, without diviſion, and in the moſt profound union, ſince through this union all theſe are after a manner one: for all things, ſays Proclus, are there without ſeparation according to a *dark miſt*, as the theologiſt * aſſerts. Αδιακριτων παντων οντων κατα σκοτοεσσαν ὁμιχλην φησιν ὁ Θεολογος. For if in arithmetic the monad, which is the cauſe of monadic numbers, contains all thoſe forms or productive principles which the decad comprehends decadically, and the tetrad tetradically, is it at all wonderful that among beings the intelligible monad ſhould comprehend all the genera of being monadically, and without ſeparation; but that another order ſhould contain theſe dyadically, another tetradically, and another decadically? For ideas alſo ſubſiſt in intelligibles, but not after the ſame manner as in intellectuals; ſince in the former they ſubſiſt *totally*, *unitedly*, and *paternally*; but in the latter *with ſeparation*, *partially*, and *demiurgically*. But it is every where neceſſary that the number of ideas ſhould be ſuſpended from the genera of being. If, therefore, intellectual ideas participate of the intellectual genera, intelligible ideas alſo muſt participate of the intelligible genera. But if ideas firſt ſubſiſt tetradically at the extremity of intelligibles, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a monadic ſubſiſtence of theſe genera prior to the formal tetrad.

Let us now conſider why Plato firſt takes away from *the one*, *motion* and *permanency*, and afterwards *ſame* and *different*. We have already indeed ſaid what was the cauſe of this, viz. that *motion* and *permanency* are twofold, one kind being prior to ſame and different, according to which every thing proceeds and is converted to its cauſe, but the other being poſterior to ſame and different, and appearing in the energies of beings. But we ſhall now, with Proclus, aſſign the reaſon of this, after another manner, from the problems themſelves. In this firſt hypotheſis then, concerning *the one*, ſome things are denied of it with reſpect to itſelf alone: for *multitude* and *the whole*, *figure*, and *the being in a certain thing*, *motion* and *permanency*, are taken away from *the one* conſidered with reſpect to itſelf. But *ſame* and *different*, *ſimilar* and *diſſimilar*, *equal* and *unequal*, *older* and *younger*, are denied of *the one* both with reſpect to itſelf and other things: for *the one* is neither the *ſame* with itſelf, nor with others, and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to

* Viz. Orpheus. Agreeably to this, in the Orphic hymn to Protogonus, who ſubſiſts at the extremity of the intelligible order, that deity is ſaid "*to wipe away from the eyes a dark miſt.*"

Οσσων ὁς σκοτοεσσαν απημαυρωσας ὁμιχλην.

different,

from *the one*, and ſo would not be *the one*. True. And if it ſhould be the ſame

different, and each of the reſt. But *that which is the object of opinion* or *ſcience*, or *which can be named*, or *is effable*, are denied of *the one* with reſpect to other things: for it is unknown to all ſecondary natures, by theſe gnoſtic energies. Negations, therefore, being aſſumed in a triple reſpect, viz. of a thing with reſpect to itſelf, of itſelf with reſpect to others, and of itſelf both with reſpect to itſelf and others, and ſome of theſe ranking as firſt, others as middle, and others as laſt, hence *motion* and *permanency* are denied of *the one*, as of itſelf with reference to itſelf, but *the ſame* and *different* are denied in a twofold reſpect, viz. of *the one* with reference to itſelf, and of itſelf with reference to other things. Hence the former are co-arranged with firſt negations, but the latter with ſuch as are middle. Nor is it without reaſon that he firſt diſcourſes about the former, and afterwards about the latter. Thus alſo he denies *the ſimilar* and *the diſſimilar*, *the equal* and *the unequal*, *the older* and *the younger*, of *the one* with reference to itſelf and other things. He likewiſe through theſe takes away from *the one*, *eſſence*, *quantity*, *quality*, and *the when*: for *the ſame* and *different* pertain to *eſſences*, *the ſimilar* and *the diſſimilar*, to *qualities*, *the equal* and *the unequal*, to *quantities*, and *the older* and *the younger*, to things which exiſt at a certain time. Plato alſo, ſays Proclus, denies *the ſame* and *the different* of *the one*, knowing that Parmenides in his poems places theſe in *the one being*: for thus Parmenides ſpeaks—

Ταυτον τ' εν ταυτῳ μιμνει, καθ' εαυτο τε κειται.

i. e. *Same* in *the ſame* abides, yet by itſelf ſubſiſts.

It is neceſſary, therefore, to ſhow that *the one* which is eſtabliſhed above *the one being*, is by no means *ſame*, and much more that it it is not *different*: for *ſameneſs* is more allied to *the one* than *difference*. Hence, he takes away both *ſame* and *different* from *the one*; that he may ſhow that it tranſcends *the one being*, in which both theſe ſubſiſt according to the verſes of Parmenides, not confuting theſe verſes, but taking occaſion from them to make this additional aſſertion. For, if that which participates of ſameneſs and difference is not yet *the true one*, it neceſſarily follows that *the true one* muſt ſubſiſt prior to theſe: for whatever is added to *the one* obſcures by the addition the unity of the recipient.

[21] There being four problems concerning *ſame* and *different*, as denied of *the one*, Plato beginning from the former of theſe, and which are more eaſily apprehended by us, proceeds through thoſe that remain. But the four problems are as follow: *The one* is not different from itſelf: *the one* is not different from other things: *the one* is not the ſame with itſelf: and *the one* is not the ſame with other things. Of theſe four the extremes are the cleareſt: for that *the one* is not the ſame with other things is evident, and alſo that it is not different from itſelf. But the other two are attended with ſome difficulty. For how can any one admit that that which is one is not the ſame with itſelf? Or how is it poſſible not to be perſuaded, that it is not different from other things, ſince it is exempt from them?

Let us then conſider how the firſt of theſe problems is demonſtrated, viz. that *the one* is not different from itſelf. It is, therefore, demonſtrated as follows: If *the one* is different from itſelf, it will be entirely different from *the one*. But that which is different from *the one*, is not *one*:

ſame with another [22], it would be that thing and would not be itſelf; ſo that neither could it thus be *the one*, but it would be ſomething different from *the*

for that which is different from man is not man, and that which is different from horſe is not horſe; and, in ſhort, that which is different from any thing is not that thing. If, therefore, *the one* is different from itſelf, *the one* is not *one*. And this abſurdity leads us to contradiction, that *the one* is not *one*. *The one*, therefore, is not different from itſelf. Some one, however, may doubt againſt this demonſtration, whether it may not thus be ſhown that *difference* is not *different* from itſelf; though indeed it is neceſſary that it ſhould. For every true being begins its energy from itſelf, as we have before obſerved: and the Eleatean gueſt, in the Sophiſta, ſays that the nature of *difference* is different from the other genera. But if *difference* is different from itſelf, it will not be *difference*; and hence *difference* is not different from itſelf. May we not ſay, therefore, that difference begins indeed its energy from itſelf, and makes itſelf different, yet not different from itſelf, but from other things? For it is able to ſeparate them from each other, and, by a much greater priority, itſelf from them: and thus its energy is directed to itſelf, in preſerving itſelf unconfuſed with other things. It may alſo be ſaid, and that more truly, that *difference* ſo far as it is different from itſelf is not *difference*: for it is different from itſelf through the participation of the other genera of being. So far, therefore, as it participates of other things, ſo far it is not difference. Nor is it abſurd that this ſhould be the caſe with *difference*: for it is *multitude*. But it is abſurd that this ſhould be the caſe with *the one*: for it is *one* alone, and nothing elſe.

[22] This is the ſecond of the four problems, which is indeed more eaſily to be apprehended than thoſe that follow, but is more difficult than the one that precedes it. Plato, therefore, confides in the aſſertion that *the one* receives nothing from other things. For this is an axiom of all others the moſt true, both when applied to *the one*, and to all other cauſes; ſince no cauſe receives any thing from that which is ſubordinate to itſelf. For neither do the heavens receive into themſelves any thing of mortal moleſtation; nor does the demiurgus receive any thing from the generation which is about the whole world; nor do intelligibles participate of multitude from the intellectual order, and the ſeparation which it contains. So that neither can *the one* be filled from the idiom of beings, and conſequently it is by no means the ſame with other things. For it would either participate of the things themſelves, or of things proceeding from them, or both they and *the one* would participate of ſome other one. But both cannot participate of another one: for nothing is better than *the one*, nor is there any thing which is more one; ſince in this caſe there would be ſomething prior to *the one*. For the aſcent is to *the one*, and not to multitude; ſince things more elevated always poſſeſs more of the nature of unity, as for inſtance, ſoul than body. Nor does *the one* participate of things themſelves, ſince theſe are worſe than it, nor of things proceeding from them: for it is at once exempt from all things, and is the object of deſire to all beings, ſubſiſting as an imparticipable prior to wholes, that it may be *one* without multitude; ſince the participated one is not in every reſpect one. In no reſpect, therefore, is *the one* the ſame with others. And thus it appears from common conceptions that the aſſertion is true.

Let

the one. It could not indeed. But, if it is the ſame with another, muſt it not be different from itſelf? It muſt. But it will not be different [23] from another

Let us now conſider the demonſtration of Parmenides, which is as follows: If *the one* is the ſame with any thing elſe, it will be the ſame with that which is not one: for it is itſelf *the one*. Hence alſo it is at the ſame time evident, that it is impoſſible for the true one to be two: for the two will differ from each other. Each, therefore, being one and differing from the other, each in conſequence of poſſeſſing difference together with unity, will no longer be one. Hence *the one* is alone one. That, therefore, which is different from it is not one. Hence, if *the one* is the ſame with another, it is clearly the ſame with non-one: for that which is the ſame with *the one* is one, and that which is the ſame with non-man is non-man. If, therefore, *the one* is the ſame with any other thing beſides itſelf, *the one* is not one. But if not one it is different from *the one*; which was before ſhown to be abſurd. Parmenides alſo adds, and it would be different from *the one*, that through the abſurdity proximately ſhown the abſurdity of this hypotheſis alſo may become apparent. Thus likewiſe it may be demonſtrated that ſameneſs itſelf is not ſameneſs, if there is any inſtance in which it is in a certain reſpect the ſame with difference, or any thing elſe beſides itſelf. Thus, it may be ſaid that ſameneſs is the ſame with difference, ſo far as it participates of difference. If, therefore, it is the ſame with difference, it is different, and not the ſame. Nor is there any abſurdity in this: for in its own eſſence it is ſameneſs, but by participation of difference it becomes different. It becomes however the *ſame* with *difference*, through the participation of difference; which is moſt paradoxical, that *ſameneſs* ſhould become *ſame* through *difference*.

[23] Of the two remaining problems Plato again demonſtrates the more eaſy prior to the other. But it is eaſier to deny that which is more remote from *the one*; and ſuch is *difference*. But ſameneſs is more allied to *the one*; and hence it has a nature more difficult to be ſeparated from it, and requires more abundant diſcuſſion. *The one* then, ſo far as *one*, does not participate of difference: for, if it did, it would be non-one. But every thing which is different from another is ſaid to be ſo through difference. *The one*, therefore, ſo far as one is not different, becauſe it does not participate of difference. For to be different alone pertains to that which is different from another, and not to *the one*; and ſuch is that which participates of difference. But if *the one* is different through difference, it participates of difference. For *the one* is one thing, and different another; the former being denominated by itſelf, and the other with relation to ſomething elſe: ſo that different is not different by *the one*, but by that which makes different.

But here a doubt may ariſe, how *the one* is ſaid to be exempt from all things if it is not different from them? For that which is exempt is ſeparated from thoſe things from which it is exempt. But every thing which is ſeparated is ſeparated through difference: for *difference* is the ſource of diviſion, but *ſameneſs* of connexion. In anſwer to this it may be ſaid, that *the one* is exempt and ſeparate from all things, but that it does not poſſeſs this ſeparation through difference, but from another ineffable tranſcendency, and not ſuch as that which difference imparts to beings. For, as both the world and intellect ſubſiſt for ever, but the *ever* is not the ſame in both, being *temporal* in the former, and *eternal* in the latter, and exempt from all time; ſo intellect is exempt from the

another while it is *the one*. For it does not belong to *the one* to be different from another, but to that alone which is different from another, and to no other. Right. In conſequence, therefore, of its being *the one*, it will not be another; or do you think that it can? Certainly not. But if it is not different from another, neither will it be different from itſelf. But if not different from itſelf, it will not be that which is *different*; and being in no reſpect that which is different, it will be different from nothing. Right. Nor yet will it be the ſame [1] with itſelf. Why not? Is the nature of *the one* the ſame with that of *ſame*? Why? Becauſe, when any thing becomes the ſame with any thing, it does not on this account become one. But what then? That which becomes the ſame with many things muſt neceſſarily become many, and not one. True. But if *the one* and *ſame* differ in no reſpect, whenever any thing becomes *ſame* it will always become *the one*, and whenever it becomes *the one* it will be *ſame*. Entirely ſo. If, therefore, *the one* ſhould be the *ſame* with itſelf, it would be to itſelf that which is *not one*; and ſo that which is one will not be one. But this indeed is impoſſible. It is impoſſible, therefore, for *the one* to be either different from another, or the ſame with itſelf. Impoſſible. And thus *the one* will neither be *different* [2] nor *the ſame*, either with reſpect to itſelf or another. It

world, and *the one* from beings; but the exempt ſubſiſtence of intellect is derived from *difference* which ſeparates beings, but that of *the one* is prior to *difference*. For *difference* imitates that which is exempt and unmingled in *the one*, juſt as *ſameneſs* imitates its ineffable *oneneſs*.

[1] This is the fourth of the problems, that *the one* is not the *ſame* with itſelf, neither as ſameneſs, nor as participating of ſameneſs: and, in the firſt place, he ſhows that it is not as *ſameneſs*. For, if *the one* is ſameneſs, it is neceſſary that every thing which participates of ſameneſs ſhould according to that participation become one. It is however poſſible that a thing ſo far as it participates of ſameneſs may become many, as is evident in that which becomes the ſame with many qualities. Sameneſs, therefore, is not *the one*. For, as that which becomes the ſame with man is man, and that which becomes the ſame with the white is white, and with the black, black, and, in ſhort, in every thing, that which is the ſame with any form entirely receives that with which it is ſaid to become the ſame,—ſo that which becomes the ſame with many things, ſo far as it is many, is the ſame with them. But, ſo far as it is many, it is impoſſible that it can be one. And hence ſameneſs is not *the one*.

[2] This is the common concluſion of the four problems, and which reverts to the firſt propoſition. We may alſo ſee that Plato begins from *the different* and ends in *the different*, imitating, both by the conciſeneſs of the concluſion and in making the end the ſame with the beginning, the

It will not. But neither will it be ſimilar [1] to any thing, or diſſimilar either to itſelf or to another. Why not? Becauſe the ſimilar is that which in a certain

the circle of intellectual energy. It is alſo beautifully obſerved here by Proclus, that as *difference* in beings is twofold, or rather triple, viz. that of things more excellent, that of things ſubordinate, and that of things coordinate,—hence in ſupereſſential natures *tranſcendency* muſt be aſſumed inſtead of the *difference* which ſubſiſts in forms between the more excellent and the inferior; *ſubjection* inſtead of the *difference* of the *inferior* with reſpect to the ſuperior; and *idiom* inſtead of the *ſeparation* of things coordinate from each other. *The one*, therefore, tranſcends all things; and neither is *the one* different from other things, nor are other things different from *the one*. But if we employ ſuch like appellations, and aſſert that other things are different from *the one*, we ſhould look to the imbecility of human nature, and pardon ſuch aſſertions. For that we cannot properly predicate any thing of *the one*, Plato himſelf indicates at the end of this hypotheſis: at the ſame time, however, we aſſert ſomething *concerning* it, through the ſpontaneous parturition of the ſoul about *the one*.

[1] Parmenides, ſays Proclus, paſſes from the *demiurgic* to the *aſſimilative* order, the idiom of which is to be alone ſupermundane, and through which all the *mundane* and *liberated* genera are aſſimilated to the intellectual Gods, and are conjoined with the demiurgic monad, which rules over wholes with exempt tranſcendency. From this demiurgic monad, too, all the aſſimilative order proceeds. But it imitates the *ſameneſs* which is there through ſimilitude, exhibiting in a more partial manner that power of *ſameneſs* which is collective and connective of wholes. It likewiſe imitates *demiurgic difference*, through diſſimilitude, expreſſing its ſeparating and diviſive power through unconfuſed purity with reſpect to the extremes. Nor muſt we here admit, as Proclus well obſerves, that which was aſſerted by ſome of the antients, viz. that *ſimilitude* is *remitted ſameneſs*, and *diſſimilitude remitted difference*. For neither are there any intentions and remiſſions in the Gods, nor things indefinite, and the more and the leſs, but all things are there eſtabliſhed in their proper boundaries and proper meaſures. Hence, it more accords with divine natures to aſſert ſuch things of them as can be manifeſted by analogy. For Plato alſo admits analogy in theſe, in the Republic eſtabliſhing *the good* to be that in intelligibles which *the ſun* is in ſenſibles. Similitude, therefore, and diſſimilitude are that in ſecondary which ſameneſs and difference are in the natures prior to them: and the ſimilar and the diſſimilar are the firſt progeny of ſameneſs and difference. The equal, alſo, and the unequal proceed from thence, but prior to theſe are ſimilitude and diſſimilitude: for the ſimilar is more in forms than the equal, and the diſſimilar more than the unequal. Hence, they are proximately ſuſpended from the demiurgic monad; and on this account Timæus not only repreſents the demiurgus making the world, but alſo *aſſimilating* it to animal itſelf more than it was before; indicating by this that the *aſſimilative* cauſe preſubſiſts in the fabricator of the univerſe. With great propriety, therefore, Plato proceeds to the aſſimilative order after the demiurgic monad, taking away this alſo from *the one*.

But the method of the problems is the ſame as before: for here alſo there are four problems, viz. if *the one* is ſimilar to itſelf; if *the one* is diſſimilar to itſelf; if *the one* is ſimilar to other things;

certain reſpect ſuffers [1] *ſame*. Certainly. But it has appeared that *ſame* is naturally ſeparate from *the one*. It has appeared ſo. But if *the one* ſhould ſuffer any thing except being *the one* which *is*, it would become more than *the one*: but this is impoſſible. Certainly. In no reſpect, therefore, can *the one*

if *the one* is diſſimilar to other things. But all the demonſtrations, that none of theſe is adapted to *the one*, originate from ſameneſs and difference, the media, according to demonſtrative rules, being the proper cauſes of the thing. Hence, he often frames the demonſtration from things remote, and not from things which have been proximately demonſtrated. For things in a higher order, and which have a prior ſubſiſtence, are not always generative of ſecondary natures, but they perfect, or defend, or employ a providential care about, but are not entirely generative of them. Thus, for inſtance, Plato demonſtrates that *the one* is not a *whole*, and has not *parts*, from *the many*: for thence the intellectual wholeneſs proceeds. He demonſtrates that it has not *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, from *whole* and *parts*: for the order characterized by *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, is proximately produced from theſe. Again, he demonſtrates that *the one* is neither *ſtraight* nor *round*, from *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*: for the *ſtraight* and *round* thence receive their generation. But he ſhows that *the one* is neither in *itſelf*, nor in *another*, from that order, and not from figure, though according to progreſſion this is arranged before it. And he demonſtrates that *the one* neither ſtands nor is moved, from *not being in any thing*, and from *not having a middle*, and from *not having parts*. Thus, alſo, in the demonſtrations concerning *ſimilitude* and *diſſimilitude*, he derives the negations which are negative of *the one* from *ſameneſs* and *difference*: for the latter are the ſources of progreſſion to the former.

[1] The ſyllogiſm which furniſhes us with a proof that *the one* is not ſimilar, neither to itſelf nor to another, proceeds geometrically as follows, Plato having firſt defined what the ſimilar is. That, then, which ſuffers a certain ſomething which is the ſame, is ſaid to be ſimilar to that with which it ſuffers ſomething the ſame. For, we ſay that two white things are ſimilar, and alſo two black, in conſequence of the former being the paſſive recipients of the white, and the latter of the black. And again, if you ſay that a white thing and a black thing are ſimilar to each other, you will ſay that they are ſimilar from the participation of colour, which is their common genus. The ſyllogiſm, therefore, is as follows: *The one* ſuffers nothing the ſame, neither with itſelf nor with another: *the ſimilar* ſuffers ſomething the ſame, either with itſelf or with another: *the one*, therefore, is not ſimilar, neither to itſelf nor to another. Such being the ſyllogiſm, Plato thinks that one of the propoſitions alone requires aſſiſtance, viz. that which aſſerts that *the one* does not ſuffer any thing the ſame, neither with itſelf nor with another.

And here, as Proclus well obſerves, we may ſee what caution Plato uſes: for he does not ſay if *the one* ſhould ſuffer *the one*, but if *the one* ſhould ſuffer any thing, except being *the one which is*, χωρις του ἐν ειναι, for it is *the one*, and does not ſuffer it; ſince every thing which ſuffers, or is paſſive, is many. For he calls the participation of any thing a paſſion. Does he not, therefore, in ſaying that *the one* ſuffers nothing elſe, but *the one* which *is*, indicate in a very wonderful manner that even *the one* is ſubordinate to the principle of all things? which indeed he ſays it is at the

one ſuffer to be the ſame, either with another or with itſelf. It does not appear that it can. It cannot, therefore, be ſimilar either to another or to itſelf. So it ſeems. Nor yet can *the one* ſuffer to be another; for thus it would ſuffer to be more than *the one*. More, indeed. But that which ſuffers to be different, either from itſelf or from another, will be diſſimilar either to itſelf or to another, if that which ſuffers *ſame* is ſimilar. Right. But *the one*, as it appears, ſince it in no reſpect ſuffers *different*, can in no reſpect be diſſimilar either to itſelf or to another. It certainly cannot. *The one*, therefore, will neither be ſimilar nor diſſimilar, either to another or to itſelf. It does not appear that it can.

end of this hypotheſis. He alſo indicates that the addition of this aſſertion to the principle of things is foreign to it, though more allied to it than other things, becauſe it is not poſſible to conceive any thing more venerable than *the one*.

Should it be aſked whence it is that what ſuffers the ſame is ſimilar, we reply that ſimilitude is the progeny of ſameneſs, in the ſame manner as ſameneſs of *the one*. Sameneſs, therefore, participates of *the one*, and ſimilitude of ſameneſs. For, this it is to ſuffer, to participate of another, and to proceed according to another more antient cauſe.

Let it alſo be obſerved, that when it is ſaid that all things are ſimilar to *the one*, in conſequence of ineffably proceeding from thence, they muſt not be underſtood to be ſimilar according to this ſimilitude, but alone according to that union which pervades to all beings from *the one*, and the ſpontaneous deſire of all things about *the one*. For all things are what they are from a deſire of *the one*, through *the one*; and in conſequence of this parturition every thing being filled with a union adapted to its nature, is aſſimilated to the one cauſe of all things. Hence, it is not aſſimilated to ſimilars; leſt the ineffable principle itſelf ſhould alſo appear to be ſimilar to other things; but, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, it is aſſimilated to the paradigm of things ſimilar to this higheſt cauſe. Beings, therefore, are aſſimilated to *the one*; but they are aſſimilated through an ineffable deſire of *the one*, and not through this aſſimilative order, or the form of ſimilitude. For the aſſimilative which immediately ſubſiſts after the intellectual order, is not able to conjoin and draw upwards all beings to *the one*; but its province is to elevate things poſterior to itſelf to the intellectual demiurgic monad. When, therefore, it is ſaid that every progreſſion is effected through ſimilitude, it is requiſite to pardon the names which we are accuſtomed to uſe in ſpeaking of beings, when they are applied to the unfolding into light of all things from the ineffable principle of all. For, as we call him *the one*, in conſequence of perceiving nothing more venerable, nothing more holy, in beings than unity, ſo we characterize the progreſſion of all things from him by *ſimilitude*, not being able to give any name to ſuch progreſſion more perfect than this. Thus alſo Socrates, in the Republic, calls this ineffable principle, according to analogy, the *idea* of the good; becauſe *the good*, or *the one*, is that to all beings which every intelligible idea is to the proper ſeries ſubſiſting from and with relation to it.

But

But ſince it is ſuch, it will neither be equal [1] nor unequal, either to itſelf or to another. How ſo? If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the ſame

[1] After the aſſimilative order of Gods, which is ſupermundane alone, antient theologiſts arrange that which is denominated liberated, the peculiarity of which, according to them, is to be exempt from mundane affairs, and at the ſame time to communicate with them. They are alſo proximately carried in the mundane Gods; and hence they ſay that they are allotted the medium of the ſupermundane and mundane Gods. This liberated order, therefore, Plato delivers to us in the ſecond hypotheſis, and alſo there ſays what the idiom of it is, and that it is *touching:* for it is in a certain reſpect mundane and ſupermundane, being collective of thoſe that are properly called mundane Gods, and producing into multitude the union of all the aſſimilative and ſupermundane ſeries. Here, however, Plato omits this order, and paſſes on to thoſe Gods that are alone mundane; the reaſon of which we ſhall endeavour to aſſign in commenting on the ſecond hypotheſis.

The peculiarity, therefore, of the mundane Gods is *the equal* and *the unequal*, the former of theſe indicating their fulneſs, and their receiving neither any addition nor ablation; (for ſuch is that which is equal to itſelf, always preſerving the ſame boundary;) but the latter, the multitude of their powers, and the exceſs and defect which they contain. For, in theſe, diviſions, variety of powers, differences of progreſſions, analogies, and bonds through theſe, are, according to antient theologiſts, eſpecially allotted a place. Hence, Timæus alſo conſtitutes ſouls through analogy, the cauſes of which muſt neceſſarily preſubſiſt in the Gods that proximately preſide over ſouls: and as all analogies ſubſiſt from equality, Plato very properly indicates the idiom of theſe divinities by the equal and the unequal. But he now very properly frames the demonſtrations of the negations of the equal and the unequal from *ſameneſs* and *the many*, and not from *the ſimilar* and *the diſſimilar*, though he proximately ſpoke of theſe. For every mundane deity proceeds from the demiurgic monad, and the firſt multitude which he firſt denies of the one.

Of this then we muſt be entirely perſuaded, that the things from which demonſtrations conſiſt are the preceding cauſes of the particulars about which Parmenides diſcourſes; ſo that *the equal* and *the unequal*, ſo far as they proceed from *the one*, and ſubſiſt through *ſameneſs* and *the many*, ſo far through theſe they are denied of *the one*. Hence, Plato thus begins his diſcourſe concerning them:—"*But ſince it is ſuch*," viz. not as we have juſt now demonſtrated, but as was formerly ſhown, that it neither receives *ſame* nor *different*, and is *without multitude*,—being ſuch, it is neither equal nor unequal, neither to itſelf nor to others: for, again, there are here twofold concluſions, in the ſame manner as concerning the ſimilar and the diſſimilar, and the ſame and the different. But that *the equal* and *the unequal* are ſuſpended from the twofold coordinations of divine natures is not immaniſeſt. For *the equal* is arranged under *the ſimilar*, and *the ſame*, *ſubſiſtence in another*, *the round*, and *the whole*; but *the unequal*, under *the diſſimilar*, *the different*, *ſubſiſtence in itſelf*, *the ſtraight*, and *the poſſeſſion of parts*. And again, of theſe the former are ſuſpended from *bound*, and the latter from *infinity*. Plato alſo appears to produce the diſcourſe through certain oppoſitions, as it were, that he may ſhow that *the one* is above all oppoſition. For *the one* cannot be the worſe of the two oppoſites, ſince this would be abſurd; nor can it be the better of the two, ſince in

ſame [1] meaſures with that to which it is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or leſſer than the things with which it is commenſurate, will poſſeſs more meaſures than the leſſer quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to thoſe to which it is incommenſurable, with reſpect to the one part, it will conſiſt of leſſer; and with reſpect to the other, of greater meaſures. How ſhould it not? Is it not, therefore, impoſſible that that which does not participate of *ſame* ſhould either be of the ſame meaſures, or admit any thing in any reſpect the ſame? It is im-

in this caſe it would not be the cauſe of all things. For the better oppoſite is not the cauſe of the worſe, but in a certain reſpect communicates with it, without being properly its cauſe. For neither does ſameneſs give ſubſiſtence to difference, nor permanency to motion; but comprehenſion and union pervade from the better to the worſe.

[1] It is by no means wonderful that the demonſtrations of *the equal* and *the unequal*, which are here aſſumed as ſymbols of mundane deity, ſhould be adapted to phyſical and mathematical equals, to the equals in the reaſons of ſoul, and to thoſe in intellectual forms. For it is neceſſary that demonſtrations in all theſe negations ſhould begin ſupernally, and ſhould extend through all ſecondary natures, that they may ſhow that *the one* of the Gods is exempt from intellectual, pſychical, mathematical, and phyſical forms. All ſuch axioms, therefore, as are now aſſumed concerning things equal and unequal, muſt be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, ſays Proclus, as it contains many powers, ſome of which are coordinate with each other, and extend themſelves to the ſelf-perfect and the good, but others differ according to tranſcendency and ſubject in—the former muſt be ſaid to be characteriſed by *equality*, but the latter by *inequality*. For *the good* is the meaſure of every thing: and hence ſuch things as are united by the ſame good are meaſured by the ſame meaſure, and are equal to each other. But things which are uncoordinated with each other make their progreſſion according to the unequal.

Since, however, of things unequal, ſome are commenſurate and others incommenſurate, it is evident that theſe alſo muſt be adapted to divine natures. Hence commenſuration muſt be referred to thoſe Gods, through whom ſecondary natures are mingled with thoſe prior to them, and participate of the whole of more excellent beings: for thus, in things commenſurate, the leſſer is willing to have a common meaſure with the greater, the ſame thing meaſuring the whole of each. But incommenſuration muſt be aſcribed to thoſe divinities from whom things ſubordinate, through the exempt tranſcendency of more excellent natures, participate of them in a certain reſpect, but are incapable through their ſubjection of being conjoined with the whole of them. For the communion from firſt to partial and multifarious natures is incommenſurate to the latter. If, indeed, *the equal* and *the unequal* are ſymbols of the mundane Gods, *the commenſurate* and *the incommenſurate* are here very properly introduced. For in things incorporeal and immaterial this oppoſition has no place, all things being there effable; but where there is a material ſubject, and a mixture of form and ſomething formleſs, there an oppoſition of commenſuration very properly ſubſiſts. Hence, as the mundane Gods are proximately connective of ſouls and bodies, form and matter, a diviſion appears in them, according to *the equal* and *the unequal*.

poſſible.

poſſible. It will, therefore, neither be equal to itſelf nor to another, if it does not conſiſt of the ſame meaſures. It does not appear that it will. But if it conſiſts of more or fewer meaſures, it will be of as many parts as there are meaſures; and ſo again it will no longer be *the one*, but as many as there are meaſures. Right. But if it ſhould be of one meaſure, it would become equal to that meaſure: but it has appeared that *the one* cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared ſo. *The one*, therefore, neither participates of one meaſure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor (ſince it in no reſpect participates of *ſame*) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itſelf or to another, nor again greater or leſſer either than itſelf or another. It is in every reſpect ſo.

But what? Does it appear that *the one* can be either older [r] or younger, or

[r] Plato having proceeded in negations as far as to the mundane Gods, always taking away things in a conſequent order from *the one*, through the middle genera, or, to ſpeak more clearly, the negations always producing things ſecondary, through ſuch as are proximate to *the one*, from the exempt cauſe of wholes, he is now about to ſeparate from *the one* the divine eſſence itſelf, which firſt participates of the Gods, and receives their progreſſion into the world; or, to ſpeak more accurately, he is now about to produce this eſſence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its ſubſiſtence from the monad of beings, both *true being*, and that which is aſſimilated to it, which of itſelf indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an obſcure repreſentation of being; in like manner, from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable tranſcendency, every divine number ſubſiſts, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The deſign, therefore, as we have before obſerved, of what is now ſaid, is to ſhow that *the one* is exempt from this eſſence. And here we may ſee how Parmenides ſubverts their hypotheſis who contend that the firſt cauſe is ſoul, or any thing elſe of this kind, and this by ſhowing that *the one* does not participate of time: for it is impoſſible that a nature which is exempt from time ſhould be ſoul; ſince every ſoul participates of time, and uſes periods which are meaſured by time. *The one* alſo is better than and is beyond intellect, becauſe every intellect is both moved and permanent; but it is demonſtrated that *the one* neither ſtands nor is moved: ſo that, as Proclus well obſerves, through theſe things the three hypoſtaſes which rank as principles, viz. *the one*, *intellect*, and *ſoul*, become known to us (ὡς τι διὰ τουτων τας τρεις αρχικας ὑποστασεις εχοιμεν ἀν γνωριμους γεγενημενας.) But that *the one* is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides demonſtrates by ſhowing in the firſt place that it is neither older, nor younger, nor of the ſame age with itſelf, nor with any other. For every thing which participates of time neceſſarily participates of theſe; ſo that by ſhowing that *the one* is exempt from theſe which happen to every thing that participates of time, he alſo ſhows that *the one* has no connexion with time. This, however, ſays Proclus, is incredible to the many, and appeared ſo to the phyſiologiſts

or be of the ſame age? What ſhould hinder? If it had in any reſpect the ſame

giſts prior to Plato, who thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any thing which time does not meaſure. For, as they were of opinion that all things are in place, in conſequence of thinking that all things are bodies, and that nothing is incorporeal, ſo they thought that all things ſubſiſt in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is immovable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itſelf place, but motion time. As therefore it was demonſtrated that *the one* is not in place, becauſe it is not in another, and on this account is incorporeal,—in like manner through theſe arguments it is alſo ſhown that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not ſoul, nor any thing elſe which requires and participates of time, either according to eſſence or according to energy.

And here it is well worthy our obſervation, that Parmenides no longer ſtops at the dyad as in the former concluſions, but triadically enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. *the older*, *the younger*, and *the poſſeſſion of the ſame age*, though, as Proclus juſtly obſerves, he might have ſaid dyadically, *of an equal age*, and *of an unequal age*, as there *the equal* and *the unequal*. But there indeed, having previouſly introduced the dyad, he paſſes from the diviſion of the unequal to the triadic diſtribution; but here he begins from the triad. For there union precedes multitude, and the whole the parts; but in this order of things multitude is moſt apparent, and a diviſion into parts, as Timæus ſays, whom Parmenides, in what is now ſaid, imitating begins indeed from the triad, but proceeds as far as to the hexad. For *the older* and *the younger*, and *the poſſeſſion of the ſame age*, are doubled, being divided into *itſelf* and *relation to another*. That the triad, indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order, is not immanifeſt: for the triple nature of ſoul, conſiſting of *eſſence*, *ſame*, and *different*, and its triple power, which receives its completion from the charioteer and the two horſes, as we learn from the Phædrus, evince its alliance with the triad; and its eſſence being combined from both theſe ſhows its natural alliance with the hexad.

And here it is neceſſary to obſerve, that as the diſcourſe is about divine ſouls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, *time* according to its firſt ſubſiſtence pertains to theſe ſouls,—not that which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and without habitude; and this is the time which is now denied of *the one*. All the periods of ſouls, their harmonious motions about the intelligible, and their circulations, are meaſured by this time. For it has a ſupernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves, and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to ſoul, or in whatever other manner it may be ſaid to ſubſiſt. This time alſo is indeed eſſentially an intellect; but it is the cauſe to divine ſouls of their harmonic and infinite motion about the intelligible, through which theſe likewiſe are led to *the older* and to *the ſame age*: and this in a twofold reſpect. For *the older* in theſe *with reſpect to themſelves* takes place, ſo far as with their more excellent powers they more enjoy the infinity of time, and participate it more abundantly: for they are not filled with ſimilar perfection from more divine natures, according to all their powers, but with ſome more, and with others leſs. But that is ſaid to be older which participates more of time. That which is older in theſe divine ſouls *with reſpect to other things* is effected ſo far as ſome of theſe receive the whole meaſure of time,

ſame [1] age, either with itſelf or with another, it would participate equally of time and ſimilitude, which we have nevertheleſs aſſerted *the one* does not participate.

and the whole of its extenſion proceeding to ſouls, but others are meaſured by more partial periods. Thoſe, therefore, are older, whoſe period is more total, and is extended to a longer time. They may alſo be ſaid to be *older and at the ſame time younger with reſpect to themſelves*, by becoming *hoary* as it were above, through extending themſelves to the whole power of time, but *juvenile* beneath, by enjoying time more partially. But, *as with reſpect to others*, they may be ſaid to be *older and at the ſame time younger*, according to a ſubjection of energy: for that which has its circulation meaſured by a leſſer period is *younger* than that whoſe circulation is meaſured by a more extended period. Again, among things coordinate, that which has the ſame participation and the ſame meaſure of perfection with others may be ſaid to be of *the ſame age with itſelf and others*. But every divine ſoul, though its own period is meaſured according to one time, and that of the body which is ſuſpended from it according to another, yet it has an equal reſtitution to the ſame condition; itſelf always according to its own time, and its body alſo according to its time. Hence, again, it is of the ſame age with itſelf and its body, according to the analogous.

By thus interpreting what is now ſaid of *the one*, we ſhall accord with Plato, in the Timæus, who there evinces that *time* is the meaſure of every tranſitive life, and who ſays that ſoul is the origin of a divine and wiſe life through the whole of time. And we ſhall alſo accord with his aſſertion in the Phædrus, that ſouls ſee true being through time, becauſe they perceive *temporally*, and not *eternally*.

[1] Plato here demonſtrates that *the one* is neither older nor younger than itſelf, or another. For, it was neceſſary to ſhow that *the one* is beyond every divine ſoul, prior to other ſouls, in the ſame manner as it is demonſtrated to be prior to true beings, and to be the cauſe of all things. Nor muſt it be on this account admitted that *the one* comprehends in itſelf the cauſes of all things, and through this is multitude. For every cauſe is the cauſe of one particular property; as, for inſtance, *animal itſelf* is the cauſe alone to animals of a ſubſiſtence as animals; and, in the ſame manner, every intelligible produces other things, according to its idiom alone. *The one*, therefore, is the cauſe of *unities*, and of *union* to all things; and all things are thence derived, either as being unities, or as compoſed from certain unities: for being itſelf, and, in ſhort, every thing, is either as *one*, or as conſiſting from certain unities. For, if it is *united*, it is evident that it conſiſts from certain things; and if theſe are unities the conſequence is manifeſt: but if they are things united, we muſt again paſs on to the things from which they are compoſed, and thus proceeding ad infinitum, we muſt end in certain unities, from which, as elements, that which is united conſiſts. Hence it follows that all things are either unities or numbers. For that which is not a *unity*, but *united*, if it conſiſts from certain definite unities, is number, and this will be the firſt number, ſubſiſting from things indiviſible: for every unity is indiviſible. But the number of beings is from beings, and not from things indiviſible. So that, if there is a certain cauſe of beings, it is the cauſe of all beings; but if there is a certain cauſe of the unities from which all things conſiſt, it is indeed the cauſe of all things: for there is no longer any thing which is not either a unity, or compoſed from unities. Hence, it is not proper to ſay that the cauſes of all things are

participate. We have aſſerted ſo. And this alſo we have ſaid, that it neither participates of diſſimilitude nor inequality. Entirely ſo. How, therefore, being ſuch, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or poſſeſs the ſame age with any thing? It can in no reſpect. The one, therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the ſame age, either with itſelf or with another. It does not appear that it will. Will it not, therefore, be impoſſible that *the one* ſhould be at all in time, if it be ſuch? Or, is it not neceſſary that, if any thing is in time, it ſhould always become older than itſelf? It is neceſſary. But is not that which is older [1], always older than the younger? What then? That, therefore, which is becoming to be older than itſelf, is at the ſame time becoming to be younger than itſelf, if it is about to have that through which it may become older. How do you ſay? Thus: It is requiſite that nothing ſhould ſubſiſt in *becoming* to be different from another, when it *is* already different, but that it ſhould

in *the one*, nor, without ſaying this, to think that *the one* is the cauſe of certain things, as of unities, and is not at the ſame time the cauſe of all things. Since, therefore, it is the cauſe of every divine ſoul, ſo far as theſe derive their ſubſiſtence as well as all beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it neceſſary to ſhow that the one is beyond the order of deified ſouls: for theſe ſouls ſo far as they are intellectual have intellect for their cauſe; ſo far as they are eſſences, they originate from intellect; and ſo far as they have the form of unity, they are derived from the one; receiving their hypoſtaſis from this, ſo far as each is a multitude conſiſting of certain unities, and of theſe as elements.

[1] That which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding, as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ending in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion from the ſame to the ſame, to which both the beginning and the end are the ſame, and the motion is unceaſing, every thing in it being both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly, participates of time periodically: and ſo far as it departs from the beginning it becomes older, but ſo far as it approaches to the end it becomes younger. For, becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to its proper beginning; but that which becomes nearer to its beginning becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end becomes younger, the ſame alſo according to the ſame becoming older; for that which approximates to its end proceeds to that which is older. That to which the beginning, therefore, is one thing, and the end another, to this the younger is different from the older; but that to which the beginning and the end are the ſame, is in no reſpect older than younger, but, as Plato ſays, at the ſame time becomes younger and older than itſelf. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time, if it becomes both older and younger than itſelf, is circularly moved. But divine ſouls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and the time of their proper motion is periodical.

be now different from that which *is* different, *have been* from that which *was*, and *will be* from that which is *to be hereafter:* but from that which is *becoming to be* different, it ought neither to *have been*, nor *to be hereafter*, nor *to be*, but to ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* different, and no otherwiſe. It is neceſſary. But the older differs from the younger, and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is *becoming to be* older than itſelf, muſt neceſſarily at the ſame time ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* younger than itſelf. It ſeems ſo. But likewiſe it ought not to ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* in a longer time than itſelf, nor yet in a ſhorter; but in a time equal to itſelf it ſhould ſubſiſt in *becoming to be*, ſhould *be*, *have been*, and *be hereafter*. For theſe are neceſſary. It is neceſſary, therefore, as it appears, that ſuch things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, ſhould each one poſſeſs the ſame age with itſelf, and ſhould ſubſiſt in becoming to be both older and younger than itſelf. It ſeems ſo. But no one of theſe paſſions belongs to *the one*. None. Neither, therefore, is time preſent with it, nor does it ſubſiſt[1] in any time. It does not, indeed, according to the deciſions of reaſon. What then? Do not the terms *it was*[2], *it has been*, *it did become*, ſeem to

[1] As *the one* is not in *time*, becauſe it is not in motion, ſo neither is it in *eternity*, becauſe it is not in *permanency:* for *eternity abides*, as Timæus ſays.

[2] This diviſion of time, ſays Proclus, accords with the multitude of the divine genera which are ſuſpended from divine ſouls, viz. with angels, dæmons, and heroes. And, in the firſt place, this diviſion proceeds to them ſupernally, according to a *triadic* diſtribution into the *preſent*, *paſt*, and *future*; and, in the next place, according to a diſtribution into nine, each of theſe three being again ſubdivided into three. For the monad of ſouls is united to the one whole of time, but this is participated ſecondarily by the multitude of ſouls. And of this multitude thoſe participate of this whole *totally*, that ſubſiſt according to *the paſt*, or *the preſent*, or *the future*; but thoſe participate it *partially*, that are eſſentialized according to the differences of theſe: for to each of the wholes a multitude is coordinated, divided into things firſt, middle, and laſt. For a certain multitude ſubſiſts in conjunction with that which is eſtabliſhed according to the paſt, the *ſummit* of which is according to *the was*, but the *middle* according to it *has been*, and the *end* according to it *did become*. With that alſo which is eſtabliſhed according to the *preſent*, there is another multitude, the *principal* part of which is characterized by *the is*, the *middle* by it *is generated*, and the *end* by it *is becoming to be*. And there is another triad with that which ſubſiſts according to the future, the *moſt elevated part* of which is characterized by the *will be*, that which ranks in the *middle*, by it *may become*, and the *end*, by it *will be generated*. And thus there will be three triads proximately ſuſpended from theſe three wholeneſſes, but all theſe are ſuſpended from their monad.

All

to ſignify the participation of the time paſt? Certainly. And do not the terms *it will be*, *it may become*, and *it will be generated*, ſignify that which

All theſe orders which are diſtributed according to the parts of time, energize according to the whole of time, this whole containing in itſelf triple powers, one of which is *perfective* of all motion, the ſecond *connects* and *guards* things which are governed by it, and the third *unfolds* divine natures into light. For as all ſuch things as are not eternal are led round in a circle, the *wholeness* or the *monad* of time perfects and connects their eſſence, and diſcloſes to them the united infinity of eternity, evolving the contracted multitude which ſubſiſts in eternal natures; whence alſo this apparent time, as Timæus ſays, unfolds to us the meaſures of divine periods, perfects ſenſibles, and guards things which are generated in their proper numbers. Time, therefore, poſſeſſes triple powers prior to ſouls, viz. *the perfective*, *the connective*, and *the unfolding*, according to a ſimilitude to eternity. For eternity, poſſeſſing a middle order in intelligibles, *perfects* the order poſterior to itſelf, ſupplying it with union, but *unfolds into light* that which is prior to itſelf, producing into multitude its ineffable union, and *connects* the middle bond of intelligibles, and guards all things intranſitively through its power. Time, therefore, receiving ſupernally the triple powers of eternity, imparts them to ſouls. Eternity, however, poſſeſſes this triad unitedly; but time unitedly, and at the ſame time diſtributively; and ſouls diſtributively alone. Hence, of ſouls, ſome are characterized according to one, and others according to another power of time; ſome imitating its *unfolding*, others its *perfective*, and others its *connective* power. Thus alſo with reſpect to the Fates, ſome of theſe being adapted to give completion and perfection to things, are ſaid to ſing the paſt, always indeed energizing, and always ſinging, their ſongs being intellections and fabricative energies about the world: for the *paſt* is the ſource of *completion*. Others again of theſe are adapted to *connect* things preſent: for they guard the eſſence and the generation of theſe. And others are adapted to *unfold* the future: for they lead into eſſence and to an end that which as yet is not.

We may alſo ſay, ſince there is an order of ſouls more excellent than ours divided into ſuch as are firſt, ſuch as are middle, and ſuch as are laſt, the moſt total of theſe are adapted to *the paſt*. For, as this comprehends in itſelf the preſent and the future, ſo theſe ſouls comprehend in themſelves the reſt. But ſouls of a middle rank are adapted to *the preſent*: for this was once *future*, but is not yet *the paſt*. As, therefore, *the preſent* contains in itſelf *the future*, ſo theſe middle ſouls comprehend thoſe poſterior, but are comprehended in thoſe prior to themſelves. And ſouls of the third order correſpond to *the future*: for this does not proceed through *the preſent*, nor has become *the paſt*, but is *the future* alone; juſt as theſe third ſouls are of themſelves alone, but, through falling into a moſt partial ſubſiſtence, are by no means comprehenſive of others; for they convolve the boundary according to a triadic diviſion of the genera poſterior to the Gods.

The whole of the firſt triad, therefore, has in common the *once*, for this is the peculiarity of the paſt, and of completion; but it is divided into *the was*, *it was generated*, and *it did become*. Again, therefore, of theſe three, *the was* ſignifies the ſummit of the triad, bounded according to hyparxis itſelf; but *it was generated*, ſignifies an at-once-collected perfection; and *it did become*, an extenſion in being perfected; theſe things being imitations of intelligibles. For *the was* is an imitation of *being*, *it was generated*, of *eternity*, and *it did become*, of that which is *primarily eternal*: for *being* is derived to all things from the firſt of theſe; a ſubſiſtence at once as *all* and a *whole* from the ſecond, and an *extenſion into multitude* from the third.

is

is about to be hereafter? Certainly. But are not the terms *it is*, and *it is becoming to be*, marks of the preſent time? Entirely ſo. If then *the one* participates [1] in no reſpect of any time, it neither ever *was*, nor *has been*, nor *did become*: nor is it *now generated*, nor is *becoming to be*, nor *is*, nor *may become* hereafter, nor *will be generated*, nor *will be*. It is moſt true. Is it poſſible, therefore, that any thing can participate of eſſence [2], except

[1] It is not immaniſeſt how the ſyllogiſm proceeds in what is now ſaid: *The one* participates of no time; but every thing which once ſubſiſted *was*, or *has been*, or *did become*; every thing which ſubſiſts according to the preſent *is*, or *is generated*, or *is becoming to be*; and every thing which ſubſiſts according to the future *will be*, or *may become*, or *will be generated*. But all theſe diſtribute the *wholeneſs* of time. *The one*, therefore, is exempt from, and is expanded above, this temporal triad and the unity from which it is ſuſpended. From all, therefore, that has been ſaid, it is requiſite, as Proclus juſtly obſerves, to collect this one thing, that *the one* is eſtabliſhed above every divine eſſence characterized by the nature of ſoul, and which always energizes after the ſame manner, ſuch as are the ſouls of the more excellent genera, whether the diviſion of them is made into three, or into nine, or into any other number.

Should it be ſaid, however, that *the one*, though it does not participate of time, may be time itſelf, for the firſt cauſe is denominated time by Orpheus; to this it may be replied, that *the one* cannot be time; ſince in this caſe the perfection proceeding from it would extend no further than ſouls, and things which are moved. For eternal natures are more excellent than ſuch as energize according to time. *The one*, therefore, would be the cauſe of ſubordinate only, and not of ſuperior natures; and thus would not be the cauſe of all things. But the firſt cauſe, ſays Proclus, was denominated time by Orpheus, according to a certain wonderful analogy: for the theologiſt ſymbolically calls the myſtical proceſſions of unbegotten natures, generations; and the cauſe of the unfolding into light of divine natures, Time; for, where there is generation, there alſo there is time. Thus, the generation of ſenſibles is according to mundane time, that of ſouls according to ſuperceleſtial time, and that of things eternal according to *the one*. Proclus beautifully adds: As therefore we endure to hear the ſleepleſs energy of divine natures ſeparate from the objects of their providential care, denominated ſleep, their union, a bond, and their progreſſion, a ſolution from bonds, ſo alſo we muſt endure thoſe that introduce time and generation to things without time, and which are unbegotten.

[2] Having proceeded as far as to a deified eſſence, and which always energizes after the ſame manner, and having denied all the orders of *the one*, viz. the divine, the intellectual, and ſuch as are pſychical, we muſt again recur through a nature common to all the aforeſaid orders, or, in other words, through *being* to the intelligible monad of all beings, and from this alſo we muſt exempt *the one*. For, as we before obſerved, Plato does not make the beginning of his negations from the ſummit of intelligibles, but from the ſummit of the intellectual order: for there *the many* are generated, as we ſhall ſhow in commenting on the ſecond hypotheſis. But eſſence which ſubſiſts according to *the ont being*, is prior to theſe *many*, and to all the above-mentioned orders. Hence, from all theſe, as participating of *eſſence* in common, we recur to *eſſence itſelf*, and

according to ſome one of theſe? It is not. In no reſpect, therefore, does *the one* participate of eſſence. It does not appear that it can. *The one*, therefore,

and make a negation even of this. For every thing which participates of eſſence participates of it according to ſome one of theſe, not indeed of thoſe that are proximately enumerated, but of all together that the firſt hypotheſis contains, ſuch as *whole*, or having *parts*, or having *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, or *being in itſelf*, or *in another*, and every thing elſe which is there denied of *the one*; ſo that it follows, as was before obſerved, that ſuch things only are aſſumed as are conſequent to beings ſo far as they are beings, and not ſo far as they are certain vital or intellectual natures. For every thing, ſays he, which in any reſpect participates of eſſence, participates of it according to ſome one of theſe negations. *The one*, therefore, does not participate of eſſence. Thus alſo Socrates, in the Republic, ſays, that *the good* is beyond eſſence, and is not eſſence, but is the cauſe of it, and is beyond every thing intellectual and intelligible, in the ſame manner as the ſun is the cauſe of all viſible natures, by *eſſence* meaning the ſame as *being* (το ον). For Plato here clearly ſays, that it is not poſſible for any thing *to be*, unleſs it participates of *eſſence*: and in the Timæus he makes a ſimilar aſſertion. If, therefore, the firſt cauſe is ſupereſſential and above all being, it is falſe to aſſert that he *is*: for, ſince he is beyond *eſſence*, he is alſo exempt from *being*. And in this, as Proclus well obſerves, Parmenides in Plato differs from Parmenides in his verſes, becauſe the latter looks to *the one being*, and ſays that this is the cauſe of all things; but the former aſcending from *the one being* to that which is *one alone* and prior to being, he denies of *the one* the participation of eſſence.

And here obſerve, that Plato does not adopt the concluſion that *the one is not* through demonſtration, becauſe it was not poſſible to demonſtrate this directly through the alliance of *being* with *the one*. For, as we have before obſerved, in negations, things more allied are more difficult to be demonſtrated. But if this be true, it is evident that *the one* IS NOT. For every thing about *the one* which is added to it diminiſhes its exempt tranſcendency.

Should it be aſked why Parmenides does not begin his negations from *the is*, but from *the many*, and neither ſeparates the order which immediately ſubſiſts after *the one*, and thus proceeds as far as to the laſt of things, nor, ſeparating *the one* from theſe, aſcends as far as to the ſummit of beings, we reply, that the negation of eſſence would be contrary to the hypotheſis: for the hypotheſis ſays that *the one* IS, but the negation that it IS NOT. It would, therefore, be of all things the moſt ridiculous to ſay immediately from the beginning, if *the one is*, *the one is not*: for the aſſertion would appear to ſubvert itſelf. Hence, employing the *is*, and ſaying, as if it made no difference, *if the one is*, Parmenides finds that *the many* appear to be eſpecially oppoſed to *the one*.

That *the one*, indeed, according to Plato, is above all eſſence, is evident from the teſtimony of Speuſippus, according to Proclus, who alſo adds, that Speuſippus confirms this from the opinion of the antients, when he ſays they thought that *the one* is better than *being*, and is the principle of *being*, free from all habitude to ſubſequent natures, juſt as *the good itſelf* is ſeparated from the condition of every other good. But Speuſippus there calls the firſt being the proper principle of beings, and boundleſs divinity depending on *the one*.

Parmenides,

fore, *is* in no reſpect. So it ſeems. Hence, it is not in ſuch a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be being, and participate of eſſence: but, as it appears, the one neither *is one* nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reaſoning of this kind. It appears ſo. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not? How can it? Neither, therefore, does any name belong to it, nor diſcourſe, nor any ſcience, nor ſenſe, nor opinion. It does not appear that there can. Hence, it can neither be named, nor

Parmenides, therefore, beginning ſupernally from the intelligible ſummit of the firſt intellectual Gods, and producing in an orderly ſeries the genera of the Gods, and of the natures united and ſubſequent to them, and always evincing that *the one* is ineffably exempt from all things, again returns from hence to the beginning, and, imitating the converſion of wholes, ſeparates *the one* from the intelligible or higheſt Gods. For thus eſpecially may we behold its immenſe tranſcendency, if we not only ſhow that it is eſtabliſhed above the ſecond or third orders in the golden chain of deity, but that it alſo ranks before the intelligible unities themſelves, and evince this in a manner coordinate to the ſimplicity of thoſe occult na ures, and not by various words, but by intellectual projection alone: for intelligibles are naturally adapted to be known by intellect. This, therefore, Parmenides in reality evinces, leaving logical methods, but energizing according to intellect, and aſſerting that *the one* is beyond eſſence, and *the one being*. For this is not collected, as we have before obſerved, from the preceding concluſions; ſince in this caſe the belief concerning the higheſt Gods, who are implied by *eſſence*, being derived from things inferior to them, would be void of demonſtration: for all demonſtration, as Ariſtotle juſtly obſerves, is from things naturally prior to, and more honourable than, the concluſions. Hence, Parmenides at the ſame time infers, that every kind of knowledge, and all the inſtruments of knowledge, fall ſhort of the tranſcendency of *the one*, and beautifully end in the ineffable of the God who is beyond all things. For, after ſcientific energies and intellectual projections, union with the unknown ſucceeds; to which alſo Parmenides referring the whole diſcourſe, concludes the firſt hypotheſis, ſuſpending all the divine genera from *the one*, which, as he alſo ſhows, is ſingularly exempt from all things. Hence it is ſaid to be beyond *the one which is conjoined with eſſence*, and at the ſame time all the participated multitude of unities.

It is alſo beautifully obſerved by Proclus, that by the appellation of *the one* in this dialogue we are not to underſtand that which is in itſelf *the one*; but that the inward one reſident in our eſſence, and derived from the firſt one, as an occult ſymbol of his nature, is expreſſed by this appellation. For in every being there is an innate deſire of the firſt cauſe; and hence, prior to appetite there is a certain occult perception of that which is firſt.

Laſtly, when Parmenides ſays that *the one* can neither be named nor ſpoken of, it follows that we are not only incapable of affirming any thing of it, but that even negations of it, though more ſafe than affirmations, are not to be admitted. For he who openly denies, in the mean time ſecretly affirms; ſince to deny any thing of the firſt, is to ſeparate ſomething from it; and this cannot be effected without forming in ourſelves both the firſt, and that which we ſeparate from it.

ſpoken

ſpoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it ſeems. Is it poſſible, therefore, that theſe things can thus take place about *the one?* It does not appear to me that they can.

Are you therefore willing that we ſhould return again to the hypotheſis from the beginning, and ſee whether or not by this means any thing ſhall appear to us different from what it did before? I am entirely willing. Have we not therefore declared if *the one is*, what circumſtances ought to happen to it? Is it not ſo? Certainly. But conſider from the beginning, if *the one is*[1], can it be poſſible that it ſhould *be*, and yet not participate of *eſſence?*

[1] This is the beginning of the ſecond hypotheſis, which, as we have obſerved in the Introduction to this dialogue, unfolds the whole order of the Gods, and eſtabliſhes the ſummit of intelligibles as the firſt after *the one*, but ends in an eſſence which participates of time, and in deified ſouls. In the firſt place, therefore, let us endeavour to unfold what Plato here occultly delivers concerning the firſt proceſſion or order of Gods, called the intelligible triad.

As the firſt cauſe then is *the one*, and this is the ſame with *the good*, the univerſality of things muſt form a whole, the beſt and the moſt profoundly united in all its parts which can poſſibly be conceived: for *the firſt good* muſt be the cauſe of the greateſt good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodneſs is union, the beſt production muſt be that which is moſt united. But as there is a difference in things, and ſome are more excellent than others, and this in proportion to their proximity to the firſt cauſe, a profound union can no otherwiſe take place than by the extremity of a ſuperior order coaleſcing through intimate alliance with the ſummit of one proximately inferior. Hence the firſt of bodies, though they are eſſentially corporeal, yet κατα σχεσιν, through *habitude* or *alliance*, are moſt vital, or lives. The higheſt of ſouls are after this manner intellects, and the firſt of beings are Gods. For, as *being* is the higheſt of things after *the firſt cauſe*, its firſt ſubſiſtence muſt be according to a ſupereſſential characteriſtic.

Now that which is ſupereſſential, conſidered as participated by the higheſt or *true being*, conſtitutes that which is called *intelligible*. So that every true being depending on the Gods is a *divine intelligible*. It is *divine*, indeed, as that which is deified; but it is *intelligible*, as the object of deſire to intellect, as perfective and connective of its nature, and as the plenitude of *being* itſelf. But in the firſt being life and intellect ſubſiſt according to cauſe: for every thing ſubſiſts either according to *cauſe*, or according to *hyparxis*, or according to *participation*. That is, every thing may be conſidered either as ſubſiſting occultly in its cauſe, or openly in its own order (or according to what it is), or as participated by ſomething elſe. The firſt of theſe is analogous to light when viewed ſubſiſting in its fountain the ſun; the ſecond to the light immediately proceeding from the ſun; and the third to the ſplendour communicated to other natures by this light.

The firſt proceſſion therefore from the firſt cauſe will be the intelligible triad, conſiſting of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, which are the three higheſt things after the firſt God, and of which *being*

eſſence? It cannot. Will not eſſence therefore be the *eſſence* of *the one*, but not the ſame with *the one?* for, if it were the ſame, it would not be the eſſence

is prior to *life*, and *life* to *intellect*. For whatever partakes of life partakes alſo of being: but the contrary is not true, and therefore being is above life; ſince it is the characteriſtic of higher natures to extend their communications beyond ſuch as are ſubordinate. But *life* is prior to *intellect*, becauſe all intellectual natures are vital, but all vital natures are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, on account of its ſupereſſential characteriſtic, all things may be conſidered as ſubſiſting according to cauſe: and conſequently number here has not a proper ſubſiſtence, but is involved in unproceeding union, and abſorbed in ſuper-eſſential light. Hence, when it is called a triad, we muſt not ſuppoſe that any *eſſential diſtinction* takes place, but muſt conſider this appellation as expreſſive of its ineffable perfection. For, as it is the neareſt of all things to *the one*, its union muſt be tranſcendently profound and ineffably occult.

All the Gods indeed conſidered according to their unities are all in all, and are at the ſame time united with the firſt God like rays to light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all eſtabliſhed in the firſt cauſe (as Proclus beautifully obſerves) like the roots of trees in the earth; ſo that they are all as much as poſſible ſupereſſential, juſt as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the ſame time being earth itſelf: for the nature of the earth as being a whole, or ſubſiſting according to the eternal, is different from the partial natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its being wholly of a ſupereſſential idiom, muſt poſſeſs an inconceivable profundity of union, both with itſelf and its cauſe, ſo as to ſubſiſt wholly according to *the united*, το ηνωμενον; and hence it appears to the eye of pure intellect, as one ſimple indiviſible ſplendour beaming from an unknown and inacceſſible fire.

He then who is able, by opening the greateſt eye of the ſoul, to ſee that perfectly which ſubſiſts without ſeparation, will behold the ſimplicity of the intelligible triad ſubſiſting in a manner ſo tranſcendent as to be apprehended only by a ſuperintellectual energy, and a deific union of the perceiver with this moſt arcane object of perception. But ſince in our preſent ſtate it is impoſſible to behold an object ſo aſtoniſhingly lucid with a perfect and ſteady viſion, we muſt be content, as Damaſcius well obſerves *, with a far diſtant, ſcarcely attainable, and moſt obſcure glimpſe; or with difficulty apprehending a trace of this light like a ſudden corruſcation burſting on our ſight. Such then is the preeminence of the intelligible order, to which, on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we aſſign a triple diviſion, beholding as in a mirror a luminous triad, beaming from a uniform light; juſt, ſays Damaſcius, as the uniform colour of the ſun appears in a cloud which poſſeſſes three catoptric intervals, through the various-coloured nature of the rainbow.

But when we view this order in a diſtributed way, or as poſſeſſing ſeparation in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of ſubſiſtence to our imperfect conceptions, it is neceſſary to give the triad itſelf a triple diviſion. For we have ſaid that it conſiſts of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*. But in *being* we may view life and intellect, according to cauſe; in *life* being according to participation,

* Vid. Excerpta ex Damaſcio, a Wolfio, p. 232.

and

eſſence of *the one*, nor would *the one* participate of eſſence; but it would be all one to ſay *the one is*, and *one one*. But now our hypotheſis is not *if one*, what

and intellect according to cauſe; and in *intellect* both being and life according to participation; while at the ſame time in reality the whole is profoundly one, and contains all things occultly, or according to cauſe. But when viewed in this divided manner, each triad is ſaid in the Chaldaic theology to conſiſt of *father*, *power*, and *intellect*; *father* being the ſame with *hyparxis*, *unity*, *ſummit*, or *that which is ſuper-eſſential*; *power* being a certain pouring forth, or infinity of *the one* * (or the ſummit); and on this account, ſays Damaſcius, it is preſent with *father*, as a diffuſed with an abiding one, and as pouring itſelf forth into a true chaos: but *intellect*, that is *paternal intellect*, ſubſiſting according to a converſion to the paternal *one*; a converſion tranſcending all other converſions, as being neither gnoſtic, nor vital, nor eſſential, but an unſeparated ſurpaſſing energy, which is union rather than converſion.

Let not the reader, however, imagine that theſe names are the inventions of the latter Platoniſts; for they were well known to Plato himſelf, as is evident from his Timæus. For in that dialogue he calls the artificer of the univerſe *intellect*, and *father*; and repreſents him commanding the junior Gods to imitate the *power* which he employed in their generation.

This intelligible triad is occultly ſignified by Plato, in the Philebus, under the dialectic epithets of *bound*, *infinite*, and *that which is mixed*. For all beings (ſays he) conſiſt or are mingled from *bound* and *infinity*; and conſequently *being itſelf*, which we have already ſhown has the higheſt ſubſiſtence after the firſt cauſe, muſt be before all things mixed from theſe two; the former of theſe, viz. *bound*, being evidently analogous to *the one*, or *father*, and *infinity* to power. We may likewiſe conſider him as unfolding the intelligible order in the ſame dialogue, by the epithets of *ſymmetry*, *truth*, and *beauty*; which, ſays he, are requiſite to every thing that is mixed. And he adds that this triad ſubſiſts in the veſtibule of *the good*; evidently alluding by this expreſſion to the profound union of this triad with the incomprehenſible cauſe of all things.

But, in the preſent dialogue, the intelligible order is delivered by Plato according to an all-perfect diſtribution into three triads; for the ſake of affording us ſome demonſtration, though very obſcure and imperfect, of truth ſo tranſcendent and immenſe. In this ſecond hypotheſis, therefore, which, as we have already obſerved, unfolds the various orders of the Gods, each concluſion ſignifying ſome particular order, he calls the firſt of theſe triads ἓν ὄν, *one being*; power, or the middle habitude of both, being here concealed through exceſs of union; ſo that here *the one* partakes of *being*, and *being* of *the one*; which, as Proclus well obſerves, is indeed a circumſtance of a moſt wonderful nature. Parmenides therefore calls this triad *one being*, without mentioning *power*, becauſe the whole triad abides in unproceeding union, ſubſiſting uniformly and without ſeparation. But after this the ſecond triad is allotted a progreſſion, which Parmenides characteriſes by intelligible *wholeneſs*, but its parts are *being* and *the one*, and power, which is ſituated in the middle, is here diſtributive and not unific, as in the former triad. But his diſcourſe concerning this triad commences from hence—" Again, therefore, let us conſider if *the*

* Let the reader be careful to remember that *the one* of the Gods is their ſupereſſential characteriſtic.

what ought to happen, but *if the one is*—Is it not ſo? Entirely ſo. Does it not ſignify that the term *is* is ſomething different from *the one?* Neceſſarily.

one is, what will happen. Conſider then whether it is not neceſſary that this hypotheſis ſhould ſignify ſuch a *one* as poſſeſſes parts." But he concludes his ſpeculation thus—"That which is *one* therefore is a whole, and poſſeſſes a part."

But after theſe the third triad ſubſiſts, in which all intelligible multitude appears; and which Parmenides indeed (ſays Proclus) calls a wholeneſs, but ſuch a one as is compoſed from a multitude of parts. For after that occult union (ſays he) of the firſt triad, and the dyadic diſtinction of the ſecond, the progreſſion of the third triad is produced, poſſeſſing its hypoſtaſis indeed from parts, but then theſe parts compoſe a multitude which the triad prior to this generates. For *unity*, *power* and *being* are contained in this third triad; but then each of theſe is multiplied, and ſo the whole triad is a wholeneſs. But ſince each of its extremities, viz. *the one*, and *being*, is a multitude which is conjoined through a collective power, each of theſe is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining united multitude with the multitude of beings, ſome of theſe *one being* perfects through progreſſion; but others, *being which is one*, through communion. Here therefore there are two parts of the wholeneſs, *one* and *being*. But *the one* participates of *being*: for *the one* of *being* is conjoined with *being*. *The one* of *being* therefore is again divided, ſo that both *the one* and *being* generate a ſecond unity, connected with a part of *being*. But *being which participates of the one*, ον ἓν, is again divided into *being* and *the one*: for it generates a more particular *being*, depending on a more particular *unity*. And *being* here belongs to more particular deified beings, and is a more ſpecial monad. But *power* is the cauſe of this progreſſion: for power poſſeſſes dual effection, and is fabricative of multitude.

Parmenides begins his diſcourſe concerning this triad as follows:—"What then? Can each of theſe parts of *one being*, that is to ſay *the one* and *being*, deſert each other, ſo that *the one* ſhall not be a part of *being*, or *being* ſhall not be a part of *the one?* By no means." But he finiſhes thus: "Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it appears." Proclus adds: "Hence this triad proceeds according to each of the preexiſtent triads, *flowing (according to the Oracle) and proceeding into all intelligible multitude*. For infinite multitude demonſtrates this flux, and evinces the incomprehenſible nature of power."

But he likewiſe evinces that this triad is *firſt begotten*: for this firſt imparts the power of generating. And hence he calls the multitude which it contains *generating* (γιγνομενον). Proclus, therefore, very properly aſks, whether the frequent uſe of the term generation in this part, does not plainly imply that the natures prior to this triad are more united with each other? But the infinity of multitude in this triad muſt not be conſidered as reſpecting the infinite of quantity; but nothing more is implied than that a multitude of this kind is the progeny of the firſt infinity, which it alſo unfolds: and this infinite is the ſame with that which is *all perfect*. For that (ſays Proclus) which has proceeded according to *the all*, and as far as it is requiſite an intelligible nature ſhould proceed, on account of a power generative of all things, is *infinite*; for it can be comprehended by no other. And thus much concerning the third intelligible triad, according to Parmenides.

Let

ſarily. If, therefore, any one ſhould ſummarily aſſert that *the one is*, this would be no other one than that which participates of eſſence. Certainly. Again,

Let us now diſcourſe in general (ſays Proclus *) concerning all the intelligible triads, and the three concluſions in the Parmenides, by which theſe three orders are characteriſed. The firſt triad, therefore, which is allotted an occult and intelligible ſummit among intelligibles, Plato, at one time proceeding from that union which it contains, and from its ſeparate ſupremacy with reſpect to others, denominates *one*; as in the Timæus—For *eternity* (ſays he) *abides in one*. But reaſon demonſtrates that the firſt triad of intelligibles is contained in this *one*. But at another time proceeding from the extremities which it contains, that is from that which is participated, and from that which participates, he calls it *one being*; not mentioning power here, becauſe it is uniformly and occultly comprehended in this triad. And again, ſometimes he calls the whole triad *bound, infinite*, and *mixed*, according to the monads which it contains. And here *bound* demonſtrates divine *hyparxis*; but *infinite*, *generative power*; and *mixed*, *an eſſence proceeding from this power*. And thus (as I have ſaid) by theſe appellations Plato inſtructs us concerning the firſt triad; evincing its nature, ſometimes by one name, ſometimes by two, and ſometimes by three appellations. For a *triad* is contained in this, according to which the whole is characteriſed; likewiſe a *duad*, through which its extremities communicate with each other; and laſtly a *monad*, which evinces through its monads the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of the firſt God.

But he calls the ſecond triad poſterior to this; in the Timæus, indeed, *eternity*; but in the Parmenides *the firſt wholeneſs*. And if we attentively conſider that every eternal is a whole, we ſhall perceive that theſe two are allotted the ſame peculiarity of nature. For, whatever is entirely eternal poſſeſſes both its whole eſſence and energy at once preſent with itſelf. For ſuch is every intellect which perfectly eſtabliſhes in itſelf both being and intellection, as a whole at once preſent, and a comprehenſive all. Hence it does not poſſeſs one part of being while it is deſtitute of another; nor does it participate partially of energy, but it *wholly* comprehends *total* being and *total* intelligence. But if intellect proceeded in its energies according to time, but poſſeſſed an eternal eſſence, it would poſſeſs the one as a *whole* ever abiding the ſame, but the other ſubſiſting in generation, differently at different periods of time. *Eternity*, therefore, wherever it is preſent, is the cauſe of *wholeneſs*. To which we may add, that *the whole* every where contains eternity: for no *whole* ever deſerts either its own eſſence or perfection; but that which is firſt corrupted and vitiated is partial. Hence this viſible univerſe is eternal, becauſe it is a whole; and this is likewiſe true of every thing contained in the heavens, and of each of the elements: for *wholeneſs* is every where comprehenſive of its ſubject natures. Hence *wholeneſs* and *eternity* ſubſiſt together, are the ſame with each other, and are each of them a meaſure; the one indeed of all eternal and perpetual natures, but the other of parts and every multitude. But ſince there are three *wholeneſſes*, one *prior to parts*, another *compoſed from parts*, and a third *contained in a part*—hence, through that *wholeneſs* which is prior to parts, eternity meaſures the divine unities exempt from beings; but through that which is compoſed from parts, the unities diſtributed together with beings; and through that which ſubſiſts in a part, all beings

* In Plat. Theol. lib. 3. p. 168.

and

Again, therefore, let us ſay, if *the one is*, what will happen. Conſider then whether it is not neceſſary that this hypotheſis ſhould ſignify ſuch a *one*

and total eſſences. For theſe partially contain the parts of the divine unities, which preexiſt unically in the unities themſelves. Beſides, *eternity is nothing elſe than an illumination proceeding from the unity connected with being.* But *whole itſelf* conſiſts of two parts, viz. from *one* and *being*, power being the conciliator of theſe parts. Hence the duad, according with the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform and occult hypoſtaſis of the firſt triad. Beſides, Plato in the Timæus calls the third intelligible triad *animal-itſelf*, *perfect*, and *only-begotten*. But in the Parmenides he denominates it *infinite multitude*, and *a wholeneſs comprehending many parts*. And in the Sophiſta he calls it *that which is always intelligible, and diſtributed into many beings*. All theſe, therefore, are the progeny of one ſcience, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when Timæus calls this triad *intelligible animal*, he likewiſe aſſerts that it is *perfect*, and that it comprehends intelligible animals as its parts, both according to *the one* and according *to parts*. And Parmenides himſelf, declaring that *one being* is perfect multitude, demonſtrates that it ſubſiſts in this order. For the infinite is omnipotent and perfect, as we have previouſly obſerved, containing in itſelf an intelligible multitude of parts, which it likewiſe produces. And of theſe parts, ſome are more univerſal, but others more partial; and (as Timæus obſerves) are parts both according to the one and according to genera. Beſides, as Timæus calls that which is *animal-itſelf eternal*, and *only-begotten*, ſo Parmenides firſt attributes to infinite multitude *the ever*, and *to be generated*, in the following words: "And on the ſame account, whatever part is *generated* will *always* poſſeſs theſe two parts: for *the one* will *always* contain *being*, and *being the one*; ſo that two things will *always be generated*, and no part will ever *be* one."

Who then ſo perſpicuouſly admoniſhes us of *eternal animal* and of the *firſt-begotten* triad as Parmenides, who firſt aſſumes in this order *generation* and *the ever*, and ſo frequently employs each of theſe appellations? *Perfect animal*, therefore, is the ſame with omnipotent intelligible multitude. For ſince the firſt infinity is power, and the whole of that which is intelligible ſubſiſts according to this, receiving from hence its diviſion into parts, I rather chooſe to call this triad *omnipotent*; deviating in this reſpect from that appellation of *the infinite*, by which vulgar minds are generally diſturbed.

Such then is the intelligible triad, conſidered according to an all-perfect diſtribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our mental eye. But if we are deſirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal viſion, and the faſcinating but deluſive forms of the phantaſy, which, Calypſo-like, detain us in exile from our fathers' land; after having through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal port, and purified ourſelves from the baneful rout of the paſſions, thoſe domeſtic foes of the ſoul; if after all this we are deſirous of gaining a glimpſe of the ſurpaſſing ſimplicity and ineffable union of this occult and aſtoniſhing light, we muſt crowd all our conceptions together into the moſt profound indiviſibility, and, opening the greateſt eye of the ſoul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, ſilently walking on the extremities of her ſhining feet, he will ſuddenly from his awful ſanctuary riſe to our view.

one as poſſeſſes parts? How? Thus. If the term *it is* is ſpoken of *one being*, and *the one*, of *being which is one*, and *eſſence* is not the ſame with *the one*, but each belongs to that ſame *one being* which we have ſuppoſed, is it

But after ſuch a viſion, what can language announce concerning this tranſcendent object? That it is perfectly indiſtinct and void of number. "And," as Damaſcius * beautifully obſerves, "ſince this is the caſe, we ſhould conſider whether it is proper to call *this* which belongs to it *ſimplicity*, απλοτης; *ſomething elſe*, *multiplicity* πολλοτης; and *ſomething beſides this*, *univerſality* παντοτης. For that which is intelligible is *one*, *many*, *all*, that we may triply explain a nature which is one. But how can one nature be *one* and *many*? Becauſe *many* is the infinite power of *the one*. But how can it be *one* and *all*? Becauſe *all* is the every-way extended energy of *the one*. Nor yet is it to be called an energy, as if it was an extenſion of power to that which is external; nor power, as an extenſion of hyparxis abiding within; but again, it is neceſſary to call them three inſtead of one: for one appellation, as we have often teſtified, is by no means ſufficient for an explanation of this order. And are all things then here indiſtinct? But how can this be eaſy to underſtand? For we have ſaid that there are three principles conſequent to each other; viz. *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*. *But theſe in reality are neither one, nor three, nor one and at the ſame time three* †. But it is neceſſary that we ſhould explain theſe by names and conceptions of this kind, through our penury in what is adapted to their nature, or rather through our deſire of expreſſing ſomething proper on the occaſion. For as we denominate this triad *one*, and *many*, and *all*, and *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*, and again *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*—ſo likewiſe we call it *a monad*, and *the indefinite duad*, and *a triad*, and a paternal nature compoſed from both theſe. And as in conſequence of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations as unable to harmonize with the things themſelves, we ſhould likewiſe reject the latter on the ſame account."

Now from this remarkable paſſage in particular, and from all that has been ſaid reſpecting the intelligible triad, it follows that the Platonic is totally different from the Chriſtian trinity, ſince the former is a triad poſterior to the firſt cauſe, who according to Plato is a principle tranſcendently exempt from all multitude, and is not coordinated or conſubſiſtent with any being or beings whatever.

A ſuperficial reader indeed, who knows no more of Platoniſm than what he has gleaned from Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem, will be induced to think that the genuine Platonic trinity conſiſts of *the firſt cauſe*, or *the good*, *intellect*, and *ſoul*, and that theſe three were conſidered by Plato as in a certain reſpect one. To ſuch men as theſe it is neceſſary to obſerve, that a triad of principles diſtinct from each other, is a very different thing from a triad which may be conſidered as a whole, and of which each of the three is a part. But *the good* or *the one* is according to Plato ſupereſſential; as is evident from the firſt hypotheſis of this Dialogue, and from the ſixth Book of his Republic. It is impoſſible, therefore, that *the good* can be conſubſiſtent with *intellect*, which is even poſterior to *being*, and much leſs with *ſoul*, which is ſubordinate to *intellect*. And hence *the good*, *intellect*, and *ſoul*, do not form a conſubſiſtent triad.

* Vid. Excerpta, p. 228.

† Αλλ' αυτως μεν ουκ εισι κατα αληθειαν, ουτε μιαν, ουτε τρεις, ουτε μια αμα και τρεις.

not

not neceſſary that the whole of it ſhould be *one being*, but that its parts ſhould be *the one* and *to be?* It is neceſſary. Whether, therefore, ſhould we call each of theſe parts a part alone, or a part of the whole? Each ſhould be called a part of the whole. That which *is one*, therefore, is a whole, and poſſeſſes a part. Entirely ſo. What then? Can each of theſe parts of one being, viz. *the one* and *being*, deſert each other, ſo that *the one* ſhall not be a part of *being*, or *being* ſhall not be a part of *the one?* It cannot be. Again, therefore, each of the parts will contain both *one* and *being*, and each part will at leaſt be compoſed from two parts; and, on the ſame account, whatever part takes place will always poſſeſs theſe two parts: for *the one* will always contain *being*, and *being the one*; ſo that two things will always be produced, and no part will ever be *one*. Entirely ſo. Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it ſeems.

But proceed, and ſtill further conſider this. What? We have ſaid that the one participates of eſſence, ſo far as it is being. We have ſaid ſo. And on this account *one being* appears to be *many*. It does ſo. But what then? If we receive dianoëtically that one which we ſaid participates of eſſence, and apprehend it alone by itſelf without that which we have ſaid it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this alſo be many? I think it will be one. But let us conſider another certain circumſtance. It is neceſſary that its eſſence ſhould be one thing, and itſelf another thing, if *the one* does not participate of eſſence; but as eſſence it participates of *the one*. It is neceſſary. If, therefore, *eſſence* is one thing, and *the one* another thing, neither is *the one*, ſo far as *the one*, different from *eſſence*, nor *eſſence*, ſo far as *eſſence*, different from *the one;* but they are different from each other through that which is *different* and *another*. Entirely ſo. So that *different* is neither the ſame with *the one* nor with *eſſence*. How can it? What, then, if we ſhould ſelect from them, whether if you will *eſſence* and *different*, or *eſſence* and *the one*, or *the one* and *different*, ſhould we not, in each aſſumption, ſelect certain things which might very properly be denominated both theſe? How do you mean? After this manner: Is there not that which we call *eſſence?* There is. And again, that which we denominate *the one?* And this alſo. Is not, therefore, each of them denominated? Each. But what, when I ſay *eſſence* and *the one*, do I not pronounce both theſe? Entirely ſo. And if I ſhould ſay *eſſence* and *different*, or *different* and

and *the one*, ſhould I not perfectly, in each of theſe, pronounce both? Certainly. But can thoſe things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two? They cannot. And can any reaſon be aſſigned, why of two things each of them ſhould not be one? There cannot. As, therefore, theſe two ſubſiſt together, each of them will be one. It appears ſo. But if each of them is one, and *the one* is placed together with them, by any kind of conjunction, will not all of them become three? Certainly. But are not three *odd*, and two *even*? How ſhould they not? But what then? Being two, is it not neceſſary that twice ſhould be preſent? And being three, thrice; ſince twice one ſubſiſts in two, and thrice one in three? It is neceſſary. But if there are two and twice, is it not neceſſary that there ſhould be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there ſhould be thrice three? How ſhould it not? But what, if there are three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not neceſſary that there ſhould be thrice two and twice three? Entirely ſo. Hence, there will be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd. It will be ſo. If, therefore, this be the caſe, do you think that any number will be left which is not neceſſarily there? By no means. If, therefore, *the one* is, it is alſo neceſſary that there ſhould be number [1]. It is neceſſary. But

[1] Parmenides after the intelligible triads generates the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual orders, and demonſtrates, by ſubſequent concluſions, a continuous progreſſion of the Gods. For the ſeries and connection of the words with each other imitate the indiſſoluble order of things, which always conjoins the media with the extremes, and through middle genera advances to the ultimate progreſſions of beings. As there are then three intelligible triads, conſiſting of *one being*, *whole itſelf*, and *infinite multitude*, ſo three intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual triads preſent themſelves to our view, viz. *number itſelf*, *whole itſelf*, and *the perfect itſelf*. Hence, *number* here proceeds from *one being*; but *that which is a whole* from *whole itſelf* in intelligibles; and *the perfect itſelf* from *infinite multitude*. For in the intelligible triad the *infinite* was omnipotent and perfect, comprehending all things, and ſubſiſting as incomprehenſible in itſelf. *The perfect*, therefore, is analogous to that which is omnipotent and all-perfect, poſſeſſing an intellectual perfection, and ſuch as is poſterior to primary and intelligible perfection. But *the whole*, which is both intelligible and intellectual, is allied to that which is intelligible, yet it differs from it ſo far as the latter poſſeſſes wholeneſs according to *the one union* of *the one being*; but *the one* of the former appears to be eſſentially a whole of parts characterized by unity, and its being a compoſite of many beings.

But again, *number* muſt be conſidered as analogous to *one being*. For *one being* ſubſiſts among intelligibles occultly, intelligibly, and paternally; but here, in conjunction with difference, it ge-

But if number is, it is neceſſary that the many ſhould ſubſiſt, and an infinite multitude of beings: or do you think that number, infinite in multitude, will alſo participate of eſſence? By all means I think ſo. If, therefore, every number participates of eſſence, will not each part alſo of number participate of eſſence? Certainly. Eſſence, therefore, will be diſtributed through all things which are many, and will not deſert any being, whether the leaſt or the greateſt: for how can eſſence be abſent from any being? In no reſpect. Eſſence, therefore, is diſtributed as much as poſſible into the leaſt and the greateſt, and into all things every way, and is divided the moſt of all things, and poſſeſſes infinite parts. It is ſo. Very many, therefore, are its parts. Very many, indeed. But what, is there any one of theſe which is a part of eſſence, and yet is not *one* part? But how can this be? But if it is, I think it muſt always be neceſſary, as long as it is, that it ſhould be a certain one; but that it cannot poſſibly be nothing. It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, is preſent with every part of eſſence, deſerting no part, whether ſmall or great, or in whatever manner it may be affected. It is ſo. Can *one being*, therefore, be a whole, ſubſiſting in many places at once? Conſider this diligently. I do conſider it, and I ſee that it is impoſſible. It is divided, therefore, ſince it is not a whole; for it can no otherwiſe be preſent with all the parts of eſſence, than in a divided ſtate. Certainly. But that which is diviſible ought neceſſarily to be ſo many as its

nerates number, which eſtabliſhes the ſeparation of forms and reaſons. For *difference* firſt exhibits itſelf in this order; but ſubſiſts among intelligibles as *power* and the *duad*. And in this order it is a maternal and prolific fountain. With great propriety, therefore, does Plato from the ſummit of this order begin his negations of *the one*: for *the many* ſubſiſt here, through that difference which divides *being* and *the one*; becauſe *the whole*, which is denied of *the one*, is intellectual and not intelligible. The negation, therefore, aſſerts that *the one* is not a whole, on which account the affirmation muſt be, *the one* is a whole. For *intelligible whole* is *one being*, but not *the one*. And he thus denies *the many*, "*The one* is not many," the oppoſite to which is, *the one* is many. But the multitude of intelligibles, and not *the one*, is the proximate cauſe of *the many*. And, in ſhort, the whole of that which is intelligible is characterized by *one being*. For both *being* and *the one* are contained in this, and are naturally conjoined with each other; and *being* is here the moſt of all things characterized by *the one*. But when each of theſe, viz. *being*, and *the one*, proceeds into multitude, the one becomes diſtant from the other, and evinces a greater diverſity of nature; but each is diſtributed into multitude through the prolific nature of difference itſelf. And thus it is from hence evident, that the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual orders proceed with ſubjection analogous to the intelligible triads. In the notes to the Phædrus it will be ſhown how Socrates leads us to this order of Gods.

parts.

parts. It ought. We did not, therefore, juſt now ſpeak truly, when we ſaid that eſſence was diſtributed into very many parts; ſince it is not divided into more parts than *the one*, but into parts equal to thoſe of *the one*: for neither does *being* deſert *the one*, nor *the one*, *being*: but theſe two always ſubſiſt, equalized through all things. It appears to be entirely ſo. *The one*, therefore, which is diſtributed by eſſence, is many and an infinite multitude. So it appears. *One being*, therefore, is not only many, but it is likewiſe neceſſary that *the one* which is diſtributed by eſſence ſhould be many. Entirely ſo.

And, indeed, in conſequence of the parts being parts of a whole, *the one* will be defined according to a whole: or are not the parts comprehended by the whole? Neceſſarily ſo. But that which contains will be a bound. How ſhould it not? *One being*, therefore, is in a certain reſpect both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude. It appears ſo. As it is bounded, therefore, muſt it not alſo have extremes? It is neceſſary. But what, if it be a whole, muſt it not alſo have a beginning, middle, and end? Or can there be any whole without theſe three? And if any one of theſe be wanting, can it be willing to be any longer a whole? It cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, will poſſeſs a beginning, end, and middle. It will. But the middle is equally diſtant from the extremes; for it could not otherwiſe be the middle. It could not. And, as it appears, *the one* being ſuch, will participate of a certain figure, whether ſtraight or round, or a certain mixture from both. It will ſo.

Will it, therefore, being ſuch, ſubſiſt in itſelf[1] and in another? How? For each of the parts is in the whole, nor is any one external to the whole. It

[1] By theſe words Plato indicates the ſummit of the intellectual order, or in other words, according to the Grecian theology, Saturn. For, ſo far as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed *to himſelf*, but ſo far as he is in the intelligibles prior to himſelf, he eſtabliſhes the all-perfect intelligence of himſelf in *another*. For ſubſiſtence in *another* here ſignifies that which is better than the ſubſiſtence of a thing in *itſelf*. Saturn, therefore, being intelligible as among intellectuals, eſtabliſhes himſelf in the intelligible triads of the orders prior to him, from which he is alſo filled with united and occult good; and on this account he is ſaid to be *in another*. But becauſe he is a pure and immaterial deity, he is converted to himſelf, and ſhuts up all his powers in himſelf. For the parts of this deity, when he is conſidered as an intellectual wholeneſs, are more partial

It is ſo. But all the parts are comprehended by the whole. Certainly. But *the one* is all the parts of itſelf; and is neither more nor leſs than all. Certainly. Is not *the one*, therefore, a whole? How ſhould it not? If, therefore, all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are one, and *the one* is a whole, but all the parts are comprehended by the whole; hence, *the one* will be comprehended by *the one*, and ſo *the one* will be in itſelf. It appears ſo. But again, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in a certain one. For, if it were in all, it would neceſſarily be in one: for, if it were not in ſome one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a one belonging to all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, how can it any longer be a whole in all the parts? In no reſpect. Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole ſhould be in ſome of the parts, the greater would be in the leſſer; which is impoſſible. Impoſſible. But ſince the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould either be in ſome other, or that it ſhould be nowhere? It is neceſſary. But if it is nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, ſince it is not in itſelf, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould be in another? Entirely ſo. So far, therefore, as *the one* is a whole, it is in another: but ſo far as all things are its parts, and itſelf all the parts, it is in itſelf: and ſo *the one* will neceſſarily be in itſelf and in another. Neceſſarily.

But as *the one* is naturally ſuch, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould both be moved[1] and ſtand ſtill? How? It muſt ſtand ſtill, indeed, if it be in itſelf. For,

powers, which haſten indeed to a progreſſion from him as their father, but are eſtabliſhed in, and on all ſides comprehended by, him. And this wholeneſs is a deity which connectedly contains the intelligible parts in itſelf, being parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, and ſtably generating all things. It alſo receives into its boſom, and again gathers into itſelf its progeny, and, as the more tragical of fables ſay, devours and depoſits its offſpring in itſelf. For its progeny are twofold; ſome being, as it were, reſolved into itſelf, and others ſeparated from it.

[1] The middle of the intellectual order, viz. Rhea, is here indicated by Plato: for all life, according to Plato, is motion; ſince ſoul is ſelf-motive becauſe it is ſelf-vital; and intellect is through this moved, becauſe it poſſeſſes the moſt excellent life. The firſt vivific cauſe, therefore, of the intellectual Gods is primarily allotted *motion*. If this cauſe, however, was the firſt and higheſt life, it would be requiſite to call it *motion*, and not *that which is moved*; but ſince it is life as in intellectuals, and is filled from exempt life, it is at the ſame time *motion* and *that which is moved*. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides evince that *the one* in this order is moved, becauſe

For, being in one, and not departing from this, it will be in *ſame*, through being in itſelf. It will. But that which is always in the ſame muſt neceſſarily without doubt always ſtand ſtill. Entirely ſo. But what, muſt not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, neceſſarily never be in *ſame*? But if it be never in *ſame*, can it ſtand ſtill? And if it does not ſtand ſtill, muſt it not be moved? Certainly. It is neceſſary, therefore, that *the one*, ſince it is always in itſelf and in another, muſt always be moved and ſtand ſtill. It appears ſo.

But, likewiſe, it ought to be the ſame [1] with itſelf, and different from itſelf; and, in like manner, the ſame with, and different from, others, if it ſuffers

cauſe it proceeds from the cauſes of all life which rank above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual order; which triad Socrates in the Phædrus calls *heaven*, becauſe the whole of it is *life* and *motion*.

When Parmenides, therefore, ſays that *the one* is both *moved and ſtands ſtill*, by *motion* he indicates the vivific hyparxis of the Gods, and the generative fountain of wholes; but by *permanency* coordinated with motion, that pure monad which contains the middle centres of the triad of *guardian* deities, or, in other words, one of the *Curetes* conſubſiſtent with Rhea. So that the *motion* in this order is the fountain of the life which proceeds to all things; and the *permanency* eſtabliſhes the whole vivific fountain in itſelf, but is thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Hence Parmenides, delivering to us the progreſſion of theſe two, ſhows that *that which is moved* is generated from *that which is in another*, but *that which is permanent* from *that which is in itſelf*. For *motion* in this order is better than *permanency*. For as *that which is in another* is cauſally more antient than *that which is in itſelf*, ſo here that which is *moved* than that which is *permanent*. Hence, according to the Grecian theology, the Curetes are powers ſubordinate to Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, the parents of the intellectual order, and are contained in them.

[1] Parmenides here delivers the ſymbols of that deity who ſubſiſts at the extremity of the intellectual order, viz. Jupiter, the artificer of the univerſe. We ſhall find, therefore, that the number of the concluſions is here doubled. For *the one* is no longer ſhown to be alone *ſame* or *different*, as it was ſhown to be *in itſelf* and *in another*, and to be *moved* and be *permanent*; but it is now demonſtrated to be *the ſame with itſelf*, and *different from itſelf*, and *different from others*, and *the ſame with others*. But this *twice* perfectly accords with the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologiſts, and to Socrates in the Cratylus, who ſays that the demiurgic name is compoſed from two words.

In the next place the multitude of cauſes is here ſeparated, and all the monads of the Gods appear according to the demiurgic progreſſion. For the paternal order of the demiurgus, the prolific power which is coordinate with him, the undefiled monad which is the cauſe of exempt providence, the fountain diſtributive of wholes, and all the orders in conjunction with theſe

which

ſuffers what we have related above. How? Every thing, in a certain reſpect, thus takes place with relation to every thing: for it is either the ſame with it or different: or if it is neither ſame nor different, it will be a part of this to which it is ſo related, or with reſpect to a part it will be a whole. It appears ſo. Is therefore *the one* a part of itſelf? By no means. It will not therefore be a whole, with reſpect to itſelf, as if itſelf were a part. For it cannot. But is *the one*, therefore, different from *the one?* By no means. It will not therefore be different from itſelf. Certainly not. If, therefore, it is neither different nor a whole, nor yet a part with reſpect to itſelf, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould be the ſame with itſelf? It is neceſſary. But what, that which is elſewhere than itſelf, ſubſiſting in *ſame* in

which ſubſiſt about the demiurgus, according to which he produces and preſerves all things, and, being exempt from his productions, is firmly eſtabliſhed in himſelf, and ſeparates his own kingdom from the united government of his father—all theſe are here unfolded into light.

Hence that which Parmenides firſt demonſtrates concerning the nature of *the one*, viz. that it is *the ſame* with itſelf, repreſents to us the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which Jupiter is the demiurgus. For the term *ſame* is a manifeſt ſign of his proper or paternal hyparxis: for being one, and the exempt demiurgus and father of wholes, he eſtabliſhes his proper union in himſelf. This term alſo remarkably ſhows the uniform nature, and the alliance of this deity with *bound*. But his being *the ſame with others*, is the illuſtrious good of prolific power, and of a cauſe proceeding to all things, and pervading through all things without impediment. For he is preſent to all things which he produces, and is in all things which he adorns, pre-eſtabliſhing in himſelf an eſſence generative of wholes. Hence *bound* and *the infinite* ſubſiſt in him fabricatively; the former conſiſting in a *ſameneſs* ſeparate from *others*, and the latter in a power which generates *others*. The aſſertion alſo that *he is different from others*, manifeſts his undefiled purity, and his tranſcendency exempt from all ſecondary natures. Hence by his never ceaſing to impart good, by his providence, and by his generating things ſubordinate, *he is the ſame with them:* for he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But by his purity, his undefiled power, and his undeviating energies, he is ſeparate from wholes, and is not conſubſiſtent with others. And as Saturn, the firſt king of the intellectual Gods, is allotted a nature which does not verge to matter, through that pure monad or guard which is united to him, viz. the firſt of the Curetes; and as the vivific goddeſs Rhea poſſeſſes her ſtable and undeviating power from the ſecond of the guardian deities; ſo alſo the demiurgic intellect guards a tranſcendency ſeparate from others, and a union withdrawing itſelf from multitude, through the third monad of the Curetes, who are the leaders of purity.

That deity therefore remains who is the ſeventh of theſe intellectual monads, who is conjoined with all of them, and energizes in conjunction with all, but particularly unfolds himſelf into light in the demiurgic order. This deity, which is celebrated by antient theologiſts as Ocean, Par-

in itſelf, muſt it not neceſſarily be different from itſelf, ſince it has a ſubſiſtence elſewhere? It appears ſo to me. And in this manner *the one* appears to ſubſiſt, being at the ſame time both in itſelf and in another. So it ſeems. Through this, therefore, it appears that *the one* is different from itſelf. It does ſo.

But what if any thing is different from any thing, is it not different from that which is different? Neceſſarily ſo. But are not all ſuch things as are not one different from *the one?* And is not *the one* different from ſuch things as are not one? How ſhould it not? *The one* therefore will be different from other things. Different. But ſee whether *different* and *ſame* are not contrary to each other. How ſhould they not? Do you think, therefore, that *ſame* can ever be in *different*, or *different* in *ſame?* I do not.

menides indicates when he aſſerts that *the one* is *different from itſelf.* As, therefore, the demiurgus is the ſame with himſelf through paternal union, ſo he is ſeparated from himſelf and his father, according to this difference. Whence, therefore, does Parmenides ſay that the demiurgus derives this power? We reply, From being *in himſelf*, and *in another*. For theſe things were unitedly in the firſt father, but ſeparately in the third. Hence ſeparation there ſubſiſts according to cauſe, but in the demiurgus it ſhines forth, and unfolds his power into light. For that the cauſe of diviſion ſubſiſts in a certain reſpect in the firſt father, Parmenides himſelf evinces in the firſt hypotheſis, when he ſays, that every thing which is in itſelf is in a certain reſpect *two*, and is *ſeparated* from itſelf. But the duad is there indeed occultly, but here it ſubſiſts more clearly, where all intellectual multitude is apparent. For difference is the progeny of the duad, which is there firmly eſtabliſhed. This *difference*, therefore, ſeparates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and alſo ſeparates from each other the monads which it contains. Hence Parmenides, when he divides the ſigns of fabrication, ſhows that the idioms of the undefiled and diviſive monads are in the middle of them, ſo far as they alſo in a certain reſpect are comprehended in the one fabrication of things. For the firſt of the concluſions demonſtrates that *the one* is *the ſame with itſelf;* the ſecond, that it is *different from itſelf;* the third, that it is *different from others;* and the fourth, that it is *the ſame with others;* conjoining the diviſive power with the paternal union, and connecting the providential cauſe of ſecondary natures—with a tranſcendency ſeparate from them. For in the Gods it is neceſſary that union ſhould ſubſiſt prior to ſeparation, and a purity unmingled with things ſecondary prior to a providential care of them, through which the divinities being every where are alſo no where, being preſent to all things are exempt from all things, and being all things are no one of their progeny.

I only add, that the reader will find the theology concerning Saturn, delivered by Plato in perfect conformity to what has been above aſſerted of this deity, in the Cratylus, Politicus, and Gorgias; that concerning Rhea, in the Cratylus; concerning Jupiter in the Timæus, Critias, Philebus, Protagoras, and Politicus; and concerning the Curetes in the Laws.

If

If therefore *different* is never in *ſame*, there is no being in which for any time *different* ſubſiſts; for, if it ſubſiſted in it during any time whatever, in that time *different* would be in *ſame*. Would it not be ſo? It would. But ſince it is never in *ſame*, *different* will never ſubſiſt in any being. True. Neither therefore will *different* be in things which are not one, nor in *the one*. It will not. *The one*, therefore, will not through *different* be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one from *the one*. Not, indeed. Nor likewiſe will they be different from each other, ſince they do not participate of *different*. For how can they? But if they are neither different from themſelves, nor from *different*, muſt they not entirely eſcape from being different from each other? They muſt eſcape. But neither will things which are not one participate of *the one*: for if they did they would no longer be *not one*, but in a certain reſpect one. True. Hence things which are *not one* will not be number; for they would not be entirely *not one* in conſequence of poſſeſſing number. Certainly not. But what, can things which are *not one* be parts of one? Or would not things which are *not one* by this means participate of *the one*? They would participate. If, therefore, this is entirely *the one*, but thoſe *not one*, neither will *the one* be a part of things which are *not one*, nor a whole with reſpect to them, as if they were parts; nor, on the contrary, will things which are *not one* be parts of *the one*, nor yet wholes, as if *the one* were a part. They will not. But we have ſaid that things which are neither parts nor wholes, nor different from each other, muſt be the ſame with each other. We have ſaid ſo. Muſt we not therefore aſſert that *the one*, ſince it ſubſiſts in this manner with reſpect to things which are *not one*, is the ſame with them? We muſt. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, is both different from others and itſelf, and the ſame with them and with itſelf. It appears from this reaſoning to be ſo.

But is it alſo ſimilar[1] and diſſimilar to itſelf and others? Perhaps ſo. Since,

[1] After the intellectual the ſupermundane order of Gods follows, who are alſo called by the Grecian theologiſts *aſſimilative leaders*. *Sameneſs* and *difference*, therefore, as we have before obſerved, define the idiom of the demiurgic order, and of the Gods coordinated with it. But ſince the whole order of the aſſimilative Gods is ſuſpended from the demiurgic monad, ſubſiſts about, and is converted to it, and is perfected from it, it is neceſſary to refer the ſigns of this

Since, therefore, it appears to be different from others, others alſo will be different from it. But what then? Will it not be different from others, in the ſame manner as others from it? And this neither more nor leſs? How ſhould it not? If, therefore, neither more nor leſs, it muſt be different in a ſimilar manner. Certainly. Will not that through which *the one* becomes different from others, and others in a ſimilar manner from it, be alſo that through which both *the one* becomes the ſame with others, and others with *the one?* How do you ſay? Thus: Do not you call every name the name of ſomething? I do: but what then? Do you pronounce the ſame name often or once? I pronounce it once. When, therefore, you enunciate that name once, do you denominate that thing to which the name belongs: but if often, not the ſame? Or, whether you pronounce the ſame name once or often, do you not neceſſarily always ſignify the ſame thing? But what then? Does not a different name belong to ſome certain thing? Entirely ſo. When, therefore, you pronounce this, whether once or often, you do not aſſign this name to any other, nor do you denominate any other thing than that to which this name belongs. It is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo. But when we ſay that other things are different from *the one*, and that *the one* is different from others, twice pronouncing the name *different*, we yet ſignify nothing more than the nature of that thing of which this is the name. Entirely ſo.

this order to the demiurgic ſeries, and thence to impart to them a generation proceeding according to order and meaſure.

As this order of Gods, therefore, according to the Grecian theologiſts, aſſimilates ſenſibles to intellectuals, and produces all things poſterior to itſelf according to an imitation of cauſes, it is the primary cauſe of ſimilitude to things ſubordinate to itſelf. Hence it is alſo the cauſe of diſſimilitude coordinate with ſimilitude: for all things which participate of the ſimilar neceſſarily alſo participate of the diſſimilar.

Similitude alſo in this order has a ſubſiſtence analogous to paternal cauſes, and to thoſe which convert things to their principles; but diſſimilitude is analogous to prolific cauſes, and which preſide over multitude and diviſion. Hence *ſimilitude* is *collective*, but *diſſimilitude ſeparative* of things which proceed.

But that the idioms of theſe Gods proceed from the demiurgic monad, and the ſigns which there preſubſiſt, Parmenides ſufficiently demonſtrates: for demiurgic ſameneſs and difference are the cauſes, as he ſays, of the ſimilitude and diſſimilitude of this order.

The reader will find the theology relative to this order delivered by Plato, conformably to what is here ſaid, in the Politicus and the Laws, the Gorgias and the Cratylus.

If therefore *the one* be different from others, and others from *the one*, in conſequence of ſuffering the ſame *different*, *the one* will not ſuffer that which is different from others, but the ſame with others: but is not that which in a certain reſpect ſuffers the ſame ſimilar? Certainly. But, in the ſame manner, as *the one* becomes different from others, every thing becomes ſimilar to every thing: for every thing is different from all things. It appears ſo. But is the ſimilar contrary to the diſſimilar? It is. And is not *different* contrary to *ſame?* And this alſo. But this likewiſe is apparent, that *the one* is both the ſame with and different from others. It is apparent. But to be the ſame with others is a contrary paſſion to the being different from others. Entirely ſo. But *the one* appears to be ſimilar, ſo far as different. Certainly. So far therefore as it is *ſame*, it will be diſſimilar on account of its ſuffering a paſſion contrary to that which produces the ſimilar: or was it not the ſimilar which produced the different? Certainly. It will therefore render that which is diſſimilar the ſame; or it would not be contrary to different. So it appears. *The one* therefore will be both ſimilar and diſſimilar to others: and ſo far as *different* it will be ſimilar; but ſo far as *the ſame* diſſimilar. The caſe appears to be ſo. And it is likewiſe thus affected. How? So far as it ſuffers *ſame* it does not ſuffer that which is various; but not ſuffering that which is various, it cannot be diſſimilar; and not being diſſimilar, it will be ſimilar: but ſo far as it ſuffers *different* it will be various; and being various it will be diſſimilar. You ſpeak the truth. Since, therefore, *the one* is both the ſame with and different from others, according to both and according to each of theſe, it will be ſimilar and diſſimilar to others. Entirely ſo. And will not this in a ſimilar manner be the caſe with relation to itſelf, ſince it has appeared to be both different from and the ſame with itſelf; ſo that, according to both theſe, and according to each, it will appear to be ſimilar and diſſimilar? Neceſſarily ſo.

But conſider now how *the one* ſubſiſts with reſpect to touching[1] itſelf and others,

[1] That order of Gods called by the Greek theologiſts απολυτοι or *liberated*, ſucceeds the *ſupermundane* order, and is here indicated by Plato by *the one touching itſelf and others*. For all the divine genera after the demiurgic monad double their energies, ſince their energy is naturally directed both to themſelves and to other things poſterior to themſelves, rejoicing in progreſſions, being ſubſervient to the providence of ſecondary natures, and calling forth the ſupernatural, impartible,

others, and not touching. I conſider. For *the one* appears in a certain reſpect to be in the whole of itſelf. Right. But is *the one* alſo in others? Certainly. So far therefore as *the one* is in others it will touch others; but ſo far as it is in itſelf it will be hindered from touching others, but it will touch itſelf becauſe it ſubſiſts in itſelf. So it appears. And thus, indeed, *the one* will both touch itſelf and others. It will ſo. But what will you ſay to this? Muſt not every thing which is about to touch any thing be ſituated in a place proximate to and after that which it is about to touch, and in which when ſituated it touches? It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, if it is about to touch itſelf, ought to be ſituated immediately after itſelf, occupying the place proximate to that in which it is. It ought ſo. Would not this be the caſe with *the one* if it was two; and would it not be in two places at once? But can this be the caſe while it is *the one?* It cannot. The ſame neceſſity therefore belongs to *the one*, neither to be two nor to touch itſelf. The ſame. But neither will it touch others. Why? Becauſe we have ſaid, that when any thing is about to touch any thing which is ſeparate from it, it ought to be placed proximate to that which it is about to touch; but that there muſt be no third in the middle of them. True. Two things, therefore, at the leaſt are requiſite, if contact is about to take

partible, and all-perfect producing power of their father, and deducing it to ſubordinate beings. This *contact*, therefore, with and ſeparation from inferior natures clearly repreſents to us a liberated idiom. For *touching* indicates a providence allied to and coordinate with us; and *not to touch*, a tranſcendency exempt and ſeparate from others. Hence theſe epithets admirably accord with the *liberated* genus of Gods, who are ſaid to be at the ſame time conjoined with the celeſtial divinities, and expanded above them, and to proceed to all things with unreſtrained energy. Hence the Fates, as we have ſhown in a note on the 10th book of the Republic, belong to this order; for they are ſaid by Socrates to *touch* the celeſtial circulations. In the Cratylus alſo, the mundane *Core* or Proſerpine, who governs the whole of generation, is ſaid to *touch* flowing eſſence, and through this contact to have been called *Pherſephatta*. To which we may add, that in the Phædo, where we are taught what the mode is of the cathartic life of ſouls, Socrates ſays, that the ſoul, when it is not converſant with the body, *paſſes into contact with being*; through all which Plato indicates that *contact* is the buſineſs of an inſeparable providence, and coordinate inſpection; and that the negation of this is the employment of a dominion ſeparate, unreſtrained, and exempt from the natures that are governed.

Theſe *liberated* Gods are the ſame with thoſe which the Chaldæans call *azonic*, and which according to them are *Serapis*, *Bacchus*, the ſeries of *Oſiris*, and of Apollo, as we are informed by Pſellus in his expoſition of Chaldaic dogmas. He adds, "they are called *azonic*, becauſe they rule without reſtraint over the zones, and are eſtabliſhed above the apparent Gods."

place. Certainly. But if a third thing ſucceeds to the two terms, theſe will now be three, but the contacts two. Certainly. And thus one always being added, one contact will be added, and it will come to paſs that the contacts will be leſs by one than the multitude of the numbers: for by how much the two firſt numbers ſurpaſſed the contacts, ſo as to be more in number than the contacts, by ſo much will all the following number ſurpaſs the multitude of the contacts. For in that which remains one will be added to the number, and one contact to the contacts. Right. The contacts, therefore, leſs by one will always be as many in number as the things themſelves. True. If therefore it is one alone, and not two, there can be no contact. How can there? Have we not ſaid that ſuch things as are different from *the one* are neither one nor participate of it, ſince they are different? We have. *The one* therefore is not number in others, as *the one* is not contained in them. How can it? *The one*, therefore, is neither others, nor two, nor any thing poſſeſſing the name of another number. It is not. *The one*, therefore, is one alone, and will not be two. It will not, as it appears. There is no contact, therefore, two not ſubſiſting. There is not. *The one* therefore will neither touch other things, nor will other things touch *the one*, as there is no contact. Certainly not. On all theſe accounts, therefore, *the one* will both touch and not touch others and itſelf. So it appears.

Is it therefore equal [1] and unequal to itſelf and others? How? If *the one* were greater or leſſer than others, or others greater or leſſer than *the one*, would it not follow that neither *the one*, becauſe one, nor others, becauſe different from *the one*, would be greater or leſſer than each other from their own eſſences? But if each, beſides being ſuch as they are, ſhould poſſeſs equality, would they not be equal to each other? But if the one ſhould poſſeſs magnitude, and the other parvitude, or *the one* magnitude but *others* parvitude, would it not follow, that, with whatever ſpecies magnitude was preſent, that ſpecies would be greater; but that the ſpecies would be leſſer with which parvitude was preſent? Neceſſarily ſo. Are there not, therefore, two certain ſpecies of this kind, magnitude and parvitude? For if they had no ſubſiſtence they could never be contrary to each other, and be preſent with beings.

[1] The *equal* and *unequal* are characteriſtic of the mundane Gods, as we have ſhown in the notes on the firſt hypotheſis, to which we refer the reader. *

How

How ſhould they? If therefore parvitude becomes inherent in *the one*, it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it. It is neceſſary. But if it ſhould be inherent in the whole, will it not either be extended equally through the whole of *the one* or comprehend *the one?* Plainly ſo. If parvitude, therefore, is equally inherent in *the one*, will it not be equal to *the one*; but if it comprehends *the one* will it not be greater? How ſhould it not? Can therefore parvitude be equal to or greater than any thing, and exhibit the properties of magnitude and equality, and not its own? It is impoſſible. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in the whole of *the one*, but if at all, in a part. Certainly. Nor yet again in the whole part; as the ſame conſequences would enſue in the *whole* part of *the one*, as in the whole of *the one:* for it would either be equal to or greater than the part in which it is inherent. It is neceſſary. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in any being, ſince it can neither be in a part nor in a whole; nor will there be any thing ſmall, except ſmallneſs itſelf. It does not appear that there will. Neither will magnitude therefore be in *the one:* for there will be ſome other thing great beſides magnitude itſelf. I mean that in which magnitude is inherent; and this, though parvitude is not, which ought to be ſurpaſſed by that which is great; but which in this caſe is impoſſible, ſince parvitude is not inherent in any being. True. But, indeed, magnitude itſelf will not ſurpaſs any thing elſe but parvitude itſelf, nor will parvitude be leſs than any other than magnitude itſelf. It will not. Neither therefore will other things be greater than *the one;* nor leſſer, ſince they neither poſſeſs magnitude nor parvitude: nor will theſe two poſſeſs any power with reſpect to *the one*, either of ſurpaſſing or of being ſurpaſſed, but this will be the caſe only with reſpect to each other: nor, on the contrary, will *the one* be either greater or leſſer than theſe two, or others, as it neither poſſeſſes magnitude nor parvitude. So indeed it appears. If *the one* therefore is neither greater nor leſſer than others, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould neither ſurpaſs nor be ſurpaſſed by them? It is neceſſary. Is it not alſo abundantly neceſſary, that that which neither ſurpaſſes nor is ſurpaſſed ſhould be equally affected? And muſt it not, if equally affected, be equal? How ſhould it not? *The one* therefore will be thus circumſtanced with reſpect to itſelf: *viz.* from neither poſſeſſing magnitude nor parvitude in itſelf, it will neither ſurpaſs nor be ſurpaſſed by itſelf; but being equally affected it will

be equal to itſelf. Entirely ſo. *The one* therefore will be equal both to itſelf and others. So it appears.

But if *the one* ſhould be in itſelf, it would alſo be externally about itſelf; and ſo, through comprehending itſelf, it would be greater than itſelf; but from being comprehended leſs than itſelf: and thus *the one* would be both greater and leſſer than itſelf. It would ſo. Is not this alſo neceſſary, that nothing has any ſubſiſtence beſides *the one* and others? How ſhould it be otherwiſe? But ought not whatever has a being to be always ſomewhere? Certainly. And does not that which ſubſiſts in another, ſubſiſt as the leſſer in the greater? For one thing cannot in any other way ſubſiſt in another. It cannot. But ſince there is nothing elſe except *the one* and others, and it is neceſſary that theſe ſhould be in ſomething, is it not neceſſary that they ſhould be in one another, viz. others in *the one*, and *the one* in others; or that they ſhould be no where? It appears ſo. Becauſe, therefore, *the one* is in others, others will be greater than *the one*, through comprehending it; but *the one* will be leſs than others, becauſe comprehended: but if others are inherent in *the one*, *the one* on the ſame account will be greater than others; but others will be leſs than *the one*. It appears ſo. *The one*, therefore, is equal to, greater and leſſer, both than itſelf and others. It ſeems ſo. But if it is greater, equal, and leſſer, it will be of equal, more, and fewer meaſures, both than itſelf and others; and if of meaſures, alſo of parts. How ſhould it not? Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer meaſures, it will alſo be more and leſs in number, both with reſpect to itſelf and others; and alſo, for the ſame reaſon, equal to itſelf and others. How? That which is greater poſſeſſes more meaſures than that which is ſmaller, and contains as many parts as meaſures; and that which is leſſer in the ſame manner, as alſo that which is equal. It is ſo. Since *the one*, therefore, is both greater, leſſer, and equal to itſelf, will it not alſo contain meaſures equal to, more and fewer than itſelf? And if of meaſures, will not this alſo be true of parts? How ſhould it not? If, therefore, it contains equal parts with itſelf, it will be equal in multitude to itſelf: but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, leſs in multitude, than itſelf. It appears ſo. But will *the one* be ſimilarly affected towards others? For, ſince it appears to be greater than others, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould be more in number than others? but, becauſe it is leſſer, muſt it not alſo be fewer in number?

number? and becauſe equal in magnitude, muſt it not alſo be equal in multitude to others? It is neceſſary. And thus again, as it appears, *the one* will be equal, more, and leſs in number, both than itſelf and others. It will ſo.

Will *the one*, therefore, participate of time? And is it, and does it ſubſiſt in becoming to be younger [1] and older, both than itſelf and others? And again, neither younger nor older than itſelf and others, though participating of time? How? *To be* in a certain reſpect is preſent with it, ſince it *is the one*. Certainly. But what elſe is *to be* than a participation of eſſence with the preſent time? In the ſame manner as *it was* is a communication of eſſence with the paſt, and *it will be* with the future? It is no other. It muſt participate, therefore, of time, if it participates of being. Entirely ſo. Muſt it not, therefore, participate of time in progreſſion? Certainly. It will always, therefore, ſubſiſt *in becoming to be* older than itſelf, if it proceeds according to time. It is neceſſary. Do we, therefore, call to mind that the older is always becoming older, becauſe it is always becoming younger? We do call it to mind. Does not *the one*, therefore, while it is becoming older than itſelf, ſubſiſt in becoming older than itſelf, while it is becoming younger than itſelf? Neceſſarily ſo. It will, therefore, become both younger and older than itſelf. Certainly. But is it not then older when it ſubſiſts in *becoming to be* according to the preſent time, which is between *it was* and *it will be*: for, through proceeding from the paſt to the future, it will not paſs beyond the preſent *now?* It will not. Will it not, therefore, ceaſe becoming to be older, when it arrives at *the now*, and is no longer *becoming to be*, but *is* now older? For while it proceeds it will never be comprehended by *the now*. For that which proceeds ſubſiſts in ſuch a manner as to touch upon both *the now* and the future time; departing, indeed, from *the now*, but apprehending the future, becauſe it ſubſiſts in the middle of the future and *the now*. True. But if it be neceſſary that whatever is becoming to be ſhould not paſs by *the now* or the preſent time, hence, as ſoon as it arrives at *the now*, it will always ceaſe becoming to be, and *is* then that which it was in purſuit of becoming. It appears ſo. *The one*, therefore, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*, will ceaſe *becoming*

[1] *Younger* and *older* are characteriſtic of divine ſouls. See the notes on that part of the firſt hypotheſis which correſponds to this part of the ſecond.

to

to be, and then *is* older. Entirely ſo. Is it not, therefore, older than that in reſpect of which it becomes older? And does it not become older than itſelf? Certainly. And is not the older older than the younger? It is. *The one*, therefore, is younger than itſelf, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*. It is neceſſary. But *the now* is always preſent with *the one*, through the whole of its being: for it is always *now* as long as it is. How ſhould it not? *The one*, therefore, always is, and is becoming to be younger and older than itſelf. So it appears. But *is the one*, or does it ſubſiſt in *becoming to be*, in a time more extended than or equal to itſelf? In an equal time. But that which either *is*, or ſubſiſts in *becoming to be*, in an equal time poſſeſſes the ſame age. How ſhould it not? But that which has the ſame age is neither older nor younger. By no means. *The one*, therefore, ſince it both ſubſiſts in *becoming to be* and *is*, in a time equal to itſelf, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* younger nor older than itſelf. It does not appear to me that it can.

But how is it affected with reſpect to others? I know not what to ſay. But this you may ſay, that things different from *the one* becauſe they are *others*, and not *another*, are more than *the one*. For that which is another is one; but being *others* they are more than one, and poſſeſs multitude. They do. But multitude participates of a greater number than *the one*? How ſhould it not? What then? Do we ſay that things more in number are generated, or have been generated, before the few? We aſſert this of the few before the many. That which is the feweſt, therefore, is firſt: but is not this *the one*? Certainly. *The one*, therefore, becomes the firſt of all things poſſeſſing number: but all other things have number, if they are *others* and not *another*. They have indeed. But that which is firſt generated has I think a priority of ſubſiſtence: but others are poſterior to this. But ſuch as have an after generation are younger than that which had a prior generation; and thus others will be younger than *the one*, but *the one* will be older than others. It will indeed. But what ſhall we ſay to this? Can *the one* be generated contrary to its nature, or is this impoſſible? Impoſſible. But *the one* appears to conſiſt of parts; and if of parts, it poſſeſſes a beginning, end, and middle. Certainly. Is not, therefore, the beginning generated firſt of all, both of *the one* and of every other thing; and after the beginning all the other parts, as far as to the end? What then? And, indeed,

indeed, we ſhould ſay that all theſe are parts of a whole and of one; but that *the one*, together with the end, is generated *one* and a *whole*. We ſhould ſay ſo. But the end I think muſt be generated laſt of all, and *the one* muſt be naturally generated together with this; ſo that *the one*, ſince it is neceſſary that it ſhould not be generated contrary to nature, being produced together with the end, will be naturally generated the laſt of others. *The one*, therefore, is younger than others, but others are older than *the one*. So again it appears to me. But what, muſt not the beginning, or any other part whatever, of *the one*, or of any thing elſe, if it is a part, and not parts—muſt it not neceſſarily be one, ſince it is a part? Neceſſarily. *The one*, therefore, while becoming to be, together with the firſt part, will be generated, and together with the ſecond; and it will never deſert any one of the other generated parts, till arriving at the extremity it becomes one whole; neither excluded from the middle, nor from the laſt, nor the firſt, nor from any other whatever in its generation. True. *The one*, therefore, will poſſeſs the ſame age with others, as (if it be not *the one* contrary to its own nature) it will be generated neither prior nor poſterior to others, but together with them; and on this account *the one* will neither be older nor younger than others, nor others than *the one:* but, according to the former reaſoning, *the one* was both older and younger than others, and others in a ſimilar manner than it. Entirely ſo.

After this manner, therefore, *the one* ſubſiſts and is generated. But what ſhall we ſay reſpecting its becoming older and younger than others, and others than *the one*; and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? Shall we ſay that it ſubſiſts in the ſame manner with reſpect to the term *becoming to be* as with reſpect to the term *to be?* or otherwiſe? I am not able to ſay. But I am able to affirm this, that however one thing may be older than another, yet it cannot otherwiſe ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* older, than by that difference of age which it poſſeſſed as ſoon as it was born: nor, on the contrary, can that which is younger ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* younger, otherwiſe than by the ſame difference. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing elſe, always cauſe them to differ by the ſame interval by which they were diſtant at firſt. How ſhould it be otherwiſe? *That which is*, therefore, cannot ſubſiſt in *becoming to be*

older or younger than *one being*, ſince it *is* always equally different from it in age: but this *is* and *was* older, but that younger; but by no means ſubſiſts in *becoming* ſo. True. That which *is* one, therefore, will never ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* either older or younger than other beings. Never. But ſee whether by this means other things will *become* younger and older. After what manner? The ſame as that through which *the one* appeared to be older than others, and others than *the one*. What then? Since *the one* is older than others, it was for a longer period of time than others. Certainly.

But again conſider, if we add an equal time to a longer and ſhorter time, does the longer differ from the ſhorter by an equal or by a ſmaller part? By a ſmaller. *The one*, therefore, will not differ from others by ſo great an age afterwards as before; but, receiving an equal time with others, it will always differ by a leſs age than before. Will it not be ſo? Certainly. But does not that which differs leſs in age, with reſpect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with reſpect to thoſe than which it was before older? Younger. But if it is younger, will not, on the contrary, others with reſpect to *the one* be older than before? Entirely ſo. That, therefore, which was generated younger, will ſubſiſt in *becoming to be* older, with reſpect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never *is* older, but always is *becoming* older than it; the one indeed advancing to a more juvenile ſtate, but the other to one more aged: but that which is older is *becoming to be* younger than the younger, after the ſame manner. For both tending to that which is contrary they ſubſiſt in becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger: but they are not able to *become* ſo. For if they ſhould *become* they would no longer ſubſiſt in *becoming*, but would now *be*. But now they are becoming younger and older than each other; and *the one* indeed becomes younger than others, becauſe it appears to be older, and to have a prior generation: but others are older than *the one*, becauſe they have a poſterior generation; and, from the ſame reaſon, other things will be ſimilarly related with reſpect to *the one*, ſince they appear to be more antient and to have a prior generation. So indeed it appears. Does it not follow, that ſo far as the one does not become younger or older than

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the other, becauſe they differ by an equal number from each other, that, ſo far as this, *the one* will not become older or younger than others, nor others than *the one?* But that, ſo far as it is neceſſary that the prior ſhould always differ from ſuch as are becoming to be poſterior, and the poſterior from the prior; ſo far it is neceſſary that they ſhould become older and younger than each other, both others than *the one* and *the one* than others? Entirely ſo. On all theſe accounts, therefore, *the one is*, and is *becoming to be*, older and younger both than itſelf and others; and again, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* older nor younger than itſelf and others. It is perfectly ſo. But ſince *the one* participates of time, and of becoming to be older and younger, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould participate of the paſt, preſent, and future, ſince it participates of time? It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, was, and is, and will be; and was generated, and is generated, and will be generated. What then? And there will alſo be ſomething belonging to it, and which may be aſſerted of it, and which was, and is, and will be. Entirely ſo. There will, therefore, be ſcience, opinion, and ſenſe of *the one*, ſince we have now treated of all theſe things about it. You ſpeak rightly. A name, therefore, and diſcourſe may ſubſiſt about *the one*, and it may be denominated and ſpoken of: and whatever particulars of the ſame kind take place in other things, will alſo take place about *the one*. The caſe is perfectly ſo.

In the third place, let us conſider, if *the one* ſubſiſts in the manner we have already aſſerted, is it not neceſſary, ſince it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating of time, that becauſe *it is* one it ſhould participate of eſſence; but that becauſe *it is not*, it ſhould not at any time participate of eſſence? It is neceſſary. Is it, therefore, poſſible, that when it participates and becomes ſuch as it is, that then it ſhould not participate; or that it ſhould participate when it does not participate? It cannot be poſſible. It participates, therefore, at one time, and does not participate at another: for thus alone can it participate and not participate of the ſame. Right. Is not that alſo time, when it receives *being* and again loſes it? Or how can it be poſſible that, being ſuch as it is, it ſhould at one time poſſeſs the ſame thing, and at another time not, unleſs it both receives and loſes it? No otherwiſe. Do you not denominate the receiving of eſſence *to become?* I do. And is not

not to loſe eſſence the ſame as to periſh? Entirely ſo. *The one*, therefore, as it ſeems, by receiving and loſing eſſence, is generated and periſhes. Neceſſarily ſo. But ſince it is both one and many, and ſubſiſts in becoming to be and periſhing, when it becomes one does it ceaſe to be many, and when it becomes many does it ceaſe to be one? Entirely ſo. But, in conſequence of becoming one and many, muſt it not be ſeparated and collected? It muſt. And when it becomes diſſimilar and ſimilar, muſt it not be aſſimilated and diſſimilated? Certainly. And when it becomes greater, leſſer, and equal, muſt it not be increaſed, corrupted, and equalized? It muſt ſo. But when from being moved it ſtands ſtill, and when from ſtanding ſtill it is changed into being moved, it is requiſite that it ſhould not ſubſiſt in one time. How ſhould it? But that which before ſtood ſtill and is afterwards moved, and was before moved and afterwards ſtands ſtill, cannot ſuffer theſe affections without mutation. For how can it? But there is no time in which any thing can neither be moved nor ſtand ſtill. There is not. But it cannot be changed without mutation. It is not probable that it can. When, therefore, will it be changed? For neither while it ſtands ſtill, nor while it is moved, will it be changed: nor while it is in time. It will not. Is that any wonderful thing in which it will be when it changes? What thing? *The ſudden*, or that which unapparently ſtarts forth to the view. For *the ſudden* ſeems to ſignify ſome ſuch thing, as that from which it paſſes into each of theſe conditions. For while it ſtands ſtill it will not be changed from ſtanding, nor while in motion will it be changed from motion: but that wonderful nature *the ſudden* is ſituated between motion and abiding, is in no time, and into this and from this that which is moved paſſes into ſtanding ſtill, and that which ſtands ſtill into motion. It appears ſo. *The one*, therefore, if it ſtands ſtill and is moved, muſt be changed into each: for thus alone will it produce both theſe affections. But, becoming changed, it will be changed ſuddenly; and when it changes will be in no time: for it will then neither ſtand ſtill nor be moved. It will not. Will *the one* alſo be thus affected with reſpect to other mutations? And when it is changed from *being* into the *loſs of being*, or from *non-being* into *becoming to be*, does it not then become a medium between certain motions and abidings? and then neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor periſhes? It appears ſo. And in the ſame manner,

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when it paſſes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it ſeparated nor collected. And in paſſing from ſimilar to diſſimilar, and from diſſimilar to ſimilar, it is neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar, nor is aſſimilated nor diſſimilated. And while it paſſes from ſmall into great, and into equal or its contrary, it will neither be ſmall nor great, nor unequal, nor increaſing, nor periſhing, nor equalized. It does not appear that it can. But all theſe paſſions *the one* will ſuffer, if it is. How ſhould it not?

But ſhould we not conſider what other things ought to ſuffer if *the one* is? We ſhould. Let us relate, therefore, *if the one is*, what other things ought to ſuffer from *the one*. By all means. Does it not follow that becauſe other things are different from *the one* they are not *the one:* for otherwiſe they would not be different from *the one?* Right. Nor yet are others entirely deprived of *the one*, but participate it in a certain reſpect. In what reſpect? Becauſe things different from *the one* are different, from their having parts: for if they had not parts they would be entirely one. Right. But parts we have aſſerted belong to that which is a whole. We have ſo. But it is neceſſary that a whole ſhould be one compoſed from many, of which one the many are parts: for each of the parts ought not to be a part of many, but of a whole. How ſo? If any thing ſhould be a part of many, among which it ſubſiſts itſelf, it would doubtleſs be a part of itſelf (which is impoſſible), and of each one of the others; ſince it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of theſe it will be a part of the others, this being excepted; and ſo it will not be a part of each one: and not being a part of each, it will be a part of no one of the many: and being a part of no one of the many, it is impoſſible that it ſhould be any thing belonging to all thoſe, of no one of which it is either a part or any thing elſe. So it appears. A part, therefore, is neither a part of many nor of all; but of one certain idea and of one certain thing which we call a whole, and which becomes one perfect thing from all: for a part indeed is a part of this. Entirely ſo. If, therefore, other things have parts, they will alſo participate of a whole and one. Certainly. One perfect whole, therefore, poſſeſſing parts, muſt neceſſarily be different from *the one*. It is neceſſary. But the ſame reaſoning is true concerning each of the parts: for it is neceſſary

neceſſary that each of theſe ſhould participate of *the one*. For, if each of theſe is a part, the very being each, in a certain reſpect, ſignifies one; ſince it is diſtinguiſhed from others, and has a ſubſiſtence by itſelf, if it is that which is called each. Right. But it participates of *the one* as it is evidently ſomething different from *the one*; for otherwiſe it would not participate, but would be *the one itſelf*. But now it is impoſſible that any thing can be *the one* except *the one itſelf*. Impoſſible. But it is neceſſary both to a whole and to a part to participate of *the one*: for a whole is one certain thing and has parts. But each part whatever, which is a part of the whole, is one part. It is ſo. Muſt not, therefore, thoſe which participate of *the one* participate it, as being different from *the one*? How ſhould they not? But things different from *the one* will in a certain reſpect be many; for if things different from *the one* were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. They would. But ſince the things which participate of one part and one whole are more than one, is it not neceſſary that theſe very things which participate of *the one* ſhould be infinite in multitude? How? Thus: they are different from *the one*, nor are they participants of *the one*, then when they have already participated of it. Certainly. Are not thoſe multitudes in which *the one* is not? Multitudes, certainly. What then? If we ſhould be willing by cogitation to take away the leaſt quantity from theſe, would it not be neceſſary that this quantity which is taken away ſhould be multitude, and not one, ſince it does not participate of *the one*? It is neceſſary. By always ſurveying, therefore, another nature of form, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf, will not any quantity of it which we may behold be infinite in multitude? Entirely ſo. And ſince every part becomes one, the parts will have bounds with reſpect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with reſpect to the parts. Perfectly ſo. It will happen, therefore, to things different from *the one*, as it appears both from *the one* and from their communicating with each other, that a certain ſomething different will take place in them; which indeed affords to them a bound towards each other, while in the mean time the nature of theſe cauſes them to become eſſentially connected with infinity. It appears ſo. And thus things different from *the one*, both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate of bound.

Entirely

Entirely ſo. Are they not, therefore, ſimilar and diſſimilar, both to each other and to themſelves? Why? Becauſe, ſo far as all of them are in a certain reſpect infinite, according to their own nature, they all of them, in conſequence of this, ſuffer that which is *the ſame*. How ſhould they not? But ſo far as they ſuffer to be bounded and infinite, which are paſſions contrary to each other, they ſuffer theſe paſſions. Certainly. But things contrary, as ſuch, are moſt diſſimilar. What then? According to each of theſe paſſions, therefore, they are ſimilar to themſelves and to each other; but, according to both, they are on both ſides moſt contrary and diſſimilar. It appears ſo. And thus others will be the ſame with themſelves and with each other, and ſimilar and diſſimilar. They will ſo. And again, they will be the ſame and different from each other, will both be moved and ſtand ſtill; and it will not be difficult to find all kinds of contrary paſſions ſuffered by things different from *the one*, while they appear to be paſſive, in the manner we have related. You ſpeak rightly.

Shall we not, therefore, paſs by theſe things as evident, and again conſider if *the one* is, whether things different from *the one* will ſubſiſt not in this manner, or whether in this manner alone? Entirely ſo. Let us, therefore, aſſert again from the beginning, *if the one is*, what things different from *the one* ought to ſuffer. Let us. Is, therefore, *the one* ſeparate from others, and are others ſeparate from *the one*? Why? Becauſe there is no other *different* beſides theſe, viz. that which is *different* from *the one*, and that which is *different* from others; for all that can be ſpoken is aſſerted, when we ſay *the one* and *others*. All, indeed. There is nothing elſe, therefore, beſides theſe in which *the one* and *others* can ſubſiſt after the ſame manner. Nothing. *The one* and *others*, therefore, are never in the ſame. It does not appear that they are. Are they ſeparate, therefore? They are. We have likewiſe aſſerted that *the truly one* has not any parts. For how can it? Neither, therefore, will the whole of *the one* be in *others*, nor the parts of it, if it is ſeparate from *others*, and has no parts. How ſhould it not be ſo? In no way, therefore, will *others* participate of *the one*, ſince they neither participate according to a certain part of it, nor according to the whole. It does not appear that they can. By no means, therefore, are *others the one*, nor have they any *one* in themſelves. They have not.

Neither,

Neither, then, are other things many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one: but now things different from *the one* are neither one nor many, nor a whole, nor parts, ſince they in no reſpect participate of *the one*. Right. *Others*, therefore, are neither two nor three, nor is *one* contained in them, becauſe they are entirely deprived of *the one*. So it is. *Others*, therefore, are neither ſimilars nor diſſimilars, nor the ſame with *the one*, nor are ſimilitude and diſſimilitude inherent in them. For, if they were ſimilar and diſſimilar, ſo far as they contained in themſelves ſimilitude and diſſimilitude, ſo far things different from *the one* would comprehend in themſelves two contrary ſpecies. So it appears. But it is impoſſible for thoſe to participate of two certain things which do not participate of one. Impoſſible. *Others*, therefore, are neither ſimilars nor diſſimilars, nor both. For, if they were things ſimilar or diſſimilar, they would participate of one other form; and if they were both, they would participate of two contrary forms: but theſe things appear to be impoſſible. True. *Others*, therefore, are neither *ſame* nor *different*, nor are moved nor ſtand ſtill, nor are generated nor deſtroyed, nor are greater, or leſſer, or equal, nor do they ſuffer any thing elſe of this kind. For, if *others* could ſuſtain to ſuffer any ſuch affection, they would participate of one and two, and of even and odd; all which it appears impoſſible for them to participate, ſince they are entirely deprived of *the one*. All this is moſt true. Hence, then, if *the one is*, *the one* is all things and nothing; and is ſimilarly affected towards itſelf and towards others. Entirely ſo.

Let this then be admitted. But ſhould we not after this conſider what ought to happen if *the one* is not? We ſhould. What then will be the hypotheſis *if the one is not?* Will it differ from the hypotheſis *if that which is not one is not?* It will indeed differ. Will it only differ, or is the hypotheſis *if that which is not one is not*, entirely contrary to the hypotheſis *if the one is not?* Entirely contrary. But what, if any one ſhould ſay, if magnitude is not, or parvitude is not, or any thing elſe of this kind, would he not evince in each of theſe that he ſpeaks of *that which is not* as ſomething *different?* Entirely ſo. Would he not, therefore, now evince that he calls *that which is not* different from others, when he ſays *if the one is not*; and ſhould we underſtand that which he ſays? We ſhould underſtand. In

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the firſt place, therefore, he ſpeaks of ſomething which may be known; and afterwards of ſomething different from others when he ſays *the one*, whether he adds to it *to be* or *not to be*: for that which is ſaid not to be will be not the leſs known, nor that it is ſomething different from others: is it not ſo? It is neceſſary it ſhould. Let us, therefore, relate from the beginning, *if the one is not*, what ought to be the conſequence. In the firſt place, therefore, this as it appears ought to happen it, that either there ſhould be a ſcience of it, or that nothing of what is pronounced can be known, when any one ſays *if the one is not*. True. Muſt not this alſo happen, that either other things muſt be different from it, or that it muſt be ſaid to be different from others? Entirely ſo. Diverſity, therefore, beſides ſcience, is preſent with it; for, when any one ſays that *the one* is different from others, he will not ſpeak of the diverſity of others, but of the diverſity of *the one*. It appears ſo. And beſides, that which is not, or non-being, will participate of *that*, and of *ſome certain thing*, and of *this*, and of *theſe*, and every thing of this kind. For neither could *the one* be ſpoken of, nor things different from *the one*, nor would any thing be preſent with it, nor could it be denominated any thing, if it neither participated of ſome certain thing or things of this kind. Right. But *to be* cannot be preſent with *the one* if it is not; though nothing hinders but it may participate of *the many*: but, indeed, it is neceſſary that it ſhould, if *the one* is *that*, and is not ſomething different from *that*. If, therefore, it is neither *the one* nor *that*, neither will it be; but diſcourſe muſt take place about ſomething elſe, and it will be neceſſary to pronounce nothing concerning it. But if *the one* is eſtabliſhed as *that* and not as *another*, it is neceſſary that it ſhould participate of *that* and of many other things. Entirely ſo. Diſſimilitude, therefore, is preſent with it as to other things: for other things being different from *the one* will alſo be foreign from it. Certainly. But are not things foreign various? How ſhould they not? And are not things various diſſimilars? Diſſimilars. If, therefore, they are diſſimilars to *the one*, it is evident they will be diſſimilars to that which is diſſimilar. It is evident. Diſſimilitude, therefore, will be preſent with *the one*, according to which others will be diſſimilars to it. It appears ſo. But if a diſſimilitude with reſpect to other things belongs to it, muſt not ſimilitude to itſelf be preſent with it? How? If there be a diſſimilitude of *the one* with reſpect to *the one*, diſcourſe would not take place about a

thing of this kind as of *the one*; nor would the hypotheſis be about *the one*, but about ſomething different from *the one*. Entirely ſo. But it ought not. Certainly not. There ought, therefore, to be a ſimilitude of *the one* with reſpect to itſelf. There ought. But neither is *the one* equal to others. For, if it were equal, it would according to equality be ſimilar to them; but both theſe are impoſſible, ſince *the one* is not. Impoſſible. But ſince it is not equal to others, is it not neceſſary that others alſo ſhould not be equal to it? It is neceſſary. But are not things which are not equal unequal? Certainly. And are not unequals unequal to that which is unequal? How ſhould they not? *The one*, therefore, will participate of inequality, according to which others will be unequal to it. It will participate. But magnitude and parvitude belong to inequality. They do. Do magnitude and parvitude, therefore, belong to a one of this kind? It appears they do. But magnitude and parvitude are always ſeparated from each other. Entirely ſo. Something, therefore, always ſubſiſts between them. Certainly. Can you aſſign any thing elſe between theſe, except equality? Nothing elſe. With whatever, therefore, there is magnitude and parvitude, with this equality alſo is preſent, ſubſiſting as a medium between theſe. It appears ſo. But to *the one which is not*, equality, magnitude, and parvitude, as it appears, belong. So it ſeems. But it ought likewiſe, in a certain reſpect, to participate of eſſence. How ſo? Ought it to poſſeſs the properties which we have already deſcribed? for, unleſs this is the caſe, we ſhall not ſpeak the truth when we ſay *the one is not*; but if this is true, it is evident that we have aſſerted things which have a ſubſiſtence: is it not ſo? It is. But ſince we aſſert that we ſpeak truly, it is likewiſe neceſſary to aſſert that we ſpeak of things which exiſt. It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, as it appears, *is*; for *if it is not*, while *not being* [1], but remits ſomething of *being* in order to *not being*, it will immediately become *being*. Entirely ſo. It ought, therefore, to have, as the bond of *not to be, to be that which is not* [2], if it is about *not to be*: juſt as *being* ought to have as a bond *not to be that which is*

[1] The original is μη εστι μη ον, and this is literally *is not non-being*. But the meaning of this difficult paſſage is as follows: Any remiſſion of *being* is attended with *non-being*, which is the ſame with *is not*; and if any thing of it be taken away, *is not* is immediately introduced, and ſo it will immediately become *is not non-being*, that is, *it is being*.

[2] For between μη ειναι and ειναι ον, ειναι μη ον muſt ſubſiſt as a medium.

not,

not [1], that it may be perfectly *that which is.* For thus, in a moſt eminent degree, *being* will *be* and *non-being* will *not be: being* participating of eſſence, in order that it may *be being*; but of *non-eſſence* in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is about perfectly *to be:* but *non-being* participating of *non-eſſence*, in order that *it may not be that which is not being*; but participating of eſſence, in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is to be perfectly *that which is not.* Moſt truly ſo. Since, therefore, *non-being* is preſent with *being*, and *being* with *non-being*, is it not neceſſary that *the one* alſo, ſince it is not, ſhould participate of *being*, in order that it may *not be?* It is neceſſary. Eſſence, therefore, will appear with *the one*, if it is not. So it ſeems. And *non-eſſence*, ſince it is not. How ſhould it not? Can any thing, therefore, which is affected in a certain manner, be not ſo affected when not changed from this habit? It cannot. Every thing, therefore, ſignifies a certain mutation, which is affected and again not affected in ſome particular manner. How ſhould it not? Is mutation a motion, or what elſe do we call it? It is a motion. But has not *the one* appeared to be both *being* and *non-being?* Certainly. It has appeared, therefore, to be *thus* and *not thus* affected. It has. *The one*, therefore, which is *non-being* appears to be moved, ſince it poſſeſſes a mutation from *being* into *non-being.* It appears ſo. But if it be no where among beings, as *it is not* in conſequence of *not being*, it cannot paſs elſewhere. For how can it? It will not, therefore, be moved by tranſition. It will not. Neither will it revolve in *ſame:* for it will never touch *ſame*, ſince *ſame* is *being.* But it is impoſſible that *non-being* can reſide in *any being.* Impoſſible. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, cannot revolve in that in which it is not. It cannot. Neither will *the one* be altered from itſelf, either into *being* or *non-being:* for our diſcourſe would no longer be concerning *the one*, if it was altered from itſelf, but concerning ſomething different from this one. Right. But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in *ſame*, nor ſuffers tranſition, is there any way in which it can be moved? How ſhould there? But that which is immovable muſt neceſſarily

[1] So το μη ον μη ειναι is the medium between το ειναι ον and το μη ειναι ον: for το μη ειναι μη is the ſame as το ειναι, and connects with το ειναι ον; and το μη ον with το μη ειναι ον. Thompſon had not the leaſt glimpſe of this meaning, as may be ſeen from his verſion.

be at reſt; and that which is at reſt muſt abide or ſtand ſtill. It is neceſſary. *The one which is not*, therefore, as it appears, both abides and is moved. It appears ſo. But if it be moved, there is a great neceſſity that it ſhould be altered; for, ſo far as any thing is moved, it is no longer affected in the ſame manner as before, but differently. There is ſo. *The one*, therefore, ſince it is moved, is alſo altered. Certainly. But as again it is in no reſpect moved, it will be in no reſpect altered. It will not. So far, therefore, as *the one which is not* is moved, it is altered; but ſo far as it is not moved it is not altered. Certainly not. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, is both altered and not altered. It appears ſo. But is it not neceſſary that when any thing is altered it ſhould become different from what it was before, and ſhould ſuffer a diſſolution of its former habit; but that a nature which is not altered ſhould neither be generated nor diſſolved? It is neceſſary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, through being altered, will be generated and diſſolved; but at the ſame time, from its not ſuffering alteration, will not be ſubject to either generation or corruption. And thus *the one which is not* will be generated and diſſolved, and will neither be generated nor diſſolved. It will not.

But let us again return to the beginning, and ſee whether theſe things will appear to us in our ſubſequent diſcuſſion as they do now, or otherwiſe. It is neceſſary, indeed, ſo to do. Have we not already related, *if the one is not*, what ought to happen concerning it? Certainly. But when we ſay *it is not*, do we ſignify any thing elſe than the abſence of eſſence from that which we ſay is not? Nothing elſe. Whether, therefore, when we ſay that any thing *is not*, do we ſay that in a certain reſpect it is not, and that in a certain reſpect it is? Or does the term *is not* ſimply ſignify that it is in no reſpect any where, and that it does not any how participate of eſſence, ſince it *is not*? It ſignifies, indeed, moſt ſimply. Neither therefore can that which is not *be*, nor in any other reſpect participate of eſſence. It cannot. But is to be generated and corrupted any thing elſe than for this to receive eſſence and for that to loſe eſſence? It is nothing elſe. That therefore with which nothing of eſſence is preſent, can neither receive nor loſe it. How can it? *The one*, therefore, ſince it in no reſpect *is*, can neither poſſeſs, nor loſe, nor receive eſſence, in any manner whatever. It is proper

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it ſhould be ſo. *The one which is not*, will neither therefore be corrupted nor generated, ſince it in no reſpect participates of eſſence. It does not appear that it will. Neither, therefore, will it be in any reſpect altered; for if it ſuffered this paſſion it would be generated and corrupted. True. But if it is not altered, is it not alſo neceſſary that it ſhould not be moved? It is neceſſary. But that which in no reſpect *is*, we have likewiſe aſſerted, cannot ſtand ſtill; for that which ſtands ought always to be in a certain *ſame*? How ſhould it not? And thus we muſt aſſert that *non-being* neither at any time ſtands nor is moved. For indeed it does not. But likewiſe nothing of beings is preſent with it; for this, through participating of being, would participate of eſſence. It is evident. Neither magnitude, therefore, nor parvitude, nor equality, belongs to it. Certainly not. Neither will ſimilitude or diverſity, either with reſpect to itſelf or others, be preſent with it. It does not appear that they will. But what, can other things be in any reſpect preſent with it, if nothing ought to be preſent with it? They cannot. Neither, therefore, are ſimilars nor diſſimilars, nor *ſame* nor *different*, different from it. They are not. But what, can any thing be aſſerted of it, or be with it, or can it be any certain thing, or this, or belong to this, or that, or be with ſome other thing, or be formerly, or hereafter, or now—or can ſcience, or opinion, or ſenſe, or diſcourſe, or a name, or any thing elſe belonging to beings, ſubſiſt about that which is not? There cannot. *The one* therefore *which is not*, will not in any reſpect ſubſiſt any where. So indeed it appears.

But let us again declare *if the one is not*, what other things ought to ſuffer. Let us. But in a certain reſpect *others* ought to ſubſiſt; for, unleſs *others* have a being, we cannot diſcourſe concerning them. True. But if diſcourſe is about *others*, *others* will be different: or do you not call *others* and *different* the ſame? I do. But do we not ſay that *different* is different from different, and *other* is other than *another*? Certainly. With reſpect to *others*, therefore, if they are about to be *others*, there is ſomething than which they will be others. It is neceſſary. But what will this be? For they will not be different from *the one*, ſince it is not. They will not. They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing. Right. According to multitudes, therefore,

each is different from each; for they cannot be different according to *the one*, ſince *the one is not*. But each maſs of theſe, as it appears, is infinite in multitude. And though any one ſhould aſſume that which appears to be the leaſt, like a dream in ſleep, on a ſudden, inſtead of that which ſeemed to be *one*, *many* would riſe to the view; and inſtead of that which is ſmalleſt, a quantity perfectly great with reſpect to the multitude diſtributed from it. Moſt right. But among theſe maſſes or heaps, *others* will be mutually different from one another, if they are *others* and *the one* is not. Eminently ſo. Will there not then be many heaps, each of which will appear to be one, but is not ſo ſince *the one* is not? There will ſo. There will likewiſe appear to be a number of theſe, if each of theſe which are many is one. Entirely ſo. But the even and odd which are among them will not have a true appearance, ſince *the one* will not have a being. They will not. But likewiſe that which is ſmalleſt, as we have ſaid, will appear to be with them; but this minimum will ſeem to be many things and great, with reſpect to each of the things which are many and ſmall. How ſhould it not? And every ſmall heap will ſeem in the eye of opinion to be equal to many ſmall heaps: for it will not appear to paſs from a greater into a leſſer quantity, before it ſeems to arrive at ſomething between; and this will be a phantaſm of equality. It is likely to be ſo. Will it not alſo appear to be bounded with reſpect to another heap, itſelf with reſpect to itſelf, at the ſame time neither having a beginning, nor middle, nor end? How ſo? Becauſe, when any one apprehends by the dianoëtic power ſome one of theſe prior to the beginning, another beginning will always appear, and after the end another end will always be left behind: but in the middle there will always be other things more inward than the middle; and ſmaller, becauſe each of them cannot receive *one one*, ſince *the one is not*. This is moſt true. But every thing which any one may apprehend by the dianoëtic power, muſt I think be broken to pieces and diſtributed; for the bulk will in a certain reſpect be apprehended without *the one*. Entirely ſo. But will not ſuch a heap, to him who beholds it afar off and with a dull eye, neceſſarily appear to be one: but to him who with an intellectual eye ſurveys it near and acutely, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, ſince it is deprived of *the one*, becauſe it has no ſubſiſtence? It is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo in the higheſt degree.

Each, therefore, of other things ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, *if the one is not*, and other things beſides *the one* have a ſubſiſtence. It ought to be ſo. Will they, therefore, appear to be ſimilars and diſſimilars? But how? Since to him who beholds *others* at a diſtance, involved as it were in ſhadow, they all appear to be one, they will ſeem to ſuffer *ſame* and to be ſimilar. Entirely ſo. But to him who approaches nearer they will appear to be many and different, and different from and diſſimilar to themſelves, through the phantaſm of *diverſity*. It is ſo. The heaps, therefore, will neceſſarily appear to be ſimilar and diſſimilar to themſelves, and to each other. Entirely ſo. Will they not alſo be the ſame and different from each other, and in contact with, and ſeparate from, themſelves, and moved with all poſſible motions, and every way abiding: likewiſe generated and corrupted, and neither of theſe, and all of this kind, which may be eaſily enumerated, if, though *the one is not*, *the many* have a ſubſiſtence? All this is moſt true.

Once more, therefore, returning again to the beginning, let us relate what ought to happen to things different from *the one*, *if the one is not*. Let us relate. Does it not, therefore, follow that *others* are not *the one?* How ſhould it not be ſo? Nor yet are they many; for, in *the many*, *the one* alſo would be inherent. For, if none of theſe is one, all are nothing; ſo that neither can there be many. True. *The one*, therefore, not being inherent in *others*, *others* are neither many nor one. They are not. Nor will they appear either to be one or many. Why not? Becauſe *others* cannot in any reſpect have any communication with things which are not, nor can any thing of non-beings be preſent with *others*; for no part ſubſiſts with non-beings. True. Neither, therefore, is there any opinion of that which is not, inherent in others, nor any phantaſm; nor can that which is not become in any reſpect the ſubject of opinion to others. It cannot. *The one*, therefore, *if it is not*, cannot by opinion be conceived to be any certain one of others, nor yet many; for it is impoſſible to form an opinion of many without *the one*. It is impoſſible. If *the one*, therefore, *is not*, neither have *others* any ſubſiſtence; nor can *the one* or *the many* be conceived by opinion. It does not appear that they can. Neither, therefore, do ſimilars nor diſſimilars ſubſiſt. They do not. Nor *ſame nor different*, nor things in contact, nor

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ſuch as are ſeparate from each other, nor other things, ſuch as we have already diſcuſſed, as appearing to ſubſiſt; for no particular of theſe will have any exiſtence, nor will others appear to be, *if the one is not.* True. If we ſhould, therefore, ſummarily ſay, that *if the one is not, nothing is*, will not our aſſertion be right? Entirely ſo. Let this then be aſſerted by us, and this alſo: that whether *the one is* or *is not*, both itſelf, as it appears, and others, both with reſpect to themſelves and to each other, are entirely all things, and at the ſame time are not all, and appear to be, and at the ſame time do not appear. It is moſt true.

THE END OF THE PARMENIDES.

THE

THE SOPHISTA;

A

DIALOGUE

ON BEING.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE SOPHISTA.

THE following is the preface of Proclus [1] to this dialogue, as preſerved in the Greek Scholia on Plato, publiſhed by Ruhnkenius. "Plato not only calls a certain man a Sophiſt, but alſo Love [2], Pluto, and Jupiter, and ſays that the ſophiſtical art is all-beautiful; whence we may conjecture that the dialogue has a more noble ſcope than it appears to poſſeſs. For, according to the great Jamblichus, its ſcope is concerning the ſublunary demiurgus [3]; ſince this Divinity is the fabricator of images, and the purifier of ſouls, always ſeparating them from contrary reaſons, being a tranſmuter, and a mercenary hunter of rich young men. While he receives ſouls coming from on high replete with productive principles, he takes from them a reward, viz. the fabrication of animals, in ſuch a way as is accommodated to the nature of mortals. This Deity gives himſelf to non-being, becauſe he fabricates material beings, and embraces matter,—a thing which is truly falſe. At the ſame time, however, he looks to true being. He is alſo many-headed, hurling forth many eſſences and lives, through which he furniſhes the variety of generation. The ſame power is likewiſe a magician, in conſequence of alluring ſouls by natural reaſons, ſo that they are with difficulty divulſed from generation. For Love, alſo, and Nature, are called by ſome magicians,

[1] Ficinus, who has given a verſion of this preface, aſcribes it to Proclus, and doubtleſs from good authority.

[2] This word is wanting in Ruhnkenius, and is ſupplied from the verſion of Ficinus.

[3] Viz. Pluto.

on account of the ſympathy and antipathy in things which have a natural ſubſiſtence. Now, therefore, Plato wiſhes to inſtruct us in an all-various ſophiſt. For a philoſopher is a ſophiſt, as imitating the celeſtial and alſo the ſublunary demiurgus: for the diviſive art imitates the progreſſion of things from *the one*, and the ſublunary the celeſtial demiurgus; and on this account he is a ſophiſt. A ſophiſt alſo among men is ſo called, becauſe he imitates great things: and hence Plato denominates the ſophiſt many-headed. The Elean gueſt is analogous to the ſuperceleſtial and exempt father of the artificers of things, but his hearers to demiurgic intellections, one of theſe being analogous to the intellection of Jupiter, and the other to angelic intelligence, as being Mercurial and geometrical. And becauſe fabrication proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, on this account the Elean gueſt firſt converſes with Theodorus, and afterwards converts himſelf to Socrates in particular [1]." Thus far Proclus.

Plato in this dialogue preſents us with ſix definitions of a ſophiſt; but as definition cannot be obtained without diviſion, for the latter is the principle of the former, hence he divides the genus of the ſophiſt by its proper differences, from which, in conjunction with genus, ſpecies is compoſed and de-

[1] I give the original of this fragment of Proclus for the ſake of the learned Platonical reader, who may not have theſe Greek Scholia in his poſſeſſion: for, to a genuine Platoniſt, every thing written by Proclus muſt be invaluable. Ὁτι σοφιστην καλει ὁ Πλατων και τον . . . . (ſupple Ερωτα) και τον Αιδην, και τον Δια, και παγκαλην λεγει ειναι την σοφιστικην τεχνην· ὁθεν ὑπονοημεν, ὁτι γλαφυρωτερου σκοπου εχεται ὁ διαλογος. Εστι γαρ κατα τον μεγαν Ιαμβλιχον σκοπος νυν περι του ὑπο σεληνην δημιουργου. Ὁυτος γαρ ειδωλοποιος, και καθαρτης ψυχων, εναντιων λογων αει χωριζων, μεταβλητικος, και νεων πλουσιων εμμισθος θηρευτης, ψυχας ὑποδεχομενος πληρεις λογων ανωθεν ιασας, και μισθον λαμβανων παρ' αυτων, την ζωοποιον την κατα λογον των θνητων. Ὁυτος ενδεδεται τῳ μη οντι, τα ενυλα δημιουργων, και το ως αληθως ψευδος ασπαζομενος, την ὑλην. Βλεπει δε εις το οντως ον. Ὁυτος εστιν ὁ πολυκεφαλος, πολλας ουσιας και ζωας προβεβλημενος, δι' ὡν κατασκευαζει την ποικιλιαν της γενεσεως. Ὁ δ' αυτος και γοης, ὡς θελγων τας ψυχας τοις φυσικοις λογοις, ὡς δυσαποσπαστως εχειν απο της γενεσεως. Και γαρ ὁ ερως γοης, και ἡ φυσις ὑπο τινων μαγος κεκληται δια τας συμπαθειας και αντιπαθειας των φυσει. Νυν ουν τον παντοδαπον σοφιστην βουλεται διδασκειν. Και γαρ και ὁ φιλοσοφος σοφιστης, ὡς μιμουμενος τον τε ουρανιον δημιουργον και τον γενεσιουργον. Και ἡ διαιρετικη μιμειται την απο του ενος των οντων προοδον, και ὁ γενεσιουργος τον ουρανιον δημιουργον. διο και σοφιστης, και αυτος δε ὁ σοφιστης ανθρωπος ων δια το τα μεγαλα μιμεισθαι, σοφιστης καλειται· ὁθεν και τον σοφιστην πολυκεφαλον ειρηκεν. Ὁ δε ξενος εις τυπον του πατρος των δημιουργοντων νοεισθω ὑπερουρανιος και εξηρημενος· οἱ δε ακροαται εις τας δημιουργικας νοησεις, ὁ μεν εις την του Διος, ὁ δε εις την αγγελικην, ὡς Ερμαϊκος και γεωμετρικος. Και επει ἡ δημιουργια εκ του ατελους εις το τελειον, δια τουτο πρωτον ὁ ξενος τῳ Θεοδωρῳ συγγινεται· ειτα δι' επιστροφης τῳ ἰδιῳ (lege ἰδιῳ) Σωκρατει.

ſined. He alſo ſhows, conformably to what is delivered in the Parmenides, that *being* is ſubordinate to *the one*; and enumerates five genera of *being*, viz. *eſſence*, *ſame*, and *different*, *permanency* and *motion*. He likewiſe teaches us that true eſſence belongs to incorporeal, and imaginable to corporeal natures; and is indignant with thoſe who deny that there are forms ſuperior to ſenſibles, and alſo with thoſe who contend that all things are either alone permanent, or alone in motion. Beſides all this, he diſputes concerning ſcience and opinion, true and falſe diſcourſe, verb and noun, ſo far as they appear to pertain to the diſcuſſion of *being*. He likewiſe obſerves, that the ſophiſt is concealed from our view, becauſe he is involved in the darkneſs of non-entity, and that a philoſopher alſo is not eaſily diſcerned on account of the ſplendor of being with which he is ſurrounded: "for the eyes of vulgar ſouls (ſays he) are unable to ſupport the view of that which is divine."

In order, however, to underſtand the moſt abſtruſe part of this dialogue, it is neceſſary to refer the reader to our copious Notes and Introduction to the Parmenides: for he whoſe mental eye has gained a glimpſe of the ineffable light of *ſupereſſential unity*, will more eaſily perceive the ſplendors of *being*.

I only add, that Plato in this dialogue has given a moſt beautiful ſpecimen of that part of his dialectic [1] called diviſion; a branch of the maſter ſcience in which he and the moſt illuſtrious of his diſciples were eminently ſkilled, and by which they were enabled to diſcover all the connecting media in the vaſt ſeries of being, and to aſcend from that which is laſt in the univerſe to the ineffable principle of all things.

[1] For an ample account of this maſter ſcience ſee the Introduction to the Parmenides.

THE SOPHISTA.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS,	An ELEAN GUEST, or STRANGER,
SOCRATES,	And THEÆTETUS.

WE are come, Socrates, according to our agreement yeſterday, as good manners require, and have brought with us this gueſt, who is an Elean by birth, but very different from the aſſociates of Parmenides and Zeno: he is however a great philoſopher.

Soc. Perhaps, therefore, Theodorus, according to the aſſertion of Homer [1], you are conducting a certain God, and not a ſtranger. For he ſays, that both other Gods, and eſpecially the hoſpitable deity, are converſant with men who participate of juſt ſhame, and that they inſpect the inſolent and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he who now follows you, is one of the natures ſuperior to man, who attends you in order to behold and confute us who diſpute badly, as being himſelf a certain reprehending God.

THEO. This is not the manner of this gueſt, Socrates, but he is more modeſt than thoſe that are ſtudious of contention. And he appears to me, as being a man, not to be a God, but to be divine: for ſo I denominate all philoſophers.

[1] Odyſſ. lib. vii. ver. 485, &c. See the Apology for the Fables of Homer, vol. i. p. 163 of this work. It is well obſerved by the Greek Scholiaſt on this place, that Socrates now, conſiſtently with what he aſſerts in the Republic, reprobates theſe verſes of Homer, but in a milder manner, in conſequence of becoming an aſſociate with the Elean gueſt.

Soc. And you do well in calling them ſo, my friend. But indeed the genus of philoſophers is not much more eaſily diſtinguiſhed, as I may ſay, than that of divinity. For thoſe who are not fictitiouſly but truly philoſophers, appear through the ignorance of others to be of an all-various nature, while they wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of inferior natures. And to ſome they appear to deſerve no honour, but by others they are conſidered as worthy of all honour. And ſometimes they appear to be politicians, but at other times Sophiſts; and ſometimes, in the opinion of certain perſons, they are conſidered to be perfectly inſane. I would gladly, therefore, inquire of this our gueſt, if agreeable to him, what his familiars the Eleans think of theſe things, and how they denominate them.

THEO. What things do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. The ſophiſt, politician, and philoſopher.

THEO. What, and of what kind, is the doubt about theſe, which you would wiſh to have diſſolved?

Soc. This: Whether they denominate all theſe, one or two. Or as there are three names, whether they alſo make a diſtribution into three genera, and aſcribe the reſpective names to the reſpective genera.

THEO. But I think that he will not enviouſly refuſe to diſcuſs theſe things. Or how ſhall we ſay, gueſt?

GUEST. In this manner, Theodorus. For I ſhall not enviouſly refuſe, nor is it difficult to inform you, that they think theſe are three genera: but to define clearly what each of them is, is not a ſmall nor an eaſy work.

THEO. You have perhaps, Socrates, fallen upon queſtions ſimilar to thoſe which we were aſking this our gueſt before we came hither. But he then gave us the ſame anſwers as he juſt now gave you: for he ſaid, that he had ſufficiently heard, and did not forget them.

Soc. You ought, therefore, to gratify us, O gueſt, with reſpect to our firſt queſtion: But tell us thus much, whether you are accuſtomed to diſcuſs by yourſelf in a long diſcourſe, that which you wiſh to evince, or by interrogations, which I once heard Parmenides employing, and at the ſame time delivering all-beautiful arguments, I being then a young and he a very elderly man.

GUEST. If any one anſwers, Socrates, without difficulty, and in a placid manner

manner, it is more eaſy to diſcourſe with ſuch a one by interrogating; but if not, it is better to diſcourſe by oneſelf.

Soc. You are at liberty, therefore, to chooſe whichever of theſe you pleaſe: for we ſhall all of us obey you without reluctance. But I would adviſe you to chooſe ſome young man for this purpoſe, either Theætetus here, or any other that you may think proper.

Guest. I am aſhamed, Socrates, that, converſing with you now for the firſt time, I have not given word for word, but, making a long diſcourſe either by myſelf or to another, I have acted as if I had been framing a demonſtration. For in reality no one ſhould expect that the preſent queſtion can be ſolved with the greateſt facility: for it requires a very long diſcuſſion. On the contrary, not to gratify you, and thoſe that are now aſſembled, eſpecially ſince you have aſked in ſo modeſt a manner, would, as it appears to me, be inhoſpitable and ruſtic; ſince, from what I have before ſaid, and from what you have now urged me to do, I ſhall have Theætetus here as my aſſociate in the diſcuſſion.

Theæ. By thus acting indeed, O gueſt, as Socrates ſays, you will gratify all of us.

Guest. It appears then, Theætetus, that nothing further muſt be ſaid againſt theſe things. And as it ſeems, after this, I muſt addreſs myſelf to you. But if being weary through the length of the diſcourſe you ſhould become indignant, do not blame me, but theſe your companions, as the cauſe of this.

Theæ. I am far from thinking that this will be the caſe: but if a thing of this kind ſhould take place, then we can call upon the nameſake of Socrates here, who is of the ſame age with me, and is my aſſociate in gymnaſtic exerciſes, and who is not unaccuſtomed to accompliſh many laborious things in conjunction with me.

Guest. You ſpeak well. Deliberate, therefore, about theſe things by yourſelf, in the courſe of the diſputation: but now conſider in common with me, beginning in the firſt place (as it appears to me) from the ſophiſt; and let us evince by our diſcourſe what he is. For now both you and I have only the name in common reſpecting this thing: but perhaps each of us thinks differently as to the thing denominated. But it is always requiſite reſpecting every thing, rather to conſent through reaſons to the thing itſelf, than to the name alone without reaſon. However, with reſpect to the tribe which

which we now take upon us to inveſtigate, it is by no means eaſy to apprehend what a ſophiſt is. It appears however to all men, and is an antient opinion, that whoever wiſhes to labour through great things well, ſhould exerciſe himſelf in ſuch as are ſmall and more eaſy, before he attempts ſuch as are the greateſt. Now, therefore, as we are of opinion that the genus of a ſophiſt is difficult to inveſtigate, I would adviſe, Theætetus, that we ſhould firſt of all conſider the method of this inveſtigation, in ſomething more eaſy: unleſs you are able to ſhow a more expeditious way.

THEÆ. But I am not able.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that, adducing a vile thing, we ſhould eſtabliſh it as a paradigm of a greater thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But what if we propoſe a thing well known, and of a trifling nature, but which will contribute as well as any thing to the apprehenſion of greater things? as for inſtance a fiſherman. Is he not known to every one? and is it not likewiſe certain, that he does not deſerve much ſerious conſideration?

THEÆ. It is ſo.

GUEST. Yet I ſuſpect he will furniſh us with a method, and reaſoning proceſs, not unadapted to our deſign.

THEÆ. In this caſe, therefore, it will be well.

GUEST. Come then, let us begin from this: and inform me, whether we ſhould conſider a fiſherman, as one endued with art, or as without art, but poſſeſſing another power.

THEÆ. We muſt by no means conſider him as without art.

GUEST. But there are nearly two ſpecies of all arts.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. Agriculture, and the care reſpecting every mortal body, together with that pertaining to every thing compoſite and plaſtic, which we denominate an utenſil, and in conjunction with theſe the imitative power, all which may be juſtly called by one name.

THEÆ. How ſo? and by what name?

GUEST. When any one afterwards leads into exiſtence that which was not before, then we ſay that he who leads makes, and that the thing led is made.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But all the particulars which we juſt now mentioned poſſeſs a power adapted to this.

THEÆ. They do.

GUEST. In a ſummary way, therefore, we ſhall denominate them effective.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. But after this, the whole ſpecies of diſcipline and knowledge, together with the ſpecies of gain, conteſt and hunting, may be called a certain art of acquiring, ſince no one of theſe fabricates any thing, but procures things which are and have been, partly ſubjecting them to its power by words and actions, and partly conceding them to thoſe by whom they are received.

THEÆ. They may be ſo called: for it is proper.

GUEST. Since all arts, therefore, conſiſt either in acquiring or in effecting, in which of theſe, Theætetus, ſhall we place the art of fiſhing?

THEÆ. Doubtleſs in the art of acquiring.

GUEST. But are there not two ſpecies of the art of acquiring? the one being a commutation between thoſe that are willing, through gifts, buying, and wages? But the other will be a mancipation, effected either by deeds or words.

THEÆ. It appears this muſt be the caſe, from what has been ſaid.

GUEST. But what? Muſt not mancipation alſo receive a twofold diviſion?

THEÆ. After what manner?

GUEST. The one being apparent, and wholly agoniſtic; but the other being occult, and wholly conſiſting in hunting.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. It is likewiſe abſurd, not to give hunting a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. Inform me how.

GUEST. One member of the diviſion conſiſts of the inanimate, and the other of the animated kind.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly: for there are both theſe.

GUEST. How, indeed, is it poſſible there ſhould not? And it is requiſite that we ſhould leave the hunting of inanimate things without a name, and that we ſhould likewiſe diſmiſs the conſideration of certain parts of the art of ſwimming, and other trifling things of this kind; and denominate

the

the other part, which is the hunting of animated natures, the hunting of animals.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. But is it not juſtly ſaid, that there is a twofold ſpecies of the hunting of animals? one being the hunting of the pedeſtrian kind, which is diſtinguiſhed by many ſpecies and names, but the other of every ſwimming animal, and which is denominated hunting in water?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But of the ſwimming diviſion, we ſee that one kind cuts the air with wings, and that the other is aquatic.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called fowling.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

GUEST. But nearly that of all the aquatic tribe, fiſhing.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But what? Muſt we not divide this hunting into two greateſt parts?

THEÆ. What are theſe parts?

GUEST. According to which we either fiſh with nets, or by percuſſion.

THEÆ. How do you ſay? And how do you divide each?

GUEST. That every thing which on all ſides encloſing reſtrains any thing for the ſake of impediment, is fitly denominated a net.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But do you call a bow-net, dictuon [1], a ſnare, and a caſting-net, any thing elſe than nets?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

GUEST. We muſt ſay, therefore, that this hunting with nets is a part of fiſhing, or ſomething of this kind.

THEÆ. We muſt.

GUEST. But that which is accompliſhed with hooks and darts, by percuſſion, and which is different from the other kind of fiſhing, it will be proper that we ſhould now call by one word, percutient-hunting, unleſs you, Theætetus, have any thing better to ſay.

[1] The *dictuon* was a larger and wider kind of net.

THEÆ. Let us pay no attention to the name: for this is ſufficient.

GUEST. Of percutient-hunting, therefore, one kind is I think nocturnal, being effected by the light of fire; and on this account it happens to be called igniferous.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But the other kind is diurnal, and is effected with tridents hooked on the extremities of rods; the whole of this being aduncous fiſhing.

THEÆ. It is indeed ſo called.

GUEST. Of aduncous-percutient-fiſhing, therefore, that kind which is effected by darting the tridents into the water from on high, is I think called by ſome tridental fiſhing.

THEÆ. So certain perſons ſay.

GUEST. Only one ſpecies then, as I may ſay, remains.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. A percuſſion contrary to this, effected indeed with a hook, but not caſually ſtriking any part of the body, as in fiſhing with tridents, but piercing only the head and mouth of the fiſh, and drawing it upwards with rods and reeds. By what name, Theætetus, ſhall we ſay this ought to be called?

THEÆ. By that of aduncous fiſhing with rods: and we now appear to have accompliſhed that which we propoſed to diſcuſs.

GUEST. Now, therefore, you and I have not only accorded in giving a name to fiſhing, but we have likewiſe ſufficiently explained the manner in which it is conducted. For, of the whole art, one half we ſaid conſiſted in acquiring; and the half of this in manual ſubjugation; and again the half of this in hunting. Likewiſe that the half of hunting conſiſted in the capture of animals; and that the half of the capture of animals was hunting in water. That again, of hunting in water, the downward diviſion of the whole was fiſhing; that the half of fiſhing was percutient; that the half of percutient fiſhing was performed with a hook: and laſtly, that the half of this conſiſted in drawing that which is downwards upwards; and that, thence deriving its name, it is called aduncous fiſhing with rods.

THEÆ. This, therefore, has been in every reſpect ſufficiently ſhown.

GUEST. Come then, let us endeavour according to this paradigm to diſcover what a ſophiſt is.

THEÆ. By all means.

GUEST. And this indeed was the firſt object of inquiry in the example juſt adduced, whether a fiſherman is to be conſidered as a rude character, or as one endued with a certain art.

THEÆ. It was.

GUEST. And now, Theætetus, ſhall we call a ſophiſt a rude character, or one in every reſpect ſkilful?

THEÆ. We muſt by no means call him a rude character. For I underſtand what you ſay, that he who is ſo called ought not to be unſkilful, but endued with a certain art.

GUEST. But with what art ought we to conſider him endued?

THEÆ. I aſk you the ſame queſtion.

GUEST. By the Gods, then, are we ignorant that one of theſe men is allied to the other?

THEÆ. Which men?

GUEST. The fiſherman and the ſophiſt.

THEÆ. In what reſpect are they allied?

GUEST. Both of them appear to me to be hunters.

THEÆ. Of what is this latter character a hunter? for we have ſpoken of the other.

GUEST. We divided the whole of hunting into the ſwimming and the pedeſtrian.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And we diſcuſſed, indeed, the particulars reſpecting the ſwimming part of aquatic natures; but we omitted the pedeſtrian diviſion, and ſaid that it was multiform.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Thus far, therefore, the ſophiſt and the fiſherman equally proceed from the art of acquiring.

THEÆ. They appear ſo indeed.

GUEST. Some however, abandoning the hunting of land animals, betake themſelves to the ſea, to rivers and lakes, and hunt animals in theſe.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But ſome ſubjugate animals on the earth, and in rivers, as in meadows abounding with riches and youthfulneſs.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Of pedeſtrian hunting there are two greateſt parts.

THEÆ. Of what kind is each of theſe parts?

GUEST. One is the hunting of tame, and the other of ſavage animals.

THEÆ. Is there any hunting then of tame animals?

GUEST. Either man is a tame animal, (adopt what I ſay as you pleaſe,) or no animal is tame; or ſome other animal is tame, but man is a ſavage animal: or you may ſay that man indeed is a tame animal, but you may think that there is no hunting of men. Adopt whichever of theſe diviſions is moſt agreeable to you.

THEÆ. But I think, O gueſt, that we are a tame animal, and I ſay that there is a hunting of men.

GUEST. We muſt ſay then that there is alſo a twofold hunting of tame animals.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. By defining prædatory hunting, that which reduces into bondage, and tyrannic hunting, to be all of them violent hunting.

THEÆ. Well defined.

GUEST. But that which pertains to judicial caſes, popular harangues, and diſcourſe, may ſummarily be called a certain art of perſuaſion.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But of this art of perſuaſion we ſay there are two kinds.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. One of them is private, and the other public.

THEÆ. There are theſe two ſpecies.

GUEST. Again, with reſpect to the hunting of private perſuaſion, one kind is effected by wages, and another by gifts.

THEÆ. I do not underſtand you.

GUEST. It ſeems you have never attended to the hunting of lovers.

THEÆ. In what reſpect?

GUEST. In this, that beſides other things they beſtow gifts on thoſe they have caught.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. Let this then be a ſpecies of the amatory art.

THEÆ. By all means.

GUEST. But with reſpect to that ſpecies of the hunting of perſuaſion which is effected by wages, that part of it which converſes with others through favour, and entirely procures enchantments through pleaſure, that it may thence alone receive aliment as its reward, this I think we all of us call adulation, or a certain art adminiſtering to pleaſure.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But another part of it profeſſes to converſe for the ſake of virtue, and requires money for its reward. Ought not this part, therefore, to be called by another name?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Endeavour to tell me this name.

THEÆ. It is evident. For we appear to me to have found a ſophiſt; and I think this name is adapted to this other part of the object of our inveſtigation.

GUEST. According to the preſent reaſoning, as it ſeems, Theætetus, the profeſſion of a ſophiſt muſt be called an art, ſervile, ſubjugating, and venatic; hunting pedeſtrian, terreſtrial, and tame animals; or, in other words, privately bringing men into captivity for pecuniary rewards, and enſnaring rich and noble young men, through an opinion of erudition.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Further ſtill, let us conſider as follows:—For the object of our preſent inveſtigation does not participate of a certain vile art, but of one various in the extreme. For, from what has been before ſaid, we may conjecture that it does not belong to that kind of art which we juſt now mentioned, but to another kind.

THEÆ. What is that kind?

GUEST. There were in a certain reſpect two ſpecies of the art of acquiring, the one conſiſting in hunting, and the other flowing from contracts.

THEÆ. There were.

GUEST. We ſay, therefore, that there are two ſpecies of contracts, the one conſiſting in beſtowing, and the other in buying and ſelling.

THEÆ. There are ſo.

GUEST. And again, we ſay that the ſpecies of contracts which conſiſts in buying and ſelling, muſt receive a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST.

GUEST. He who expoſes his own works to ſale may be called a ſeller of his own property; but he who ſells the works of others, an exchanger.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But what? Is not that exchange which takes place in the ſame city, and which is nearly the half of the whole of exchange, denominated cauponary?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And is not the other half that which takes place by buying and ſelling in different cities, and which we call emporic?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And do we not perceive, that of emporic exchange, one part pertains to the nutriment of the body, and the other to the diſcipline of the ſoul, exchanging erudition for money?

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. That part which pertains to the ſoul we are, perhaps, unacquainted with: for the other part we underſtand.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But we ſay that he who buys muſic in one city by learning, and ſells it in another by teaching, and who acts in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to painting, enchantment, and many other things pertaining to the ſoul, as well ſerious as jocoſe,—we ſay that ſuch a one traffics no leſs than he who ſells meats and drinks.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. Will you not, therefore, ſimilarly denominate him who wanders about different cities in order to exchange diſciplines for money?

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But of this merchandize pertaining to the ſoul, may not one part be moſt juſtly called demonſtrative; and may not the other part, though ridiculous, yet, ſince it is no leſs the ſelling of diſciplines than the former, be called by a name which is the brother to that of ſelling?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But in this traffic of diſciplines, he who ſells the diſciplines of other arts muſt be called by a name different from him who ſells the diſciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. For he who ſells the diſciplines of other arts may be aptly called a ſeller of arts; but conſider by what name he ſhould be called who ſells the diſciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. By what other name can he be called without error, except that which is the object of our inveſtigation at preſent, a ſophiſt?

GUEST. By no other. We may, therefore, now collect as follows: that, by a ſecond inveſtigation, a ſophiſt has appeared to us to be an exchanger, a buyer and ſeller, a merchant reſpecting diſcourſes, and one who ſells the diſciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. In the third place, I think that you in like manner will call him a ſophiſt, who being ſettled in a city, partly buys and partly himſelf fabricates diſciplines, which he ſells in order to procure the neceſſaries of life.

THEÆ. Why, indeed, ſhould I not?

GUEST. You will, therefore, call him a ſophiſt who is converſant in acquiring, who traffics, and ſells either his own inventions, or thoſe of others, about the diſciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Neceſſarily ſo. For it is requiſite to aſſent to reaſon.

GUEST. Let us ſtill further conſider, whether the genus which we are at preſent inveſtigating is ſimilar to a certain thing of this kind.

THEÆ. Of what kind?

GUEST. Of the art of acquiring, a certain part appeared to us to be agoniſtic.

THEÆ. It did.

GUEST. It will not, therefore, be improper to give it a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. Inform me how you divide it.

GUEST. One part is defenſive, and the other offenſive.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

GUEST. Of the offenſive part, therefore, that which takes place when bodies fight againſt bodies may be fitly called violence.

THEÆ. It may.

GUEST. But what elſe, Theætetus, can that which takes place when arguments oppoſe arguments be called, except contention?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

GUEST. But as to contentions, there muſt be a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. In what reſpect?

GUEST. For, ſo far as contention takes place through employing prolix arguments againſt prolix arguments in public concerning things juſt and unjuſt, it is judicial.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But when it takes place in private, by a diſtribution into minute parts, through queſtion and anſwer, are we accuſtomed to call it any thing elſe than contradiction?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

GUEST. But of contradiction, that part which is employed about contracts, and which ſubſiſts caſually, and without art, is to be placed as a ſeparate ſpecies, ſince reaſon diſtinguiſhes it from other kinds of contradiction; but it has neither been aſſigned a name by any of the antients, nor does it deſerve to be denominated by us at preſent.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. For it is divided into parts extremely ſmall and all-various. But that which proceeds according to art, and diſputes about things juſt and unjuſt, and univerſally about other particulars, we are accuſtomed to call contentious.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But of the contentious diviſion, one part diſſipates poſſeſſions, and the other accumulates wealth.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We ſhould, therefore, endeavour to diſcover by what name each of theſe ought to be called.

THEÆ. It is proper to do ſo.

GUEST. It appears then to me, that he who, through delighting in the ſtudy of contention, neglects his affairs, and is always hunting after trifling queſtions, cannot be called any thing elſe than a man of words.

THEÆ. He may, indeed, be called ſo.

GUEST. But do you now, in your turn, endeavour to inform me how he is to be denominated who endeavours to acquire wealth from private contention.

THEÆ. Can any one with rectitude call him any thing elſe than that wonderful character the ſophiſt, which we inveſtigate, and who now again for the fourth time preſents himſelf to our view?

GUEST. As reaſon, therefore, again ſhows us, a ſophiſt is nothing elſe than that pecuniary genus which is converſant with the art of contention, with contradiction, controverſy, hoſtile oppoſition, and with the agoniſtic art, and that of acquiring.

THEÆ. He is altogether ſo.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, therefore, that it is truly ſaid, this wild beaſt is a various animal, and that, according to the proverb, he is not to be caught with the other hand?

THEÆ. It will, therefore, be proper to uſe both hands.

GUEST. It will be proper, and we muſt do ſo to the utmoſt of our power. But inform me, whether we have any ſervile names?

THEÆ. We have many. But reſpecting which of the many do you aſk me?

GUEST. Such as when we ſay to waſh, to diſtribute, to boil, and to ſeparate.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And beſides theſe, to card wool, to draw down, to comb, and ten thouſand other ſuch-like words which we meet with in the arts. Or do we not?

THEÆ. Which among theſe do you wiſh to ſerve throughout, as an inſtance of what you mean to evince?

GUEST. All the names that have been mentioned are in a certain reſpect diviſive.

THEÆ. They are.

GUEST. According to my reaſoning, therefore, ſince there is one art in all theſe, we ſhould call them by one name.

THEÆ. By what name?

GUEST. Segregative.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. Conſider, again, whether we are able to perceive two ſpecies of this?

THEÆ. You ſeem to urge me to a rapid conſideration.

GUEST. And, indeed, in all theſe ſegregations, the worſe was ſeparated from the better, and the ſimilar from the ſimilar.

THEÆ. It appears that it was nearly ſo ſaid.

GUEST. Of the latter of theſe ſegregations, therefore, I cannot tell the name; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects the worſe.

THEÆ. Inform me what it is.

GUEST. The whole of this ſeparation (as I conjecture) is called by all men a certain purification.

THEÆ. It is ſo called.

GUEST. Does not, therefore, every one ſee that the cathartic ſpecies is twofold?

THEÆ. Yes. If any one, perhaps, thinks about it at leiſure; for I do not ſee it at preſent.

GUEST. And, indeed, it is proper to comprehend in one name the many ſpecies of purgations pertaining to the body.

THEÆ. What kind of purgations do you mean? and by what name ought they to be called?

GUEST. The inward purgations of the bodies of animals, by gymnaſtic and medicine, which purify by rightly ſeparating; and thoſe which operate externally, and which it is vile to mention, viz. ſuch as baths afford; and likewiſe the purgations of inanimate bodies, by means of the fuller's art, and the whole art of adorning the body, which occaſions attention to things of a trifling nature,—all theſe appear to be allotted many and ridiculous names.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. Entirely ſo, indeed, Theætetus. But the order of reaſoning cares neither more nor leſs, whether wiping with a ſponge purifies in a ſmall degree, but the drinking a medicine is more advantageous to us, by the purification it affords. For, that it may underſtand all arts, by endeavouring to apprehend what is allied, and what not, it equally honours the ſeveral arts, and is of opinion that ſome are not more ridiculous than others according to ſimilitude. It likewiſe conſiders hunting, effected through military diſcipline, as in no reſpect more venerable than ſearching after vermin, but for the moſt part more futile. And now, indeed, which was what you aſked, we have comprehended in one name all the powers which are allotted the purification either of an animated or inanimate body; but it is of no conſequence to the preſent diſputation what name may appear to be more becoming, if it be only placed ſeparate from the purgations of the ſoul, and include

in itſelf all ſuch things as purify the body. For the order of reaſoning now endeavours to ſeparate the purification of the dianoëtic part from other purgations, if we underſtand what it wiſhes to accompliſh.

THEÆ. But I do underſtand, and I grant that there are two ſpecies of purification; one ſpecies reſpecting the ſoul, and the other, which is ſeparate from this, reſpecting the body.

GUEST. You ſpeak in the moſt beautiful manner. Attend to me, therefore, in what follows, and endeavour to give a twofold diviſion to what has been ſaid.

THEÆ. Wherever you may lead, I will endeavour to diſtribute in conjunction with you.

GUEST. Do we not ſay, then, that depravity in the ſoul is ſomething different from virtue?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And we likewiſe ſaid, that purification conſiſts in rejecting what is depraved, and preſerving what remains.

THEÆ. We did ſay ſo.

GUEST. So far, therefore, as we ſhall diſcover an ablation of depravity in the ſoul, we ought to call it purgation.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Two ſpecies of depravity in the ſoul muſt be eſtabliſhed.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. The one is like diſeaſe in the body, but the other reſembles inherent baſeneſs.

THEÆ. I do not underſtand you.

GUEST. Perhaps you do not think that diſeaſe is the ſame with ſedition.

THEÆ. Again, I am not able to anſwer this queſtion.

GUEST. Whether do you think ſedition is any thing elſe than the corruption of natural alliance through a certain diſcord?

THEÆ. It is nothing elſe.

GUEST. And is baſeneſs any thing elſe than entire deformity, ariſing from the immoderation of things of one kind?

THEÆ. It is nothing elſe.

GUEST. What then, do we not ſee in the ſoul of the depraved that opinions

nions differ from deſires, anger from pleaſures, reaſon from pain, and all theſe from each other?

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But all theſe are neceſſarily allied to each other.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We ſhall ſpeak rightly, therefore, in calling depravity the ſedition and diſeaſe of the ſoul.

THEÆ. We ſhall ſpeak moſt rightly.

GUEST. But what, when we ſee ſuch things as participate of motion, and propoſe to themſelves a certain end, wander from and miſs the mark according to every impulſe, do we ſay that they are affected in this manner through ſymmetry to each other, or, on the contrary, through a privation of ſymmetry?

THEÆ. It is evident that this happens through a privation of ſymmetry.

GUEST. But we know that every ſoul is involuntarily ignorant of any thing.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But ignorance is nothing elſe than a delirium of the ſoul, which, while it is impelled to truth, wanders in its apprehenſion of things.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We muſt conſider, therefore, a ſoul involved in ignorance as baſe and deformed.

THEÆ. So it appears.

GUEST. It ſeems, therefore, that there are theſe two genera of evils in the ſoul; one of which is called by the multitude depravity, and is moſt evidently a diſeaſe.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But the other the multitude call ignorance, but they are unwilling to acknowledge that this is a vice in the ſoul.

THEÆ. It muſt by all means be granted, though when you juſt now ſpoke I was doubtful of it, that there are two genera of vice or depravity in the ſoul; and that we ought to conſider timidity, intemperance, injuſtice, and every thing elſe of this kind, as a diſeaſe in us; but the paſſion of abundant and all-various ignorance as baſeneſs.

GUEST.

GUEST. In the body, therefore, are there not two certain arts about theſe two paſſions?

THEÆ. What are theſe arts?

GUEST. About baſeneſs, gymnaſtic; but about diſeaſe, medicine.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. About inſolence, therefore, injuſtice, and timidity, is not chaſtizing juſtice naturally the moſt adapted of all arts?

THEÆ. It is likely, as I may ſay, according to human opinion.

GUEST. But, can any one ſay that there is a more proper remedy for all ignorance than erudition?

THEÆ. No one can.

GUEST. Muſt we ſay, therefore, that there is only one kind of erudition, or that there are more kinds than one? But take notice, that there are two greateſt genera of it.

THEÆ. I do take notice.

GUEST. And it appears to me that we ſhall very rapidly diſcover this.

THEÆ. In what manner?

GUEST. By perceiving that ignorance has a certain twofold diviſion. For, being twofold, it is evident that it neceſſarily requires a twofold mode of inſtruction, correſponding to the members of its diviſion.

THEÆ. What then? Is that apparent which is the object of your preſent inveſtigation?

GUEST. I perceive, indeed, a great and ponderous ſpecies of ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.

THEÆ. Of what kind is it?

GUEST. When he who is ignorant of a thing appears to himſelf to know it. For it appears that through this all the deceptions in our dianoëtic part take place.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And I think that to this ſpecies of ignorance alone the name of ruſticity ſhould be given.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. How, therefore, do you think that part of erudition ſhould be called which liberates from this ſpecies of ignorance?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I think, indeed, O gueſt, that the other part is denominated demiurgic erudition, but that this is called by us diſcipline.

GUEST. It is nearly ſo denominated, Theætetus, by all the Greeks. But this alſo muſt be conſidered by us, whether the whole of this is indiviſible, or poſſeſſes a certain diviſion which deſerves to be named.

THEÆ. It is requiſite to conſider this.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, to me, that this may be ſtill further divided.

THEÆ. According to what?

GUEST. Of the erudition which is effected by diſcourſe, one way appears to be more rough, and another part of it more ſmooth.

THEÆ. Of what kind do we call each of theſe?

GUEST. The one antient and paternal, which men formerly adopted towards their children, and many uſe at preſent, viz. as often as children do wrong, partly ſeverely reproving, and partly mildly admoniſhing them. But the whole of this may be called with the utmoſt propriety admonition.

THEÆ. It may ſo.

GUEST. But ſome are of opinion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himſelf wiſe is willing to learn thoſe things in which he conſiders himſelf as ſkilled; but that the admonitory ſpecies of diſcipline makes very ſmall advances with great labour.

THEÆ. And they think right.

GUEST. They likewiſe adopt another mode in order to diſcloſe this opinion.

THEÆ. What mode?

GUEST. By inquiring into thoſe particulars about which a man thinks he ſays ſomething to the purpoſe, when at the ſame time this is far from being the caſe. In the next place, they eaſily explore the opinions of thoſe that err, and, collecting them together by a reaſoning proceſs, render them the ſame with each other: and after this they evince that theſe opinions are contrary to themſelves, reſpecting the ſame things, with reference to the ſame, and according to the ſame. But thoſe whoſe opinions are thus explored, on ſeeing this, are indignant with themſelves, and become milder to others; and after this manner are liberated from mighty and rigid opinions; which liberation is of all others the moſt pleaſant to hear, and the moſt firm to him who is the ſubject of it. For, O beloved youth, thoſe that purify

theſe

theſe think in the ſame manner as phyſicians with reſpect to bodies. For phyſicians are of opinion, that the body cannot enjoy ſalubrious food till ſome one removes the impediments it contains. In like manner, theſe mental purifiers think that the ſoul can derive no advantage from diſciplines accommodated to its nature, till he who is confuted is aſhamed of his error, and, the impediments of diſciplines being expelled, viz. falſe opinions, he becomes pure, and alone thinks that he knows the things which he does know, and not more than he knows.

THEÆ. This is the beſt and the moſt modeſt of habits.

GUEST. Hence, Theætetus, we muſt ſay, that confutation [1] is the greateſt and the chief of all purifications; and that he who is not confuted, even though he ſhould be the great king himſelf, ſince he would be unpurified in things of the greateſt conſequence, will be rude and baſe with reſpect to thoſe things in which it is fit he ſhould be moſt pure and beautiful, who wiſhes to become truly happy.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But by whom ſhall we ſay this art is employed? For I am afraid to ſay it is uſed by the ſophiſts.

THEÆ. On what account?

GUEST. Leſt we ſhould honour them more than is fit.

THEÆ. But yet what has been juſt now ſaid appears to be adapted to a certain character of this kind.

GUEST. So likewiſe a wolf reſembles a dog, a moſt ſavage a moſt mild animal. But he who wiſhes to be free from deception ought to guard againſt ſimilitude above all things: for it is a genus of the greateſt lubricity. But, at the ſame time, let theſe things be admitted; for I think it is not proper to diſpute about ſmall terms, at a time when theſe ought to be carefully avoided.

THEÆ. It is not proper.

GUEST. Let, therefore, a ſpecies of the ſeparating art be cathartic: and let a part of the cathartic ſpecies be limited to the ſoul. But of this let a part be doctrinal; and of the doctrinal let diſcipline be a part. But of diſcipline,

[1] Plato here alludes to the third energy of the dialectic method, the end of which is a purification from twofold ignorance. See the Introduction to the Parmenides.

that confutation which takes place about a vain opinion of wiſdom ſhould be called, as it appears from our preſent diſcourſe, nothing elſe than that ſophiſtic art which is of a noble race.

THEÆ. It ſhould be ſo called. But I am dubious, what, out of many things which preſent themſelves, it is fit truly and ſtrenuouſly to call a ſophiſt.

GUEST. You are very properly dubious. But indeed it is proper to think, that even a ſophiſt himſelf will now very much doubt, by what means he may eſcape our arguments. For the proverb rightly ſays, It is not eaſy to avoid all things. Now, therefore, let us attack him with all our might.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. But, in the firſt place, let us ſtop as it were to take breath, and reaſon among ourſelves, at the ſame time mutually reſting when we are weary. Let us conſider, then, how many forms the ſophiſt aſſumes. For we appear from our firſt inveſtigation to have diſcovered, that he is a mercenary hunter of the youthful and rich.

THEÆ. We do ſo.

GUEST. But from our ſecond inveſtigation it appears, that he is a certain merchant in the diſciplines of the ſoul.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And did he not, in the third place, appear to be a huckſter about theſe ſame things?

THEÆ. He did. And did we not, in the fourth place, find him to be one who ſells us his own inventions?

GUEST. You properly remind me. But I will endeavour to remember the fifth particular. For, in the next place, we found him to be one who ſtrives in the agoniſtic exerciſe about diſcourſes, and who is defined from the art of contention.

THEÆ. We did ſo.

GUEST. The ſixth form is indeed ambiguous; but at the ſame time we muſt admit it, and grant that a ſophiſt is a purifier of ſuch opinions as are an impediment to diſciplines reſpecting the ſoul.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do you therefore perceive, that, when any one appears to poſſeſs a ſcientific

a ſcientific knowledge of many things, and is called by the name of one art, this is not a ſound phantaſm? It is indeed evident, that he who is thus affected with reſpect to any art cannot behold that particular thing to which all theſe diſciplines look. Hence he who poſſeſſes a multitude of diſciplines ſhould be called by many names, inſtead of one name.

THEÆ. This appears to be in the higheſt degree natural.

GUEST. Leſt, therefore, the ſame thing ſhould happen to us through indolence in this inveſtigation, let us repeat, in the firſt place, one of the things which we ſaid reſpecting the ſophiſt: for one of theſe appears to me eſpecially to indicate him.

THEÆ. Which of them?

GUEST. We ſaid that he was in a certain reſpect a contradictor.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And does he not alſo become a teacher of this to others?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us now, therefore, conſider, about what it is that ſophiſts ſay they make others contradictors. But let our conſideration from the beginning be as follows. With reſpect to divine things which are unapparent to the many, do ſophiſts ſufficiently impart the power of contradiction?

THEÆ. This is indeed aſſerted of them.

GUEST. But what with reſpect to things apparent, ſuch as earth and heaven, and the particulars pertaining to theſe?

THEÆ. What of them?

GUEST. For, in private converſations, when any thing is aſſerted in general reſpecting generation and eſſence, we ſay that the ſophiſts are ſkilled in contradicting, and that they are able to render others like themſelves.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But what, with reſpect to laws, and all political concerns, do they not alſo promiſe to make men contentious in theſe?

THEÆ. No one, as I may ſay, would diſcourſe with them unleſs they promiſed this.

GUEST. But writings containing ſuch contradictions as ought to be urged

againſt the profeſſors of the ſeveral arts, may every where be procured by him who wiſhes to learn the art of contradiction.

THEÆ. You appear to me to allude to the writings of Protagoras reſpecting wreſtling and the other arts.

GUEST. And to the writings of many others, O bleſſed man. But is not the art of contradicting, ſummarily a certain power, ſufficient to bring all things into controverſy?

THEÆ. It appears, therefore, that nearly nothing is omitted.

GUEST. But by the Gods, O boy, do you think this is poſſible? For perhaps you young men behold this more acutely, but we more dully.

THEÆ. In what reſpect? and why do you particularly aſſert this? For I do not underſtand your preſent queſtion.

GUEST. I aſked, if it were poſſible for any one man to know all things.

THEÆ. If it were poſſible, our race, O gueſt, would be bleſſed.

GUEST. How, therefore, can any one deſtitute of ſcience be able, by contradicting, to urge any thing found againſt him who is endued with ſcience?

THEÆ. He cannot in any reſpect.

GUEST. What then is it which will be wonderful in the ſophiſtic power?

THEÆ. About what?

GUEST. The manner by which ſophiſts are able to produce an opinion in young men, that they are the wiſeſt of all men in all things? For it is evident that, unleſs they contradicted rightly, or at leaſt appeared to do ſo to young men, and, when appearing to do ſo, unleſs they were conſidered to be more wiſe through their contentions, they would be without employment, and, as you ſaid, no one would give them money to become their diſciple.

THEÆ. Doubtleſs no one would.

GUEST. But now men are willing to do this.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. For I think the ſophiſts appear to have a ſcientific knowledge of thoſe particulars about which they employ contradiction.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But do they employ contradiction in all things? Shall we ſay ſo?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. They appear, therefore, to their diſciples to be wiſe in all things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But yet they are not: for this ſeems to be impoſſible.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. A ſophiſt, therefore, appears to us to poſſeſs doxaſtic, and not true ſcience, about all things.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo. And what has been now ſaid, reſpecting ſophiſts, ſeems to be moſt rightly ſaid.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, aſſume a clearer paradigm reſpecting them.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. This. But endeavour to attend to what I ſay, and anſwer me in the beſt manner you are able.

THEÆ. Of what kind is the paradigm?

GUEST. Juſt as if any one ſhould aſſert that he neither ſays any thing, nor contradicts, but that he makes and cauſes all things to be known by one art.

THEÆ. What is your meaning in all this?

GUEST. You are obviouſly ignorant of the beginning of what is ſaid: for, as it ſeems, you do not underſtand the word *all*.

THEÆ. I do not.

GUEST. I ſay then that you and I are in the number of all things, and beſides us, other animals and trees.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. If any one ſhould aſſert that he would make you and me, and all other living things.

THEÆ. Of what making do you ſpeak? For you do not mean a huſbandman, becauſe the artificer you mention is a maker of animals.

GUEST. I do ſay ſo. And beſides this, he is the maker of the ſea, the earth, the heavens, the Gods, and all other things. And as he rapidly makes each of theſe, ſo he ſells each for a ſmall price.

THEÆ. You ſpeak in jeſt.

GUEST. What then? May not he alſo be ſaid to jeſt, who aſſerts that he knows all things, and profeſſes himſelf able to teach another all things, for a ſmall ſum of money, and in a ſhort time?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But have you any ſpecies of jeſting more artificial and agreeable than the imitative?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I have not. For you have mentioned a very ample ſpecies, which comprehends all things in one, and is nearly moſt various.

GUEST. Do we not, therefore, know that he who profeſſes himſelf able to make all things by one art, in conſequence of fabricating imitations and homonyms of things, by the art of painting, is able to deceive ſtupid young men and boys, by ſhowing them his pictures at a diſtance, and induce them to believe that he is ſufficient to effect whatever he pleaſes?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what as to diſcourſes, will it not appear to us that there is another certain art reſpecting theſe, by which ſeducers, as if employing certain incantations, are able to draw young men far away from the truth, by bewitching their ears with their diſcourſes, and exhibiting to them images of every thing, inſtead of realities; ſo as to cauſe themſelves to appear to ſpeak the truth, and to be the wiſeſt of all men in all things?

THEÆ. Why ſhould there not be another certain art of this kind?

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, neceſſary, Theætetus, that many of thoſe who then hear theſe things, after through the courſe of time they have arrived at the perfection of manhood, and conſider the things themſelves nigh at hand, and are compelled through paſſions clearly to handle realities, will then abandon their former opinions, and be induced to conſider thoſe things as ſmall, which once appeared to them to be great, thoſe things difficult which they once conſidered eaſy, and thus at length entirely ſubvert all the phantaſms produced by diſcourſe, through the works which take place in actions?

THEÆ. It appears ſo to me, as far as my age is capable of judging. For I am of opinion, that as yet I rank among thoſe who are far diſtant from the truth.

GUEST. All we, therefore, who are preſent will endeavour to aſſiſt you. And now we ſhall endeavour, free from paſſion, to approach as near as poſſible to the truth. With reſpect to a ſophiſt, then, inform me whether this is clear, that he ranks among enchanters, being an imitator of things? or muſt we yet doubt whether he poſſeſſes in reality the ſciences of thoſe things reſpecting which he appears able to contradict?

THEÆ. But how can we doubt this, O gueſt? For it is nearly evident from what has been ſaid that he is one of thoſe who participate parts of erudition.

GUEST.

GUEST. He muſt be conſidered, therefore, as a certain enchanter and mimic.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Come then: for we muſt now no longer drop our prey; as we have now nearly encloſed the ſophiſt in a certain net of reaſoning; ſo that he cannot hereafter eſcape from this.

THEÆ. From what?

GUEST. That he is one of thoſe who work miracles.

THEÆ. This alſo is my opinion reſpecting him.

GUEST. It ſeems, therefore, that we ſhould divide with the utmoſt celerity the image producing art; and that, entering into it, if the ſophiſt evidently waits for us, we ſhould apprehend him conformably to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit our prey to the king: but that, if he enters into the parts of the imitative art, we ſhould follow him, always dividing the part which receives him, till we apprehend him. For neither will he, nor any other genus, ever be able to fly from him who can purſue every particular through all things according to method.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well. And in this manner, therefore, we muſt act.

GUEST. According to the ſuperior mode of diviſion, I now appear to myſelf to ſee two ſpecies of the imitative art; but in which of theſe we ſhould place the idea which is the object of our inveſtigation, it does not yet appear to me poſſible to know.

THEÆ. But firſt of all inform me by diviſion what theſe two ſpecies are.

GUEST. I ſee that one indeed is the aſſimilative [1] art. But this eſpecially takes place, when any one according to the commenſurations of a paradigm, in length, depth, and breadth, and beſides this by the addtiion of convenient colours, gives birth to a reſemblance.

THEÆ. What then, do not all thoſe that imitate any thing endeavour to do this?

GUEST. Not ſuch as faſhion or paint any great work. For, if they ſhould impart the true ſymmetry of things beautiful, you know that the upper parts would appear ſmaller than is fit, and the lower parts greater, in conſequence of the former being ſeen by us at a diſtance, and the latter nigh at hand.

[1] See the Notes to the tenth book of the Republic.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do not therefore artiſts, bidding farewell to truth, neglect real ſymmetry, and accommodate to images ſuch commenſurations as are only apparently beautiful?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, juſt to call the one ſpecies, ſince it is a likeneſs, an image?

THEÆ. Perfectly ſo.

GUEST. And is it not juſt to call the other ſpecies aſſimilative?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. We muſt, therefore, call the other part of the imitative art, as we ſaid above, aſſimilative.

THEÆ. We muſt ſo call it.

GUEST. But what ſhall we call that which appears indeed ſimilar to the beautiful, but, when inſpected by him who is endued with a power ſufficient for the purpoſe, is found not to reſemble that to which it appears to be ſimilar? Muſt we not call it a phantaſm, ſince it appears to be but is not ſimilar?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Is not this part abundantly to be found in painting, and in the whole of the imitative art?

THEÆ. It is impoſſible it ſhould not.

GUEST. But may we not with the greateſt rectitude call that art which produces a phantaſm, and not an image, phantaſtic?

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. I have already, therefore, ſaid that theſe were two ſpecies of the image-producing art, viz. the aſſimilative and phantaſtic.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But neither am I able now to ſee clearly, that of which I was then dubious, viz. in which of theſe ſpecies the ſophiſt is to be placed. For this is truly a wonderful man; and it is extremely difficult to diſcern him; ſince even now, in a very excellent and elegant manner, he has fled into a ſpecies which it is almoſt impoſſible to inveſtigate.

THEÆ. It ſeems ſo.

GUEST. Do you then aſſent to this in conſequence of underſtanding it?

or

or does a certain uſual impetus ariſing from diſcourſe induce you to a rapid coincidence of ſentiment?

THEÆ. How, and with a view to what, do you ſay this?

GUEST. O bleſſed man, we are truly engaged in a ſpeculation perfectly difficult. For that this thing ſhould appear and ſeem to be, and yet is not; and that a man ſhould aſſert certain things, and yet not ſuch as are true,—all theſe things have always been ſubjects of the greateſt doubt in former times, and are ſo at preſent. For it follows, that he who ſpeaks in this manner muſt either ſpeak falſely, or be of opinion that ſuch things truly are; and thus ſpeaking, Theætetus, it is extremely difficult for him not to contradict himſelf.

THEÆ. Why ſo?

GUEST. Becauſe ſuch a mode of ſpeaking dares to admit that non-being is: for otherwiſe it would not be falſe, which it is. But the great Parmenides, O boy, while we were yet boys, both from the firſt and to the end, rejected this mode of ſpeaking. For, both in proſe and verſe, he every where ſpeaks as follows: "Non-beings can never, nor by any means, be. But do thou, when inquiring, reſtrain thy conceptions from this path." The truth of this, therefore, is teſtified by him, and this aſſertion will the moſt of all things become evident, if moderately diſcuſſed. Let us, therefore, if it is not diſagreeable to you, conſider this in the firſt place.

THEÆ. You may do as you pleaſe with reſpect to me. But do you conſider what it is beſt to inveſtigate, and in this path lead me.

GUEST. It will be proper ſo to do. Tell me, then: Dare we to pronounce that which in no reſpect is?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible we ſhould not?

GUEST. Not for the ſake of contention, therefore, nor jeſting, but ſeriouſly, every one who hears us ought to join with us in conſidering the import of this word *non-being*. But can we think that he who is aſked this queſtion would know where to turn himſelf, or how to ſhow what non-being is?

THEÆ. You aſk a difficult queſtion, and to me, as I may ſay, entirely impervious.

GUEST. This, however, is evident, that non-being cannot be attributed to any thing which ranks among beings.

THEÆ. For how could it?

GUEST. Since, therefore, it cannot be attributed to being, neither can any one rightly attribute it to any thing.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

GUEST. This alſo is evident to us, that this word *ſomething* is every where predicated of a certain being. For it is impoſſible to ſpeak of it alone, as if it were naked and ſolitary with reſpect to all beings.

THEÆ. It is impoſſible.

GUEST. Thus conſidering, therefore, muſt you not agree with me, that he who ſpeaks of ſomething muſt neceſſarily ſpeak of one certain thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. For you would ſay, that the word *ſomething* is a ſign of one thing, and that *certain-things* is a ſign of many things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But it is moſt neceſſary, as it appears, that he who ſpeaks of that which is not ſomething muſt entirely ſpeak of nothing.

THEÆ. This is moſt neceſſary.

GUEST. Muſt it not therefore follow, that neither this is to be granted, that he who ſpeaks of ſomething ſpeaks of that which is not even one thing, or nothing? But neither muſt we ſay that he ſpeaks who endeavours to enunciate non-being.

THEÆ. The doubts, therefore, in which our diſcourſe is involved ſhould come to an end.

GUEST. You do not as yet ſpeak of ſomething great. For, O bleſſed man, the greateſt and firſt of doubts ſtill remains about theſe things: for it is a doubt which takes place about the principle of non-being.

THEÆ. Tell me how, and do not be remiſs.

GUEST. To that which is, ſomething elſe belonging to beings may happen.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But ſhall we ſay, that any thing belonging to beings can ever be preſent to that which is not?

THEÆ. How can we?

GUEST. But do we not rank the whole of number among beings?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly, if we rank any thing elſe among beings.

GUEST. We ſhould, therefore, neither attempt to attribute the multitude of number, nor *the one*, to non-being.

THEÆ. Reaſon ſhows that we cannot with propriety.

GUEST. How, therefore, can any one enunciate by the mouth, or altogether comprehend by the dianoëtic power, non-beings, or non-being ſeparate from number?

THEÆ. Tell me why not.

GUEST. When we ſay non-beings, do we not endeavour to adjoin the multitude of number?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And when we ſay non-being, do we not endeavour to adjoin *the one?*

THEÆ. Moſt clearly ſo.

GUEST. And beſides this we ſay, that it is neither juſt nor right to endeavour to adapt being to non-being.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. Do you not, therefore, perceive, that non-being can neither be rightly enunciated, nor ſpoken, nor yet be cogitated, itſelf by itſelf, but that it is incomprehenſible by thought, ineffable, non-vocal, and irrational?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Did I, therefore, juſt now ſpeak falſely when I ſaid, that I could produce the greateſt doubt reſpecting it?

THEÆ. What then, can we mention any doubt greater than this?

GUEST. Do you not ſee, O wonderful youth, from what has been ſaid, that non-being leads him who confutes it into ſuch perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it he is compelled to contradict himſelf?

THEÆ. How do you ſay? Speak yet clearer.

GUEST. There is no occaſion to conſider any thing clearer in me. For, when I adopted the poſition, that non-being ought to participate neither of *the one*, nor of *many*, both a little before, and now, I employed the term *the one*. For I enunciated non-being. Do you perceive this?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And again, a little before, I ſaid that non-being was non-vocal, ineffable, and irrational. Do you apprehend me?

THEÆ. I do. For how is it poſſible I ſhould not?

GUEST. When, therefore, I endeavoured to adapt being to non-being, did I not aſſert things contrary to what I had before advanced?

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. And in conſequence of attributing this to it, did I not ſpeak of it as one thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And beſides this, while I called it irrational, ineffable, and non-vocal, did we not make theſe aſſertions as pertaining to one thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For we have ſaid, that he who ſpeaks of non-being in a proper manner, ought neither to define it as one, nor many, nor give it any appellation whatever: for it is impoſſible to denominate it, without at the ſame time calling it one thing.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. What then will ſome one ſay of me? For, both formerly and now, he will find me vanquiſhed in this contention reſpecting non-being. So that, as I have already ſaid, you muſt not expect me to ſpeak properly on this ſubject. But come, let us now conſider this affair in you.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Endeavour in a becoming and generous manner, as being a young man, and with all your might, to aſſert ſomething about non-being, conformable to right reaſon, without adding to it either eſſence, or *the one*, or the multitude of number.

THEÆ. It certainly would be great raſhneſs in me to engage in a conteſt in which you have been vanquiſhed.

GUEST. But, if it is agreeable to you, we will diſmiſs you and me; and till we meet with ſome one who is able to accompliſh this, we will ſay that a ſophiſt more than any other perſon conceals himſelf in an impervious place.

THEÆ. Very much ſo, indeed.

GUEST. If, therefore, we ſhould ſay that he poſſeſſed a certain phantaſtic art from this uſe of words, he would eaſily attack us, and turn the diſcourſe to the very contrary of what is aſſerted. For, while we call him a maker of

images,

images, he will immediately aſk us what we aſſert an image to be. Conſider therefore, Theætetus, what anſwer we ſhould give to this queſtion of the ſophiſt.

THEÆ. It is evident we ſhould ſay that images are ſuch things as are ſeen in water and mirrors, and beſides this, ſuch things as are painted and carved, and every thing elſe of this kind.

GUEST. It ſeems, Theætetus, that you have never ſeen a ſophiſt.

THEÆ. Why ſo?

GUEST. He would appear to you to wink, or to be entirely deprived of eyes.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. He would laugh at you for anſwering him by appearances in mirrors, and by pictures and carvings, when you ſpeak to him as being yourſelf endued with ſight; and he will pretend that he knows nothing about mirrors, or water, or even ſight itſelf, but that he alone interrogates you about this one thing.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. That which in all the particulars you have mentioned you think fit to call by one name, pronouncing the word image in all of them, as being one thing. Speak, therefore, and give aſſiſtance, and do not yield to the man.

THEÆ. But what, O gueſt, can we ſay an image is, except that which, being itſelf ſomething different, approaches to a true ſimilitude to another thing?

GUEST. When you ſay an image is ſomething different, do you mean that it is truly different, or do you aſſert this of ſomething elſe?

THEÆ. It is by no means truly different, but only appears to be ſo, or is ſimilar.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, call real being that which is true?

THEÆ. I do.

GUEST. But is not that which is not true contrary to the true?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. When, therefore, you ſay that which is ſimilar is at the ſame time not true, you aſſert that it is not. It has however a being.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. You ſay that it truly *is* not.

THEÆ. It certainly *is* not; but it is truly an image.

GUEST. That, therefore, which we called an image of being, is not truly being, and that which is not truly being, truly is.

THEÆ. Non-being appears to poſſeſs a certain connection of this kind with being, and that in a very wonderful manner.

GUEST. How is it poſſible it ſhould not appear wonderful? You now, therefore, perceive that the many-headed ſophiſt, through this alternation, compels us unwillingly to confeſs that *non-being* in a certain reſpect *is*.

THEÆ. I ſee it, and very much ſo.

GUEST. How, then, ſhall we define this art, ſo that we may be conſiſtent with ourſelves?

THEÆ. What is it you are afraid of, that you ſpeak in this manner?

GUEST. When we ſaid that he was a deceiver about a phantaſm, and that his art was a certain deception, whether ſhall we ſay that our ſoul then opined falſely, through his art; or what ſhall we ſay?

THEÆ. This very thing. For what elſe can we ſay?

GUEST. But is falſe opinion that which opines things contrary to things which are?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. You ſay, therefore, that falſe opinion opines things which are not.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. Whether does it opine that non-beings are not, or that things which have no ſubſiſtence whatever, in a certain reſpect are?

THEÆ. If any one is ever deceived, and in the ſmalleſt degree, it is neceſſary he ſhould opine that non-beings in a certain reſpect are.

GUEST. And will he not alſo opine, that things which entirely are, in no reſpect are?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And this alſo falſely?

THEÆ. And this too.

GUEST. And falſe ſpeech, in my opinion, will think after the ſame manner, aſſerting that beings are not, and that non-beings are.

THEÆ. For how can it otherwiſe become falſe?

GUEST. Nearly, no otherwiſe. But the ſophiſt will not ſay ſo. For by what poſſible device can any one of a ſound mind admit the things which have

have been previouſly granted, ſince they are non-vocal, ineffable, irrational, and incomprehenſible by the dianoëtic power? Do we underſtand what the ſophiſt ſays, Theætetus?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible we ſhould not? For he ſays that our former aſſertions are contrary to the preſent, ſince we have falſely dared to aſſert that non-being ſubſiſts in opinion and diſcourſe. He likewiſe adds, that we have often been compelled to adapt being to non-being, though we have juſt now acknowledged, that this is in a certain reſpect the moſt impoſſible of all things.

GUEST. You rightly recollect. But we ſhould now conſult what we ought to do reſpecting the ſophiſt. For, if we ſhould attempt to inveſtigate him, by placing him in the art of deceivers and enchanters, you ſee that many doubts will ariſe.

THEÆ. Many, indeed.

GUEST. We have, therefore, only diſcuſſed a ſmall part of them, ſince they are, as I may ſay, innumerable.

THEÆ. But if this is the caſe, it appears to be impoſſible to apprehend a ſophiſt.

GUEST. What then, ſhall we thus effeminately deſiſt from our undertaking?

THEÆ. I ſay we ought not, if there is the leaſt poſſibility of apprehending this man.

GUEST. You will, therefore, pardon, and, as you juſt now ſaid, be ſatisfied, if we make but a ſmall proficiency in ſo arduous an affair.

THEÆ. How is it poſſible I ſhould not?

GUEST. I, therefore, in a ſtill greater degree requeſt this of you.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That you do not think I am become, as it were, a certain parricide.

THEÆ. Why do you requeſt this?

GUEST. Becauſe it will be neceſſary for us to examine with our opponents the diſcourſe of our father Parmenides, and to compel non-being in a certain reſpect to be, and again being, in a certain reſpect not to be.

THEÆ. It appears that a thing of this kind muſt be contended for in our diſcourſe.

GUEST. For how is it poſſible this ſhould not appear, and, as it is ſaid,

even

even to a blind man? For, while theſe things are neither confuted, nor aſſented to, no one can ſpeak either about falſe aſſertions, or about opinion, whether reſpecting reſemblances, or images, or imitations, or phantaſms, or of the arts converſant with theſe, without being ridiculous in conſequence of being compelled to contradict himſelf.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

GUEST. Hence, we muſt dare to oppoſe the paternal diſcourſe; or we muſt entirely diſmiſs it, if a certain ſluggiſhneſs reſtrains us from oppoſing it.

THEÆ. But nothing will in any reſpect hinder us from oppoſing it.

GUEST. I ſtill, therefore, requeſt a third, and a trifling thing of you.

THEÆ. Only ſay what it is.

GUEST. I juſt now ſaid that I was always wearied in the confutation of things of this kind, and that I am ſo at preſent.

THEÆ. You did ſay ſo.

GUEST. I am afraid leſt I ſhould appear to you to be inſane, in conſequence of what I have ſaid, and from immediately transferring myſelf upwards and downwards. For we ſhall enter on the confutation of the paternal diſcourſe, for your ſake, if we happen to confute it.

THEÆ. As you will not, therefore, by any means be conſidered by me as acting in a diſorderly manner by entering on this confutation, and demonſtration, on this account engage boldly in this affair.

GUEST. Come then, whence ſhall we begin this very dangerous diſcourſe? For it appears, O boy, to be moſt neceſſary for us to proceed in the following path.

THEÆ. What is that path?

GUEST. That we ſhould firſt of all conſider thoſe things which now appear to be clear, leſt we immediately deſiſt from our undertaking, deterred by its difficulty; and that we ſhould proceed in an eaſy manner, by mutually aſſenting to each other, as if we were engaged in a ſubject which may be eaſily diſcuſſed.

THEÆ. Speak more clearly.

GUEST. Parmenides appears to me to have ſpoken with eaſe, and whoever elſe has attempted to determine the number and quality of beings.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. It ſeems to me that each of them has related a fable to us, as being

boys.

boys. One of them, by aſſerting that the things which have a ſubſiſtence are three [1]; but that ſome of them ſometimes oppoſe each other in a hoſtile manner; and at other times becoming friends, unite in marriage, bring forth, and adminiſter aliment to their offspring. But another of theſe ſays that beings are only two, viz. the moiſt and the dry, or the hot and the cold; and theſe he aſſociates with each other. But the Eleatic ſect among us, which derives its origin from Zenophanes, and from others ſtill prior to him, by denominating all things one, diſcuſſes its doctrines in fables. But the Iades [2], and certain Sicilian muſes poſterior to theſe, have thought it more ſafe to connect theſe with each other, and to ſay that being is both many and one, but is held together by ſtrife and friendſhip [3]. For that which is diſcordant always unites with ſomething elſe, as the more vehement muſes aſſert. But the more effeminate muſes always looſen *the many* from *the one*; and aſſert that the univerſe is alternately one, and in friendſhip with itſelf, through Venus; and many, and hoſtile to itſelf, through a certain ſtrife. But with reſpect to all theſe aſſertions, whether they are true or falſe, to oppoſe ſuch illuſtrious and antient men is difficult and raſh. This, however, may be aſſerted without envy.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That they very much deſpiſed us who rank among the multitude. For each of them finiſhes his own work, without being at all concerned whether we can follow them in what they aſſert.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

[1] Of the antient philoſophers that phyſiologized, ſome ſaid that the firſt beings were three in number, *the hot* and *the cold* as extremes, but *the moiſt* as the medium, which ſometimes conciliates the extremes, and ſometimes not; but they did not place *the dry* in the rank of a principle, becauſe they thought it ſubſiſted either from a privation or a concretion of moiſture. On the other hand, the followers of Anaxagoras aſſerted that there were four elements, two of which, viz. *heat* and *cold*, ranked as agents, but the other two, *dryneſs* and *moiſture*, as patients. Heraclitus and Empedocles aſſerted that there is one matter of the univerſe, but different qualities, with which this matter ſometimes accords, and at others is diſſonant. Heraclitus, however, was of opinion that the world, together with a certain diſcordant concord, was nearly always ſimilar, though not entirely the ſame: for all things are in a continual flux. But Empedocles aſſerted that the ſubſtance of the world remained the ſame, but that in one age all things were diſſolved into chaos through diſcord, and in another were adorned through concord.

[2] Viz. the Ionians. [3] This was the doctrine of Empedocles.

GUEST. When any one of them aſſerts that *the many* is, or was, or is generated, or that this is the caſe with two or one, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, externally adducing for this purpoſe ſeparations and concretions,—by the Gods, Theætetus, do you underſtand what they mean by each of theſe aſſertions? Indeed, when I was younger, I was confident that I accurately underſtood that of which we are now dubious, when any one ſpoke of non-being; but now you ſee in what difficulties we are involved through doubting about it.

THEÆ. I do ſee.

GUEST. Perhaps, therefore, receiving in no leſs a degree the ſame paſſion in our ſoul reſpecting being, we ſay that it is eaſy to underſtand it when it is enunciated by any one, but that this cannot be aſſerted of non-being, though we are ſimilarly affected with reſpect to both.

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. And this very ſame thing has been ſaid by us reſpecting the other particulars which we mentioned before.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We will conſider, therefore, after this reſpecting many things, if it is agreeable to you; but let us now firſt ſpeculate about that which is the greateſt and principal thing.

THEÆ. Of what are you ſpeaking? Or do you ſay that we ought in the firſt place to inveſtigate being, and conſider what they aſſert who are thought to evince ſomething about it?

GUEST. You clearly apprehend me, Theætetus. For I ſay that we ought to proceed in the ſame manner as if thoſe I juſt now mentioned were preſent, and to interrogate them as follows: Ye who aſſert that the hot and the cold, or any two ſuch things, are all things, what is it you affirm to ſubſiſt in both theſe, when you ſay that both are, and that each is? What are we to underſtand by this term of yours *to be?* Is it a third thing different from thoſe two, and are we to eſtabliſh three things as conſtituting the all, and no longer two things, according to your hypotheſis? For, while you call either of the two *being*, you cannot ſay that both ſimilarly *are*. For each would nearly be one thing, and not two.

THEÆ. You ſpeak the truth.

GUEST. Are you, therefore, willing to call both of them being?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But, O friends, we ſhall ſay, thus alſo you will moſt clearly call two things one.

THEÆ. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. Since, therefore, we are thus involved in doubt, will you ſufficiently unfold to us what you wiſh to ſignify when you pronounce *being?* For it is evident that you have had a knowledge of theſe things for ſome time paſt: but we, indeed, at firſt thought we knew them, but now we are dubious. Inſtruct us, therefore, firſt of all in this, that we may not think we learn the things aſſerted by you, when the very contrary to this takes place. By ſpeaking in this manner, and making this requeſt, both to theſe, and to ſuch others as aſſert that *the all* is more than one thing, ſhall we, O boy, err?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But what with reſpect to thoſe who aſſert that *the all* is one, ought we not to inquire of them, to the utmoſt of our power, what they call *being?*

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. To this queſtion, therefore, they may anſwer: Do you ſay there is one thing alone? We do ſay ſo. Or will they not ſpeak in this manner?

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST. What then, do you call *being* any thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. Do you call it *the one*[1], employing two names reſpecting the ſame thing? Or how do you ſay?

THEÆ.

[1] Plato here dividing *the one* and *being* from each other, and ſhowing that the conception of *the one* is different from that of *being*, evinces that what is moſt properly and primarily one is exempt from *the one being*. For *the one being* does not abide purely in an unmultiplied and uniform hyparxis. But *the one* withdraws itſelf from all addition; ſince by adding any thing to it you diminiſh its ſupreme and ineffable union. It is neceſſary, therefore, to arrange *the one* prior to *the one being*, and to ſuſpend the latter from the former. For, if *the one* in no reſpect differs from *the one being*, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be poſſible to name things, leſt there ſhould be two things, the thing itſelf, and the name. For all multitude being taken away, and all diviſion, there will neither be a name of any thing, nor any diſcourſe about it, but the name will appear to be the ſame with the thing. Nor yet will a name be the name of a thing, but a name will be the name of a name, if a thing is the ſame with a name, and a name the

THEÆ. What anſwer will they give to theſe things, O gueſt?

GUEST. It is evident, Theætetus, that he who lays down this hypotheſis will not be able with perfect eaſe to anſwer the preſent queſtion, or any other whatever.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. To acknowledge that there are two names, while eſtabliſhing nothing but one thing, is ridiculous.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And this alſo is ridiculous, to aſſent in every reſpect to him who aſſerts that there is a name to a thing of which no account can be given.

THEÆ. In what manner?

GUEST. He who eſtabliſhes a name different from a thing, ſpeaks of two certain things.

THEÆ. He does.

GUEST. And beſides this, if he aſſerts that a name is the ſame with a thing, he is either compelled to ſay that it is the name of nothing; or, if he ſays it is the name of ſomething, it muſt happen that a name is alone the name of a name, but of nothing elſe.

THEÆ. It muſt ſo.

GUEST. And *the one* muſt be *the one being* alone of *one*, and this muſt be *the one being* of a name.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. But what, do they ſay that which is a whole is different from one being, or the ſame with it?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly, they will and do ſay ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, a whole is, as Parmenides [1] ſays, "that which is every

ſame with a thing; and a thing alſo will be a thing of a thing. For all the ſame things will take place about a thing as about a name, through the union of thing and name. If theſe things, therefore, are abſurd, both *the one* and *being* have a ſubſiſtence, and *being* participates of *the one*. And hence *the one* is not the ſame as *the one being*. See the Introduction and Notes to the Parmenides.

[1] The following extract from the Commentaries of Simplicius on Ariſtotle's Phyſics, p. 31, contains an admirable account of the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the firſt being:

"That Parmenides did not conſider *the one being*, το ἐν ον, to be any thing among things generated and corrupted, is evident from his aſſerting that *the one* is unbegotten and incorruptible. And, in ſhort, he was far from thinking that it is corporeal, ſince he ſays it is indiviſible; for thus he

every where ſimilar to the bulk of a perfect ſphere, entirely poſſeſſing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more ſtable than this:"— if this be the caſe, it is neceſſary that being ſhould have a middle and an extremity.

he ſpeaks: 'nor is it diviſible, ſince the whole is ſimilar.' Hence, neither can what he ſays be adapted to the heavens, according to the aſſertions of ſome, as we are informed by Eudemus, who were led to this opinion from that verſe of Parmenides,

παντοθεν ευκυκλου σφαιρης εναλιγκιον ογκῳ,

i. e. 'on all ſides ſimilar to the bulk of a perfect ſphere:' for the heavens are not indiviſible, nor a ſphere ſimilar to that which Parmenides mentions, though they form a ſphere the moſt accurate of all ſuch as are phyſical. It is alſo evident that neither does Parmenides call *the one being* pſychical, becauſe he ſays that it is immovable; for the pſychical eſſence, according to the Eleatics, poſſeſſes motion. He likewiſe ſays, that the whole of this *one being* is preſent at once, επει νυν εστιν ὁμου παν, and that it ſubſiſts according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner.

Ταυτον εν ταυτῳ τε μενον, καθ' ἑαυτο τε κειται.

'Same in the ſame abides, and by itſelf ſubſiſts.' And it is evident that it poſſeſſes the whole at once, and according to the ſame, in eſſence, power, and energy, ſince it is beyond a pſychical hypoſtaſis. Neither does he ſay that it is intellectual: for that which is intellectual ſubſiſts according to a ſeparation from the intelligible, and a converſion to it. But, according to him, in *the one being* intellection, intelligible, and intellect, are the ſame: for thus he writes—

Ταυτον δε εστι νοειν τε, και ου ενεκεν εστι νοημα.

i. e. 'Intellection, and that for the ſake of which intellectual conception ſubſiſts, are the ſame.' He adds, ου γαρ ανευ του εοντος, 'for it is not without *being*,' i. e. the intelligible, in which, ſays he, you will find intellection has not a ſubſiſtence ſeparate from being. Further ſtill, the intellectual is ſeparated into forms, as the intelligible pre-aſſumes unitedly, or, in other words, cauſally comprehends the ſeparation of forms. But where there is ſeparation, there difference ſubſiſts, and where this is, there non-being alſo is at the ſame time apparent. Parmenides however entirely exterminates non-being from being: for he ſays, 'non beings never are, nor do they ſubſiſt in any reſpect; but do thou, inveſtigating in this path, reſtrain thy intellectual conception.' Neither likewiſe, according to him, is *the one being* a thing of poſterior origin, ſubſiſting in our conceptions, from an ablation of ſenſibles; for this is neither unbegotten nor indeſtructible. Nor is it that which is common in things: for this is ſenſible, and belongs to things doxaſtic and deceitful, about which he afterwards ſpeaks. Beſides, how could it be true to aſſert of this, that it is at once all things, or that it contracts in itſelf intellect and the intelligible? Shall we ſay, therefore, that he calls *the one being* an individual ſubſtance? But this indeed is more diſſonant. For an individual ſubſtance is generated, is diſtinguiſhed by difference, is material and ſenſible, and is different from accident. It is alſo diviſible and in motion. It remains, therefore, that the Parmenidean *one*

extremity. And having theſe, it muſt unavoidably have parts. Or how ſhall we ſay?

THEÆ. Juſt ſo.

GUEST. But, indeed, nothing hinders but that, when it is divided, it ſhould have the paſſion of *the one*, in all its parts, and that thus *the one* ſhould be every being, and a whole.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But is it not impoſſible that that which ſuffers theſe things ſhould be *the one?*

THEÆ. Why?

GUEST. Becauſe, according to right reaſon, that which is *truly one* ſhould be ſaid to be entirely without parts.

THEÆ. It muſt indeed neceſſarily be ſo.

GUEST. But ſuch a thing as we have juſt now mentioned, in conſequence of conſiſting of many parts, would not harmonize with *the one*.

THEÆ. I underſtand you.

GUEST. But whether will the whole having the paſſion of *the one*, be thus one, and a whole, or muſt we by no means ſay that *the one* is a whole?

THEÆ. You propoſe a difficult choice.

GUEST. You ſpeak moſt true. *For, ſince in a certain reſpect being is paſſive*

being muſt be the intelligible, the cauſe of all things: and hence it is intellect and intellection, in which all things are unitedly and contractedly comprehended according to one union, in which alſo there is one nature of *the one* and *being*. Hence Zeno ſays, that he who demonſtrates *the one* will likewiſe aſſign being, not as rejecting *the one*, but as ſubſiſting together with being. But all the above-mentioned concluſions accord with *the one being:* for it is without generation and indeſtructible, entire and only-begotten. For that which is prior to all ſeparation will not be ſecondary to any other being. To this likewiſe it pertains to be all things at once, and to have no connection with non-being. The undivided alſo, and the immovable according to every form of diviſion and motion, a ſubſiſtence perfectly uniform, and *termination*, for it is the *end* of all things, accord with this *one being*. If beſides it is that for the ſake of which intellection ſubſiſts, it is evidently intelligible: for intellection and intellect are for the ſake of the intelligible. And if intellection and the intelligible are the ſame in it, the tranſcendency of its union will be ineffable."

After this, Simplicius, in order to give credibility to what he has ſaid of Parmenides, and on account of the books of that philoſopher being very rare in his time, the ſixth century, has preſerved a conſiderable number of his verſes, which are well worthy the attention of the learned and philoſophical reader. He then adds as follows: "We muſt not wonder if Parmenides ſays that

paſſive to the one, it does not appear to be the ſame with the one, and all things will be more than one. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But likewiſe if *being* is a non-whole on account of its becoming paſſive to whole, but yet is whole itſelf, *being* in this caſe will happen to be indigent of itſelf.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And *being*, according to this reaſoning, ſince it is deprived of itſelf, will be *non-being*.

THEÆ. It will ſo.

GUEST. And thus again all things will be more than one, ſince being and the whole are allotted their proper nature, each ſeparate from the other.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And if the whole has in no reſpect a ſubſiſtence, theſe ſame things will take place with reſpect to *being*; and beſides, *being* not having a ſubſiſtence, neither will it at any time have been generated.

THEÆ. Why not?

GUEST. Whatever is generated is always generated a whole. So that he who does not place in the rank of beings, *the one* or the *whole*, ought neither to denominate eſſence, nor generation, as that which has a being.

that *the one being* is ſimilar to the bulk of a perfectly round ſphere: for, on account of his poetry, he touches on a certain mythological fiction. In what, therefore, does this differ from that aſſertion of Orpheus, It is of a white texture? And it is evident that ſome of the aſſertions of Parmenides accord with other things poſterior to being. Thus, for inſtance, the unbegotten and the indeſtructible are adapted to both ſoul and intellect; and the immovable and abiding in ſameneſs to intellect. But all the aſſertions at once, and genuinely underſtood, accord with *the one being*. For though according to a certain ſignification the ſoul is unbegotten, and alſo intellect, yet they are produced by the intelligible. Likewiſe this one or firſt being is properly immovable, in which motion is not ſeparated according to energy. An abiding in ſameneſs alſo properly pertains to being. But ſoul and much-honoured intellect proceed from that which abides, and are converted to it. It is likewiſe evident that ſuch things as are ſaid to pertain to being pre-ſubſiſt in it unitedly, but are unfolded from it with ſeparation. And it ſeems indeed that *the one being* is delivered by Parmenides as the firſt cauſe, ſince it is at once, one and all, and the laſt boundary. But if he does not ſimply call it *one*, but *the one being*, and only-begotten, and a boundary but finite, perhaps he indicates that the ineffable cauſe of all things is eſtabliſhed above it." Simplicius concludes with obſerving, that the objections both of Plato and Ariſtotle to the aſſertions of Parmenides are philanthropic, and were made by thoſe philoſophers to prevent his doctrine from being perverted.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It appears that this is entirely the caſe.

GUEST. Likewiſe, that which is not a whole ought not to be any quantum whatever. For, being a certain quantum, ſo far as it is ſo, it muſt neceſſarily be a whole.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, that every one will be involved in ten thouſand other inſoluble doubts, who ſays that *being* is alone either two or one.

THEÆ. This is nearly evident by the things which have juſt now been ſhown. For greater and more difficult doubts will always follow each other in a connected ſeries, reſpecting what has been above aſſerted.

GUEST. But we have not yet diſcuſſed the aſſertions of thoſe who accurately diſcourſe about *being* and *non-being*. At the ſame time, what we have already ſaid is ſufficient. But let us again conſider thoſe who ſpeak inaccurately about theſe, that we may perceive from all things, that it is in no reſpect more eaſy to ſay what *being* is, than what *non-being* is.

THEÆ. It will be, therefore, requiſite to conſider thoſe.

GUEST. Indeed, there appears to be among theſe a certain gigantic war as it were, through the doubts in which they are mutually involved reſpecting eſſence.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. Some of theſe draw down all things from heaven and the inviſible region to earth, ſeizing in *reality*, for this purpoſe, rocks and oaks. For, in conſequence of touching all ſuch things as theſe, they ſtrenuouſly contend that that alone has a being which can be ſeen and handled [1], and this they define to be body and eſſence. But if any one ſays that there are other things which are without a body, they perfectly deſpiſe the aſſertion, and are unwilling to hear of any thing that is not corporeal.

THEÆ. You ſpeak of *dire* men: but I alſo have frequently met with ſuch.

GUEST. On the contrary, the opponents of theſe men *very religiouſly* contend ſupernally from the inviſible region, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal ſpecies to be true eſſence: but by their arguments they

[1] Is not this the doctrine of thoſe who are called experimental philoſophers? If ſo, the fable of the Giants is unfolded in thoſe men.

break

break into ſmall pieces the bodies of the others, and that which is denominated by them truth, at the ſame time calling it flowing generation inſtead of eſſence. But *between theſe, Theætetus, an immenſe conteſt always ſubſiſted.*

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Let us now, therefore, receive from each a particular account of the eſſence eſtabliſhed by each.

THEÆ. But how can we receive it?

GUEST. From thoſe that place eſſence in forms we may eaſily receive it: for they are more mild. But from thoſe who violently draw all things to body we ſhall receive it more difficultly. And perhaps it will be nearly impoſſible to do ſo. It appears to me, however, that we ſhould act in the following manner with reſpect to them.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. It will be beſt, if poſſible, to make them in reality better: but if this is impoſſible, we muſt be content with making them ſo in our diſcourſe, and ſuppoſe them to anſwer more equitably than at preſent they would be willing to do. For that which is aſſented to by better men poſſeſſes more authority than that which is aſſented to by worſe men. However, we pay no attention to theſe things, but explore the truth.

THEÆ. Moſt right.

GUEST. Order them, therefore, as being made better to anſwer you, and to unfold the meaning of that which they aſſert.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. Do they, therefore, ſay, that what they call a mortal animal is any thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly they do.

GUEST. And do they not acknowledge that this is an animated body?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And, admitting this, do they alſo acknowledge that ſoul is ſomething?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. Do they likewiſe aſſert that one ſoul is juſt, and another unjuſt; and that one is wiſe, and another unwiſe?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But does not every ſoul become ſuch through the habit and

preſence of juſtice, and the contrary, through the habit and preſence of the contraries to theſe?

THEÆ. Theſe things alſo they will aſſent to.

GUEST. But will they ſay that that is altogether any thing, which is able to be preſent to and abſent from any thing?

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST. Since, therefore, juſtice is ſomething, and likewiſe prudence, and every other virtue, and the contraries to the virtues, together with ſoul in which theſe ſubſiſt, whether will they ſay that each of theſe is viſible and tangible, or that all of them are inviſible?

THEÆ. They will nearly aſſert that no one of theſe is viſible.

GUEST. But what? Will they ſay that any one of things of this kind has a body?

THEÆ. They will not give the ſame anſwer to the whole of this queſtion: but ſoul itſelf will appear to them to poſſeſs a certain body; but with reſpect to prudence, and the other things about which you juſt now inquired, they will be reſtrained by ſhame from daring ſtrenuouſly to aſſert, that they are either nothing, or that all of them are bodies.

GUEST. The men, Theætetus, are clearly become better. For ſuch of them as are Spartans or natives would not be aſhamed to aſſert this, but would contend that whatever cannot be graſped by the hands is altogether nothing.

THEÆ. You nearly ſpeak their conceptions.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again aſk them. For, if they are willing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is ſufficient. For we aſk them reſpecting that which is connate with incorporeal, and at the ſame time with corporeal natures, what it is they look to, when they ſay that both of them have a being.

THEÆ. Perhaps they would not be able to give an anſwer, if they ſhould ſuffer any thing of this kind.

GUEST. Conſider whether, in conſequence of our propoſing this queſtion, they will be willing to admit and acknowledge that being is a thing of this kind.

THEÆ. Of what kind? Speak, and perhaps we ſhall underſtand.

GUEST. I ſay then that whatever poſſeſſes any power, whether of doing

any thing naturally, or of ſuffering though in the leaſt degree from the vileſt thing, and though this takes place but once,—every thing of this kind truly is. For I define being to be nothing elſe than power.

THEÆ. But ſince they cannot at preſent ſay any thing better than this, they muſt admit it.

GUEST. It is well ſaid: for perhaps afterwards both we and they may think differently. Let this then now remain acknowledged by them.

THEÆ. Let it remain.

GUEST. Let us now proceed to the others, the friends of forms. And do you unfold to us their ſentiments.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. Do you then ſay that generation is one thing, and eſſence another, ſeparating them from each other?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. And do you admit that by our body we communicate with generation, through ſenſe, but that by our ſoul we communicate with true eſſence, through the reaſoning power? Do you likewiſe ſay, that true eſſence always ſubſiſts ſimilarly according to the ſame, but that generation ſubſiſts differently at different times?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But, O beſt of men, what do you call the communion which ſubſiſts between theſe two? Is it that which we juſt now mentioned?

THEÆ. What was that?

GUEST. Paſſion or action ariſing from a certain power, from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps you, Theætetus, do not know what anſwer they would give to this queſtion; but perhaps I do, through my familiarity with them.

THEÆ. What anſwer then would they give?

GUEST. They would not grant us that which was juſt now ſaid to the earth-born men reſpecting eſſence.

THEÆ. What was that?

GUEST. We eſtabliſhed this to be a ſufficient definition of beings, viz. when a power though the ſmalleſt is preſent to any thing, either of acting or ſuffering.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. To this they will ſay, that a power of acting and ſuffering is preſent with generation, but that no power of this kind is adapted to eſſence.

THEÆ. They will, therefore, ſpeak to the purpoſe.

GUEST. To this, however, we muſt ſay, that we require to hear from them ſtill more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the ſoul knows, and that eſſence is known.

THEÆ. They certainly ſay ſo.

GUEST. But what? Do you ſay that to know, or to be known, is action, or paſſion, or both? Or do you ſay that action is one thing, and paſſion another? Or that neither of theſe participates in no reſpect of the other? It is evident, indeed, that neither participates of the other. For, if they admitted this, they would contradict what they aſſerted above.

THEÆ. I underſtand you.

GUEST. For if to know was to do ſomething, it would neceſſarily happen that what is known would ſuffer, or become paſſive. And thus, according to this reaſoning, eſſence being known by knowledge, would, ſo far as it is known, be moved, through becoming paſſive; which we ſay cannot take place about a thing at reſt.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. What then, by Jupiter, ſhall we be eaſily perſuaded that true motion, life, ſoul [1], and prudence, are not preſent to that which is *perfectly being*, and that it neither lives, nor is wiſe, but abides immovable, not poſſeſſing a venerable and holy intellect?

THEÆ. But it would be a dire thing, O gueſt, to admit this.

GUEST. Shall we ſay then that it poſſeſſes intellect, but not life?

THEÆ. And how?

GUEST. Or ſhall we ſay that both theſe reſide in it, but that it does not poſſeſs theſe in ſoul?

THEÆ. But after what other manner can it poſſeſs theſe?

GUEST. Shall we then ſay that it poſſeſſes intellect, life, and ſoul, but that, though animated, it abides perfectly immovable?

[1] All theſe are *cauſally* contained in the firſt being, becauſe it is better than all theſe.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. All theſe things apppear to me to be irrational.

GUEST. We muſt therefore grant, that both that which is moved, and motion, are beings.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. It follows therefore, Theætetus, that intellect will never in any reſpect be preſent to any thing immovable.

THEÆ. It does follow.

GUEST. But, indeed, if we grant that all things are borne along and moved, we ſhall by ſuch an aſſertion take away ſameneſs from beings.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. Does it appear to you that that which ſubſiſts according to the ſame, and in a ſimilar manner, and about the ſame, can ever ſubſiſt without *permanency?*

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But do you perceive that intellect ever was, or is, without theſe?

THEÆ. In the ſmalleſt degree.

GUEST. But beſides this, we ſhould oppoſe, by every poſſible argument, him who entirely taking away ſcience, or prudence, or intellect, ſtrenuouſly endeavours to introduce any thing elſe.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But it is perfectly neceſſary, as it appears, that the philoſopher, and he who honours theſe things in the higheſt degree, ſhould not aſſent to thoſe who, aſſerting that there is either one, or many ſpecies of things, conſider the univerſe as ſtanding ſtill: nor yet ſhould he by any means hear thoſe who affirm that being is every where moved; but, according to the opinion even of boys, he ſhould call things immovable, and things moved, conſidered as ſubſiſting together, being, and the all.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

GUEST. Do we not, then, now appear to have equitably comprehended being in our diſcourſe?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Now therefore, Theætetus, as it appears to me, we are ſtrangely involved in doubt.

THEÆ. How ſo? and why do you aſſert this?

GUEST.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, O bleſſed man, that we are at preſent in the greateſt ignorance reſpecting being, and yet we have appeared to ourſelves to ſay ſomething about it?

THEÆ. I do perceive it; but I do not altogether underſtand in what reſpect we have deceived ourſelves.

GUEST. Conſider more clearly, whether, in conſequence of aſſenting to theſe things, any one may juſtly interrogate us, in the ſame manner as we interrogated thoſe who ſaid that the whole of things conſiſted of the hot and the cold.

THEÆ. Remind me what theſe interrogations were.

GUEST. By all means: and I will endeavour to do this by aſking you the ſame queſtion as I then aſked them, that we may at the ſame time make ſome advance in our inquiry.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Do you not then ſay, that motion and permanency are contrary to each other?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And do you not likewiſe ſay, that both and each of them ſimilarly are?

THEÆ. I do.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, ſay, that both and each are moved, when you admit that they are?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But do you ſignify that they ſtand ſtill, when you ſay that both are?

THEÆ. But how can I?

GUEST. You may, therefore, place in your ſoul being, as a third thing different from theſe, conſidering it as comprehending under itſelf permanency and motion; and looking to the communion of theſe with eſſence, you may thus aſſert that both of them are.

THEÆ. We ſeem to propheſy that being is a certain third thing, when we ſay that there are motion and permanency.

GUEST. Being, therefore, is not both motion and permanency, but ſomething different from theſe.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Hence being, according to its own nature, neither ſtands ſtill, nor is moved.

THEÆ. It is nearly ſo.

GUEST. Where then ought he to turn his thoughts, who wiſhes to eſtabliſh in himſelf any clear conceptions reſpecting being?

THEÆ. Where?

GUEST. I do not think it is yet eaſy for him to turn his thoughts any where. For, if being is not moved, why does it not ſtand ſtill? Or how is it poſſible, if it in no reſpect ſtands ſtill, that it ſhould not be moved? But being has now appeared to us without both theſe. Is this, however, poſſible?

THEÆ. It is the moſt impoſſible of all things.

GUEST. In the next place, therefore, it will be juſt to call to mind this.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That being aſked reſpecting the name of non-being, we were involved in the greateſt doubt reſpecting what it ought to be. Do you remember?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Are we, therefore, now involved in leſs doubt reſpecting being?

THEÆ. If it be poſſible to ſay ſo, O gueſt, we appear to be involved in greater doubt.

GUEST. Let this ambiguity then reſt here. But ſince both being and non-being equally participate of doubt, we may now hope, that if one of them ſhall appear to be more obſcure, or more clear, the other likewiſe will appear to be the ſame: and again, that if we ſhould not be able to perceive one of them, the other will alſo be inviſible to us. And thus we ſhall purſue the diſcourſe reſpecting both of them in the moſt becoming manner we are able.

THEÆ. It is well ſaid.

GUEST. Let us relate, then, after what manner we denominate this ſame thing by many names.

THEÆ. Adduce for this purpoſe a certain paradigm.

GUEST. In ſpeaking of man, we give him various appellations, and attribute to him colour, figure, magnitude, virtue, and vice; in all which, and

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ten thouſand other particulars, we not only ſay that man is, but that he is good, and an infinity of other things: and we act in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other particulars; for, conſidering each as one thing, we again call it many things, and by many names.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Whence, I think, we have given a feaſt to young men, and to thoſe who ſtudy in old age. For it is eaſy for every one immediately to object, that it is impoſſible for *the many* to be *one*, and *the one many*. Hence, they will exult, not ſuffering us to ſay that a man is good, but that good is good, and man man. For I think, Theætetus, that you have often met with young men who ſeriouſly apply themſelves to things of this kind, and ſometimes with men advanced in years, who, through the poverty of their poſſeſſions with reſpect to wiſdom, admire ſuch things as theſe, and who think themſelves all-wiſe for having diſcovered this.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. That our diſcourſe, therefore, may extend to all who have ever aſſerted any thing reſpecting eſſence, let what we ſhall now ſay in the way of interrogation be underſtood as addreſſed as well to theſe as to thoſe others whom we have above mentioned.

THEÆ. What is it you are now going to ſay?

GUEST. Whether we ſhould neither conjoin eſſence with motion and permanency, nor any thing elſe with any thing elſe, but, as if things were unmingled, and it were impoſſible for them to communicate with each other, we ſhould conſider them as ſeparate in our diſcourſe? Or whether we ſhould collect all things into the ſame, as if they were able to communicate with each other? Or conſider this as the caſe with ſome things, but not with others? Which of theſe, Theætetus, ſhall we ſay is to be preferred?

THEÆ. I indeed have nothing to anſwer to theſe things. Why, therefore, do you not, by anſwering to each particular, conſider what follows from each?

GUEST. You ſpeak well. We will ſuppoſe them, therefore, if you pleaſe, to ſay, in the firſt place, that nothing has any power of communicating with any thing, in any reſpect. Will it not, therefore, follow, that motion and permanency in no reſpect participate of eſſence?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. They certainly will not.

GUEST. But what? Will any one of them be, and at the ſame time have no communication with eſſence?

THEÆ. It will not.

GUEST. From conſenting to this, all things, as it ſeems, will become rapidly ſubverted, as well the doctrine of thoſe who contend that all things are moved, as of thoſe who contend that all things ſtand ſtill, together with the dogmas of thoſe who aſſert that ſuch things as ſubſiſt according to forms or ſpecies ſubſiſt ſimilarly according to the ſame. For all theſe conjoin being with their doctrines, ſome aſſerting that things are truly moved, and others that they truly ſtand ſtill.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Such, likewiſe, as at one time unite all things, and at another time ſeparate them, whether dividing from one thing into things infinite, or into things which have finite elements, and compoſing from theſe, and whether they conſider this as partially, or as always taking place,—in all theſe caſes they will ſay nothing to the purpoſe, if there is in no reſpect a mixture of things.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Further ſtill, we ourſelves ſhall have diſcourſed the moſt ridiculouſly of all men, who permitting nothing pertaining to the communion of the paſſion of *different*, have yet uſed the appellation *the other*.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. They are in a certain reſpect compelled to employ the term *to be*, about all things, likewiſe the terms *ſeparate*, *others*, and *by itſelf*, and ten thouſand others, from which being unable to abſtain, and finding it neceſſary to inſert theſe expreſſions in their diſcourſes, they do not require any other confutation, but, as it is ſaid, they have an enemy and an adverſary at home, vociferating within, and always walk as if carrying about with them the abſurd Eurycles [1].

THEÆ. You very much ſpeak of that which is like and true.

[1] "This is a proverb, ſays the Greek Scholiaſt on this dialogue, applied to thoſe who propheſy evil to themſelves. For Eurycles appeared to have a certain dæmon in his belly, exhorting him to ſpeak concerning future events; whence he was called a ventriloquiſt."

GUEST. But what if we ſhould permit all things to have the power of communicating with each other? This, indeed, I myſelf am able to diſſolve.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Becauſe motion itſelf would entirely ſtand ſtill, and again, permanency itſelf would be moved, if they were mingled with each other. But this indeed is impoſſible from the greateſt neceſſity, that *motion* ſhould ſtand ſtill, and *permanency* be moved.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The third thing, therefore, alone remains.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. For one of theſe things is neceſſary, either that all things ſhould be mingled together, or nothing; or that ſome things ſhould be willing to be mingled with each other, and that other things ſhould be unwilling.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And two of the members of this diviſion cannot be found.

THEÆ. They cannot.

GUEST. Every one, therefore, who wiſhes to anſwer rightly ſhould adopt that which remains of the three.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But ſince ſome things are willing to be mingled, and others not, they will nearly be affected in the ſame manner as letters. For ſome of theſe are incongruous with reſpect to each other, but others mutually harmonize.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For vowels being in a particular manner the bond, as it were, of the other letters, pervade through all of them, ſo that without ſome one of theſe it is impoſſible for any two of the others to accord with each other.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Does every one, therefore, know what letters will communicate with each other? or is art requiſite in order to accompliſh this ſufficiently?

THEÆ. Art is requiſite.

GUEST. What kind of art?

THEÆ. The grammatic.

GUEST. And is not this the caſe with reſpect to ſharp and flat ſounds? I mean,

mean, Is not he who knows by art what ſounds are conſonant or diſſonant, a muſician, but he who is ignorant of this not ſo?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. And in other arts, and the privation of arts, we ſhall find other ſuch circumſtances take place.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Since then we have acknowledged, that the *genera*[1] *of being* are mixed

[1] Of the ſciences, ſome look to one ſcientific object, as medicine to health, but others extend to more than one, as arithmetic to philoſophy, to a polity, to the tectonic art, and to many others; and others contribute to all arts, not the fabricative only, but alſo ſuch as are theoretic, ſuch as is the *diviſive* art, of which Socrates ſpeaks in the Philebus. As, therefore, in the ſciences ſome are moſt total, and others partial, ſo in intelligible cauſes ſome are altogether partial, alone being the leaders of a peculiar number of one ſpecies, but others extend themſelves to many, as *equal*, *ſimilar*, and *whole*; for *whole* ſo far as *whole* is not common to all things, ſince a *part* ſo far as a *part* is not a *whole*: and others extend themſelves to all things, becauſe all things participate of them ſo far as they are beings, and not ſo far as they are vital, or animated, or poſſeſs any other idiom, but according to the appellation itſelf of being. Becauſe, therefore, *being* is the firſt among intelligible cauſes, it has the moſt total order among the genera; and theſe are five in number, viz. *eſſence*, *ſame*, *different*, *motion*, *permanency*. For every being is *eſſentialized*, is *united* itſelf to itſelf, is *ſeparated* from itſelf and other things, *proceeds* from itſelf, and its proper principle, and participates of a certain *permanency*, ſo far as it preſerves its proper form. Whether, therefore, it be intelligible, or ſenſible, or a thing ſubſiſting between theſe two, it is compoſed from theſe genera. For all things are not vital, or wholes, or parts, or animated; but of theſe genera all things participate. Likewiſe *eſſence* not ſubſiſting about a thing, neither will any thing elſe be there; for eſſence is the receptacle of other things. Without the ſubſiſtence of *ſameneſs*, that which is a whole will be diſſipated; and *difference* being deſtroyed there will be one thing alone without multitude. In like manner, *motion* and *permanency* not ſubſiſting, all things will be unenergetic and dead, without ſtability, and tending to non-entity. It is neceſſary, therefore, that each of theſe ſhould be in all things, and that *eſſence* ſhould rank as the firſt, being as it were the Veſta and monad of the genera, and arranged analogous to *the one*. After eſſence, *ſameneſs* and *difference* muſt ſucceed, the former being analogous to *bound*, and the latter to *infinity*; and next to theſe *motion* and *permanency*. Of theſe genera too, ſome are particularly beheld about the *powers*, and others about the *energies* of beings. For every being ſo far as it is a being participates of a certain *eſſence*, as it is ſaid in this dialogue, and in the Parmenides. But every eſſential power is either under *ſame*, or under *different*, or under both. Thus for inſtance heat, and every *ſeparative* power, ſubſiſts under *different*, but coldneſs, and every *collective* power, is under *ſame*. And if there is any thing which ſubſiſts between theſe, it is under both *ſame* and *different*. For every energy is either *motion* or *permanency*, or in a certain reſpect both; ſince the energy of intellect may be rather ſaid to be *permanency* than *motion*, and in like manner every energy which preſerves the energizing nature in the ſame condition, or that about which it energizes. But the motion of

mixed with each other, after the ſame manner, ought not he neceſſarily to proceed in his diſcourſe ſcientifically, who is about to ſhow what genera mutually accord, and what do not admit each other? Likewiſe, whether theſe genera ſo hold together through all things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again in their diviſions, if there is another cauſe of diviſion through wholes?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible ſcience ſhould not be requiſite for this purpoſe, and nearly, perhaps, the greateſt of all ſciences?

GUEST. What then, again, Theætetus, ſhall we call this ſcience? Or, by Jupiter, have we ignorantly fallen upon the ſcience of the liberal? And do we appear, while inveſtigating a ſophiſt, to have firſt found a philoſopher?

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Do we not ſay, that to divide according to genera, and neither to think the ſame ſpecies different, nor a different ſpecies the ſame, is the buſineſs of the dialectic ſcience?

THEÆ. We do ſay ſo.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is able to do this, ſufficiently perceives one idea [1] every way extended through many things, the individuals of which

bodies into each other does not abide in *ſame*, but departs from that in which it ſubſiſts; and that which changes the energizing nature in the *ſame* and about the *ſame*, is *ſtable motion*. Every thing, therefore, by its very being participates of this triad, *eſſence*, *power*, and *energy*, on account of theſe five genera.

[1] Here genus is ſignified by *one idea extended through many*: for genus is not an aggregate of ſpecies, as a whole of parts, but it is preſent to every ſpecies, to which it is at the ſame time prior. But every ſpecies ſubſiſting ſeparate from other ſpecies, and from genus itſelf, participates of genus. By *many ideas different from each other, but externally comprehended under one idea*, which is genus, ſpecies are ſignified: externally comprehended, indeed, genus being exempt from ſpecies, but comprehending the cauſes of ſpecies: for genera, truly ſo called, are both more antient and more eſſential than the ſpecies which are ranked under them. Of genera, alſo, ſome have a ſubſiſtence prior to ſpecies, but others ſubſiſt in them according to participation. To perceive theſe two, therefore, viz. one idea extended through many, the individuals of which ſubſiſt apart from each other, is the province of the *diviſive* power of dialectic; but the other two pertain to the *definitive* power of this art: for definition perceives one idea through many wholes conjoined in one, and collects into one definitive conception many ideas, each ſubſiſting as a whole. It alſo connects them with each other, and perfects one idea from the aſſumption of all wholes; conjoining the many in one. Beſides this, it conſiders the many which it has collected in one, lying apart, and the whole which is produced from them.

are

are placed apart from each other, and many ideas different from each other externally comprehended under one, and one idea through many wholes conjoined in one; and laſtly, many ideas, every way divided apart from each other. This is to know ſcientifically, how to diſtinguiſh according to genus, in what reſpect particulars communicate, and how far they do not communicate with each other.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But I think you do not give dialectic to any other than one who philoſophizes purely and juſtly.

THEÆ. For how is it poſſible to give it to any other?

GUEST. If we ſeek, indeed, we ſhall find a philoſopher in a place of this kind, both now and hereafter, though it is alſo difficult to ſee this character clearly; but the difficulty of perceiving a ſophiſt is of a different kind from that with which the perceiving a philoſopher is attended.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. The former flying into the darkneſs of non-being, and by uſe becoming adapted to it, is with difficulty perceived through the obſcurity of the place. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. So it ſeems.

GUEST. But the philoſopher through reaſoning, being always ſituated near the idea of being, is by no means eaſily diſcerned, on account of the ſplendor of the region. For the eyes of vulgar ſouls are unable to ſupport the view of that which is divine.

THEÆ. It is likely that theſe things ſubſiſt in this manner, no leſs than thoſe.

GUEST. About this particular, therefore, we ſhall perhaps at another time conſider more clearly, if it be permitted us. But, with reſpect to the ſophiſt, it is evident that we ſhould not diſmiſs him till we have ſufficiently ſurveyed him.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. Since then it is acknowledged by us, that ſome of the genera of being communicate with each other, and that ſome do not, and that ſome communicate with a few, and others with many things, and others again are not hindered from communicating through all things with all things;—this being the caſe, let us, in the next place, following the order of diſ-

courſe,

courſe, ſpeculate not about all ſpecies, leſt we ſhould be confounded by their multitude,—but, chooſing certain of thoſe which are called the greateſt, let us, in the firſt place, conſider the qualities of each, and, in the next place, what communion of power they poſſeſs with each other, that we may not in any reſpect be indigent of diſcourſe about being and non-being (though we may not be able to comprehend them with perfect perſpicuity), as far as the condition of the preſent ſpeculation admits. If, therefore, while we are aſſimilating non-being, we ſhould ſay that it is truly non-being, we ſhould be exculpated.

THEÆ. It would indeed be proper that we ſhould.

GUEST. But the greateſt of all the genera which we have now mentioned are, being itſelf, permanency, and motion.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. And we have ſaid that the two latter are unmingled with each other.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But being is mingled with both: for both after a manner are.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Theſe things then become three.

THEÆ. Certainly.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, each of theſe different from the other two, but the ſame with itſelf?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. What then ſhall we now ſay reſpecting ſameneſs and difference? Shall we ſay that they are two certain genera, different from the other three, but yet always mingled with them from neceſſity? And thus are we to conſider about five, and not three genera only? Or are we ignorant that we have denominated this ſameneſs and difference, as ſomething belonging to the other three?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But, indeed, motion and permanency are neither different nor ſame.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. That which we in common call motion and permanency can be neither of theſe.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Why?

GUEST. Becauſe motion would be permanent, and permanency be moved. For, with reſpect to both, the one becoming the other, would compel that other to change into the contrary to its nature, as participating of the contrary.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But yet both participate of ſame and different.

THEÆ. They do.

GUEST. We muſt not, therefore, ſay that motion is either ſame or different, nor yet muſt we aſſert this of permanency.

THEÆ. We muſt not.

GUEST. Are, therefore, being and ſameneſs to be conſidered by us as one certain thing?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But if being and ſameneſs ſignify that which is in no reſpect different, when we again aſſert of motion and permanency, that both are, we thus denominate both of them the ſame, as things which have a being.

THEÆ. But, indeed, this is impoſſible.

GUEST. It is impoſſible, therefore, that ſameneſs and being ſhould be one thing.

THEÆ. Nearly ſo.

GUEST. We muſt place ſameneſs, therefore, as a fourth ſpecies, in addition to the former three.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But what? Muſt we not ſay that difference is a fifth ſpecies? Or is it proper to think that this, and being, are two names belonging to one genus?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But I think you will grant, that of beings, ſome always ſubſiſt themſelves by themſelves, but others in relation to other things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But different is always referred to different. Is it not?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But this would not be the caſe unleſs being and difference widely

differed from each other. But if difference participated of both ſpecies, as is the caſe with being, there would be ſome one among things different, which would be no longer different with reference to that which is different. But now it happens from neceſſity, that whatever is different is ſo from its relation to that which is different.

THEÆ. It is as you ſay.

GUEST. We muſt ſay, then, that the nature of different muſt be added as a fifth to the ſpecies of which we have already ſpoken.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And we muſt likewiſe ſay that it pervades through all theſe. For each one of the others is different, not through its own nature, but through participating the idea of difference.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But we may thus ſpeak reſpecting each of the five genera.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. In the firſt place, that motion is entirely different from permanency. Or how ſhall we ſay?

THEÆ. That it is ſo.

GUEST. It is not, therefore, permanency.

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But it *is*, through participating of being.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. Again, motion is different from ſameneſs.

THEÆ. Nearly ſo.

GUEST. It is not, therefore, ſameneſs.

THEÆ. It is not.

GUEST. And yet it is ſame, in conſequence of all things participating of ſameneſs.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. It muſt be confeſſed, therefore, that motion is both ſame, and not ſame, nor muſt we be indignant that it is ſo. For, when we ſay that it is both ſame, and not ſame, we do not ſpeak of it in a ſimilar manner; but when we ſay it is ſame, we call it ſo, through the participation of ſameneſs with reſpect to itſelf; and when we ſay it is not ſame, we call it ſo through

its communion with different, through which, ſeparating it from ſame, it becomes not ſame, but different. So that it is again rightly ſaid to be not ſame.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, motion itſelf ſhould in any reſpect participate of permanency, there would be no abſurdity in calling it ſtable.

THEÆ. Moſt right, ſince we have acknowledged that ſome of the genera are willing to be mingled with each other, and others not.

GUEST. And, indeed, we arrived at the demonſtration of this prior to what we have evinced at preſent, by proving that the thing ſubſiſts after this manner.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we may again ſay that motion is different from different, juſt as it is different from ſameneſs and permanency.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. It is, therefore, in a certain reſpect, not different and different, according to this reaſoning.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. What then follows? Shall we ſay it is different from three of the genera, but not from the fourth? acknowledging that the genera are five, about which, and in which, we propoſe to ſpeculate?

THEÆ. And how?

GUEST. For it is impoſſible to grant that they are fewer in number than they now appear to be. We may, therefore, ſafely contend, that motion is different from being.

THEÆ. We may, moſt ſafely.

GUEST. It clearly follows, therefore, that motion is truly non-being, and at the ſame time being, ſince it participates of being.

THEÆ. Moſt clearly.

GUEST. Non-being, therefore, is neceſſarily in motion, and in all the genera. For, in all of them, the nature of different rendering them different from being, makes each to be non-being. Hence, we rightly ſay that all of them are non-beings; and again, becauſe they participate of being, that they are, and are beings.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. About each of the ſpecies, therefore, there is much of being, but there is alſo non-being infinite in multitude.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Muſt not, therefore, being itſelf be ſaid to be different from the others?

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. Being, therefore, is not ſo many in number as the others; for, not being them, it is itſelf one, but is not other things, which are infinite in number.

THEÆ. This is nearly the caſe.

GUEST. We ought not, therefore, to be indignant at theſe things, ſince the genera have naturally a mutual communion. But if ſome one does not admit theſe things, yet, as we have been perſuaded by the former aſſertions, in like manner we ought to be perſuaded by theſe.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt juſtly.

GUEST. We may alſo ſee this.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. When we ſay non-being, we do not, as it appears, ſay any thing contrary to being, but only that which is different [1].

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. Juſt as when we ſay a thing is not great, do we then appear to you to evince by this word that which is ſmall rather than that which is equal?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible we ſhould?

GUEST. We muſt not, therefore, admit that the contrary to a thing is ſignified, when negation is ſpoken of; but thus much only muſt be aſſerted, that the terms not, and neither, ſignify ſomething of other things, when placed before names, or rather before things, about which the names of the negations afterwards enunciated are diſtributed.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. This alſo we may conſider by a dianoëtic energy, if it is agreeable to you.

[1] By *non-being*, therefore, in this place, Plato means *difference*, one of the five genera of being.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. The nature of different appears to me to be cut into ſmall parts, in the ſame manner as ſcience.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. This nature itſelf is one; but a part of it reſiding in any thing and being individually defined, poſſeſſes a private appellation of its own; on which account there are ſaid to be many arts and ſciences.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do not, therefore, the parts of the nature of different, which is itſelf one thing, ſuffer this very ſame thing?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo. But we muſt ſhow how this takes place.

GUEST. Is there any part of different oppoſite to the beautiful?

THEÆ. There is.

GUEST. Muſt we ſay that this part is nameleſs, or that it has a certain name?

THEÆ. That it has a name. For every thing which we ſay is not beautiful, is not different from any thing elſe than the nature of the beautiful.

GUEST. Come, then, anſwer me the following queſtion.

THEÆ. What queſtion?

GUEST. When any thing is defined as belonging to one particular genus, and is again oppoſed to a certain eſſence, does it happen that thus it is not beautiful?

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. But the oppoſition of being to being happens, as it ſeems, to be not beautiful.

THEÆ. Moſt right.

GUEST. What then? Does it follow from this reaſoning that the beautiful belongs more to beings, and the non-beautiful leſs?

THEÆ. It does not.

GUEST. We muſt ſay, therefore, that the non-great and the great ſimilarly are.

THEÆ. Similarly.

GUEST. Hence, too, we muſt aſſert of the juſt and the non-juſt, that the one in no reſpect *is* more than the other.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And the ſame muſt be ſaid of other things, ſince the nature of different appears to rank among beings. But difference having a ſubſiſtence, it is neceſſary to place the parts of it as no leſs having ſubſiſtence.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As it appears, therefore, the oppoſition of a part of the nature of different, and of the parts of being, are no leſs eſſence, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, than being itſelf; nor do they ſignify that which is contrary to being, but only ſomething different from it.

THEÆ. It is moſt clear.

GUEST. What then ſhall we call it?

THEÆ. It is evident that non-being, which we have ſought after on account of a ſophiſt, is this very thing.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, as you ſay, is it no more deficient of eſſence than the others? And ought we now boldly to ſay, that non-being poſſeſſes its own nature firmly, in the ſame manner as the great was found to be great, and the beautiful beautiful, and the non-great to be non-great, and the non-beautiful non-beautiful? Shall we in like manner ſay, that non-being was and is non-being, as one ſpecies which muſt be numbered among many beings? Or muſt we ſtill, Theætetus, be diffident about this?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. Do you perceive, therefore, how diſobedient we have been to the prohibition of Parmenides?

THEÆ. In what reſpect?

GUEST. We have wandered beyond the limits he appointed us, by thus continuing ſtill further to explore and evince.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Becauſe he ſays, "Non-beings never, and by no means are; but do you, while inveſtigating, reſtrain your conceptions from this path."

THEÆ. He does ſpeak in this manner.

GUEST. But we have not only ſhown that non-beings are, but we have demonſtrated what the form of non-being is. For, having evinced that the nature of different has a ſubſiſtence, and that it is divided into ſmall parts, which are mutually diſtributed through all things, we then dared to ſay, that the part of it which is oppoſed to the being of every thing, is itſelf truly non-being.

THEÆ. And to me, O gueſt, we appear to have ſpoken with the greateſt truth.

GUEST. Let no one, therefore, ſay, that we, having evinced that non-being is contrary to being, dare to aſſert that it *is*. For we ſome time ſince bade farewell to him who aſks whether that which is contrary to any thing has a ſubſiſtence, and poſſeſſes a certain reaſon, or is entirely irrational. But, with reſpect to that which we now call non-being, either ſome one who is not perſuaded by our arguments ſhould confute us, as not having ſpoken well; or, if he cannot do this, he muſt alſo ſay as we ſay, that the genera are mingled with each other, and that being and different pervading through all things, and through each other, different participating of being, *is* through this participation, not being that of which it participates, but ſomething elſe. But, being different from being, it clearly follows that it is neceſſarily non-being. And again, *being*, in conſequence of participating of difference, will be different from the other genera: but being different from all of them, it is not any one of them, nor all the others, nor any thing beſides itſelf. So that, without doubt, being is not ten thouſand things in ten thouſand things; and, in like manner, each and all of the other genera are multifariouſly diſtributed, but are not themſelves multifarious.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And if any one does not believe in theſe contrarieties, he ſhould conſider, and aſſert ſomething better than has been now ſaid. Or if ſome one, in conſequence of finding this to be a difficult ſpeculation, rejoices, drawing the arguments from one ſide to another, ſuch a one, as our preſent reaſoning aſſerts, is not engaged in a purſuit which deſerves much ſerious attention. For *this* neither poſſeſſes any thing elegant, nor is difficult to diſcover; but *that* is difficult, and at the ſame time beautiful.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That of which we have ſpoken above; I mean that, omitting theſe particulars, we may be able to confute any one who aſſerts that different is ſame, or ſame different. For, to ſhow that ſame is different, and different ſame, that the great is ſmall, and the ſimilar diſſimilar, and to rejoice in thus introducing contraries in diſcourſe, is not a true confutation, but is evidently the province of one who has but a ſlight apprehenſion of the thing, and is recently born.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. For, O excellent young man, to endeavour to ſeparate every thing from every thing, is both inelegant, and the province of one rude and deſtitute of philoſophy.

THEÆ. Why ſo?

GUEST. To diſſolve each thing from all things, is the moſt perfect abolition of all diſcourſe. For diſcourſe ſubſiſts through the conjunction of ſpecies with each other.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Conſider, therefore, how opportunely we have now contended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit one thing to be mingled with another.

THEÆ. With a view to what?

GUEST. To this, that diſcourſe may be one certain thing belonging to the genera of being. For, if we are deprived of this, we ſhall, for the moſt part, be deprived of philoſophy. And further ſtill, it is requiſite at preſent that we ſhould mutually conſent to determine what diſcourſe is. But, if it is entirely taken away from us, we can no longer ſpeak about any thing. And it will be taken away, if we admit that things are not in any reſpect mingled with each other.

THEÆ. Right. But I do not underſtand why we ſhould now mutually conſent to determine what diſcourſe is.

GUEST. But, perhaps, you will eaſily underſtand by attending to this.

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. Non-being has appeared to us to be one of the other genera, and to be diſperſed through all beings.

THEÆ. It has ſo.

GUEST. After this, therefore, we ſhould conſider whether it is mingled with opinion and diſcourſe.

THEÆ. On what account?

GUEST. Becauſe, if it is not mingled with theſe, it muſt neceſſarily follow that all things are true: but, if it is mingled with theſe, falſe opinion and falſe diſcourſe muſt be produced. For to opine, or ſpeak of non-beings, is itſelf falſehood ſubſiſting in the dianoëtic part and diſcourſe.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

GUEST.

GUEST. But, being falſehood, it is deception.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. And deception ſubſiſting, all things muſt neceſſarily be full of reſemblances, images, and phantaſy.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we have ſaid that the ſophiſt flies into this place, while he denies that there is any ſuch thing as falſehood. For he aſſerts that no one can either think or ſpeak of non-being; becauſe it in no reſpect participates of eſſence.

THEÆ. Theſe things were ſaid by us.

GUEST. But now it has appeared that non-being participates of being. So that in this reſpect perhaps he will no longer oppoſe us. Perhaps however he will ſay, that of ſpecies, ſome participate of non-being, and others not; and that diſcourſe and opinion rank among thoſe things which do not participate it. So that he will again contend with us, that the image-making and phantaſtic art, in which we have ſaid he is concealed, has no ſubſiſtence; ſince opinion and diſcourſe have no communion with non-being. He will likewiſe aſſert that falſehood has not any kind of ſubſiſtence, ſince this communion of things is no where to be found. Hence we muſt inveſtigate the nature of diſcourſe, opinion, and phantaſy, that, theſe becoming apparent, we may perceive their communion with non-being; and, perceiving this, may evince that there is ſuch a thing as falſehood; and, having evinced this, may bind the ſophiſt in it, if he is found to be guilty; or, liberating him, inveſtigate in ſome other genus.

THEÆ. That, O gueſt, which we ſaid at firſt about the ſophiſt, appears to be very true—I mean, that he is a genus difficult to apprehend. For he appears to be full of problems; nor can any one arrive at his retreats, till he has firſt vanquiſhed the obſtacle which he throws in the way. For now we have ſcarcely overcome the obſtacle which he hurled forth, I mean that non-being is not, and he immediately throws in our way another. Hence it is requiſite to ſhow that there is falſehood, both in diſcourſe and opinion, and after this perhaps ſomething elſe, and another thing after that, and ſo on, as it appears, without end.

GUEST. He, O Theætetus, who is able to make advances continually, though

though in a ſmall degree, ought to proceed boldly in this affair. For what will he be able to accompliſh in other things, who is without ardor in theſe? For he who either effects nothing in theſe, or is repelled backwards, will ſcarcely (according to the proverb) ever take the city. But now, O good man, ſince as you ſay this is accompliſhed, we ſhall have captured the greateſt wall, and the reſt will be eaſy and trifling.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. Let us then now, in the firſt place, as we ſaid, conſider diſcourſe and opinion, that we may more clearly ſhow, whether non-being touches upon theſe, or whether both theſe are in every reſpect true, and neither of them at any time falſe.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Come then, let us again ſpeculate about nouns, in the ſame manner as we did about ſpecies and letters. For that which is the object of our preſent inveſtigation appears in a certain reſpect to have a ſimilar ſubſiſtence.

THEÆ. What is it you wiſh to be conceived reſpecting nouns?

GUEST. Whether all of them harmonize with each other; or ſome accord, but others do not.

THEÆ. It is evident that ſome accord, and others do not.

GUEST. Perhaps your meaning is this, that ſuch nouns as in an orderly ſucceſſion aſſert and evince ſomething, mutually accord; but that ſuch as ſignify nothing by continuity, do not mutually accord.

THEÆ. How do you mean? and what is it you ſay?

GUEST. What I thought you would both underſtand and aſſent to. For there is a twofold genus of vocal declarations reſpecting eſſence.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. One, which is called nouns, and the other verbs.

THEÆ. Speak of each.

GUEST. That which is a declaration in actions, we call a verb.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But a mark or ſign of voice impoſed on the agents themſelves, we call a noun.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST.

GUEST. From nouns, therefore, alone, enunciated in continued ſucceſſion, a ſentence is never produced; nor yet again from verbs enunciated without nouns.

THEÆ. Theſe things I have not learned.

GUEST. But it is evident that you juſt now acknowledged this, when looking to ſomething elſe. For this is what I wiſhed to ſay, that when theſe are enunciated in continued ſucceſſion, a ſentence is not produced.

THEÆ. How ſo?

GUEST. As, for inſtance, walks, runs, ſleeps, and ſuch other words as ſignify actions, all which when any one enunciates in continued ſucceſſion, he will not by this means produce a ſentence.

THEÆ. For how can he?

GUEST. Again, therefore, when any one ſays, a lion, a ſtag, a horſe, and ſuch other nouns as ſignify agents themſelves, a ſentence will not yet be produced by this continuity. For the things enunciated do not evince action, or a privation of action, or the eſſence of a thing which is, or which is not, till verbs are mingled with nouns. But when they are harmonized, a ſentence is immediately produced, and the firſt connection of theſe is nearly the firſt ſentence, though it ſhould be the ſhorteſt poſſible.

THEÆ. How is this?

GUEST. When any one ſays, A man learns, would you not ſay that this is the ſhorteſt and firſt ſentence?

THEÆ. I ſhould.

GUEST. For he then evinces ſomething reſpecting things which actually are, or are riſing into being, or have been, or will be. Nor does he denominate only, but he finiſhes ſomething connecting verbs and nouns. Hence we ſay that he ſpeaks, and does not alone denominate, and to this connection we give the name of diſcourſe.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. And thus as we ſaid reſpecting things, that ſome harmonized with each other, and that others did not, ſo likewiſe with reſpect to the ſigns of voice, ſome do not harmonize, but others do, and produce diſcourſe.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Further ſtill, attend to this trifling thing,

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. That diſcourſe when it takes place muſt neceſſarily be a diſcourſe about ſomething: for it is impoſſible that it can be about nothing.

THEÆ. It muſt.

GUEST. Ought it not, therefore, to be of ſome particular kind?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us then give diligent attention.

THEÆ. For it is requiſite.

GUEST. I will, therefore, enunciate to you a ſentence, in which a thing is conjoined with action, through a noun and a verb: but do you inform me of what it is a ſentence.

THEÆ. I will, as far as I am able.

GUEST. Theætetus ſits:—is this a long ſentence?

THEÆ. It is not; but a moderate one.

GUEST. It is now your buſineſs to ſay what it is about, and of whom it is a ſentence.

THEÆ. It is evident that it is about me, and of me.

GUEST. But what again with reſpect to this?

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. Theætetus, with whom I now diſcourſe, flies.

THEÆ. Reſpecting this alſo, no one can ſay but that it is about me, and of me.

GUEST. But we ſaid it was neceſſary that every ſentence ſhould be of ſome particular kind.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. But of what kind muſt each of the ſentences juſt now mentioned be?

THEÆ. One muſt be falſe, and the other true.

GUEST. But that which is true aſſerts things reſpecting you as they are.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But that which is falſe aſſerts things reſpecting you different from what they are.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. It ſpeaks, therefore, of things which are not, as if they were.

THEÆ. Nearly ſo.

GUEST. And it ſpeaks of things which have a ſubſiſtence, but which do

not belong to you. For we ſay, that about every thing there are many things which have a ſubſiſtence, and many things which have no ſubſiſtence.

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

GUEST. In the firſt place, therefore, it is moſt neceſſary, that the latter ſentence which I enunciated reſpecting you ſhould be one of the ſhorteſt, according to the definition we have given of a ſentence.

THEÆ. This muſt now be acknowledged by us.

GUEST. In the next place, it muſt be confeſſed that it is a ſentence of ſomething.

THEÆ. It muſt.

GUEST. But if it is not of you, it is not of any thing elſe.

THEÆ. For how ſhould it?

GUEST. But if it is not of any thing, it cannot in any reſpect be a ſentence. For we have ſhown that it belongs to things impoſſible, that diſcourſe ſhould exiſt, and yet be a diſcourſe of nothing.

THEÆ. Moſt right.

GUEST. When, therefore, *other* things are aſſerted of you, as if they were the *ſame*, and things which *are not*, as things which *are*, ſuch a compoſition of verbs and nouns becomes altogether, as it appears, a really and truly falſe diſcourſe.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

GUEST. But what with reſpect to the dianoëtic energy, opinion, and phantaſy, is it not now evident that all theſe genera, as well the falſe as the true, are produced in our ſouls?

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. You will eaſily underſtand, if you firſt of all apprehend what each of them is, and in what they differ from each other.

THEÆ. Only inform me.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, the dianoëtic energy and diſcourſe the ſame, except that the former is an inward dialogue without voice, of ſoul with itſelf?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But the fluxion from the dianoëtic energy through the mouth, proceeding with ſound, is called diſcourſe.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. We perceive this alſo in diſcourſe.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. Affirmation and negation.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. When, therefore, this takes place in the ſoul according to the dianoëtic energy, accompanied with ſilence, can you call it any thing elſe than opinion?

THEÆ. How can I?

GUEST. But, when again, a certain paſſion of this kind is preſent, not according to the dianoëtic energy, but through ſenſe, can it be rightly denominated any thing elſe than phantaſy?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

GUEST. Since, then, diſcourſe is both true and falſe, and it appears that the dianoëtic energy is a dialogue of the ſoul with itſelf, but opinion the concluſion of the dianoëtic energy, and phantaſy the mixture of ſenſe and opinion with each other, it is neceſſary, ſince theſe are allied to diſcourſe, that ſome of them ſhould be ſometimes true, and ſometimes falſe.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you perceive, therefore, that we have found more eaſily than we expected, that opinion and diſcourſe are ſometimes falſe? For juſt now we were afraid, leſt by inveſtigating this matter we ſhould attempt a work which it is perfectly impoſſible to accompliſh.

THEÆ. I do perceive.

GUEST. Let us not, therefore, deſpair as to what remains; but, ſince theſe things are rendered apparent, let us recall into our memory thoſe diviſions according to ſpecies which we mentioned before.

THEÆ. Of what kind were they?

GUEST. We divided image-making into two ſpecies; the one aſſimilative, and the other phantaſtic.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And we ſaid we were dubious in which of theſe we ſhould place the ſophiſt.

THEÆ. Theſe things were ſaid by us.

GUEST. And while we were doubting about this, we were oppreſſed with a ſtill darker vertigo, in conſequence of that aſſertion which is dubious to all men,

men, that there can be no ſuch thing as either a reſemblance, or an image, becauſe that which is falſe has never in any reſpect any ſubſiſtence whatever.

THEÆ. You ſpeak the truth.

GUEST. But now ſince diſcourſe has become apparent, and likewiſe falſe opinion, it is poſſible there may be imitations of things, and that from this diſpoſition the art of deceiving may be produced.

THEÆ. It is poſſible.

GUEST. And was it not alſo acknowledged by us above, that the ſophiſt is converſant with theſe?

THEÆ. It was.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again endeavour, by always biſecting the propoſed genus, to proceed to the right hand part of the ſection, attending to its communion with the ſophiſt, till, having taken away all his common properties, and leaving the nature peculiar to him, we may be able eſpecially to exhibit this to ourſelves, and afterwards to thoſe who are naturally moſt proximate to the genus of this method.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Did we not, therefore, begin dividing the effective art, and the art of acquiring?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And the art of acquiring preſented itſelf to us in hunting, conteſts, merchandize, and ſuch-like ſpecies.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But now, ſince the imitative art comprehends the ſophiſt, it is evident that the effective art muſt firſt receive a twofold diviſion. For imitation is a certain making. We ſaid, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of things themſelves. Did we not?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But, in the firſt place, let there be two parts of the effective art.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. The one is divine, the other human.

THEÆ. I do not yet underſtand you.

GUEST. If we remember what was ſaid at firſt, we aſſerted that the whole of the effective art was a power cauſing things to exiſt afterwards which were not before.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. We do remember.

GUEST. But, with reſpect to all mortal animals, and plants which are produced in the earth from ſeeds and roots, together with ſuch inanimate natures as ſubſiſt on the earth, whether they are bodies which can be liquefied, or not, can we ſay that they were afterwards generated, when before they were not, by any other than a certain fabricating God? Or ſhall we employ the dogma and aſſertion of many?

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. That nature generates theſe from a certain fortuitous cauſe, and which operates without thought. Or ſhall we ſay that they are produced in conjunction with reaſon and divine ſcience, originating from Deity itſelf?

THEÆ. I, perhaps, through my age, often change my opinion. However, at preſent looking to you, and apprehending that you think theſe things were produced by Divinity, I think ſo too.

GUEST. It is well, Theætetus. And if we thought that in ſome future time you would be of a different opinion, we ſhould now endeavour to make you acknowledge this by the force of reaſon, in conjunction with neceſſary perſuaſion; but ſince I know your nature to be ſuch, that, without any arguments from us, you would of yourſelf arrive at that concluſion to which I have drawn you, I ſhall diſmiſs the attempt; for it would be ſuperfluous. But I adopt this poſition, that things which are ſaid to ſubſiſt from nature are produced by a divine art: but that the things which are compoſed from theſe by men, are produced by human art: and that, according to this poſition, there are two genera of the effective art, one of which is human, and the other divine.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But, ſince there are two genera, biſect each of them.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Juſt as the whole of the effective art was then divided according to breadth, ſo now let it be divided according to length.

THEÆ. Let it be ſo divided.

GUEST. And thus all its parts will become four; two of which indeed, with reference to us, will be human; and two again, with reference to the Gods, divine.

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST.

GUEST. But with reſpect to theſe, as being again divided in a different manner, one part of each diviſion is effective, but the remaining parts may be nearly called repreſentative. And hence, again, the effective art receives a twofold diviſion.

THEÆ. Inform me again how each is to be divided.

GUEST. With reſpect to ourſelves and other animals, and the things from which they naturally conſiſt, viz. fire and water, and the fiſters of theſe, we know that each of theſe productions is the offspring of Divinity. Do we not?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. After theſe the images of each, and not the things themſelves, follow; and theſe are produced by a dæmoniacal artifice.

THEÆ. What kind of images are theſe?

GUEST. Phantaſms which occur in ſleep, and ſuch as appearing in the day are called ſpontaneous; as, for inſtance, ſhadow, when darkneſs is generated in fire: but this is twofold, when domeſtic and foreign light concurring in one about ſplendid [1] and ſmooth bodies, and producing a ſenſation of ſeeing contrary to accuſtomed viſion, effect by theſe means a ſpecies.

THEÆ. Theſe works, therefore, of divine making are two, viz. the things themſelves, and the image which follows each.

GUEST. But what? Shall we not ſay that our art, by architecture, makes a houſe, but by painting, that other thing, the image of the houſe, which is, as it were, a human dream effected by men awake?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Hence, by giving a twofold diviſion after this manner to other things, we ſhall again find twofold works of our effective action, and we muſt call the one *auturgic*, or the thing itſelf effected, but the image, repreſentative.

THEÆ. I now underſtand you better, and I admit theſe two ſpecies of the effective art, with a twofold diviſion, viz. the divine and human according to one ſection; and the thing itſelf effected, and the offspring of certain imitations, according to the other.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, recollect, that of the image-producing art we

[1] See the latter part of the Introduction to the Timæus.

ſaid,

ſaid, one kind would be aſſimilative, and the other phantaſtic, if it ſhould appear that the falſe is truly falſe, and one certain thing belonging to beings.

THEÆ. We did ſay ſo.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, apparent, that we have now indubitably enumerated two ſpecies?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. We muſt, therefore, again give a twofold diſtribution to the phantaſtic ſpecies.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. One kind being that which is effected through inſtruments, but the other being the phantaſm of that which exhibits itſelf as the inſtrument of the efficient.

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

GUEST. I think, when any one employing your figure cauſes body to appear ſimilar to body, or voice to voice, this is particularly called an imitation belonging to the phantaſtic ſpecies.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but we will diſmiſs the whole of the other member, as being now weary, and we will permit ſome other perſon to collect it into one, and give it a proper denomination.

THEÆ. Let the member then you ſpeak of be divided, and let us diſmiſs the other.

GUEST. And indeed, Theætetus, it is fit to think that this alſo is twofold; but take notice on what account.

THEÆ. Say.

GUEST. Of thoſe who imitate, ſome knowing that which they imitate do this, but others not knowing it. Though, can we place any diviſion greater than that of ignorance and knowledge?

THEÆ. We cannot.

GUEST. Will not, therefore, that which we juſt now ſpoke of be an imitation of thoſe that are endued with knowledge? For this man, knowing you, imitates your figure.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. But what ſhall we ſay reſpecting the figure of juſtice, and, in ſhort, of the whole of virtue? Do not many, though they are ignorant, think that they know this, and, while they imitate that which ſeems to them to be the figure of juſtice, endeavour, both in words and works, to make it appear that it is inherent in them?

THEÆ. Very many, indeed.

GUEST. Are they not, therefore, diſappointed in their expectations of appearing to be juſt, as they are not ſo in any reſpect? Or does the very contrary to this take place?

THEÆ. The very contrary takes place.

GUEST. I think then we muſt ſay that this imitator is different from the other, he who is ignorant from him who knows.

THEÆ. We muſt.

GUEST. Whence, then, can any one derive a name adapted to each? Or is it evident that it is difficult? Becauſe a certain antient cauſe of the diviſion of genera into ſpecies was unknown to our anceſtors, ſo that none of them attempted to divide; and on this account they were neceſſarily very much in want of names. But at the ſame time, though it may be a bolder aſſertion, for the ſake of diſtinction, we ſhall call the imitation which ſubſiſts with opinion *doxomimetic*; but that which ſubſiſts in conjunction with ſcience, a certain hiſtoric imitation.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

GUEST. The other of theſe appellations, therefore, muſt be uſed: for a ſophiſt was not found to be among the ſcientific, but among imitators.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Let us then conſider this *doxaſtic imitator*, or one who imitates from opinion, as if he were iron, and ſee whether he is ſound, or whether he contains in himſelf ſomething twofold.

THEÆ. Let us conſider.

GUEST. He is, therefore, very copious. For, of ſophiſts, one is fooliſh, thinking that he knows the things which he opines: but the figure of another, through his rolling like a cylinder in diſcourſe, is replete with abundance of ſuſpicion and fear, that he is ignorant of thoſe things which he feigns himſelf to know before others.

THEÆ. There are both theſe kinds of ſophiſts, as you have ſaid.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, place one of theſe as a ſimple, and the other as an ironical imitator?

THEÆ. It is proper ſo to do.

GUEST. And again, ſhall we ſay that the genus of this is one or two?

THEÆ. Do you ſee whether it is or not.

GUEST. I conſider; and two imitators appear to me: one employing irony among the multitude publicly, and in prolix diſcourſes; and the other compelling the perſon who converſes with him to contradict himſelf, and this privately, and by ſhort diſcourſes.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt rightly.

GUEST. What then did we evince the imitator to be who employs prolix diſcourſes? Did we evince him to be a politician, or a popular ſpeaker?

THEÆ. A popular ſpeaker.

GUEST. But what did we call the other,—a wiſe man, or ſophiſtic?

THEÆ. To call him a wiſe man is impoſſible, ſince we have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an imitator of a wiſe man, he muſt evidently receive a ſimilar appellation. And I now nearly underſtand that this character ought truly to be called one who *is in every reſpect* a real ſophiſt.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, bind together his name, as we did before, connecting every thing from the end to the beginning?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. He, therefore, who compels thoſe that converſe with him to contradict themſelves, who is a part of the ironic genus, and a doxaſtic imitator, who likewiſe belongs to the phantaſtic genus, which proceeds from the repreſentative art, who is to be defined to be not a divine but a human production, and who by the artifice of his diſcourſes belongs to the wonder-working diviſion; he who ſays that a real ſophiſt is of this ſtock and conſanguinity will, as it appears, ſpeak moſt truly.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

THE END OF THE SOPHISTA.

THE

THE PHÆDRUS,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE BEAUTIFUL

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHÆDRUS.

SOME, ſays Hermeas [1], have endeavoured to ſhow that this dialogue is concerning rhetoric, looking only to its beginning and end; others, that it is about the ſoul, ſince here eſpecially Socrates demonſtrates its immortality; and others, that it is about love, ſince the beginning and occaſion of the dialogue originate from this. For Lyſias had written an oration in order to prove that it is not proper to gratify a lover, but one who is not a lover; he being vehemently in love with Phædrus, but pretending that he was not. Wiſhing, therefore, to withdraw him from other lovers, he viciouſly compoſed an oration, the deſign of which was to ſhow that it is requiſite rather to gratify one who is not a lover, than one who is; which gave occaſion to Socrates to diſcourſe concerning this intemperate love, together with temperate, divine, and enthuſiaſtic love, becauſe it is a love of this latter kind which ſhould be embraced and followed. Others again aſſert that the dialogue is theological, on account of what is ſaid in the middle of it. But, according to others, its ſubject is *the good*, becauſe Socrates ſays that the ſuperceleſtial place has never been celebrated according to its deſert, and that an uncoloured and unfigured eſſence there ſubſiſts. And, laſtly, others aſſert that it is concerning the beautiful itſelf. All theſe, therefore, form their opinion of the whole ſcope of the dialogue from a certain part of it. For it is evident that the diſcourſe concerning the ſoul is aſſumed for the ſake of ſomething elſe, and alſo that concerning the firſt beauty: for Socrates aſcends from other beautiful things to this, and to the

[1] In Scholiis MSS. in Phædrum.

ſuperceleſtial place. It is alſo evident that the diſcourſes about love are to be referred to the lover. It muſt not, therefore, be ſaid that there are many ſcopes; for it is neceſſary that all of them ſhould be extended to one thing, that the diſcourſe may be as it were one animal. In ſhort, Socrates ſpeaks concerning all-various beauty. Hence he begins from the apparent beauty in the form of Phædrus, with which Lyſias was enamoured, in conſequence of falling off from the character of a true lover. But afterwards he proceeds to the beauty in diſcourſes, of which Phædrus is repreſented as a lover. From this he aſcends to the beauty in ſoul, viz. to the virtues and ſciences; and thence, in his recantation, to the mundane Gods. After which he aſcends to the intelligible fountain itſelf of beauty, to the God of love, and to the beautiful itſelf; whence he again deſcends through the diviſive art to the beauty in ſoul, and in the virtues and ſciences; and afterwards again to the beauty in diſcourſes, thus conjoining the end with the beginning. In ſhort, the whole intention of the dialogue may be divided into three parts, correſponding to three lives:—into the intemperate love, which is ſeen in the oration of Lyſias; into the temperate, which is ſeen in the firſt diſcourſe of Socrates; and, in the third place, into the divinely inſpired, which is ſeen in the recantation, and in the laſt diſcourſe of Socrates. It may alſo be ſaid that the lovers, the loves, and the objects of love, are analogous to theſe lives. Hence they do not much deviate from the deſign of the dialogue who aſſert that it is concerning love, ſince love is ſeen in a relation to the object of love: and it is neceſſary indeed not to be ignorant of kindred differences, ſince Plato himſelf does not deliver caſual diſtinctions of love, and the object of love. However, it is evident that the leading ſcope of the dialogue is not concerning love; for neither does it diſcuſs its eſſence, nor its power, but diſcourſes concerning its energies in the world, and in ſouls. But if Plato any where makes love the leading ſcope of a dialogue, he diſcourſes concerning its eſſence, power, and energy. Hence in The Banquet, where love is the leading object, he delivers its middle nature, and its order, calling it a mighty dæmon, as binding ſecondary to primary natures. But here, a diſcourſe concerning the beautiful takes the lead, to which all things are elevated by love.

And here it is neceſſary to obſerve, that the firſt ſubſiſtence of *the beautiful*, the primary object of this dialogue, is in intelligible intellect, the extremity

of the intelligible triad, where it ſubſiſts as an intelligible idea. It is this beauty which, according to Orpheus, when it aroſe, aſtoniſhed the intellectual Gods, and produced in them an admiration of their father Phanes: for thus the theologiſt ſings concerning it;

Θαυμαζον καθορωντες εν αιθερι φεγγος αελπτον,
Τῳ μεν απεστιλβε χροος αθανατοιο Φανητος.

i. e. "they wondered on beholding in æther an unexpected light, with which the body of the immortal Phanes glittered." This beauty too, as we have obſerved in a note on the Parmenides, is a vital intellectual form, the ſource of ſymmetry [1] to all things,

With reſpect to the perſons of the dialogue, they are Lyſias, or rather the oration of Lyſias, Phædrus, and Socrates; Lyſias and Phædrus being, as we have ſaid, lovers of each other, but Socrates being the curator of youth, and the providential inſpector of Phædrus, elevating him from the apparent and external beauty in words, to the beauty in ſoul and intellect. As ſome however have accuſed [2] the dialogue as inflated in its diction, on account of what is ſaid in the recantation, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that Socrates employs words adapted to the things themſelves. For, as he diſcourſes about objects unapparent, and unknown to the many, he accordingly uſes an elevated diction, and ſuch as accords with an intelligible and divine eſſence.

Indeed, if human nature in this its degraded condition is capable of receiving the inſpirations of divinity, and if a part of the preſent dialogue was compoſed under ſuch an influence, an accuſation of this kind is certainly its greateſt commendation.

Hence it is juſtly obſerved by Proclus [3], "that Plato in this dialogue being inſpired by the Nymphs, and exchanging human intelligence for fury, which is a thing far more excellent, delivers many arcane dogmas concerning the

[1] Symmetry, according to the moſt accurate and philoſophical definition of it, is the dominion of that which is naturally *more* over that which is naturally *leſs* excellent. Hence ſymmetry then ſubſiſts in body, when *form* vanquiſhes *matter*. Had Mr. Burke known and underſtood the above definition of beauty, he would not have given to the world ſuch a crudity as his treatiſe On the Sublime and Beautiful.

[2] Dicæarchus, according to Cicero vi. 2. ad Atticum, is ſaid to have reprehended this dialogue as too vehement, becauſe it breathes of the dithyrambic character.

[3] In Plat. Theol. lib. i. p. 8.

intellectual

intellectual Gods, and many concerning the liberated rulers of the univerſe, who elevate the multitude of mundane Gods to the intelligible monads, ſeparate from the wholes which this univerſe contains. And ſtill more does he deliver about the mundane Gods themſelves, celebrating their intellections and fabrications about the world, their unpolluted providence, their government about ſouls, and other particulars which Socrates diſcloſes in this dialogue according to a deific energy."

I only add, that though there are frequent alluſions in this dialogue to that unnatural vice which was ſo faſhionable among the Greeks, yet the reader will find it ſeverely cenſured in the courſe of the dialogue by our divine philoſopher. There can be no reaſon to fear, therefore, that the ears of the modeſt will be ſhocked by ſuch alluſions, ſince they are inſerted with no other view than that they may be exploded as they deſerve. But if, notwithſtanding this, any one ſhall perſiſt in reprobating certain parts of the dialogue as indecent, it may be fairly concluded, that ſuch a one poſſeſſes the affectation of modeſty without the reality; and that he is probably a bigot to ſome deſpicable and whining ſect of religion, in which cant and grimace are the ſubſtitutes for genuine piety and worth.

THE PHÆDRUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND PHÆDRUS.

SCENE.—THE BANKS OF THE ILISSUS.

SOCRATES.

WHITHER are you going, my dear Phædrus, and from whence came you?

PHÆDR. From Lyſias, the ſon of Cephalus, Socrates; but I am going, for the ſake of walking, beyond the walls of the city. For I have been ſitting with him a long time, indeed from very early in the morning till now. But being perſuaded by Acumenus[1], who is your aſſociate as well as mine, to take ſome exerciſe, I determined upon that of walking. For he ſaid that this kind of exerciſe was not ſo laborious, and at the ſame time was more healthful, than that of the courſe.

SOC. He ſpeaks well, my friend, on this ſubject: and ſo Lyſias then, as it ſeems, was in the city.

PHÆDR. He was. For he dwells with Epicrates in this houſe of Morychus, which is next to that of Olympius.

SOC. But what was his employment there? Or did not Lyſias treat you with a banquet of orations?

PHÆDR. You ſhall hear, if you have but leiſure to walk along with me, and attend.

[1] This Acumenus the phyſician is alſo mentioned by Plato in the Protagoras, and by Xenophon in the third book of the Sayings and Deeds of Socrates.

Soc. But what, do you not think that I, according to Pindar, would conſider as a thing ſuperior to buſineſs, the relation of your converſation with Lyſias?

PHÆDR. Go on then.

Soc. Begin the relation then.

PHÆDR. And indeed, Socrates, the hearing of this is proper for you [1]. For I do not know how it happened ſo, but our diſcourſe was amatory. For Lyſias, through the perſuaſion of ſome beautiful perſon, though not one of his lovers, had compoſed an oration on love, and this in a very elegant manner: in the courſe of which he aſſerts that one who does not love ought to be gratified rather than a lover.

Soc. Generous man! I wiſh he had likewiſe aſſerted that this ſhould be the caſe with the poor rather than the rich, the old than the young, and ſo in all the reſt, that thus I myſelf, and many more of us, might be gratified [2]: for then his diſcourſe would have been both polite and publicly uſeful. I am therefore ſo deſirous [3] of hearing his oration, that if you ſhould even walk as far as to Megara, and, like Herodicus [4], when you had reached the walls, immediately turn back again, I ſhould not leave you.

PHÆDR. What do you ſay, moſt excellent Socrates? Do you think me ſo much of an idiot as to ſuppoſe myſelf capable of relating, in ſuch a manner as it deſerves, a diſcourſe which Lyſias, the moſt ſkilful writer of the preſent age, was a long time in compoſing at his leiſure? I am certainly very far from entertaining ſuch a ſuppoſition: though I would rather be able to do this than be the poſſeſſer of a great quantity of gold.

Soc. O Phædrus, if I do not know Phædrus, I am likewiſe forgetful of myſelf; but neither of theſe happens to be the caſe. For I well know that

[1] Socrates acknowledges that he knew the three following things, viz. *the amatory art*, as in the Banquet he ſays concerning Diotima, "ſhe taught me amatory affairs;" *the maieutic art*, as in the Theætetus he ſays, "divinity has ordered me to exerciſe obſtetrication;" and *the dialectic art*, as in the Cratylus, "for I know nothing, ſays he, except to give and take words."

[2] It is ſcarcely neceſſary to obſerve that Socrates ſays this ironically.

[3] Socrates deſires to hear, becauſe he vehemently wiſhes, from his amatory diſpoſition, to energize divinely, and to ſave the youth.

[4] This Herodicus, as we are informed by Hermeas, was a phyſician, who made gymnaſtic exerciſes beyond the walls, beginning from a certain commenſurate interval at no great diſtance, as far as to the wall, and turning back again; and doing this often, he performed his exerciſes.

he has not only heard the diſcourſe of Lyſias once [1], but that he has deſired him to repeat it often: and that Lyſias willingly complied with his requeſt. But neither was this ſufficient for Phædrus; but having at length obtained the book, he conſidered that which he moſtly deſired to ſee. And ſitting down to peruſe it very early in the morning, he continued his employment, till being fatigued, he went out for a walk; and, by the dog, as it appears to me committed it to memory, unleſs perhaps it was too long for this purpoſe. But he directed his courſe beyond the walls, that he might meditate on this oration. Meeting, however, with one who was madly fond of diſcourſe, he rejoiced on beholding him, becauſe he ſhould have a partner in his corybantic fury; and deſired him to walk on. But when that lover of diſcourſe requeſted him to repeat the oration, he feigned as if he was unwilling to comply; but though he was unwilling that any one ſhould hear him voluntarily, he was at length compelled to the relation. I therefore entreat, Phædrus, that you will quickly accompliſh all I deſire.

PHÆDR. Well then, I will endeavour to ſatisfy you in the beſt manner I am able; for I ſee you will not diſmiſs me till I have exerted my utmoſt abilities to pleaſe you.

SOC. You perfectly apprehend the truth reſpecting me.

PHÆDR. I will therefore gratify you; but, in reality, Socrates, I have not learned by heart the words of this oration, though I nearly retain the ſenſe of all the arguments by which he ſhows the difference between a lover and one who does not love; and theſe I will ſummarily relate to you in order, beginning from the firſt.

SOC. But ſhow me firſt, my friend, what you have got there in your left [2] hand,

[1] Not to hear once, but often, ſays Hermeas, manifeſts the unwearied labour of men about apparent beauty. The book here ſignifies that ſenſible beauties are images of images, as the letters in it are primarily indicative of the ſoul, but ſecondarily of the reaſons proceeding from the ſoul. A dog is dedicated to Hermes, and is the laſt veſtige of the Mercurial ſeries. As the preſent hypotheſis, therefore, is about the oration of Lyſias, and Hermes is the inſpective guardian of diſcourſe, Socrates very properly ſwears by the dog. It may alſo be ſaid that he thus ſwears as reverencing the extremity of this order, and through it calling the inſpective Hermes himſelf as a witneſs.

[2] The left hand here manifeſts that a rhetoric of this kind is extended to the worſe, or in other words, the paſſive part of the ſoul; and that it does not pertain to the pure power and ſummit

hand, under your cloak: for I ſuſpect that you have got the oration itſelf. And if this be the caſe, think thus with yourſelf reſpecting me, that I perfectly eſteem you; but that, when Lyſias is preſent, it is by no means my intention to liſten to you. And therefore ſhow it me.

PHÆDR. You ought to deſiſt: for you have deſtroyed thoſe hopes, Socrates, which I entertained reſpecting you; the hopes I mean of conteſting with you. But where are you willing we ſhould ſit, while we read?

SOC. Let us, turning hither, direct our ſteps towards the river Iliſſus: and afterwards, when you ſhall think proper to reſt, we will ſit down.

PHÆDR. And this will be very ſeaſonable, as it appears, for I am at preſent without ſhoes [1]; but this is always the caſe with you. It will be eaſy, therefore, for us to walk by the ſide of the brook, moiſtening our feet; nor will it be unpleaſant, eſpecially at this ſeaſon of the year, and this time of the day.

SOC. Go on then, and at the ſame time look out for a place where we may ſit down.

PHÆDR. Do you ſee that moſt lofty plane tree?

SOC. Why, what then?

PHÆDR. For there, there is a cool ſhade, moderate breezes of wind, and ſoft graſs, upon which we may either ſit, or, if you are ſo diſpoſed, lie down.

SOC. Let us go then.

PHÆDR. But inform me, Socrates, whether this is not the place in which Boreas is reported to have raviſhed Orithya from Iliſſus.

of the rational ſoul, viz. to intellect, but rather to the doxaſtic and phantaſtic part. But the book being concealed under the garment of Phædrus, ſignifies that ſuch rhetoric is involved in darkneſs, and is fallen from the light of ſcience: for it is converſant with doxaſtic and material concerns, and with human trifles.

[1] The being without ſhoes here ſignifies promptitude, the unſuperfluous, and an aptitude to the anagogic, which indeed were always preſent with Socrates, but with Phædrus at that time, becauſe he was about to be perfected by Socrates. The ſummer alſo, and mid-day, are adapted to re-elevation, conformably to that ſaying of Heraclitus, that the ſoul that has a dry ſplendour is the wiſeſt. The dipping the feet in the brook ſignifies the touching on generation with the laſt and moſt abject powers of the ſoul; for theſe are indicated by the feet: the rational ſoul at the ſame time ſupernally contemplating generation. The breezes of wind alſo manifeſt the providential inſpiration of the Gods: but the ſhade ſignifies an intelligible, unapparent, and elevating power, remote from that which is ſenſible and which agitates; for this latter is indicated by the light.

SOC.

Soc. It is reported ſo indeed.

PHÆDR. Was it not juſt here then? for the brooks hereabouts appear to be grateful to the view, pure and tranſparent, and very well adapted to the ſports of virgins.

Soc. It was not, but two or three ſtadia lower down, where we meet with the temple of Diana [1], and in that very place there is a certain altar ſacred to Boreas [2].

PHÆDR.

[1] The Athenians, ſays Hermeas, eſtabliſhed a temple of Rural Diana, becauſe this Goddeſs is the inſpective guardian of every thing rural, and repreſſes every thing ruſtic and uncultivated. But the altars and temples of the Gods, ſignify their allotments; as you may alſo call the altar and temple of the ſun, and of the ſoul of the ſun, this mundane body, or apparent ſolar orb. So that in this place the allotments and illuminations of the Gods themſelves in temples will be the intelligible theory, and which inveſtigates univerſal through particulars, and *being* through that which *appears to ſubſiſt*. But the temple of this theory will be intellect.

[2] A twofold ſolution, ſays Hermeas, may be given of this fable; one from hiſtory, more ethical, but the other transferring us to wholes. And the former of theſe is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of Erectheus, and the prieſteſs of Boreas; for each of the winds has a preſiding deity, which the teleſtic art, or the art pertaining to ſacred myſteries, religiouſly cultivates. To this Orithya then, the God was ſo very propitious, that he ſent the north wind for the ſafety of the country; and beſides this, he is ſaid to have aſſiſted the Athenians in their naval battles: Orithya, therefore, becoming enthuſiaſtic, being poſſeſſed by her proper God Boreas, and no longer energizing as man (for animals ceaſe to energize according to their own idioms when poſſeſſed by ſuperior cauſes), died under the inſpiring influence, and thus was ſaid to have been raviſhed by Boreas. And this is the more ethical explanation of the fable.

But the ſecond which transfers the narration to wholes is as follows, and does not entirely ſubvert the former: for divine fables often employ tranſactions and hiſtories in ſubſerviency to the diſcipline of wholes. They ſay then, that Erectheus is the God that rules over the three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, he is conſidered as alone the ruler of the earth, and ſometimes as the preſiding deity of Attica alone. Of this deity Orithya is the daughter; and ſhe is the prolific power of the earth, which is, indeed, coextended with the word *Erectheus*, as the unfolding of the name ſignifies: for it is *the prolific power of the earth flouriſhing and reſtored according to the ſeaſons*. But Boreas is the providence of the Gods ſupernally illuminating ſecondary natures: for they ſignify the providence of the Gods in the world by Boreas; becauſe this Divinity blows from lofty places. But the anagogic power of the Gods is ſignified by the ſouth wind, becauſe this wind blows from low to lofty places; and beſides this, things ſituated towards the ſouth are more divine. The providence of the Gods, therefore, cauſes the prolific power of the earth, or of the Attic land, to *aſcend*, and proceed into the apparent.

Orithya alſo, ſays Hermeas, may be ſaid to be a ſoul* aſpiring after things above, from ὀρουω

* This is according to the pſychical mode of interpreting fables. See the General Introduction, vol. 1, of this work.

and

PHÆDR. I did not perfectly know this. But tell me, by Jupiter, Socrates, are you perſuaded that this fabulous narration [1] is true?

SOC. If I ſhould not believe in it, as is the caſe with the wiſe, I ſhould not be abſurd: and afterwards, ſpeaking ſophiſtically, I ſhould ſay that the wind Boreas hurled from the neighbouring rocks Orithya, ſporting with Pharmacia; and that ſhe dying in conſequence of this, was ſaid to have been raviſhed by Boreas, or from the hill of Mars. There is alſo another report that ſhe was not raviſhed from this place, but from that. But for my own part, Phædrus, I conſider interpretations of this kind as pleaſant enough, but at the ſame time, as the province of a man vehemently curious and laborious, and not entirely happy; and this for no other reaſon, than becauſe after ſuch an explanation, it is neceſſary for him to correct the ſhape of the Centaurs and Chimæra. And, beſides this, a crowd of Gorgons and Pegaſuſes will pour upon him for an expoſition of this kind, and of certain other prodigious

and θεω, according to the Attic cuſtom of adding a letter at the end of a word, which letter is here an ω. Such a ſoul, therefore, is raviſhed by Boreas ſupernally blowing. But if Orithya was hurled from a precipice, this alſo is appropriate: for ſuch a ſoul *dies a philoſophic*, not receiving a phyſical death, and abandons a *proairetic* *, at the ſame time that *ſhe lives* a phyſical life. And philoſophy, according to Socrates in the Phædo, is nothing elſe than a meditation of death. Let then Orithya be the ſoul of Phædrus, but Boreas Socrates raviſhing and leading it to a *proairetic* death.

[1] According to ſome, Socrates in what he now ſays, does not admit the explanations of fables. It is evident, however, that he frequently does admit and employ fables. But he now blames thoſe explanations which make fables to be nothing more than certain hiſtories, and unfold them into material cauſes, airs, and earth, and winds, which do not revert to true beings, nor harmonize with divine concerns. Hence Socrates now ſays, If unfolding this fable I ſhould recur to phyſical cauſes, and ſhould aſſert that the wind Boreas; blowing vehemently, hurled Orithya as as ſhe was playing from the rock, and thus dying ſhe was ſaid to have been raviſhed by Boreas,—ſhould I not ſpeak abſurdly? For this explanation which is adopted by the *wiſe*, viz. by thoſe who are employed in phyſical ſpeculations, is meagre and conjectural; ſince it does not recur to true beings, but to natures, and winds, and airs, and vortices, as he alſo ſays in the Phædo. He rejects, therefore, theſe naturaliſts, and thoſe who thus explain the fable, as falling into the indefinite and infinite, and not recurring to ſoul, intellect, and the Gods. But when Socrates ſays that he conſiders ſuch interpretations as the province of a man *very curious* and *laborious*, and *not entirely happy*, theſe words indicate the being converſant with things ſenſible and material. And the Centaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, and Pegaſuſes are powers which preſide over a material nature, and the region about the earth. But for an account of divine fables, and ſpecimens of the mode in which they ought to be explained, ſee the Introduction to the ſecond book of the Republic.

* That is a life pertaining to her own will; for the ſoul in this caſe gives herſelf up to the will of divinity.

natures,

natures, immenſe both in multitude and novelty. All which, if any one, not believing in their literal meaning, ſhould draw to a probable ſenſe, employing for this purpoſe a certain ruſtic wiſdom, he will ſtand in need of moſt abundant leiſure. With reſpect to myſelf indeed, I have not leiſure for ſuch an undertaking; and this becauſe I am not yet able, according to the Delphic precept, to know [1] myſelf. But it appears to me to be ridiculous, while I am yet ignorant of this, to ſpeculate things foreign from the knowledge of myſelf. Hence, bidding farewell to theſe, and being perſuaded in the opinion which I have juſt now mentioned reſpecting them, I do not contemplate theſe, but myſelf, conſidering whether I am not a wild beaſt [2], poſſeſſing more folds than Typhon, and far more raging and fierce; or whether I am a more mild and ſimple animal, naturally participating of a certain divine and modeſt condition. But are we not, my friend, in the midſt of our diſcourſe arrived at our deſtined ſeat? and is not yonder the oak to which you was to lead us?

PHÆDR. That indeed is it.

SOC. By Juno [3], a beautiful retreat. For the plane-tree very widely ſpreads its ſhady branches, and is remarkably tall; and the height and opacity of

[1] If any man ever knew himſelf, this was certainly the caſe with Socrates. In what he now ſays, therefore, his meaning may be, either that he does not yet know himſelf as pure ſoul itſelf, but that as being in body he knows himſelf; or that he does not yet know himſelf, as he is known by divinity.

[2] For it is evident that he who knows himſelf knows all things: for, in conſequence of the ſoul being παμμορφον ἀγαλμα an omniform image, he beholds all things in himſelf. By Typhon here we muſt underſtand that power which preſides over the confuſed and diſordered in the univerſe, or in other words the laſt proceſſion of things. The term *manifold*, therefore, in this place muſt not be applied to the God Typhon, but to that over which he preſides, as being in its own nature moved in a confuſed, diſordered, and manifold manner. For it is uſual with fables to refer the properties of the objects of providential care to the providing powers themſelves.

[3] Socrates mentions Juno, ſays Hermeas, as generating and adorning the beauty of the mundane fabrication; and hence ſhe is ſaid to have received the Ceſtus from Venus. Employing, therefore, true praiſe, he firſt celebrates the place from the three elements air, water, and earth; and afterwards he triply divides the vegetable productions of the earth into firſt, middle, and laſt. For this is evident from what he ſays of the plane tree, the willow, and the graſs. He ſhows, too, that all the ſenſes were delighted except the taſte. But Achelous is the deity who preſides over the much-honoured power of water: for, by this mighty river, the God who is the inſpective

of the willow, are perfectly beautiful, being now in the vigour of its vegetation, and, on this account, filling all the place with the moſt agreeable odour. Add too, that a moſt pleaſant fountain of extreme cool water flows under the plane-tree, as may be inferred from its effect on our feet, and which appears to be ſacred to certain nymphs, and to Achelous, from the virgins and ſtatues with which it is adorned. Then again, if you are ſo diſpoſed, take notice how lovely and very agreeable the air of the place is, and what a ſummer-like and ſonorous ſinging reſounds from the choir of graſshoppers. But the moſt elegant proſpect of all is that of the graſs, which in a manner ſo extremely beautiful, naturally adapts itſelf to receive on the gradual ſteep the reclining head. So that, my dear Phædrus, you have led me hither as a gueſt in the moſt excellent manner.

PHÆDR. But you, O wonderful man, appear to act moſt abſurdly; for by your diſcourſe one might judge you to be ſome ſtranger and not a native of the place. And, indeed, one might conclude that you had never paſſed beyond the bounds of the city, nor ever deſerted its walls.

SOC. Pardon me, moſt excellent Phædrus, for I am a lover of learning: and, hence I conſider that fields [1] and trees are not willing to teach me any thing; but that this can be effected by men reſiding in the city. You indeed appear to me to have diſcovered an enchantment capable of cauſing my departure from hence. For as they lead famiſhed animals whither they pleaſe, by extending to them leaves or certain fruits; ſo you, by extending to me the diſcourſes contained in books, may lead me about through all Attica, and indeed wherever you pleaſe. But now, for the preſent, ſince we

inſpective guardian of potable water is manifeſted. Nymphs are goddeſſes who preſide over regeneration, and are miniſtrant to Bacchus the offspring of Semele. Hence they dwell near water, that is, they aſcend into generation. But this Bacchus ſupplies the regeneration of the whole ſenſible world. Αχελωος δε εστι ὁ εφορος θεος της πολυτιμου δυναμεως ὑδατος· δια γαρ του μεγιστου τουτου ποταμου τον εφορον θεον δηλουσι του ποτιμου ὑδατος· νυμφαι δε εισιν εφοροι θεαι της παλιγγενεσιας· ὑπουργοι του εκ Σεμελης Διονυσου. Διο και παρα τῳ ὑδατι εισι, τουτεστι τῃ γενεσει επιβεβηκασιν· ουτος δε ὁ Διονυσος της παλιγγενεσιας ὑπαρχει παντος του αισθητου.

[1] This manifeſts, as it is beautifully obſerved by Hermeas, that Socrates always adhered to his proper principles and cauſes, and his own intelligible and proper divinities. For the true country of ſouls is the intelligible world. His diſcipline, therefore, was not derived from things ſenſible and reſiſting, but from rational and intellectual ſouls, and from intellect itſelf. The country is indeed

we are arrived hither, I for my part am diſpoſed to lie down; but do you, aſſuming whatever poſition you think moſt convenient, begin to read.

PHÆDR. Hear then.—" You are well acquainted with the ſtate of my affairs, and you have heard, I think, that it is moſt conducive to my advantage for them to ſubſiſt in this manner. But it appears to me that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wiſh to obtain, becauſe I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their deſires ceaſe, repent themſelves of the benefits which they have beſtowed; but there is no time in which it is proper for thoſe void of love to repent their beneficence; ſince they do not conſult from neceſſity, but voluntarily, and in the beſt manner about their own affairs, and do good as far as their circumſtances will admit. Beſides, lovers ſometimes reflect how negligently they have attended, through love, to their own concerns, what benefits they have beſtowed, to their own loſs, and what labours they have undergone; and therefore think they have conferred favours worthy the objects of their love. But thoſe void of love, neither blame themſelves for neglecting their affairs, nor complain of paſt labours, or diſagreement with their familiars, as produced by ſome beloved object. So that ſuch mighty evils being removed, nothing elſe remains for them than to perform with willingneſs and alacrity whatever they think will be acceptable to the objects of their beneficent exertions. Beſides, if it is ſaid that lovers make much of the party beloved, becauſe they love in the moſt eminent degree, and are always prepared, both in words and actions, to comply with the deſires of their beloved, though they ſhould offend others by ſo doing; it is eaſy to know that this is not the truth, becauſe lovers far more eſteem the poſterior than the prior objects of their love; and if the more re-

indeed ſo far pleaſant only to an intellectual man, as it is favourable to ſolitude, and this becauſe ſolitude is favourable to contemplation; but to be delighted with trees, and meadows, and ſtreams, merely for their own ſakes, is the province of ſuch as are capable of no other energies than thoſe of ſenſe and imagination. Socrates, in following Phædrus, likewiſe manifeſts his providential energy about youth, and his wiſh to ſave them. But his hearing in a reclined poſition, ſignifies his energizing about things of a more abject nature, ſuch as were the opinions of Lyſias about beauty. For it is neceſſary, as Hermeas well obſerves, to accommodate the figures alſo to the hypotheſes. Hence, in his recantation, Socrates very properly uncovers his head, becauſe he there diſcourſes on divine love. As, therefore, now intending to energize about more abject beauty, he hears reclining; aſſimilating the apparent figure to the diſcourſe. Thus alſo in the Phædo, he ſat in an *upright* poſture on the bed when he was about to ſpeak concerning the philoſopher.

cently beloved party thinks fit, they are even willing to treat injuriouſly the former ſubjects of their regard. But to what elſe is it proper to aſcribe ſuch a conduct, except that calamity, love; a conduct which he who had never experienced this paſſion would never ſuppoſe poſſible to exiſt. And beſides this, lovers themſelves confeſs that they are rather diſeaſed than prudent, and that they know their ill condition with reſpect to prudence, but are unable to ſubdue it. But how can ſuch as are properly prudent approve the deſires of ſuch as are thus diſeaſed? Beſides, if you ſhould wiſh to chooſe among lovers the beſt aſſociate, your choice muſt be confined to a few; but if you deſire to find among others one moſt accommodated to yourſelf, you may chooſe out of many, And there are much more hopes of finding one worthy of your friendſhip among a many than a few. If, therefore, you reverence the eſtabliſhed law, and are afraid leſt the infamy of offenders ſhould be your portion, it is proper to remember that lovers, who conſider themſelves as loved with a mutual regard, are accuſtomed to boaſt that they have not beſtowed their labour in vain; but that ſuch as are not infected with love, being better than theſe, content themſelves with enjoying that which is beſt rather than the opinion of men. But ſtill further, when the multitude perceive lovers following the objects of their affection, and beſtowing all poſſible aſſiduity in this employment, they are neceſſarily perſuaded that when they perceive them diſcourſing with each other, the deſire of coition has either then taken place, or is about to do ſo: but they do not attempt to reproach the familiarity of ſuch as are without love, as they know it is neceſſary that they muſt either diſcourſe through friendſhip, or ſome other pleaſure unconnected with coition. And, indeed, if in conſequence of this doctrine you are afraid that it will be difficult for friendſhip to remain, and that diſagreements, by ſome means or other ariſing, will become a common deſtruction to both; at the ſame time premiſing that you ſhall thus ſuffer a great injury in moſt of your tranſactions; if this is the caſe, you ought with much greater reaſon to be afraid of lovers. For there are many things afflictive to theſe, and they conſider every thing as happening to their diſadvantage. Hence, they prohibit the objects of their regard from aſſociating with other lovers, dreading leſt the wealthy ſhould ſurpaſs them in wealth, and the learned in knowledge; and, as far as they are able, preſerve them from the company of thoſe who poſſeſs any thing good. And thus, by

perſuading

perſuading them to abſtain from ſuch as theſe, they cauſe them to abandon their friends. If, therefore, you conſider your own advantage, you will be wiſer than theſe, and will entirely diſagree with them in opinion. But ſuch as are not your lovers, but who act in a becoming manner through virtue, will not envy your aſſociation with others, but will rather hate thoſe who are unwilling to be your familiars; thinking that you are deſpiſed by ſuch as theſe, but that you are benefited by your aſſociates. So that there is much more reaſon to hope that friendſhip will be produced by this means, than that enmity will ariſe from ſuch a connection. Add to this, that the moſt part of lovers deſire the poſſeſſion of the body before they know the manners, or have made trial of any thing elſe belonging to the beloved object: ſo that it is uncertain whether they will ſtill wiſh to be friends to them, when the deſire produced by love is no more. But it is probable that ſuch as are without love, ſince from the commencement of their friendſhip they acted without regarding venereal delight,—it is probable that they will act with leſs ardour, but that they will leave their actions as monuments of their conduct in futurity. Beſides, it will be more advantageous to you to be perſuaded by me than by a lover. For lovers will praiſe both your ſayings and actions beyond all meaſure; ſome through fear, leſt they ſhould offend you; but others, in conſequence of being depraved in their judgment, through deſire. For love will point you out to be ſuch. It likewiſe compels the unfortunate to conſider as calamitous things which cauſe no moleſtation to others, and obliges the fortunate to celebrate as pleaſant, things which are not deſerving of delight: ſo that it is much more proper to commiſerate than emulate lovers. But if you will be perſuaded by me, in the firſt place I will aſſociate with you, without caring for preſent pleaſure, but for the ſake of future advantage; not vanquiſhed by love, but ſubduing myſelf; nor for mere trifles exciting ſevere enmity, but indulging a very little anger, and this but ſlowly even for great offences: pardoning, indeed, involuntary faults, and endeavouring to turn you from the commiſſion of ſuch as are voluntary. For theſe are the marks of a friendſhip likely to endure for a very extended period of time. However, if it ſhould appear to you that friendſhip cannot be firm unleſs it is united with the lover, you ſhould conſider that, according to this, we ought not to be very fond of our children or parents, nor reckon thoſe friends faithful, who became ſuch, not from deſire, but from ſtudies of a

different kind. But further ſtill, if it is requiſite to gratify in the moſt eminent degree thoſe who are in want, it is proper to benefit, not the beſt of men, but the moſt needy: for, being liberated from the greateſt evils, they will render them the moſt abundant thanks. And beſides this, in the exertions of your own private benevolence, it is not proper to call your friends, but mendicants and thoſe who ſtand in need of alimentary ſupplies. For theſe will delight in you, and follow you; will ſtand before your doors, and teſtify the moſt abundant ſatisfaction; render you the greateſt thanks, and pray for your proſperity. But, perhaps, it is proper not to be pleaſed with thoſe who are vehemently needy, but rather with thoſe who are able to repay you with thanks, nor with lovers only but with thoſe deſerving your attention. Nor again, with thoſe who enjoy the beauty of your youth, but with ſuch as may participate your kindneſs when you are old. Nor with thoſe who, when their deſire is accompliſhed, are ambitious of obtaining others, but with thoſe who through modeſty are ſilent towards all men. Nor with thoſe who officiouſly attend upon you for a ſhort time, but with thoſe who are ſimilarly your friends through the whole of life. Nor, laſtly, with thoſe who, when deſire is extinguiſhed, ſeek after occaſions of enmity; but with thoſe who, when the flower of your beauty is decayed, will then exhibit their virtue and regard. Do you, therefore, remember what I have ſaid, and conſider that friends admoniſh lovers, that they are engaged in a baſe purſuit; but that thoſe void of love are never blamed by any of their familiars, as improperly conſulting about themſelves, through a privation of love. Perhaps you will aſk me whether I perſuade you to gratify all who are not lovers. But I think that even a lover would not exhort you to be equally affected towards all your lovers: for neither would this deſerve equal thanks from the receiver; nor would you, who are deſirous to conceal yourſelf from others, be able to accompliſh this with equal facility towards all. It is, however, neceſſary that you ſhould receive no injury from your lover; but that ſome advantage ſhould accrue to both. To me it appears, therefore, that I have ſaid ſufficient; but if you think any thing ſhould be added, inform me what it is."

How does this diſcourſe appear to you, Socrates? Is not the oration compoſed in a tranſcendent manner, both as to the ſentiments and the ſtructure of the words?

Soc.

Soc. Divinely indeed, my friend, ſo as that I am aſtoniſhed. And in the ſame tranſcendent manner am I affected towards you, Phædrus, while I behold you, becauſe you appeared to me in the courſe of reading the oration to be tranſported with delight. As I conſidered, therefore, that you was more ſkilful in ſuch affairs than myſelf, I followed you; and, in following, was agitated together with you, O divine head! with bacchic fury.

Phædr. Are you diſpoſed to jeſt in this manner?

Soc. Do I appear then to you to jeſt, and not to ſpeak ſeriouſly?

Phædr. You by no means appear to be ſerious, Socrates. But, by Jupiter, who preſides over friendſhip, tell me whether you think that any one of the Greeks could ſay any thing greater and more copiouſly on this ſubject?

Soc. But what, do you think that a diſcourſe ought to be praiſed by you and me, becauſe its compoſer has ſaid what is ſufficient? and not for this alone, that he has artificially faſhioned every word clear, and round, and accurate? For, if it is neceſſary, this muſt be granted for your ſake: for it is concealed from me, through my nothingneſs. Hence, I only attended to the eloquence of the compoſer; for, as to the other particular, I do not believe that even Lyſias will think himſelf ſufficient. And indeed to me, Phædrus, it appears (unleſs you ſay otherwiſe) that he has twice and thrice repeated the ſame things, as if he did not poſſeſs a great copiouſneſs of diſcourſe upon the ſame ſubject: or, perhaps, he took no great care about a thing of this kind. And beſides this, he ſeems to me to act in a juvenile manner, by ſhowing that he can expreſs the ſame thing in different ways, and yet at the ſame time, according to each mode, in the beſt manner poſſible.

Phædr. You ſpeak nothing to the purpoſe, Socrates: for this oration poſſeſſes a copiouſneſs of ſentiment in the moſt eminent degree. For he has omitted nothing belonging to his ſubject, which he could with propriety introduce: ſo that, beſides what has been ſaid by him, no one could ever be able to diſcourſe, either more abundantly or more to the purpoſe, on the ſame ſubject, than he has done.

Soc. I cannot grant you this; for the wiſe of old, both men and women, who have diſcourſed and written on this ſubject, would confute me, if I ſhould admit this for the ſake of gratifying you.

PHÆDR. Who are thoſe antients? and where have you heard better things than theſe?

SOC. I do not ſufficiently remember at preſent; but it is manifeſt that I have ſomewhere heard of ſome of theſe, ſuch as the beautiful Sappho, or the wiſe Anacreon, or certain other writers. But from whence do I derive this conjecture? Becauſe, O divine man! finding my breaſt full of conceptions, I perceive that I have ſomething to ſay in addition to what has been already delivered, and this not of an inferior nature. I well know, indeed, that I underſtand nothing about ſuch things from myſelf, as I am conſcious of my own ignorance. It remains therefore, I think, that I myſelf, like a veſſel, ſhould be filled with knowledge, through hearing, from the fountains of others; but that, through my dulneſs of apprehenſion, I ſhould again forget how, and from whom, I received the information.

PHÆDR. You ſpeak, moſt generous man, in the moſt excellent manner. For you cannot inform me, though I ſhould command you to do ſo, how, and from whom, you derived your knowledge; but this which you ſpeak of you are able to accompliſh, ſince you poſſeſs more abundant and more excellent conceptions than thoſe contained in the oration of Lyſias. And if you are but able to accompliſh this, I promiſe you, after the manner of the nine Archons, to place a golden ſtatue of an equal meaſure at Delphi, not of myſelf only, but likewiſe of you.

SOC. You are of a moſt friendly diſpoſition, Phædrus, and truly golden, if you ſuppoſe me to have aſſerted that Lyſias was perfectly faulty, and that ſomething better might have been ſaid than the whole of this: for I do not think that this can ever happen, even to the worſt of writers. But to the point in hand, about this oration: Do you think that any one who aſſerts that it is more proper to gratify one who does not love than a lover can have any thing to ſay beſides his aſſertion, if he omits to prove that he who is void of love is prudent, but the lover is not ſo; and praiſes the one, but blames the other? But I think that omiſſions of this kind are to be ſuffered, and even pardoned, in a writer; and that it is not the invention of theſe diſcourſes, but the elegance of the compoſition, which ought to be praiſed. But in things which are not neceſſary, and which are difficult to diſcover, I think that not only the compoſition, but likewiſe the invention, ſhould be praiſed.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. I aſſent to what you ſay: for you appear to me to ſpeak modeſtly. I will therefore allow you to ſuppoſe that a lover is more diſeaſed than one who is void of love; but, if in what remains you ſpeak more copiouſly and more to the purpoſe than Lyſias, you ſhall ſtand in Olympia, artificially fabricated, near the Cypſelidæ [1].

SOC. You are ſerious, Phædrus, becauſe I have found fault with a man who is exceedingly beloved by you; and you think that I have in reality attempted to ſpeak ſomething more copious than what his wiſdom has produced

PHÆDR. In this affair, my friend, you have afforded me a ſimilar handle to that which I ſome time ſince afforded you, and it is neceſſary for you to ſpeak upon this ſubject in the beſt manner you are able. And that we may not be compelled to adopt that troubleſome method of comedians, by anſwering one another, take care of yourſelf; and do not oblige me to retort upon you "If I, O Socrates! am ignorant of Socrates, I am alſo forgetful of myſelf." And, "that he deſires to ſpeak, indeed, but feigns to be unwilling." In ſhort, aſſure yourſelf that we ſhall not depart from hence before you have diſcloſed to me that which you keep concealed in your breaſt. For there is none but us two; we are in a ſolitary place; and I am both ſtronger and younger than you. From all this, then, underſtand what I ſay; and by no means diſpoſe yourſelf to be forced to ſpeak, rather than to diſcourſe of your own accord.

SOC. But, O bleſſed Phædrus! it would certainly be ridiculous in me, who am but an idiot, to contend with that excellent writer, and this too extemporary.

PHÆDR. Do you know how the caſe ſtands? Ceaſe your boaſting before me: for I have nearly got a ſecret in my poſſeſſion, which, when told, will force you to ſpeak.

SOC. Do not tell it, therefore, I beſeech you.

PHÆDR. Not tell it? But indeed I ſhall. For my ſecret is an oath. And therefore I ſwear to you, by ſome one of the Gods, or, if you will, be

[1] The Cypſelidæ were three princes who deſcended from Cypſelus, a king of Corinth. This Cypſelus reigned 73 years, and was ſucceeded by his ſon Periander, who left his kingdom, after a reign of 40 years, to Cypſelus II.

this plane-tree, that unleſs you deliver to me a diſcourſe the very contrary to that of Lyſias, I will never at any time either ſhow or read to you another oration.

Soc. O you wicked man! how well have you found out a method of compelling a lover of literature to act as you pleaſe!

Phædr. Why then, ſince it is ſo, do you heſitate about complying?

Soc. I ſhall not indeed any longer, ſince you have ſworn in this manner. For how is it poſſible for any one to abſtain from ſuch feaſts as you are capable of ſupplying?

Phædr. Begin then.

Soc. Do you know what I mean to do?

Phædr. About what?

Soc. Why, I mean to ſpeak covered with my garment [1], that I may rapidly run through my diſcourſe, and that, by not looking at you, I may not be hindered through ſhame.

Phædr. Do but ſpeak; and as to the reſt, you may act as you pleaſe.

Soc. Inſpire me then, O ye Muſes [2]! whether you are ſo called from the melody of ſinging, or from the muſical tribe of ſhrill ſounds; and ſo aſſiſt me in the diſcourſe which this beſt of men compels me to deliver, that his aſſociate, who formerly appeared to him to be wiſe, may now appear to him to be ſtill more ſo.

There was a certain youth, or rather a delicate young man, extremely beautiful, and who poſſeſſed a multitude of lovers. Among theſe there was one of a fraudulent diſpoſition; who, though he did not love leſs than the reſt, yet perſuaded the youth that he was not one of his lovers. And aſking him on a certain time to ſatisfy his deſire, he endeavoured to convince him that one who was not a lover ought to be gratified before one who was. But he ſpoke to this effect: In every thing, young man, one prin-

[1] The modeſty of Socrates in this place muſt ſufficiently convince the moſt careleſs reader of Plato, that this divine philoſopher was very far from being a friend to that unnatural connection of the male ſpecies, which is ſo frequently alluded to in this dialogue, and which was ſo common among the Greeks. He indeed who has in the leaſt experienced that extreme purity of ſentiment and conduct which is produced by a cultivation of the Platonic philoſophy, will require no further conviction of the chaſtity of Socratic love; but as this can never be the caſe with the vulgar, they can alone be convinced by external and popular proofs.

[2] For an account of the Muſes, ſee the notes on the Cratylus.

ciple,

ciple, to thoſe who are about to conſult in a becoming manner, is, to know that about which they conſult, or elſe it is neceſſary that they ſhould perfectly wander from the truth. But the multitude are ignorant that they do not know the eſſence of every particular. Hence in the beginning of their diſquiſitions, they do not trouble themſelves to declare what the eſſence of a thing is, as if they were very knowing in matters of this kind; but in the courſe of their inquiry they exhibit nothing more than probable reaſons; and thus they are neither conſiſtent with themſelves, nor with others. With reſpect to you and me, therefore, leſt we ſhould ſuffer that which we condemn in others, in our inquiry, whether the engagement of friendſhip ought to be entered upon with one who does not love, rather than with one who does, we ought to know what love is, and what power it poſſeſſes, mutually agreeing in our definition reſpecting it; and looking towards, and referring our diſcourſe to this, we ſhould conſider whether it is the cauſe of advantage or detriment. That love, therefore, is a certain deſire, is manifeſt to every one; and we are not ignorant that thoſe who are void of love, are deſirous of beautiful things. That we may be able, therefore, to diſtinguiſh a lover from one who is not ſo, it is requiſite to know that there are two certain ideas in each of us, endued with a ruling and leading power, and which we follow wherever they conduct us. One of theſe is the innate deſire of pleaſures; but the other an acquired opinion, deſirous of that which is beſt. But theſe ſometimes ſubſiſt in us in a ſtate of amity, and ſometimes in a ſtate of oppoſition and diſcord. And ſometimes the one conquers, and ſometimes the other. When opinion, therefore, is led by reaſon to that which is beſt, and vanquiſhes, it is denominated, from its vanquiſhing, temperance. But when deſire irrationally allures to pleaſure, and rules within us, it is called from its dominion, injury. But injury poſſeſſes a multitude of appellations: for it is multiform, and conſiſts of many ſpecies. And of theſe ideas that which ſubſiſts in the moſt remarkable degree, cauſes that in which it reſides to receive its appellation, and does not ſuffer it to be denominated any thing graceful or worthy. For when, with reſpect to food, deſire of eating vanquiſhes the reaſon of that which is beſt, and rules over the other deſires, then this deſire is called gluttony; which likewiſe ſubjects its poſſeſſor to the ſame appellation. But that which tyrannizes about intoxication, and which through this leads

its poſſeſſor wherever it pleaſes, evidently confers on him its own appellation. And it is ſufficiently manifeſt how the ſiſters of theſe, and the names of the ſiſter-deſires when they rule with abſolute ſway, ought to be called. But that for the ſake of which all this has been ſaid is now nearly evident: though it will certainly be in every reſpect more clear if enunciated, than if not. For the deſire which without reaſon rules over opinion tending to that which is right, which draws it down towards the pleaſure of beauty, and being vehemently invigorated by its kindred deſires about the beauty of body, leads and ſubdues it: this deſire, receiving an appellation from its ſtrength, is called love. But, my dear Phædrus, do I appear to you, as I do to myſelf, to ſuffer a certain divine paſſion?

PHÆDR. Indeed, Socrates, you poſſeſs a certain fluency of expreſſion, beyond what is uſual to you.

SOC. Hear me then in ſilence. For in reality the place appears to be divine. If, therefore, during my diſcourſe, I ſhould be often hurried away by the inſpiring influence of the Nymphs, you muſt not be ſurpriſed. For the words which burſt from me at preſent are not very remote from dithyrambic verſe.

PHÆDR. You ſpeak moſt truly.

SOC. But of this you are the cauſe. However, hear the reſt; for perhaps that which now poſſeſſes me may depart. But this will be taken care of by divinity. Let us, therefore, again direct our diſcourſe to the young man. What that is then, which was the object of conſultation, has been declared and defined. But looking towards this, let us conſider with reſpect to what remains, what aſſiſtance or detriment will very properly happen to him who is gratified by a lover, and to him who is gratified by one who is not ſo.

It is neceſſary then that a man who is enſlaved by deſire, or who is in ſubjection to pleaſure, ſhould render the object of his love as agreeable to himſelf as poſſible. But to one diſeaſed every thing is pleaſant which does not oppoſe his diſeaſe; but that which is better and equal is troubleſome. Hence the lover is never willing that the object of his love ſhould poſſeſs any thing more excelleſt than himſelf, or any thing approaching to an equality with himſelf; but that, as much as poſſible, he ſhould be inferior to, and more indigent than himſelf. Thus, he is deſirous that through

ignorance he may become inferior to the wife, through timidity inferior to the bold, through inability to ſpeak, to rhetoricians, and through dullneſs, to the acute. And when theſe, and far more numerous ills than theſe, according to the conceptions of the lover, are naturally inherent, or are produced in the beloved object, the lover rejoices, and even endeavours to introduce others, that he may not be deprived of his deſired pleaſure. Hence it is neceſſary that the lover ſhould be envious of his beloved, and ſhould endeavour by all poſſible means to exclude him from an aſſociation with others, through whom he may become a moſt excellent man; and thus in reality he is the cauſe of a mighty injury to his beloved. But the greateſt injury, which he is the cauſe of, is that of depriving his beloved of the means of becoming eminently prudent. But he becomes moſt prudent through divine philoſophy, from which the lover is neceſſarily compelled to withdraw his beloved, through the fear of being deſpiſed. And beſides this, he is obliged to a variety of other artifices, that his beloved, by becoming ignorant of every thing, may place all his admiration upon him; and may thus become moſt acceptable to his lover, but moſt pernicious to himſelf. And thus with reſpect to things relating to the rational part, an aſſociation with a lover is by no means advantageous, but prejudicial to the party beloved.

But after this it is neceſſary to conſider how he, who is compelled to prefer the pleaſant to the good, would take care of the body of his beloved, if it was committed to his charge. Indeed he would endeavour that it ſhould not become firm and vigorous, but effeminate and ſoft; and that it ſhould not be nouriſhed in the pure light of the ſun, but under the mingled ſhade; and that he ſhould be educated without having any experience of manly labours and dry ſweats; but on the contrary ſhould be continually accuſtomed to a delicate and effeminate mode of living, and be adorned with foreign colours and ornaments, through the want of his own proper decorations: and that he ſhould be ſtudious of every thing elſe, which is conſequent to cares of this kind. All which, as they are unworthy of a longer narration, having ſummarily defined, we ſhall proceed to what remains of our diſcourſe. Enemies, therefore, in battle, and other mighty neceſſities, will confidently aſſault ſuch a body, but friends and lovers will be in fear for its ſafety. But this, as ſufficiently evident, we ſhall diſmiſs. Let us then, in the next place, declare what advantage or detriment, with

reſpect to poſſeſſions, ariſes to us from the familiarity and guardianſhip of a lover. But this indeed is manifeſt to every one, but eſpecially to a lover, that he deſires above all things that his beloved may be deprived of the moſt friendly, moſt dear, and divine poſſeſſions: for he wiſhes to receive him deſtitute of parents, kindred and friends, thinking that theſe will impede and reprehend his moſt pleaſant aſſociation with his beloved. Beſides, he conſiders that the object of his love, if rich in gold, or any other poſſeſſion, cannot be eaſily taken, and, if taken, will not be tractable to his deſires. From all which it is neceſſary that a lover ſhould envy his beloved the poſſeſſion of abundance, and ſhould rejoice in his adverſity. Further yet, he will wiſh the youth to live for a long time without a wife, without children, and without a proper home, deſiring for a very extended period to enjoy thoſe pleaſures which he is capable of affording. There are, indeed, other evils beſides theſe, but a certain dæmon [1] immediately mingles pleaſure with

[1] We have already in the notes on the firſt Alcibiades, given an ample account of dæmons from Proclus. I ſhall, therefore, only obſerve at preſent, that, according to the Platonic theology, there are three ſpecies of dæmons; the firſt of which is *rational* only, and the laſt *irrational* only; but the middle ſpecies is partly *rational* and partly *irrational*. And again, of theſe the firſt is perfectly beneficent, but many among the other two ſpecies are malevolent and noxious to mankind; not indeed eſſentially malevolent (for there is nothing in the univerſe, the ample abode of all-bountiful Jove, eſſentially evil), but only ſo from the office which they are deſtined to perform: for nothing which operates naturally, operates as to itſelf evilly. But the Platonic Hermeas, in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, admirably obſerves on this paſſage as follows: "The diſtribution of good and evil originates from the dæmoniacal genus: for every genus, tranſcending that of dæmons, uniformly poſſeſſes good. There are, therefore, certain genera of dæmons, ſome of which adorn and adminiſter certain parts of the world; but others certain ſpecies of animals. The dæmon, therefore, who is the inſpective guardian of life, haſtens ſouls into that condition, which he himſelf is allotted; as for inſtance, into injuſtice or intemperance, and continually mingles pleaſure in them as a ſnare. But there are other dæmons tranſcending theſe, who are the puniſhers of ſouls, converting them to a more perfect and elevated life. And the firſt of theſe it is neceſſary to avoid; but the ſecond ſort we ſhould render propitious. But there are other dæmons more excellent than theſe, who diſtribute good, in an uniform manner."—Απο του δαιμονιου γενους πρωτως αρχεται ἡ των αγαθων και κακων διαιρεσις· παν γαρ το ὑπερδαιμονιον γενος, μονοειδως εχει το αγαθον. Εστιν ουν τινα γενη δαιμονων, τα μεν μεριδας τινας του κοσμου κατακοσμουντα και επιτροπευοντα· τα δε ειδε τινα ζωων· κατεχειν ουν σπουδαζειν τας ψυχας εις τον ἑαυτου κληρον, οἱον εις αδικιαν ἡ ακολασιαν· δελεαρ την ἡδονην την εν ζῳ παραυτικα αναμιγνυσιν εν αυταις, ὁ εφορος τῆς δε της ζωης δαιμων· αλλοι δε τινες εισι τουτων επαναβεβηκοτες δαιμονες, οἱ κολασεις επιπεμπουσι ταις ψυχαις, επιστρεφοντες αυτας εις τελειωτεραν και ὑπερτεραν ζωην· και τους μεν πρωτους αποτρεπεσθαι δει· τους δε δευτερους εξευμενιζεσθαι· εισι δε και αλλοι κρειττονες δαιμονες, τα αγαθα μονοειδως επιπεμποντες.

moſt

moſt of them: as in that dreadful beaſt, and mighty detriment, a flatterer, nature at the ſame time mingles a pleaſure by no means inelegant and rude. And, indeed, ſome one may revile a harlot, and other cattle, and ſtudies of this kind, which we are daily accuſtomed to delight in, as noxious; but he who is a lover of young men, beſides his being detrimental, is in his familiar converſe the moſt unpleaſant of all men. For equal, according to the proverb, rejoices in equal. For, as it appears to me, ſince equality of time leads to equal pleaſures, it produces alſo friendſhip, through ſimilitude. But at the ſame time, the aſſociation of theſe is connected with ſatiety; and neceſſity is ſaid to be grievous to every one in every concern. But this is moſt eminently the caſe in the diſſimilitude of a lover towards his beloved. For an old man adhering to a young one, does not willingly leave him, either by night or by day, but is agitated by neceſſity and fury, which always affording him pleaſure, lead him about, through ſeeing, hearing, touching, and in any manner apprehending his beloved; ſo that he aſſiduouſly follows him with unceaſing delight. But what ſolace or pleaſures can he afford his beloved, ſo as to prevent him, during the period of mutual converſe, from ſuffering the moſt extreme moleſtation? And this when he beholds his countenance aged and deformed, together with other particulars conſequent to this, which are not only unpleaſant to be engaged with, but even to hear; neceſſity always propoſing to him ſuch a ſurvey. For in order to oblige him to this, he is always watched by ſuſpicious guards in all his actions; and is under a neceſſity of hearing the unſeaſonable and immoderate praiſes and reproaches of his lover; which when he is ſober, are indeed intolerable, but when he is intoxicated, are not only intolerable, but baſe, through his employing confidence, ſatiety, and repetition in his diſcourſe. Beſides, while he loves, he is pernicious and importunate. But when he ceaſes to love, he is afterwards unfaithful to the former object of his love, whom he had perſuaded to comply with his requeſt, by employing many oaths, prayers, and promiſes; and whom, after all, he had ſcarcely been able to induce, by the hope of advantage, to bear with his troubleſome familiarity. And, laſtly, when he ought to repay him for his kindneſs, then receiving another ruler and patron in himſelf, viz. intellect and temperance, inſtead of love and fury, and thus becoming entirely changed, he deceives his once beloved object. And then the beloved calling to mind the former actions

and diſcourſes of his lover, deſires to be thanked for his kindneſs, as if he was diſcourſing with the ſame perſon as before. But the other, through ſhame, dares not ſay that he is changed, nor does he know how to free himſelf from the oaths and promiſes which his former ſtupid dominion over him produced, now he has acquired the poſſeſſion of intellect and temperance; fearing leſt, if he ſhould act as formerly, he ſhould again become ſuch as he was before. Hence it neceſſarily comes to paſs that he flies from the former object of his love, the ſhell being turned; but the other is compelled to purſue him, grievouſly enduring his change, and loading him with imprecations, as being ignorant from the beginning that a lover, and one who is neceſſarily inſane, ought not to be gratified, but much rather one who does not love, and who is endued with intellect. For otherwiſe it would be neceſſary that he ſhould give himſelf up to a man unfaithful, moroſe, envious, and unpleaſant; detrimental with reſpect to the poſſeſſion of things, and the habit of the body, but much more pernicious with reſpect to the diſcipline of the ſoul, than which nothing really is, or ever will be more venerable, both among Gods and men. It is neceſſary, therefore, my young friend, to conſider all this, and to know that the friendſhip of a lover does not ſubſiſt with benevolence, but, like one who is hungry, is exerted only for the ſake of being full. For,

The eager lover to the boy aſpires,
Juſt as the wolf the tender lamb deſires.

This is that which I predicted to you, O Phædrus, nor will you hear me ſpeak any further; for my diſcourſe to you has now arrived at its concluſion.

PHÆDR. But to me it appears that you have accompliſhed no more than the half, and that you ſhould ſpeak equally as much concerning one who is not a lover; that he of the two ought rather to be gratified; and that, for this purpoſe, the advantages which he poſſeſſes ſhould be enumerated. Why, therefore, Socrates, do you now deſiſt from ſpeaking?

SOC. Have you not taken notice, bleſſed man, that I now ſpeak in verſe, but that it is no longer dithyrambic; and that I have done this, though my diſcourſe has been full of reproach? But what do you think I ſhould be able to accompliſh, if I ſhould begin to praiſe the other? Do you not perceive that,

that, being then urged by you, and aſſiſted by Providence, I ſhould be moſt evidently agitated by the fury of the Nymphs? I ſay then, in one word, that as many goods are inherent in the one as we have numbered evils in the other. But what occaſion is there of a long diſcourſe? for enough has been ſaid concerning both. And every thing proper to the oration has been introduced. I will, therefore, croſs over the river and depart, before I am compelled by you to accompliſh ſomething greater than this.

PHÆDR. Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is over. Do you not ſee that mid-day, as it is called, ſtably remains almoſt, even now? Let us, therefore, ſtay here, and diſcourſe together about what has been ſaid, and immediately as it begins to grow cool, we will depart.

SOC. You are divine, Phædrus, with reſpect to diſcourſe, and ſincerely admirable. For I think that no one has been the occaſion of more of the orations which exiſt at preſent, than yourſelf; whether by ſpeaking of your own accord, or in ſome way or other by compelling others. I except only Simmias the Theban. For you far ſurpaſs all the reſt. And now you appear to be the cauſe of my commencing another diſcourſe, though you did not announce war, as the conſequence of my refuſal.

PHÆDR. But how have I been the cauſe? and what new diſcourſe is this?

SOC. When I was about to paſs over the river, excellent man, a dæmoniacal [1] and uſual ſignal was given me; and whenever this takes place, it always prohibits me from accompliſhing what I was about to do. And in the preſent inſtance I ſeemed to hear a certain voice, which would not ſuffer me to depart till I had made an expiation, as if I had offended in ſome particular a divine nature. I am therefore a prophet, indeed, but not ſuch a one as is perfectly worthy; but juſt as thoſe who know their letters in a very indifferent manner, alone ſufficient for what concerns myſelf. I clearly, therefore, now underſtand my offence: for even yet, my friend, there is ſomething prophetic in my ſoul, which diſturbed me during my former diſcourſe. And this cauſed me to fear leſt, perhaps, according to Ibycus, I ſhould offend the Gods, but acquire glory among men. But now I perceive in what I have offended.

PHÆDR. Will you not inform me what it is?

[1] For a full and every way ſatisfactory account of the dæmon of Socrates, ſee the note at the beginning of the Firſt Alcibiades on dæmons, from Proclus.

SOC.

Soc. You, O Phædrus, have repeated a dire, dire diſcourſe, and have compelled me to utter the ſame.

Phædr. But how?

Soc. The diſcourſe has been fooliſh, and in a certain reſpect impious. And can any thing be more dire [1] than this?

Phædr. Nothing, if you ſpeak the truth.

Soc. What then? Do you not think that Love [2] is the ſon of Venus and a certain God?

Phædr. So it is ſaid.

Soc. Yet this was neither acknowledged by Lyſias, nor in your diſcourſe, which was deduced by you, as by a certain charm, through my mouth. But if Love, as is really the caſe, is a God, or a certain ſomething divine, he cannot be in any reſpect evil: and yet in our diſcourſe about him he has been ſpoken of as evil. In this, therefore, we have offended againſt Love. But, beſides this, our diſputations, though polite, appear to have been very fooliſh: for though they aſſerted nothing ſound or true, yet they boaſted as if they did, and as if they ſhould accompliſh ſomething conſiderable, by gaining the approbation of ſome trifling deluded men. It is neceſſary, therefore, my friend, that I ſhould purify myſelf. But there is an antient purification for thoſe who offend in matters reſpecting mythology, which Homer did not perceive, but which was known to Steſichorus. For, being deprived of his eyes through his accuſation of Helen, he was not like Homer, ignorant of the cauſe of his blindneſs, but knew it, as being a muſician. So that he immediately compoſed the following lines:

> Falſe was my tale; thou ne'er acroſs the main
> In beauteous ſhips didſt fly, Troy's lofty tow'rs to gain.

And thus having compoſed a poem directly contrary to what he had before publiſhed, and which is called a recantation, he immediately recovered his loſt ſight [3]. I am, therefore, in the preſent inſtance wiſer than both theſe: for

[1] This is the language of true philoſophy and *true religion*, that nothing can be more dire than impiety.

[2] For an account of Love conſidered as a Deity, ſee the notes on The Banquet.

[3] From hence it is evident that the narration of the rape of Helen, and of the Trojan war, is entirely

for before I ſuffer any damage through my accuſation of love, I will endeavour to preſent him with my recantation, and this with my head uncovered, and not as before veiled through ſhame.

PHÆDR. You cannot, Socrates, ſay any thing which will be more pleaſing to me than this.

SOC. For, my good friend, you muſt be ſenſible how imprudent the oration was which you repeated, and how ſhamefully I myſelf alſo ſpoke concerning a lover. For, if any one of a generous diſpoſition and elegant manners, who either loves, or had formerly loved, ſuch a one as himſelf, had heard us, when we ſaid that lovers often excited the greateſt enmities for the moſt trifling occaſions, and that they were envious of, and injurious to, their beloved, would he not have thought that he was hearing men educated in ſhips, and who were perfectly unacquainted with liberal love? or do you think that he would by any means have aſſented to our accuſation of love?

PHÆDR. By Jupiter, Socrates, perhaps he would not.

SOC. Reverencing, therefore, ſuch a man as this, and fearing Love himſelf, I deſire, as it were with a potable oration, to waſh away that ſalt and

entirely mythological, concealing certain divine truths under the ſymbols of fable. But as this account of Steſichorus, and the fable of the Iliad, is beautifully explained by Proclus on Plato's Republic, p. 393, I ſhall preſent the reader with the following epitomized tranſlation of his comment. "Steſichorus, who conſidered the whole fable of Helen as a true narration, who approved the conſequent tranſactions, and eſtabliſhed his poetry accordingly, with great propriety ſuffered the puniſhment of his folly, that is, ignorance: but at length, through the aſſiſtance of muſic, he is ſaid to have acknowledged his error; and thus, through underſtanding the myſteries concerning Helen and the Trojan war, to have recovered his ſight. But Homer is ſaid to have been blind, not on account of his ignorance of theſe myſteries, as Steſichorus, but through a more perfect habit of the ſoul, i. e. by ſeparating himſelf from ſenſible beauty, eſtabliſhing his intelligence above all apparent harmony, and extending the intellect of his ſoul to unapparent and true harmony. Hence, he is ſaid to have been blind, becauſe divine beauty cannot be uſurped by corporeal eyes. On this account, fables bordering upon tragedy repreſent Homer as deprived of ſight, on account of his accuſation of Helen. But fables, in my opinion, intend to ſignify by Helen all the beauty ſubſiſting about generation, for which there is a perpetual battle of ſouls, till the more intellectual having vanquiſhed the more irrational forms of life, return to that place from which they originally came. But, according to ſome, the period of their circulation about ſenſible forms conſiſts of ten thouſand years, ſince a thouſand years produce one ambit as of one year. For nine years therefore, i. e. for nine thouſand years, ſouls revolve about generation; but in the tenth having vanquiſhed all the barbaric tumult, they are ſaid to return to their paternal habitations."

bitter diſcourſe which we have lately heard. And I would adviſe Lyſias himſelf, for ſimilar reaſons, to write as ſoon as poſſible that a lover ought rather to be gratified than one who is without love.

PHÆDR. You may be well aſſured that he will do ſo; for, after you have ſpoken in praiſe of a lover, it will be neceſſary that Lyſias ſhould be compelled by me to do the ſame.

SOC. This indeed I believe, while you remain affected as you are at preſent.

PHÆDR. Speak then confidently.

SOC. But will you not permit me to ſuppoſe that the ſame young man is preſent, to whom I addreſſed my former diſcourſe, leſt, in conſequence of not hearing my recantation, he ſhould raſhly gratify one who is not a lover?

PHÆDR. He will always be very nearly preſent with you, when you are willing he ſhould be ſo.

SOC. In this manner then, O beautiful young man, underſtand that the former diſcourſe was that of Phædrus the Myrrhinuſian, the offſpring of Pythocles; but that this which I am now about to deliver is the diſcourſe of Steſichorus the Imeræan, and the ſon of Euphemus. But he began his oration as follows:

"The diſcourſe is not true which aſſerts that, though a lover ſhould be preſent, one who is not a lover ought to be gratified before him, becauſe the one is agitated with fury, but the other is prudent in his conduct. For if it was ſimply true that mania is evil, this would be beautifully aſſerted. But now the greateſt goods [1] are produced for us through mania, and are aſſigned to

[1] This is a moſt weighty teſtimony indeed in favour of the antient oracles, and prediction in general. I ſhall therefore obſerve, in anſwer to the followers of Van Dale, Fontenelle, and others who have endeavoured to prove that the oracles of the antients were nothing more than the tricks of fraudulent prieſts, that to ſuppoſe mankind ſhould have been the dupes of ſuch impoſitions for the ſpace of three thouſand years, would exceed the moſt extravagant fiction in romance. For how is it poſſible, even if theſe prieſts had been a thouſand times more cunning and deceitful than they are ſuppoſed to have been, that they could have kept ſuch a ſecret ſo impenetrable in every city and province where there were any oracles, as never to have given themſelves the lie in any particular? Is it poſſible that there ſhould never have been one man among them of ſo much worth as to abhor ſuch impoſtures? that there ſhould never have been any ſo inconſiderate as unluckily to diſcover all the myſtery for want of ſome precautions? that no man ſhould ever have

to us by a divine gift. For the predicting propheteſs at Delphi, and the prieſteſſes

have explored the ſanctuaries, ſubterraneous paſſages, and caverns, where it is pretended they kept their machines? that they ſhould never have had occaſion for workmen to repair them? that only they ſhould have had the ſecret of compoſing drugs proper to create extraordinary dreams? and, laſtly, that they ſhould have perpetually ſucceeded one another, and conveyed their machines and their juggling tricks to all thoſe that were to follow them in the ſame employments from age to age, and from generation to generation, and yet no man have been ever able to detect the impoſition?

Beſides, who were theſe prieſts, that, as it is pretended, were monſters of cruelty, fraud, and malice? They were the moſt honourable men among the heathens *, and ſuch as were moſt eſteemed for their piety and probity. They were ſometimes magiſtrates and philoſophers. Thus Plutarch † informs us in one of his treatiſes, that he was himſelf, to a very old age, the prieſt of Apollo of Delphi, and that he preſided in this character over the oracle, the ſacrifices, and all the other ceremonies of this deity for many years. Depraved as the age is, will any one be hardy enough to aſſert that a man of ſuch probity, of ſuch gravity of manners, of ſo much penetration, learning, and judgment as Plutarch, was a cheat and an impoſtor by profeſſion? That he was capable of ſpeaking through a hollow image to counterfeit the voice of Apollo? Or of ſuborning a female to act the part of one poſſeſſed, when ſhe was ſeated on the Tripos? There is not ſurely any one ſo loſt to ſhame, ſo devoid of common ſenſe, as to make ſuch an aſſertion.

Again, how could thoſe clear and preciſe oracles have been produced by fraud, in which what was done in one place was foretold in another, as in that famous oracle which was delivered to the ambaſſadors of Crœſus. This moſt ſtupid of kings, and moſt unfortunate of cooks, as he is juſtly called by Maximus Tyrius, in order to try the veracity of the oracles, had determined, it ſeems, in a ſecret part of his palace to do ſomething to which no one ſhould be privy but himſelf, and ſent to the oracle of Apollo to tell him what he was doing. His meſſengers returned with the following anſwer:

Οιδα δ' εγω ψαμμου τ' αριθμον και μετρα θαλασσης,
Και κωφου συνιημι, και ου λαλεοντος ακουω.

* The pontiffs and other prieſts among the Greeks, as well as among the Romans, held the firſt rank of honour. They were uſually taken from noble or patrician families. Plutarch aſſerts that in ſome parts of Greece their dignity was equal to that of kings. In the firſt ages, indeed, kings themſelves were often prieſts, diviners, and augurs. This we may learn from Ariſtotle in the third book of his Politics, c. 10; from Cicero, de Divin. lib. i. and de leg. l. 2. where he ſpeaks of Romulus and Numa; from Homer, Iliad vi. l. 76. and Virgil, Æn. l. 3. when they ſpeak of Helenus, and from the latter alſo when he ſpeaks of king Anius, Æn. iii. l. 80.

Rex Anius, rex idem hominum, Phœbique ſacerdos.

Who can believe that kings, princes, and perſons of the firſt quality were capable of carrying on the trade of jugglers, and amuſing the people by deluſions and tricks of legerdemain?

† Plutarch. lib. an ſeni gerenda ſit Reſpublica.

prieſteſſes in Dodona [1], have, when inſane procured many advantages, both privately

Οδμη δ'ες φρενας ηλθε κραταιριγοιο χελωνης
Εψομενης εν χαλκῳ αμ' αρνειοισι κρεεσσιν
Ἡ χαλκος μεν ὑπεστρωται, χαλκον δ'επιεσται.

i. e. The ſand's amount, the meaſures of the ſea,
Tho' vaſt the number, are well known to me:
I know the thoughts within the dumb concealed,
And words I hear by language unrevealed.
Even now, the odours to my ſenſe that riſe
A tortoiſe boiling, with a lamb, ſupplies,
Where braſs below, and braſs above it lies.

Crœſus it ſeems was, at the very time when this oracle was delivered, boiling a lamb and tortoiſe together in a brazen veſſel. This ſtory is firſt related by Herodotus, Hiſt. lib. i. c. 8. and after him by various other writers, both heathen and chriſtian, and among the reſt by Baſil, who, with the reſt of the fathers, ſays that the devil was the author of it. Now the fact is as certain as any in antiquity. Beſides, it is not the only one of this nature: Cicero, Valerius Maximus, Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus, Strabo, Florus, &c. relate ſeveral inſtances of predictions having been verified in one place of what was doing in another. Plutarch, in the life of Paulus Æmilius, and in that of Sylla, adds others alſo; but one eſpecially that happened in the reign of Domitian, and of the truth of which he ſays no man doubted in his time. The circumſtance, as related alſo by Auguſtine, lib. ii. de Civit. Dei, cap. 24. was, that a ſervant of one Lucius Pontius prophetically exclaimed, I come a meſſenger from Bellona, the victory Sylla is thine. He afterwards added, that the capitol would be in flames. Having ſaid this, he immediately left the camp, and the next day returned more rapidly, and exclaimed that the capitol had been burnt. And the capitol it ſeems had in reality been on fire. Auguſtine adds that it was eaſy for the devil to foreſee this, and moſt rapidly to tell it. Indeed, ſuch predictions muſt have been the effect of inſpiration, either from divinity, or from ſome of the genera between divinity and man; and hence Auguſtine, very conſiſtently with his religion, aſcribed them to an evil dæmon. The Platonic reader, however, will eaſily account for moſt of them more rationally, as he *ſcientifically* knows that divination has *deity* for its origin; and that, when the perſons inſpired are worthy characters, and the predictions beneficial, ſuch inſpiration cannot be the offspring of fraudulent ſpirits.

It is very juſtly indeed obſerved by Plutarch, in his treatiſe concerning the Pythian oracles, that with reſpect to curſory predictions, ſome one might foretel that a certain perſon ſhould be victorious in battle, and he accordingly conquered; that ſuch a city ſhould be ſubverted, and it was accordingly deſtroyed; but, ſays he, *when not only the event is foretold, but how, and when, after what, and by whom, it ſhall be effected, this is no conjecture of things which may perhaps take place, but a premaniferſtation of things which will abſolutely happen.* Τοιαυτα του Βοηθου διελθοντος ὁ Σεραπιων, δικαιον (εφη) το αξιωμα περι των ουτως λεγει Βοηθος αοριστως και ανυποθετως λεγομενων· ει νικη στρατηγῳ προειρηται, νενικηκεν· ει πολεως αναιρεσις, απολωλεν. Οπου δε ου μονον λεγεται το γενησομενον, αλλα και πως, και ποτε,

privately and publicly, to the Greeks; but when they have been in a prudent ſtate, they have been the cauſe of very trifling benefits, or indeed of none

ποτε, και μετα τι, και μετα τινος, ουκ εστι εικασμος των ταχα γενησομενων, αλλα των παντως εσομενων προδηλωσις.

Should it be aſked why ſuch inſpiration, if it once exiſted, no longer exiſts at preſent, I reply by repeating what I have ſaid in my Notes on Pauſanias (Vol. 3. p. 261), that when thoſe circulations take place, mentioned in a note on the eighth book of the Republic, during which the parts of the earth ſubſiſt according to nature, and this is accompanied with a concurrence of proper *inſtruments*, *times*, and *places*, then divine illumination is abundantly and properly received. But when parts of the earth ſubſiſt contrary to nature as at preſent, and which has been the caſe ever ſince the oracles ceaſed, then as there is no longer an aptitude of *places*, *inſtruments*, and *times*, divine influence can no longer be received, though the illuminations of divine natures continue *immutably* the ſame; juſt, ſays Proclus, as if a face ſtanding in the ſame poſition, a mirror ſhould at one time receive a clear image of it, and at another, one obſcure and debile, or indeed, no image at all. For, as the ſame incomparable man further obſerves, it is no more proper to refer the defect of divine inſpiration to the Gods, than to accuſe the ſun as the cauſe of the moon being eclipſed, inſtead of the conical ſhadow of the earth into which the moon falls. The reader will find in the above-mentioned place, the theory of oracles ſcientifically unfolded.

[1] Hermeas the philoſopher, in his MS. Scholia on this dialogue, gives us the following very ſatisfactory information reſpecting the oracle in Dodona: Περι δε του Δωδωναιου μαντειου διαφορα εισι τα ἱστορουμενα· εστι μεν γαρ παλαιοτατον των Ελληνικων μαντειων· λεγουσι δε οι μεν οτι δρυς ην εκει ἡ μαντευουσα, οι δε οτι περιστεραι· το δε αληθες, οτι γυναικες ησαν ἱερειαι αἱ μαντευουσαι, δρυϊ τη κεφαλη στεφομεναι, αἱ τινες εκαλουντο πελειαδες. ισως ουν απο του ονοματος τινες πλανηθεντες, ὑποπτευουσαν ειναι περιστερας τας μαντευουσας· επειδη δε και την κεφαλην δρυϊ κατεστρεφοντο, ισως δια τουτο ειρηκασι και την δρυν μαντευειν. εστι δε Διος το μαντειον· το δε εν Δελφοις, Απολλωνος. εικοτως ουν παρελαβον ὡς συγγενη τα μαντεια· και γαρ ὁ Απολλων ὑπουργος λεγεται της του Διος δημιουργιας, και πολλακις, ει εδοξεν αυτοις ασαφης ειναι ὁ του Δωδωναιου χρησμος, απηεσαν εις τον εν Δελφοις, χρησομενοι τι βουλεται ὁ του Διος χρησμος· και πολλους αυτων εξηγησατο πολλακις ὁ Απολλων. ενθουσιωται μεν ουν και μαντευομεναι αἱ ἱερειαι, πολλα ευεργετουν τους ανθρωπους προλεγουσαι τα μελλοντα και προδιορθουμεναι· σωφρονουσι δε ὁμοιαι ησαν ταις αλλαις γυναιξιν. i. e. "Different accounts are given of the Dodonæan oracle: for it is the moſt antient of the Grecian oracles. According to ſome an oak propheſied in Dodona; but according to others, doves. The truth however is, that prieſteſſes whoſe heads were crowned with oak propheſied; and theſe women were called by ſome *peleiades*, or doves. Perhaps, therefore, certain perſons being deceived by the name, ſuſpected that doves propheſied in Dodona; and as the heads of theſe women were crowned with oak, perhaps from this circumſtance they ſaid that an oak propheſied. But this oracle belongs to Jupiter, and that at Delphi, to Apollo. Very properly, therefore, are theſe oracles conſidered as allied to each other. For Apollo is ſaid to be miniſtrant to Jupiter in the adminiſtration of things: and often when the Dodonæan oracle appeared to be obſcure, the oracle at Delphi has been conſulted, in order to know the meaning of that of Jupiter. Often too, Apollo has interpreted many of the Dodonæan oracles. Theſe prieſteſſes, therefore, when in an enthuſiaſtic

none at all. And if we ſhould ſpeak of the Sibyl [1], and others who have employed deific prophecy, rightly predicting many things to many reſpecting futurity, we ſhould be too prolix, and at the ſame time only ſpeak of that which is manifeſt to every one. This indeed is worthy of being teſtified, that ſuch of the antients as gave names to things, did not conſider mania as either baſe or diſgraceful. For they did not connect the appellation of mania with that moſt beautiful art, by which we are enabled to judge of the future, as if it was ſomething noxious; but they gave it a name of this kind, as ſomething beneficial, when it ſubſiſts through a divine allotment. But men of the preſent day, being ignorant of what is becoming, by the inſertion of the letter τ, call it μαντικη, or the art of divining. Indeed the inveſtigations of futurity, by prudent men, which take place through birds, and a variety of other tokens, as proceeding from the dianoëtic part through human intelligence, they denominated intellect and *intellective opinion*; which the moderns, through a reverence of the ω, denominate *augurial*, or pertaining to augury. By how much more perfect and honourable, therefore, prophecy is than augury, and the name and operation of the one than the name and operation of the other, by ſo much did the antients teſtify

enthuſiaſtic and prophetic condition, have greatly benefited mankind by predicting and previouſly correcting future events; but, when in a prudent ſtate, they were ſimilar to other women."

[1] Hermeas, in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, has the following remarkable paſſage on the Sibyl here mentioned: Περι δε της Σιβυλλης, ουτος εστι θαυμαστα τα λεγομενα, ωστε δοξαι μυθους ειναι· πολλαι μεντοι Σιβυλλαι γεγονασι, πασαι τουτον ελομεναι βιον· πασαι μεν δια τινα ισως λογικην αιτιαν ελοντο Σιβυλλαι προσαγορευεσθαι· ωσπερ δη ὁ Τρισμηγιστος Ἑρμης λεγεται πολλακις επιδημησας τη Αιγυπτῳ, ἑαυτου αναμνεσθαι, και τριτον κεκλησθαι Ἑρμην· και τρεις δε Ορφεις παρα Θραξι γενεσθαι· ισως ουν και αυται κατα τινα κοινωνιαν, και αναμνησιν ειλοντο ταυτας τας προσηγοριας· επει αυτη γε ἡ Σιβυλλα ἡ Ερυθραια περι ἡς νυν λεγει Εριφυλη εκαλειτο εξ αρχης· λεγουσι δε αυτην ευθυς προελθουσαν προσειπειν εξ ονοματος εκαστον, και εμμετρα φθεγγεσθαι, και εις βραχυν χρονον τελειον ειδος ανθρωπου λαβειν. i. e. "The particulars which are reported about this Sibyl, are ſo wonderful, that they have the appearance of fables. But, indeed, there were many Sibyls, all of whom adopted the ſame life, and all of them, perhaps through a certain rational cauſe, were called Sibyls: juſt as Hermes Triſmegiſtus, who often reſided in Egypt, is ſaid to have made mention of himſelf, and to have called himſelf the third Hermes. Three Orpheuſes alſo are ſaid to have exiſted among the Thracians. Perhaps, therefore, theſe Sibyls choſe theſe appellations from a certain communication and recollection; ſince this very Erythræan Sibyl, of whom Plato now ſpeaks, was from the firſt called Erophile. But they report that ſhe called every one by his proper name, as ſoon as ſhe was born, that ſhe likewiſe ſpoke in verſe, and that in a ſhort time ſhe arrived at the perfection of the human ſpecies."

that

that mania proceeding from divinity is more beautiful than prudence which proceeds from men. But indeed, in the greateſt diſeaſes and labours to which certain perſons are ſometimes ſubject through the indignation of the Gods in conſequence of guilt, mania when it takes place, predicting what they ſtand in need of, diſcovers a liberation from ſuch evils, by flying to prayer and the worſhip of the Gods. Hence, obtaining by this means purifications and the advantages of initiation, it renders him who poſſeſſes it free from diſaſters, both for the preſent and future time, by diſcovering to him who is properly inſane and poſſeſſed by divinity a ſolution of his preſent evils. But the third ſpecies is a poſſeſſion and mania deſcending from the Muſes, which receiving a ſoul tender and ſolitary, rouſes and agitates it with Bacchic fury, according to odes and other ſpecies of poetry; in conſequence of which, by adorning the infinite actions of antiquity, it becomes the means of inſtructing poſterity. But he who approaches to the poetic gates without the mania of the Muſes [1], perſuading himſelf that he can become a poet, in a manner perfectly ſufficient from art alone, will, both as to himſelf and his poetry, be imperfect; ſince the poetry which is produced by prudence vaniſhes before that which is the progeny of mania. So many then are the beautiful works ariſing from divine mania, and ſtill more than theſe, which, if it was requiſite, I ſhould relate. So that we ought not to be afraid of mania; nor ſhould any reaſon diſturb us, which endeavours to evince that we ought to prefer a prudent friend to one who is divinely agitated; for he who aſſerts this, ought likewiſe to ſhow, in order to gain the victory, that love was not ſent from the Gods for the utility of the lover and his beloved. But, on the contrary, it muſt now be ſhown by us that a mania of this kind was ſent by the Gods, for the purpoſe of producing the greateſt felicity. The demonſtration, indeed, will be to the unworthy incredible, but to the wiſe, an object of belief. It is neceſſary, therefore, in the firſt place, that, beholding the paſſions and operations of the divine and human ſoul, we ſhould underſtand the truth concerning the nature of each. Let this then be the beginning of the demonſtration:

Every ſoul is immortal [2]: for that which is perpetually moved is eternal. But

[1] See the Note on the tenth book of the Republic, concerning the different kinds of poetry.

[2] The diſcourſe of Plato here, is as it were, analytical. Thus, for inſtance, the end of man is

But that which moves another and is moved by another, when it has a ceſſation of motion, has alſo a ceſſation of life. Hence that alone which moves itſelf, becauſe it does not deſert itſelf, never ceaſes to be moved; but this alſo is the fountain and principle of motion to other things which are moved. But a principle is unbegotten: for every thing which is generated, is neceſſarily generated from a principle, while the principle itſelf is incapable of being generated. For neither could it any longer be a principle, if it was generated from an external cauſe. Since then it is unbegotten, it is alſo neceſſary that it ſhould be incorruptible: for, ſhould the principle become extinct, it could neither renew its being from another, nor generate another from itſelf, ſince it is neceſſary that all things ſhould be generated from that which is the principle. And thus the beginning of motion is derived from that which moves itſelf: and this can neither be deſtroyed nor generated. For, if this were admitted, all heaven and earth falling together muſt ſtop; nor could any force be found, whence being moved, they would be again generated. Since then it appears that a ſelf-motive nature is immortal, he who aſſerts that this is the very eſſence and definition of ſoul, will have no occaſion to bluſh. For every body to which motion externally accedes, is inanimate. But that to which motion is inherent from itſelf, is animated; as if this was the very nature of ſoul. And if there is nothing elſe which moves itſelf except ſoul, ſoul is neceſſarily without generation, and immortal. And thus much may ſuffice, concerning the immortality of the ſoul [1].

But

is nothing elſe than felicity, and this is a union with the Gods; for Plato does not place felicity in externals. But the ſoul is conjoined with the Gods even in the preſent life, when, ſurveying the whole of ſenſible and celeſtial beauty, ſhe acquires a reminiſcence of intelligible beauty. But her reminiſcence muſt be of that which ſhe once beheld: for reminiſcence is of things which ſome one has either heard of or ſeen. But the ſoul formerly beheld this beauty, when ſhe revolved in conjunction with her proper God. She muſt, therefore, be immortal: for if not, ſhe would neither have revolved nor have recovered her memory. Hence he firſt ſpeaks concerning the immortality of the ſoul, her idea, and what follows; and afterwards he diſcourſes concerning that to which Love conducts us, viz. an intelligible eſſence, and divine beauty, ſimple, and unmoved.

[1] This part contains one of the ſtrongeſt demonſtrations poſſible of the immortality of the ſoul, as will be evident to every one whoſe intellectual eye is not blinded by modern purſuits. But when Plato ſays every ſoul, the reader muſt not ſuppoſe that the ſouls of brutes are meant to be included,

But reſpecting its idea [1] we muſt ſpeak after the following manner: To give a perfect deſcription of its nature, would indeed be the employment of

included, for theſe, as is evident from the Timæus, are mortal; but every rational ſoul, as well human as divine. But this reaſoning conſiſts of two ſyllogiſms, the parts of which Socrates, as being agitated with divine fury, does not altogether diſpoſe into order; and theſe are as follows: Soul is ſelf-motive. That which is ſelf-motive is always moved, becauſe it never forſakes itſelf, nor is ever deſerted by motive power. But if it is always moved with an inward motion, it always lives. Soul, therefore, is immortal. This is the firſt ſyllogiſm. But the ſecond: ſoul is ſelf-motive, and is therefore the principle of motion. But the principle of motion is unbegotten. That which is unbegotten is immortal. Soul therefore is immortal.

[1] By the idea of the ſoul we are not to underſtand its ſupernal exemplar, but its intimate form, and the diſpoſition, and as it were figure of its power. But by the chariots of the Gods, that is, of the mundane Gods and beneficent dæmons, are to be underſtood all the inward diſcurſive powers of their ſouls, which purſue the intelligence of all things, and which can at the ſame time equally contemplate and provide for inferior concerns. And the horſes ſignify the efficacy and motive vigour of theſe powers. But the horſes and chariots of partial ſouls, ſuch as ours when ſeparated from the body, are mixed from good and evil. Our *principal part* is intellect. The better horſe is anger, and the worſe deſire. The wings are anagogic or reductory powers, and particularly belong to the charioteer or intellect. An immortal animal is compoſed from ſoul and a celeſtial body; but a mortal animal from ſoul and an elementary body. For partial ſouls, ſuch as ours, have three vehicles; one ethereal, derived from the heavens; the ſecond aërial; and the third this groſs terreſtrial body. Jupiter here ſignifies the head of that order of Gods which ſubſiſts immediately above the mundane Gods, and is called απολυτος, liberated: for the term *mighty*, as is well obſerved by Proclus, is a ſymbol of exempt ſupremacy. The twelve Gods, therefore, which are divided into four triads, are Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Veſta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The firſt triad of theſe is *fabricative*; the ſecond *defenſive*; the third *vivific*; and the fourth *reductory*. And the chariots of theſe Gods are ſupermundane ſouls, in which they are proximately carried. By *the heavens*, to the contemplation of which the *liberated* and *mundane* Gods proceed, cannot be meant the ſenſible heavens: for what bleſſed ſpectacles do theſe contain, or how can Gods be converted to things poſterior to themſelves? It is evidently, therefore, the *heaven* which Plato in the Cratylus defines to be οψις εις το ανω, or *ſight directed to that which is above*; and forms that order of Gods which is called by the Chaldæan oracles νοητος και νοερος, *intelligible and intellectual*. There is a remakable error here in the Greek text, for inſtead of ουρανια αψιδα, *celeſtial arch*, it ſhould be read ὑπουρανια αψιδα, *ſubceleſtial arch*, as is evident from Proclus in Plat. Theol. p. 217, who lays a particular ſtreſs upon the word ὑπουρανια, as a reading univerſally acknowledged. Our courſe is ſaid to be difficult and hard, becauſe the motion of the better horſe verges to intelligibles, but of the worſe to ſenſibles and generation; and becauſe our ſoul is unable in the preſent life equally to contemplate, and providentially energize. By ambroſia is ſignified that power which renders the Gods ſeparate from generation; but by nectar the immutable nature of their providential energies, which extend even to the laſt of things.

a narration every way prolix and divine; but to deſcribe a certain ſimilitude of this idea is the buſineſs of a human and ſhorter diſcourſe. Let it then be ſimilar to the kindred power of a winged chariot and charioteer. All the horſes and chariots of the Gods are indeed good, and compoſed from things good; but thoſe of other natures are mixed. And, in the firſt place, our principal part governs the reins of its two-yoked car. In the next place, one of the horſes is good and beautiful, and is compoſed from things of this kind; but the other is of a contrary nature, and is compoſed of contrary qualities: and on this account our courſe is neceſſarily difficult and hard. But we muſt endeavour to explain why it is called in a certain reſpect a mortal and immortal animal. Every ſoul takes care of every thing which is inanimate, and revolves about the whole of heaven, becoming ſituated at different times in different forms. While it is perfect, indeed, and winged, its courſe is ſublime, and it governs the univerſe. But the ſoul whoſe wings ſuffer a defluxion verges downward, till ſomething ſolid terminates its deſcent; whence it receives a terrene body, as its deſtined receptacle, which appears to move itſelf through the power of the ſoul: and the whole is called an animal compoſed from ſoul and body, and is ſurnamed a mortal animal. But that which is immortal is perceived by no rational deduction, except that which is hypothetical and feigned: ſince we neither ſee, nor ſufficiently underſtand, that a God is a certain immortal animal endued with a ſoul, and poſſeſſing a body naturally conjoined with ſoul, through the whole of time. Theſe things however are aſſerted, and may exiſt, as it pleaſes divinity. But let us now declare the cauſe through which the wings were caſt aſide, and fell from the ſoul. And this is of the following kind: There is a natural power in the wings of the ſoul, to raiſe that which is weighty on high, where the genus of the Gods reſides. But of every thing ſubſiſting about body, the ſoul moſt participates of that which is divine. But that which is divine is beautiful, wiſe, and good, and whatever can be aſſerted of a ſimilar kind. And with theſe indeed the *winged nature* of the ſoul is eſpecially nouriſhed and increaſed: but it departs from its integrity, and periſhes, through that which is evil and baſe, and from contraries of a ſimilar kind. Likewiſe Jupiter, the mighty leader in the heavens, driving his winged chariot, begins the divine proceſſion, adorning and diſpoſing all things with providential care. The army of Gods and dæmons, diſtributed into eleven parts, follows

his

his courſe: but Veſta alone remains in the habitation of the Gods. But each of the other Gods belonging to the twelve, preſides over the office committed to his charge. There are many, therefore, and bleſſed ſpectacles and proceſſions within the heavens, to which the genus of the bleſſed Gods is converted as each accompliſhes the proper employment of his nature. But *will* and *power* are the perpetual attendants of their proceſſions: for envy is far diſtant from the divine choir of Gods. But when they proceed to the banquet, and the enjoyment of delicious food, they ſublimely aſcend in their progreſſion to the ſub-celeſtial arch. And, indeed, the vehicles of the Gods being properly adapted to the guiding reins, and equally balanced, proceed with an eaſy motion: but the vehicles of other natures are attended in their progreſſions with difficulty and labour. For the horſe, participating of depravity, becomes heavy; and when he has not been properly diſciplined by the charioteers, verges and gravitates to the earth. And in this caſe labour, and an extreme conteſt, are propoſed to the ſoul. But thoſe who are denominated immortals, when they arrive at the ſummit, proceeding beyond the extremity of heaven, ſtand on its back: and while they are eſtabliſhed in this eminence, the circumference carries them round, and they behold what the region beyond the heavens contains. But the ſuperceleſtial place has not yet been celebrated by any of our poets, nor will it ever be praiſed according to its dignity and worth. It ſubſiſts, however, in the following manner; for we ſhould dare to affirm the truth, eſpecially when ſpeaking concerning the truth: without colour, without figure, and without contact, ſubſiſting as true eſſence, it alone uſes contemplative [1] intellect, the governor of the ſoul; about which eſſence, the genus of true ſcience, reſides. As the dianoëtic power, therefore, of divinity revolves with intellect and immaculate ſcience, ſo likewiſe the dianoëtic power of every ſoul, when it receives a condition accommodated to its nature, perceiving being through time, it becomes enamoured with it, and contemplating truth, is nouriſhed and filled with joy, till the circumference by a circular revolution brings it back again to its priſtine ſituation. But in this circuit it beholds juſtice herſelf, it beholds temperance, and ſcience herſelf: not that with which generation is preſent, nor in which one thing has a particular local reſidence in another, and to which we give the appellation of beings; but

[1] See the Additional Notes to the Timæus.

that which is ſcience in *true being*. And, beſides this, contemplating and banqueting on other true beings in the ſame manner, again entering within the heavens, it returns to its proper home. But, when it returns, the charioteer, ſtopping his horſes at the manger, preſents them with ambroſia, and together with it, nectar for drink. And this is the life of the Gods.

But, with reſpect to other ſouls, ſuch as follow divinity in the beſt manner, and become ſimilar to its nature, raiſe the head of the charioteer [1] into the ſuperceleſtial place; where he is borne along with the circumference; but is diſturbed by the courſe of the horſes, and ſcarcely obtains the viſion of perfect realities. But other ſouls at one time raiſe, and at another time depreſs, the head of the charioteer: and, through the violence of the horſes, they partly ſee indeed, and are partly deſtitute of viſion. And again, other ſouls follow, all of them affecting the viſion of this ſuperior place: but from being unable to accompliſh this deſign, they are carried round in a merged condition, ſpurning againſt and ruſhing on each other, through a contention of precedency in their courſe. Hence the tumult, conteſt, and perſpiration, are extreme. And here, indeed, many become lame through the fault of the charioteers, many break many of their wings, and all of them, involved in mighty labour, depart deſtitute of the perception of reality; but after their departure they uſe an aliment compoſed from *opinion*; through which there is a great endeavour to behold where the *plain of truth* is ſituated. For, from a *meadow* of this kind, that which is beſt in the ſoul receives convenient nutriment; and from this the nature of the wing is nouriſhed, by which the ſoul is enabled to aſcend. And this is the law of Adraſtia, that whatever ſoul attending on divinity has beheld any thing of reality ſhall be free from damage, till another period takes place: and that if ſhe is always able to accompliſh this, ſhe ſhall be perpetually free from the incurſions of evil. But if, through an impotency of accompliſhing this end, ſhe has not perceived reality, and from ſome misfortune, and being filled with oblivion and depravity, ſhe becomes heavy and drowſy, breaks her wings, and falls again on the earth [2], then this law prevents her in her firſt generation from

[1] The head of the charioteer is that unity of the ſoul, which ſhe participates from a divine unity, and which is, as it were, the very ſummit and flower of her eſſence.

[2] The general cauſe of the ſoul's deſcent, is her neglecting, as it were, the univerſal form of the world, diligently contemplating a certain portion of it only, and ardently deſiring a partial mode of ſubſiſtence; imagination and her vegetable power ſtrongly alluring her to ſuch a condition of being.

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being implanted in ſome brutal nature, but commands the ſoul which has ſeen the moſt, to inform the body of a philoſopher, or of one deſirous of beauty; of a muſician, or of one devoted to love [1]. But it orders the ſoul, whoſe perceptions rank in the ſecond claſs, to deſcend into a legitimate king, or a man ſtudious of empire and war. But it diſtributes a ſoul of the third order into the governor of a republic, or the ruler of a family, or the maſter of a trade. And again, it diſtributes a ſoul of the fourth rank into one engaged in gymnaſtic exerciſe, or in procuring remedies, and taking care of the body: but ſouls of the fifth order it diſtributes into prophets and myſtics. In the ſixth, it makes a diſtribution into a poetic life. In the ſeventh, into a geometrician or artificer. In the eighth, into a ſophiſt or popular character. And in the ninth, into a tyrant. But in all theſe, he who paſſes his life juſtly will afterwards obtain a better condition of being: but he who acts unjuſtly will paſs into a worſe ſtate of exiſtence. For no ſoul will return to its priſtine condition till the expiration of ten thouſand years [2]: ſince it will not recover the uſe of its wings before this period; except it is the ſoul of one who has philoſophized ſincerely, or together with philoſophy has

[1] As there are principally nine celeſtial ſouls, viz. the ſoul of the world, and the ſouls of the eight celeſtial ſpheres, to which our ſouls are at different times accommodated; hence, ſouls in their deſcent receive nine differences of character. But the philoſophic genius has the firſt rank, becauſe it is naturally adapted to the inveſtigation of every thing human and divine. And as ſuch a genius is ſtudious of wiſdom and truth, and the firſt beauty ſubſiſts in theſe; hence, with great propriety, it brings with it the purſuit of beauty. But we receive the image of beauty through the ſight and hearing; and hence Plato connects with this character a muſician and a lover: the former on account of audible, and the latter of viſible beauty. But the next character is that of a king, who indeed extends a univerſal providence towards mankind, but whoſe contemplations are not ſo ample as thoſe of the philoſopher. The providential energies of thoſe which follow, are ſtill more contracted. But when he diſtributes prophets and myſtics into the fifth order, we muſt not ſuppoſe that he means ſuch as are divine, but mercenary and vulgar prophets, who do not operate from ſcience and art, but from cuſtom and chance.

[2] The numbers three and ten are called perfect; becauſe the former is the firſt complete number, and the latter in a certain reſpect the whole of number; the conſequent ſeries of numbers being only a repetition of the numbers which this contains. Hence, as 10 multiplied into itſelf produces 100, a plain number, and this again multiplied by 10 produces 1000, a ſolid number; and as 1000 multiplied by 3 forms 3000, and 1000 by 10, 10,000; on this account Plato employs theſe numbers as ſymbols of the purgation of the ſoul, and her reſtitution to her proper perfection and felicity. I ſay, as ſymbols; for we muſt not ſuppoſe that this is accompliſhed in juſt ſo many years, but that the ſoul's reſtitution takes place in a perfect manner.

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loved beautiful forms. Theſe, indeed, in the third period of a thouſand years, if they have thrice choſen this mode of life in ſucceſſion, and have thus reſtored their wings to their natural vigour, ſhall in the three thouſandth year, fly away to their priſtine abode. But other ſouls, having arrived at the end of their firſt life, ſhall be judged. And of thoſe who are judged, ſome proceeding to a ſubterranean place of judgment, ſhall there ſuſtain the puniſhments they have deſerved. But others, in conſequence of a favourable judgment, being elevated into a certain celeſtial place, ſhall paſs their time in a manner becoming the life they have lived in a human ſhape. And in the thouſandth year, both the kinds of thoſe who have been judged, returning to the lot and election of a ſecond life, ſhall each of them receive a life agreeable to his deſire. Here alſo the human ſoul ſhall paſs into the life of a beaſt [1], and from that of a beaſt again into a man, if it has firſt been the ſoul of a man. For the ſoul which has never perceived the truth, cannot paſs into the human form. Indeed it is neceſſary to underſtand man, denominated according to ſpecies, as a being proceeding from the information of many ſenſes to a perception contracted into one by the reaſoning power. But this is a recollection of what our ſoul formerly ſaw with divinity, when in a perfect condition of being; and when ſhe deſpiſed what we now conſider as realities, and was ſupernally elevated to the contemplation of that which is true. On this account, the dianoëtic power alone of the philoſopher is juſtly winged. For the philoſophic memory perpetually adheres as much as poſſible to thoſe concerns, by an application to which even a God becomes divine. But he who properly uſes meditations of this kind, being always initiated in perfect myſteries, alone acquires true perfection. And ſuch a one being ſeparated from human ſtudies and purſuits, and adhering to that which is divine, is accuſed by the multitude as inſane, while in the mean time, from being filled with divine enthuſiaſm, he is concealed from the multitude. This whole diſcourſe, therefore, which reſpects the fourth kind of fury [2], tends to the means by which any one, on perceiving a portion

[1] We not muſt underſtand by this, that the ſoul of a man becomes the ſoul of a brute; but that by way of puniſhment it is bound to the ſoul of a brute, or carried in it, juſt as dæmons reſide in our ſouls. Hence all the energies of the rational ſoul are perfectly impeded, and its intellectual eye beholds nothing but the dark and tumultuous phantaſms of a brutal life.

[2] The four kinds of fury are the prophetic, myſtic, poetic, and amatory.

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of terrene beauty, from a reminiſcence of that which is true, may recover his wings, and, when he has recovered them, may ſtruggle to fly away. But ſince he cannot accompliſh this according to his wiſh, like a bird looking on high and deſpiſing inferior concerns, he is accuſed as one inſanely affected. This enthuſiaſm [1], therefore, is of all enthuſiaſms the beſt, and is compoſed from the beſt, both to the poſſeſſor and the participant: and he who is under the influence of this mania when he loves beautiful objects, is denominated a *lover*. For, as we have before obſerved, the ſoul of every man has from its nature perceived realities, or it could not have entered into the human form. But to recollect ſuperior natures from objects of ſenſe, is not eaſy to all men; neither to thoſe who then were engaged but a ſhort time in the contemplation of thoſe divine objects; nor to thoſe who deſcending hither have been unfortunate; nor to ſuch as, turning to injuſtice from certain aſſociations, have become oblivious of the ſacred myſteries which they once beheld. And hence but a few remain whoſe memory is ſufficient for this exalted purpoſe. But theſe, when they behold any ſimilitude of ſupernal forms, they are aſtoniſhed, and as it were rapt above themſelves: and at the ſame time they are ignorant what this paſſion may be, becauſe they are not endued with a ſufficient perception. Indeed, we behold no ſplendour in ſimilitudes which are here, of juſtice, temperance, and whatever elſe is precious in the ſoul; but very few are able, and even to theſe it is difficult, through certain dark inſtruments, to perceive from theſe images the genus of that which is repreſented. But we then ſaw ſplendid [2] beauty, when we obtained together with that happy choir, this bleſſed viſion and contemplation. And we indeed beheld it together with Jupiter [3], but others in conjunction

[1] He who is agitated with this enthuſiaſm poſſeſſes that purification which is called by the Platonic philoſophers *teleſtic*, becauſe it is obtained by the exerciſe of myſtic rites, and gives perfection to the ſoul.

[2] Plato every where ſpeaks of the ſun as analogous to the higheſt God. For as here the ſun is the lord of the whole ſenſible world, ſo the firſt cauſe of the intelligible world. And as light is deduced from the lord the ſun, which conjoins, connects, and unites that which is viſive with that which is viſible, after the ſame manner the light proceeding from the higheſt God, which light is truth, conjoins intellect with the intelligible. We may ſee, therefore, that beauty imitates this light: for it is as it were a light emitted from the fountain of intelligibles, to this world, which it calls upwards to itſelf, and becomes the ſource of union to lovers and the beloved.

[3] Plato, in the Timæus, ſays that the demiurgus, when he made the world, diſſeminated ſouls

conjunction with ſome other God; at the ſame time being initiated [1] in thoſe myſteries which it is lawful to call the moſt bleſſed of all myſteries [2]. And

equal in number to the ſtars, viz. as we have obſerved in the Introduction to that dialogue, equal according to analogy, and not as monadically conſidered. Now, therefore, in conformity to what is there aſſerted, he ſays, "we together with Jupiter," as knowing his proper God. For this is the felicity of the human ſoul, to revolve in conjunction with its proper deities; ſince it is not poſſible to paſs beyond the Gods.

[1] The word τελετη or *initiation*, ſays Hermeas, was ſo denominated from *rendering the ſoul* perfect, παρα το τελεαν ψυχην αποτελειν. The ſoul, therefore, was once perfect. But here it is divided, and is not able to energize wholly by itſelf. But it is neceſſary to know, ſays Hermeas, that *telete*, *mueſis*, and *epopteia*, τελετη, μυησις and εποπτεια differ from each other. *Telete*, therefore, is analogous to that which is preparatory to purifications. But *mueſis*, which is ſo called from cloſing the eyes, is more divine. For to cloſe the eyes in *initiation* is no longer to receive by ſenſe thoſe divine myſteries, but with the pure ſoul itſelf. And *epopteia* is to be eſtabliſhed in, and become a ſpectator of the myſteries. See more on this intereſting ſubject in my Diſſertation on the Eleuſinian and Bacchic Myſteries.

[2] There is nothing belonging to antiquity more celebrated than the myſteries, and eſpecially the Eleuſinian, though the leading particulars of this auguſt inſtitution are perfectly unknown to the moderns, as I have ſhown in my Diſſertation on the Eleuſinian and Bacchic myſteries. One circumſtance in particular of the laſt importance, has been groſsly miſrepreſented by that moſt conſummate ſophiſt Dr. Warburton, in his Divine Legation of Moſes. The circumſtance I allude to belongs to that part of the myſteries which is called εποπτεια, or *inſpection*. For here the Gods themſelves became actually apparent in ſplendid images to the eyes of the epoptæ, or initiated inſpectors. And this, in the firſt place, is evident from the following paſſage of Proclus, in MS. Comment. on the firſt Alcibiades: Εν ταις αγιωταταις των τελετων, προ της θεου παρουσιας δαιμονων χθονιων τινων ενεδολαι προφαινονται, και απο των αχραντων αγαθων εις την υλην προκαλουμεναι. i. e. "In the moſt holy of the myſteries, before the God appears, the impulſions of certain terreſtrial dæmons become viſible, alluring (the initiated) from undefiled goods to matter." And that by the moſt holy of myſteries he means the Eleuſinian, is evident from his ſixth book de Plat. Theol. p. 371. where he expreſsly calls them by this name. And ſtill more expreſsly in his Commentary on Plato's Republic, p. 380. Εν απασι ταις τελεταις και τοις μυστηριοις, οι θεοι πολλας μεν εαυτων προτεινουσι μορφας πολλα δε σχηματα εξαλλαττοντες φαινονται· και τοτε μεν ατυπωτον αυτων προβεβληται φως, τοτε δε εις ανθρωπειον μορφην εσχηματισμενον, τοτε δε εις αλλοιον τυπον προεληλυθως. i. e. "In all initiations and myſteries, the Gods exhibit many forms of themſelves, and appear in a variety of ſhapes. And ſometimes indeed an unfigured light of themſelves is held forth to the view; ſometimes this light is figured according to a human form, and ſometimes it proceeds into a different ſhape." And we are informed by Pſellus in a MS. on Dæmons that this evocation of divine natures formed one part of the ſacerdotal office; though, ſays he, thoſe who now preſide over the myſteries, are ignorant of the incantation neceſſary to evocation. Αλλ' οι γε νυν της τελετης προεξαρχειν, την μεν της κλησεως ουκ ισασιν επωδην. This doctrine, too, of divine appearances in the myſteries is clearly confirmed by Plotinus, ennead. 1. lib. 6. p. 55. and ennead.

And theſe divine orgies were celebrated by us while we were perfect, and free from thoſe evils which awaited us in a ſucceeding period of time. We likewiſe were initiated in, and became ſpectators of, entire [1], ſimple, quietly ſtable [2], and bleſſed viſions, reſident in a pure [3] light; being ourſelves pure, and liberated from this ſurrounding veſtment, which we denominate body, and to which we are now bound, like an oyſter to its ſhell.

With theſe ſpeculations, therefore, we ſhould gratify our memory; for the ſake of which, and through a deſire of thoſe realities which we once beheld, I have given ſuch an extent to my diſcourſe. But beauty, as we have ſaid, ſhone upon us during our progreſſions with the Gods; but on our arrival hither we poſſeſſed the power of perceiving it, ſhining moſt perſpicuouſly, through the cleareſt of our ſenſes. For ſight [4] is the moſt acute of all our corporeal ſenſes; though even through this wiſdom cannot be perceived. If indeed it could, what vehement love would it excite, by preſenting to the eye ſome perſpicuous image of itſelf! And the ſame may be

lib. 9. p. 770. From all this we may collect how egregiouſly Dr. Warburton was miſtaken when, in page 231 of his Divine Legation, he aſſerts that the light beheld in the myſteries was nothing more than an illuminated image which the prieſt had purified. "This," ſays he, "which was all over illuminated, and which the prieſt had thoroughly purified, was αγαλμα, an image." But, indeed, his whole account of this divine inſtitution is abſurd, falſe, and ridiculous in the extreme. I only add, that the preceding obſervations plainly ſhow to what Plato alludes in this part of the dialogue, by his *ſimple and bleſſed viſions reſident in a pure light*, and that we can no longer wonder why the initiated are reported to have been called *happy*.

[1] Viz. perfect.

[2] By this Plato indicates the firm and permanent nature of intelligibles.

[3] He ſays this becauſe the light here is not pure, being mingled with the air.

[4] Plato now wiſhes to ſpeak concerning the amatory character, and to ſhow how it is led back from ſenſible to intelligible beauty. What he ſays, therefore, is this,—that intelligible beauty ſhines forth in an intelligible eſſence, together with the ſpectacles which are there, and that from this beauty, ſenſible beauty is unfolded into light. For, as the light proceeding from the ſun illuminates the whole ſenſible world, ſo beauty, originating from intelligibles, pervades through the regions of ſenſe. But he calls the ſight the cleareſt of all the ſenſes, becauſe it is more acute than the reſt. Hence, it is conſidered as analogous to fire by thoſe who compare the ſenſes to the elements. But its ſuperior acuteneſs is evident from this, that when ſound, and that which is viſible, are produced together, as in the inſtance of thunder and lightning, we firſt ſee the lightning, and ſome time after the ſound reaches our hearing. The reaſon of this is evident: for ſight ſees without time, or in an inſtant; but the other ſenſes require time. Sight alſo is analogous to intellect: for as intellect ſees all things indiviſibly, ſo likewiſe ſight. For it directly ſees the interval which reaches from hence as far as to the heavens.

 ſaid

ſaid of every thing elſe which is the object of love. But now beauty alone is allotted the privilege of being the moſt apparent and lovely of all things. He, therefore, who has not recently deſcended hither, or whoſe manners are depraved, will not very ſwiftly be excited from hence thither to a ſurvey of the beautiful itſelf, by beholding that among ſenſible objects which receives the ſame appellation. Hence, he will not reverence it while he beholds it; but, giving himſelf up to pleaſure, he will endeavour to walk about and generate after the manner of a quadruped: and, injuriouſly converſing with others, he will neither be afraid nor aſhamed of purſuing pleaſure contrary to nature. But he who has been recently initiated, and who formerly was a ſpectator of many bleſſed viſions, when he beholds ſome deiform countenance, elegantly imitative of beauty, or ſome incorporeal idea, at firſt indeed he is ſtruck with horror [1], and feels ſomething of that terror which formerly invaded him; but, from an after ſurvey, he venerates it as a God: and if it was not for the dread of being thought vehemently inſane, he would ſacrifice to his beloved [2], as to a ſtatue and a God. But, in conſequence of ſurveying this beautiful object, he experiences a mutation in his feelings, a perſpiration and unaccuſtomed heat [3], ſuch as horror produces. For, receiving the influx of beauty through his eyes, he becomes hot, and this irrigates the nature of his wings; but when heated, whatever belongs to the germinating of his pinions liquefies, and which formerly being compreſſed through hardneſs reſtrained the vigour of their ſhoots. But an influx of nutriment

[1] It is well obſerved by Hermeas, that it is neceſſary to conſider what is here ſaid vitally and intellectually. For, as we are ſeized with aſtoniſhment on beholding certain ſenſible particulars, ſo likewiſe in the viſion of the Gods; not that it is ſuch a terror as that which ariſes from the view of enemies approaching, but a terror better than a fear of this kind, through the tranſcendent fulneſs of the Gods. It is neceſſary, therefore, that the human ſoul ſhould ſubmit itſelf to the Gods, and to incorporeal forms which ſurpaſs our power, and ſhould be ſeized with a terror better than human fear at the view of them, not as if they were dire, and dreadful, and reſiſting; for theſe are the indications of matter and earth-born natures. Plato, therefore, ſignifies by *horror*, an excitation from ſenſibles to intelligibles.

[2] That is, he would ſacrifice to intelligible beauty, of which ſenſible beauty is the repreſentation, ſimilitude and image. For here, ſays Hermeas, thoſe who ſacrifice to ſtatues do not ſacrifice to the matter itſelf, and the images, but to the Gods. Και γαρ εντευθα οι τοις αγαλμασιν θυοντες ουκ αυτη υλη θυουσι και ταις εικοσιν, αλλα τοις θεοις.

[3] Heat here ſignifies the anagogic power of the ſoul, or that power which elevates her to intelligibles.

taking place, the quill of the wing ſwells, and endeavours to burſt forth, through the whole form of the ſoul: for the whole was formerly winged. The whole, therefore, in this caſe, becomes fervid, and leaps upward. And as infants, during the growth of their teeth, are tormented with the friction and pain of their gums, in the ſame manner is the ſoul affected with reſpect to the ſhooting forth of its wings: for it becomes ſubject to an immoderate heat, titillation, and torment. When, therefore, it beholds the beauty of ſome human form, then imbibing the parts which flow from thence, and which is on this account called deſire, it becomes irrigated and heated, ceaſes to be in pain, and rejoices. But when it is ſeparated from this viſion of beauty, and becomes dry through heat, then the orifices of the paſſages through which the feathers endeavoured to ſhoot forth, being cloſed, impede the offspring of the wing. But theſe being ſhut in together with deſire, and leaping about like things ſubject to palpitation, ſtrike againſt the avenues of their progreſſion. Hence, the whole ſoul, becoming pierced on all ſides in a circle, is agitated with fury, and tormented; but, through the memory of the beautiful, again exults with delight. But, from the mixture of both theſe, it is grievouſly tormented, through the novelty of the paſſion, and becomes dubious and raging; and, while it is thus furious, can neither ſleep by night, nor abide any where by day; but runs about agitated by deſire, wherever there is any probability of obtaining the viſion of beauty. But beholding the beloved beautiful object, and deducing deſire, as through a channel, it now frees from confinement what was before incloſed; and, by this means enjoying the benefit of reſpiration, is liberated from its incitements and parturitions. For the preſent, therefore, it reaps the advantage of this moſt delicious pleaſure; by which it is ſo charmed, that it would never voluntarily depart from its allurements, nor does it eſteem any thing ſo much as this beloved beauty, but delivers over to oblivion its parents, brethren, and friends; and, beſides this, conſiders the diſſipation of its poſſeſſions through negligence as a thing of no conſequence, and perfectly deſpiſes thoſe legal inſtitutions and decencies in which it formerly gloried; and is always prepared for every kind of ſervitude and ſubjection, ſo that it may be near to the object of its deſire. For, beſides reverencing that which poſſeſſes beauty, it finds that this alone is the phyſician of its greateſt diſeaſes.

This paſſion therefore, O beautiful youth, which is the ſubject of my

preſent diſcourſe, is called by men Love [1]: but if you ſhould hear how it is denominated by the Gods, you would probably laugh, on account of your youth. But I think that certain Homerics aſſert, from ſome recondite verſes, that there are two poems upon Love, one of which calls him perfectly injurious, and not very elegant; but they celebrate him as follows:

By men Love's *flying* called; but, forced to fly,
He's named *the winged*, by the powers on high.

In theſe it is partly lawful to believe, and partly not. This however is the cauſe, and the paſſion of lovers. When any one, therefore, of the attendants upon Jupiter [2] is taken captive, ſuch a one is able to bear with greater firmneſs the burthen of this winged God: but ſuch as are ſubſervient to Mars [3], and revolve in conjunction with that deity, when they are enſnared by love, and think that they are in any reſpect treated unjuſtly by their beloved, they are eaſily incited to ſlaughter, and are ready to deſtroy both themſelves and the objects of their regard. And thus every one honours the God, round whom he harmoniouſly revolves, and imitates his life as much

[1] Plato, ſays Hermeas, wiſhes to etymologize the name of Love, viz. the paſſion which is ingenerated in us from the beautiful. This paſſion is called by men *Love*, from *flowing inward*, but by the Gods winged, from its giving wings to the ſoul. But Plato, ſays Hermeas, calls Homerics thoſe that ſing the verſes of Homer. He alſo denominates the above verſes *recondite*, wiſhing to indicate the concealed, divine, and arcane nature of the aſſertion.

[2] For all the gifts of Jupiter, ſays Hermeas, are firm, ſtable, and always ſubſiſt after the ſame manner.

[3] For Mars is the ſource of diviſion and motion. But it is neceſſary to know this univerſally, ſays Hermeas, that whatever is imparted by any divinity is received according to the peculiar aptitude of the recipient. Thus, for inſtance, ſays he, Venus beſtows friendſhip and union; but ſince the illumination imparted by the Goddeſs is mingled with matter, the recipient often perverts her gift, and friendſhip becomes adultery, from being viciouſly received. For things are imparted in one way by the Gods, and are received in another by their participants. Thus alſo, when different ſubſtances become the recipients of the ſolar heat, one of theſe is liquefied as wax, and another is hardened as clay: for each receives what is given according to its proper eſſence, though the ſolar light has a uniform ſubſiſtence.

Hermeas adds, it may alſo be ſaid, ſpeaking more theoretically, that the *ſlaughter* which is here aſcribed to Mars, ſignifies a diviſion from matter, through rapidly turning from it, and no longer energizing phyſically, but intellectually. For ſlaughter, when applied to the Gods, may be ſaid to be an apoſtacy from ſecondary natures, juſt as ſlaughter here ſignifies a privation of the preſent life.

as poſſible, and as long as he remains free from corruption: and after this manner he lives here his firſt generation, and aſſociates with, and conducts himſelf towards, his beloved and others. Every one, therefore, chooſes the love of beauty after his own faſhion, and, as if he conſidered it with reſpect to himſelf a God, he fabricates and adorns it like a ſtatue, and as that which is the object of his adoration and ſacrifice. Such, therefore, as are the followers of Jupiter ſeek after a ſoul belonging to this God for the object of their affection. Hence, they conſider whether he is naturally philoſophic, and adapted to command; and when they find their beloved with ſuch diſpoſitions, they endeavour by all poſſible means to render him completely ſuch. If, therefore, they have not already endeavoured to obtain what they deſire, then, through the incitements of love, they anxiouſly ſtrive for its poſſeſſion; learning by what means it may be acquired; and inveſtigating by themſelves how to diſcover the nature of their proper deity, they at length find it, through being compelled to look with vehemence towards their preſiding God. But when they become connected with him through memory, and are agitated by a divine influence, they receive from him manners and purſuits, as far it is poſſible for man to participate of divinity. And as they conſider the object of their love as the cauſe of all this, their love becomes ſtill more vehement. If, too, they draw their afflatus from Jupiter, then, like the female prieſteſſes of Bacchus, they pour their enthuſiaſm into the ſoul of their beloved, and by this means become as much as poſſible moſt ſimilar to their ruling God. But ſuch as follow Juno[1] ſeek after a royal ſoul; which when they have diſcovered, they act in every reſpect towards it in a manner ſimilar to the attendant on Jupiter. But the followers of Apollo, and of each of the other Gods, imitating their ſeveral deities, ſeek after a beloved object who is naturally affected like themſelves. This when they have obtained, both by imitation, perſuaſion, and elegant manners, they endeavour by all means to lead their beloved to the purſuits and idea of their peculiar God; not, indeed, by employing envy and illiberal malevolence towards the objects of their affection, but by endeavouring to conduct them to a perfect ſimilitude to the God whom they particularly adore.

[1] Of the two divinities, Juno and Apollo, that are here mentioned, ſays Hermeas, the former converts all things through empire, and the latter leads all things to ſymphony and union.

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The willing deſire, therefore, and end of true lovers, if they obtain the object of their purſuit, is ſuch as I have deſcribed: and thus they become illuſtrious and bleſſed, through the fury of love towards the beloved, when the beloved object is once obtained.

But every one who is allured is captivated in the following manner. In the beginning of this fable [1], we aſſigned a triple diviſion to every ſoul; and we eſtabliſhed two certain ſpecies as belonging to the form of the horſes, and conſidered the charioteer as the third ſpecies. Let this diviſion, therefore, remain the ſame for us at preſent. But one of the horſes, we ſaid, was good, and the other not. But we have not yet declared what the virtue is of the good horſe, or the vice of the bad one; it is therefore proper that we ſhould now declare it. The good horſe [2], therefore, ſubſiſts in a more beautiful

[1] Socrates having ſpoken concerning that love which ſubſiſts according to rectitude, and alſo concerning that which ſubſiſts according to a deviation from rectitude, and having, therefore, diſcuſſed the extremes, he now wiſhes to ſpeak about the media, viz. temperate and intemperate love. As, therefore, he ſpeaks of the ſoul conſidered as aſſociating with the body, he very properly gives to it other horſes: for, in proportion as the ſoul deſcends into generation, and approaches to theſe tempeſtuous realms, ſhe receives a greater number of veſtments. Hence, he diſcourſes concerning other horſes, viz. ſuch as poſſeſs a habitude to this body, and participate of its vital paſſions. For the ſoul while ſhe lives in the intelligible world has other horſes, which are characterized by *ſwiftneſs* and *difference*. This indeed is evident, for antient theology gives horſes even to the Gods themſelves. Now, therefore, he conſiders other horſes, viz. anger and deſire, and calls his diſcourſe concerning them a *fable*, which he did not before, when ſpeaking of the horſes of divine natures, and of the human ſoul herſelf when liberated from this terrene body. The reaſon of this, as Hermeas beautifully obſerves, is, becauſe the ſoul is in this body as in a *fiction*. For the whole apparent body with which we are ſurrounded, and all the viſible order of things, is ſimilar to a *fable*. Very properly, therefore, does Socrates, wiſhing to ſpeak concerning the habitude, proximity, or alliance of the ſoul to this body, call his diſcourſe a fable. But he did not call what he ſaid prior to this a fable, becauſe the ſoul while living on high with the Gods had other horſes. He alſo here calls the rational ſoul ηνιοχικος, *of the nature of a charioteer*, and not ηνιοχος, *a charioteer*, as in what he ſaid prior to this; ſignifying that the rational ſoul in the preſent body only imitates a charioteer. In ſpeaking of the horſes, too, he uſes the word ιππομορφω, or *having the form of horſes*, and not ιπποι, *horſes*, as before. For the energies of the ſoul in conjunction with body are not ſuch as when ſhe is united with intelligibles.

[2] The divine Plato, ſays Hermeas, diſtributes the parts of the ſoul into different parts of the body. Hence, conſidering intellect and the reaſoning power as analogous to the ruler of a city, he eſtabliſhes them in the brain: for the brain is ſpherical, and man is a microcoſm. He makes the brain, therefore, analogous to the heavens. In the next place, ſince *anger* is naturally more noble

beautiful condition, is erect, well-articulated, has its neck lofty, its noſe ſomewhat aquiline, its colour white, and its eyes black. It is likewiſe a lover of honour [1], together with temperance and modeſty; is the companion of true opinion, is not whipped, and is only to be governed by exhortation and reaſon. But the bad one is crooked [2], various, raſh in its motions, ſtiff and

noble than *deſire*, and is analogous to thoſe in a city that fight for its defence, and repreſs whatever is diſorderly and tumultuous in it, and whom he calls *auxiliaries*; ſince anger alſo reproves and oppoſes deſire,—hence he fixes it in the heart, that it may be in the veſtibules of reaſon, being only ſeparated from the brain by that interval the neck. But the deſiderative part, as being irrational and ſimilar to the *mercenary* tribe and the multitude in a city, he places in the liver, as an aſs at a manger. Anger, therefore, is more noble than deſire, as being nearer to reaſon; and hence it has a better ſtation, for it is arranged in a better region. He ſays, therefore, in the firſt place concerning anger, that it is more beautiful, and is impreſſed with forms, at one time from the body, and at another from the manners and the ſoul. He calls it *ſtraight*, becauſe it receives the meaſures of reaſon; *well-articulated*, i. e. of a diſtinct, and not of a mixed nature; and having its *neck lofty*, i. e. always extending itſelf, and deſpiſing things of a worſe condition. He alſo ſays that it has an *aquiline noſe*, indicating by this its royal nature: for the hooked or aquiline, ſays Hermeas, is always given by Plato to that which is royal and noble; and the aquiline is of a more elegant form than the flat noſe. He adds, that it is *white* to the view; indicating that it is moſt ſplendid and ſhining with beauty; alſo, that its *eyes are black*, viz. inveſtigating things profound, and wiſhing to ſurvey unapparent and intelligible natures: for he calls the unapparent black.

[1] Plato having related the prerogatives which the better of the two horſes poſſeſſes from the body, now enumerates thoſe which it poſſeſſes from the ſoul. Honour, then, is the greateſt of goods, as he ſays in the Laws; but nothing evil is honourable. On which account alſo we honour Divinity. The good horſe, therefore, is a lover of honour; that is, it aſpires after form and the good. But it alſo loves honour in conjunction with temperance, i. e. it poſſeſſes theſe prerogatives of the ſoul, performs things pertaining to itſelf, and is not willing to be filled with the contrary. It is likewiſe only to be governed by reaſon and exhortation, as being near to reaſon, and directing by its meaſures all the meaſures of its own life.

[2] Plato here ſpeaks concerning the worſe of the two horſes, and imitates its mingled nature. For he no longer ſpeaks firſt concerning the prerogatives of the body, and afterwards concerning thoſe of the ſoul, but he confuſes the order. In oppoſition, therefore, to what he had aſſerted of the more noble horſe, he ſays of this, that it is *crooked*, as being characteriſtic of deſire; for deſire is ſimilar to a wild beaſt: *various*, for this epithet alſo is accommodated to deſire, which is multiform, and the friend of multitude; and *raſh in its motions*, as being hurried along by caſual impulſe. He alſo adds, that it is *ſtiff*; indicating by this its *reſiſting* nature: that it is *ſhort-necked*, as being abject, living according to deſire, and not aſpiring after honour: *flat-noſed*, as being vile, grovelling, and not royal: *of a black colour*, as being dark, and not clear and ſhining like the other: *having its eyes gray*, as being only ſuperficially ſplendid, and poſſeſſing intellections only

and ſhort-necked, flat-noſed, of a black colour, having its eyes gray, and being full of blood; is the companion of injury and arrogance, has its ears hairy and deaf, and is ſcarcely obedient to the whip and the ſpur. When, therefore, the charioteer beholds the amatory eye inflaming all the ſoul, through ſenſible perception, and filling it with the incentives of titillation and deſire, then, as always, the horſe which is obedient to the charioteer, violently checking its motions, through ſhame reſtrains itſelf from leaping on the beloved object. But the other cannot be held back, either by the ſpur or whip of the charioteer; but hurries along violently, leaping and exulting, and, fully employing the charioteer and its aſſociate, compels both of them to ruſh along with it to venereal delight. Both theſe, however, reſiſt its violence from the beginning, and indignantly endure to be thus compelled to ſuch dire and lawleſs conduct. But at length, when there is no end of the malady, in conſequence of being borne along by compulſion, they now give way, conſent to do what they are ordered, and deliver themſelves up to the ſurvey of the ſplendid aſpect of the beloved. But the charioteer, from a viſion of this kind, recovers the memory of the nature of beauty, and again perceives it firmly eſtabliſhed, together with temperance, in a pure and holy[1] ſeat. In conſequence, however, of ſuch a perception he is terrified, and through reverence falls ſupine, and at the ſame time is compelled to draw back the reins with ſuch vehemence, that both the horſes fall upon their hips; the one indeed willingly, through his not making any reſiſtance; but the other with arrogant oppoſition, through his extreme unwillingneſs to comply. But when they have departed to a greater diſtance in their courſe, the one, through ſhame and aſtoniſhment, moiſtens all the ſoul with ſweat; but the other, being liberated from the pain which he had ſuffered through the bridle and the fall, is ſcarcely able to breathe, and, full of anger, reviles the charioteer and his partner in the courſe, as deſerting order and

only as far as to the phantaſy: *being full of blood*, i. e. being moſt allied to generation: *the companion of injury and arrogance*, as poſſeſſing properties directly contrary to the other horſe; for that was the aſſociate of temperance and modeſty: *has its ears hairy and deaf*, as being unobedient, and often hearing a thing without attending to it: and, laſtly, *is ſcarcely obedient to the whip and the ſpur*, as not capable of being benefited by exhortation.

[1] i. e. In the intelligible; for ſuch is the intelligible region, ſince the beauties which are here are not *genuinely* beautiful.

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the compact through effeminacy and fear; and again compelling them to proceed, though perfectly unwilling, he ſcarcely complies with them, requeſting ſome delay. But when the appointed time for which the delay was granted arrives, and which they feign themſelves to have forgotten, then the vicious horſe, violently urging, neighing, and hurrying them away, compels them to addreſs the beloved again in the ſame language as before. When, therefore, they approach near, then bending and extending his tail, and champing the bridle, he draws them along with importunate impudence. But the charioteer, being ſtill more affected in this manner, and falling down as it were from the goal, pulls back the reins with ſtill greater violence from the teeth of the injurious horſe, repreſſes his reviling tongue and bloody jaws, fixes his legs and hips on the ground, and thus torments him for his behaviour. But when the vicious horſe has often endured a puniſhment of this kind, he is at length rendered humble and ſubmiſſive, and follows the providential directions of the charioteer; ſo that he is loſt as it were on ſeeing a beautiful object. Hence it ſometimes happens, that the ſoul of a lover follows its beloved with reverence and fear, and that the lover pays it every kind of obſervance and attention as if it was equal to a God; and this not with any diſſimulation, but in conſequence of being really thus affected: ſo that, when the beloved happens to be naturally a friend, then his friendſhip conſpires into one with that of his obſequious lover.

If, therefore, in ſome former period of time, he has been deceived by his aſſociates, or by ſome other perſons, aſſerting that it was baſe to be familiar with a lover, and has on this account rejected his lover; yet advancing age, and the wants of nature, lead him to the converſe of love. For it was never decreed by fate, either that the evil ſhould be a friend to the evil, or that the good ſhould not be a friend to the good. When, therefore, the youth admits his lover to an intimate familiarity with him, then the benevolence of the lover aſtoniſhes the beloved, in conſequence of perceiving that all other friends and aſſociates exhibit no portion of friendſhip which can be compared with that of a friend divinely inſpired. But when the lover continues to act in this manner for a long ſpace of time, living with his beloved in high familiarity, frequently touching him in gymnaſtics and other aſſociations, then the fountain of that efflúxion which Jupiter, when enamoured with Ganymedes, denominated *deſire*, ſtreaming abundantly

towards the lover, is partly infuſed into him, and partly through its exuberance flows forth externally. And as air, or a certain echo, when received by ſmooth and ſolid bodies, is again impelled to the place from whence it proceeded; ſo this effluxion of beauty, flowing back again to the beautiful through the eyes, as it is naturally adapted to penetrate into the ſoul, and ſtimulate the avenues of the wings, now irrigates, and excites them to ſhoot forth their feathers, and fills the ſoul of the beloved with love. Hence he loves, but is doubtful concerning what he loves; and neither knows what he ſuffers, nor is able to relate it: but juſt like an eye infected with the viſion of another eye which is diſeaſed, he is unable to aſſign the cauſe of his malady, and is ignorant that he beholds himſelf in his lover, as in a mirror. Hence, when his lover is preſent, he, like him, ceaſes to be in pain; but, when he is abſent, he deſires in the ſame manner as he is deſired, poſſeſſing, inſtead of love, nothing more than an image of love; and he denominates it, and thinks that it is not love, but friendſhip. He deſires, therefore, in a manner ſimilar to his lover, though more feebly, to ſee, to touch, to love, to ſit together; and, as it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, he performs all this afterwards with the greateſt celerity. Hence, in their moſt intimate aſſociations, the intemperate horſe of the lover calls on the charioteer, and tells him that he ought to be gratified with a ſmall degree of pleaſure, as the reward of ſuch mighty labours: but the ſame horſe of the beloved has, indeed, nothing to ſay; but, diſtended and dubious, it embraces the lover, full of vehement benevolence towards him, and is prepared to comply in every reſpect with the deſires of the beloved. But the conjoined horſe, together with the charioteer, reſiſts this familiarity through reaſon and ſhame. If, therefore, the better parts of the dianoëtic power obtaining the victory lead the lovers to an orderly and philoſophic mode of conduct, then they paſs through the preſent life with felicity and concord, ſubduing themſelves, and adorned with modeſt manners; the vicious part of the ſoul being in ſubjection, and the virtuous, free. But, arriving at the end of the preſent life, they become winged and light, in conſequence of being victors in one of the truly Olympic conteſts [1]; a greater good than which, neither human

[1] Theſe conteſts are denominated Olympic, not from the mountain Olympus, but from Olympus, heaven. But he who philoſophizes truly becomes the victor in three conteſts. In the firſt place,

human temperance, nor divine fury, can extend to man. But if they lead a more arrogant and unphiloſophic life, but at the ſame time united with ambition, their intemperate horſe will perhaps lead their unguarded ſouls into intoxication, or ſome other indolent habits; cauſe them to embrace thoſe delights which the multitude conſider as the moſt bleſſed of all pleaſures; and will fix them in continual endeavours to gain the object of their deſire. They will, therefore, exerciſe themſelves in theſe delights, but this, however, rarely; becauſe the whole of the dianoëtic nature does not conſent to ſuch enjoyments. Theſe too will live in friendſhip with each other, as well as the former, through the external effluxion of love, but in a leſs fervent degree; thinking that they ought both to give and receive from each other the greateſt confidence, which it is unlawful to diſſolve, and by this means become enemies inſtead of friends. But, in their exit from the preſent body, they will not be winged indeed, but will be excited to emit their pinions; ſo that they will carry with them no ſmall reward of amatory fury. For the law forbids thoſe who are now beginning the celeſtial progreſſion, to enter into darkneſs, and the ſubterranean journey; but orders them, in conſequence of leading a ſplendid life, to be happy with each other during their progreſſions; and that, when they are ſimilarly winged, this ſhall take place for the ſake of love. Such then, O young man, ſo numerous, and ſo divine are the benefits which the friendſhip of a lover will confer on you. But the familiarity of one who is void of love, being mingled with mortal temperance, and diſpenſing mortal and niggardly concerns, will generate in the ſoul of its friendly aſſociate that illiberality which is conſidered as virtue by the vulgar, and will cauſe it to wander for nine thouſand years with a rolling motion upon and under the earth.

place, he ſubjects all the inferior powers of his ſoul to intellect; in the ſecond place, he obtains wiſdom, in conjunction with divine fury; and, in the third place, recovering his wings, he flies away to his kindred ſtar. But if any one, through the generoſity of his nature, happens to be more propenſe to love, and yet has not been from the beginning philoſophically and morally educated, and hence, after he has been enſnared by love, gives way perhaps to venereal delights; ſuch a one, in conſequence of a lapſe of this kind, cannot recover his wings entire, yet, on account of the wonderful anagogic power of love, he will be prepared for their recovery. Hence, when in a courſe of time he has amputated his luſt, and, retaining the ſublimity of love, has formed a virtuous friendſhip, he will not after the preſent life be precipitated into the loweſt region of puniſhment, but will be purified in the air, till he has philoſophized in the higheſt degree.

And thus, O beloved Love, through the impulſe of Phædrus, we have rendered and extended to thee a recantation, clothed in poetic figures and expreſſions, in the moſt beautiful and beſt manner we are able to accompliſh. Wherefore, pardoning what we before aſſerted, and gratefully [1] receiving our preſent diſcourſe, continue benignantly and propitiouſly the amatory art [2] which you have conferred on me, neither taking away nor diminiſhing its poſſeſſion through avenging anger. But grant, that among ſuch as are beautiful I may yet be more honoured than at preſent. And if Phædrus and I have formerly ſaid any thing ſevere againſt thy divinity, grant that, accuſing Lyſias as the author of ſuch a diſcourſe, we may deſiſt from all ſuch aſſertions in future; and beſides this, graciouſly convert him to the ſtudy of philoſophy, like his brother Polemarchus, ſo that this lover of his may no longer tend hither and thither, without any ſtability, as is the caſe at preſent, but may ingenuouſly paſs his life in future, in conjunction with love and philoſophic diſcourſes.

PHÆDR. I unite with you in prayer, Socrates, if it is better that all this ſhould happen to us. But I have ſome time ſince wondered at your diſcourſe; as it ſo far ſurpaſſes that which was formerly delivered, that I am afraid, leſt Lyſias himſelf ſhould appear but mean, if he is deſirous to enter the liſts againſt another. And, indeed, but lately a very principal perſon in the commonwealth branded him with this very epithet; calling him, through the whole of his accuſation, nothing more than a compoſer of orations. Perhaps, therefore, he will deſiſt through ambition from writing any more.

SOC. You aſſert, O young man, a ridiculous opinion; and you very much wander from the intention of your aſſociate, if you think him ſo extremely timid: but perhaps you think that his reviler has ſpoken the truth in what he has ſaid againſt him.

[1] It is well obſerved here by Hermeas, that Socrates uſes the word *gratefully*, not as if the Gods received any *favour* from us, but becauſe we *gratify* ourſelves through worſhipping the divinities, in conſequence of becoming allied to and familiar with them.

[2] Should it be aſked why Socrates now calls that an *art* which he had before denominated *enthuſiaſtic*, we reply with Hermeas, that he ſays this becauſe it is neceſſary to excite the artificial theorems which we poſſeſs, and thus afterwards receive the illuminations from the Gods.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. To me it appears ſo indeed, Socrates: and you yourſelf know, that the moſt powerful and venerable in a city are aſhamed to compoſe orations, and to leave their writings behind them, dreading the opinion of poſterity, leſt they ſhould be called ſophiſts.

SOC. You are ignorant, Phædrus, that the proverb, *A couch is pleaſant*, is derived from that long curvature which is about the Nile [1]: and, beſides this, you are ignorant that the moſt prudent of politicians particularly love to compoſe orations, and to leave their writings behind them; and are ſo fond of thoſe who extol their works, as to give the firſt place in their writings to ſuch as celebrate their productions every where.

PHÆDR. How do you mean? For I do not underſtand you.

SOC. What, do not you know that, in the beginning of a politician's book, the very firſt thing that makes its appearance is the perſon by whom the book is praiſed?

PHÆDR. How?

SOC. Why, it ſays, that it is approved by the council, or the people, or by both. And he who ſays this, ſays it, at the ſame time extremely reverencing and celebrating himſelf as the author. But after this he ſpeaks in ſuch a manner as to ſhow his wiſdom to his admirers, and ſometimes accompliſhes this in a very long diſcourſe. Does this, therefore, appear to you to be any thing elſe than a written oration?

PHÆDR. It does not.

SOC. If, therefore, this happens to be approved, he departs rejoicing from the theatre, like a poet. But if it ſhould be rejected, and he ſhould be excluded from compoſing orations, and ſhould be conſidered as unworthy to be an author, both he and his friends are afflicted on the account.

PHÆDR. And, indeed, very much ſo.

SOC. In this, therefore, it is ſufficiently evident, that they do not deſpiſe a ſtudy of this kind, but hold it in the higheſt eſtimation.

PHÆDR. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But what, when a rhetorician, or a king, acquires an ability like

[1] This is ſaid according to that figure in Rhetoric which is called αντιφρασις, or *oppoſition*: for this long curvature about the Nile, according to Hermeas, was a place where there was much moleſtation.

that

that of Lycurgus, or Solon, or Darius, ſo as to be reckoned an immortal writer by the city, will he not think himſelf equal to a God, while he is yet alive? and will not poſterity entertain the ſame opinion reſpecting him, upon ſurveying his writings?

PHÆDR. Very much ſo.

SOC. Do you think then that any ſuch perſon, however malevolent he may be, would revile Lyſias, merely becauſe he is a writer?

PHÆDR. It does not ſeem probable from what you have ſaid: for he would revile, as it appears, his own purſuit.

SOC. From hence, therefore, it muſt be evident to every one, that no one is ſcandalous merely from compoſing orations.

PHÆDR. For how ſhould he?

SOC. But this I think is in reality ſhameful, not to write and ſpeak in a becoming manner, but ſhamefully and viciouſly.

PHÆDR. Evidently ſo. What then is the mode of writing well and ill?

SOC. Have we not occaſion, Phædrus, to inquire this of Lyſias or of ſome other, who has either at any time written any thing, or is about to write; whether his compoſition is political, or on private ſubjects; whether it is in meaſure like the works of a poet, or without meaſure like thoſe of a private perſon?

PHÆDR. Do you aſk, if we have not occaſion? For what purpoſe, as I may ſay, is our very life, but for the ſake of pleaſures of this kind? For, certainly, it is not for the ſake of thoſe pleaſures which pain muſt neceſſarily antecede, or elſe no pleaſure would ſubſiſt; which is nearly the caſe with all pleaſures reſpecting the body. And, on this account, they are very juſtly denominated ſervile.

SOC. But we have leiſure, as it appears: and the graſhoppers ſeem to me ſinging over our heads, as in the heat, and, diſcourſing with one another, to look alſo upon us. If, therefore, they ſhould behold us, like the multitude, not diſcourſing in mid-day, but ſleeping and allured by their ſinging, through the indolence of our dianoëtic power, they might very juſtly deride us; thinking that certain ſlaves had taken up their abode with them, in order to ſleep like cattle by the ſide of the fountain during the fervour of the meridian ſun. But if they perceive us engaged in diſcourſe, and not captivated by

their allurements as if they were Syrens, but ſailing by them to our deſtined port, perhaps they will rejoice to beſtow upon us that gift which, by the conſent of the Gods, they are able to deliver to men.

PHÆDR. But what gift is this which they poſſeſs? For I do not recollect that I ever heard what it is [1].

Soc. And yet it is not proper that a man ſtudious of the Muſes ſhould be ignorant of things of this kind. But it is ſaid that theſe inſects were formerly men [2], before the Muſes had a being; that when the Muſes made their appearance, and had given birth to the ſong, ſome of theſe were ſo enſnared by the pleaſure which it produced, that through ſinging they neglected the proper ſuſtenance of the body, and, thus waſting away, at length periſhed: but that from theſe the race of graſhoppers was produced, who received this

[1] According to Jamblichus and Hermeas, dæmons are ſignified by the graſhoppers in this fable; and this is by no means wonderful, ſince in the preceding part of this dialogue, which is full of allegory, ſomething more divine than dæmons is implied by the horſes of the Gods. Beſides, the office which is here aſſigned to graſhoppers perfectly correſponds with the employment which Plato in the Banquet attributes to benevolent dæmons: for they ſtand as it were over our heads, diſcourſe with each other, and in the mean time ſpeculate our affairs, diſapprove our evil deeds, and commend ſuch as are good; all which is likewiſe confirmed by Heſiod in his Works and Days. Beſides, they receive divine gifts, and deliver them to us, approach to the Muſes, and relate our actions to the Gods. In conſequence of this correſpondence, Jamblichus and Hermeas conclude with great probability that aërial dæmons are ſignified in this place by graſhoppers. For, as theſe animals live perpetually ſinging, and imbibe the air through a ſound of this kind; ſo beneficent aërial dæmons live in the air, through perpetually celebrating divine natures.

[2] According to Hermeas, the interpretation of this place by the divine Jamblichus is as follows: Socrates calls men ſouls dwelling in the intelligible world: for ſouls before they live a mortal life abide on high in the intelligible, contemplating forms themſelves together with the ſupermundane Gods. Thus then men were before the Muſes had a being, that is, before the ſpheres and the ſenſible world; not that the term *before*, ſignifies here temporal precedency, but a ſubſiſtence * prior to this apparent progreſſion of the ſpheres. For this is the generation of the Muſes, an apparent ſubſiſtence, proceeding from the demiurgus into the ſenſible world. The Muſes, therefore, and the ſpheres, the ſenſible world, and the whole ſoul of the univerſe, and the partial ſouls of men, had a conſubſiſtent progreſſion. Theſe ſouls, too, as being recently born, and remembering what they had ſeen in the intelligible region, were averſe to generation, and were unwilling to eat and drink, i. e. were not willing to partake of ſenſible opinion; for they poſſeſſed intelligible nutriment. Hence, waſting away, they at length periſhed, i. e. they reaſcended to the intelligible.

* Viz. an *unapparent* ſubſiſtence: for this is prior to an *apparent* ſubſiſtence; in the ſame way as every cauſe, ſo far as it is a cauſe, is prior to its effect, though it may be temporally conſubſiſtent with it.

gift

gift [1] from the Muſes, that they ſhould never want nutriment, but ſhould continue ſinging without meat or drink till they died; and that after death they ſhould depart to the Muſes, and inform them what Muſe was honoured by ſome particular perſon among us. Hence that, by acquainting Terpſichore with thoſe who reverence her in the dance [2], they render her propitious to ſuch. By informing Erato of her votaries, they render her favourable in amatory concerns; and the reſt in a ſimilar manner, according to the ſpecies of veneration belonging to each. But that they announce to the moſt antient Calliope, and after her to Urania, thoſe who have lived in the exerciſe of philoſophy, and have cultivated the muſic over which they preſide; theſe Muſes more than all the reſt being converſant with the heavens, and with both divine and human diſcourſe; and ſending forth the

[1] He who lives according to intellect, ſays Hermeas, who is a lover of the Muſes, and a philoſopher, in conſequence of wiſhing to reaſcend to the Gods, does not require the care of the body and of a corporeal life; but conſiders theſe as nothing, being deſirous to be ſeparated from them. For he meditates death, i. e. a departure from the preſent life, as he knows that the body moleſts and impedes the energies of intellect. But the *gift* which is here mentioned ſignifies the ſoul becoming the attendant of its proper God. Hermeas adds: *It is however neceſſary to know that a divine nature is preſent to all things without a medium, but that we are incapable of being conjoined with divinity, without the medium of a dæmoniacal nature; juſt as we behold the light of the ſun through the miniſtrant intervention of the air.*

[2] Dancing here muſt not be underſtood literally, as if Terpſichore was propitious to thoſe who engage in that kind of dancing which is the object of ſenſe; for this would be ridiculous. We muſt ſay, therefore, as Hermeas beautifully obſerves, that there are divine dances: in the firſt place, that of the Gods; in the ſecond place, that of divine ſouls: in the third place, the revolution of the celeſtial divinities, viz. of the ſeven planets, and the inerratic ſphere, is called a dance: in the fourth place, thoſe who are initiated in the myſteries* perform a certain dance: and, in the laſt place, the whole life of a philoſopher is a dance. Terpſichore, therefore, is the inſpective guardian of all dancing. Who then are thoſe that honour the goddeſs in the dance? Not thoſe who dance well, but thoſe who live well through the whole of the preſent exiſtence, elegantly arranging their life, and dancing in ſymphony with the univerſe. Erato, ſays Hermeas, is denominated from Love, and from making the works of Love, lovely: for ſhe cooperates with Love. Calliope is denominated from the eye (παρα την οπα); and Urania preſides over aſtronomy. Through theſe two goddeſſes we preſerve our rational part from being in ſubjection to the irrational nature. For, through ſight ſurveying the order of the celeſtial Gods, we properly arrange our irrational part. And further ſtill, through rhythms, philoſophy, and hearing, we elegantly diſpoſe that which we contain of the diſorderly and void of rhythm.

* Επειτα και ενταυθα οι τελουμενοι τοις θεοις χορειαν τινα αποτελουσιν εν τοις μυστηριοις.

moſt

moſt beautiful voice. On many accounts, therefore, it is neceſſary to ſay ſomething, and not to ſleep in mid-day.

PHÆDR. It is neceſſary, indeed.

SOC. Let us, therefore, conſider what we lately ſpoke of, viz. after what manner any one may both ſpeak and write properly, or improperly.

PHÆDR. By all means.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, neceſſary, that he who is about to ſpeak with propriety ſhould poſſeſs a true [1] dianoëtic perception of that which is the ſubject of his diſcourſe?

PHÆDR. I have heard, my dear Socrates, that it is not neceſſary that he who engages in the profeſſion of an orator ſhould learn what is truly juſt [2];

[1] Plato here teaches how to write, and what the mode is of writing and ſpeaking well or ill, making the problem more univerſal and ſcientific, after having referred the whole beginning of the diſcourſe to the Muſes and the Gods. But as that which is diſtorted is judged of by a rule, and that which is not ſtraight by the ſtraight, ſo that which is falſe can only be accurately known by truth. Hence, he ſays, in ſpeaking or writing well, it is neceſſary that truth, and a knowledge of the ſubject, ſhould precede as the leaders. For he who does not know the truth of a thing ſpeaks conjecturally about it. Three things, therefore, are ſaid to be preſent with thoſe who ſpeak or write. Firſt, a knowledge of the truth. In the ſecond place, an ability of making one thing many, which is the buſineſs of the diviſive method: for by this we know the various ſignifications of the thing propoſed, if it ſhould happen to be many, whether it is homonymous or ſynonymous, whether genus or ſpecies, and the like. There muſt neceſſarily, therefore, be the diviſive method. In the third place, the many muſt be collected into one, which is the buſineſs of the analytic and definitive methods: for to be able to collect many things into one ſentence, is to give the definition of a thing. Afterwards, the compoſition and ornament of the diſcourſe muſt ſucceed. Theſe, then, as the inſtruments of ſpeaking and writing, ought to be known before every thing, viz. the nature and the eſſence, or, in other words, the truth of a thing. For thus we ſhall know how we ought to proceed, whether through ſuch things as are true, or through ſuch as are aſſimilated to the truth. For he who does not know the truth, but only has an opinion concerning it, like thoſe who poſſeſs popular rhetoric, will often perſuade his hearers to the contrary of what he wiſhes.

Afterwards, the philoſopher relates how many goods are derived from true rhetoric, and how many evils happen from that which is falſely denominated.

[2] There are three parts of rhetoric, *that which counſels*, (το συμβουλευτικον), *the forenſic*, (το δικανικον), and *the panegyric*, (το πανηγυρικον). And with reſpect to the ends of theſe three, the juſt is the end of the forenſic; good, of that which counſels; and beauty, of the panegyric. According to oppoſition, likewiſe, the juſt and the unjuſt are the ends of the forenſic; good and evil of that which conſults; and the beautiful and the baſe, of the panegyric. A certain duplicity alſo appears about each of theſe: about the forenſic, accuſation and defence; about that which conſults, exhortation and dehortation; and, about the panegyric, praiſe and blame.

but only that which appears ſo to the multitude, who undertake to judge; nor, again, what is truly good or beautiful, but only what appears to be ſo: for that perſuaſion is derived from theſe, and not from truth.

Soc. The ſayings of the wiſe, Phædrus, are by no means to be deſpiſed, but we ſhould rather conſider the meaning of their aſſertions; and, conſequently, we muſt not paſs by what you have now ſaid.

Phædr. You ſpeak properly.

Soc. Let us then conſider this matter as follows.

Phædr. How?

Soc. Suppoſe I ſhould perſuade you to fight your enemies on horſeback, but at the ſame time both of us ſhould be ignorant what a horſe is; and that I only ſhould know reſpecting you, that Phædrus thinks a horſe is an animal which has the greateſt ears of all domeſtic animals.

Phædr. This would be ridiculous indeed, Socrates.

Soc. Not yet; but when I ſhould earneſtly perſuade you to do this by a diſcourſe compoſed in praiſe of an aſs, calling him a horſe, and aſſerting that he is a moſt excellent animal, uſeful for domeſtic and military purpoſes, able to carry burthens, and adapted for a variety of other employments.

Phædr. This, indeed, would be perfectly ridiculous.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, better that a friend ſhould be ridiculous, than that he ſhould be wicked, and an enemy?

Phædr. It appears ſo.

Soc. When an orator, therefore, who is ignorant of good and evil, endeavours to perſuade a city in a like condition, not indeed by praiſing the ſhadow of an aſs, as if it was that of a horſe, but by praiſing evil, as if it was good, being anxiouſly ſolicitous about the opinion of the multitude, and thus perſuades them to do evil inſtead of good; what crop do you think the orator can reap after ſuch a ſemination?

Phædr. Not a very good one.

Soc. Have we not therefore, my friend, reviled the art of ſpeaking in a more ruſtic manner than is becoming? For the art itſelf will, perhaps, thus addreſs us: "What delirium, O wonderful men, has invaded you? For I compel no one who is ignorant of truth to learn how to ſpeak: but if any one will take my advice, he will then only employ me, when he has acquired the poſſeſſion of truth. This, then, I aſſert as a thing of great conſequence,

conſequence, that without me even he who knows realities will not, for all this, be able to procure perſuaſion." Will not the art, therefore, ſpeak juſtly, by making ſuch a declaration?

PHÆDR. I confeſs it, if our ſubſequent reaſons evince that rhetoric is an art. For I think I have heard ſome arguments, which aſſert that it deceives, and that it is not an art, but an unartificial exerciſe. But the true art of ſpeaking, ſays Laco, never was, nor ever will be unaccompanied by truth. This then is what they ſay [1], Socrates. But, bringing them hither, let us inquire of them what they aſſert, and in what manner.

SOC. Be preſent then, ye generous animals, and perſuade the beautiful youth, Phædrus, that unleſs he philoſophizes ſufficiently, he will never ſufficiently ſpeak about any thing. But let Phædrus anſwer to the interrogations. Is not the whole rhetorical art that which leads the ſoul by diſcourſes, not in judicial matters only, and other public concerns, but alſo in private affairs, and theſe whether trifling or important? And is there any thing more honourable than to act according to the true rules of this art, both in important and inconſiderable affairs? Or have you not heard that this is the caſe?

PHÆDR. I am not, by Jupiter, perfectly acquainted with all this. But it is ſpoken of, and written about, as an art for the moſt part converſant with judicial matters and ſpeeches; but I have not heard that it extends any further.

SOC. What, have you heard of the rhetorical art which Neſtor and Ulyſſes exerciſed at Troy, but have never heard about that of Palamedes?

PHÆDR. I have indeed, by Jupiter, heard about the orations of Neſtor: unleſs you will prove that Gorgias is a certain Neſtor, or Thraſymachus and Theodorus a certain Ulyſſes.

SOC. Perhaps they may be ſo; but let us drop any further diſcourſe about theſe. And do you inform me what litigators do in judicial matters: do they not contradict? Or ſhall we ſay they do any thing elſe?

PHÆDR. Nothing elſe.

[1] Hermeas here aſks whether rhetoricians are philoſophic; and he ſays in reply, that good rhetoricians cannot be formed without philoſophy. For the more celebrated among the antient rhetoricians were philoſophic. Thus, Pericles was the aſſociate of Anaxagoras, and Demoſthenes of Plato.

Soc. But are not their contradictions about *juſt* and *unjuſt*?

Phædr. Certainly.

Soc. But does not he who accompliſhes this by art, cauſe the ſame thing to appear to the ſame perſons, whenever he pleaſes, at one time juſt, and at another time unjuſt?

Phædr. But what then?

Soc. And in his oration does he not cauſe the ſame things to appear to the city at one time good, and at another time juſt the contrary?

Phædr. Certainly.

Soc. And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes is reported to have been able by his art to cauſe the ſame things to appear to his hearers, both ſimilar and diſſimilar, one and many, abiding and borne along?

Phædr. Certainly.

Soc. The contradictory art, therefore, takes place, not only in judicial matters and orations, but, as it appears, about every thing which is the ſubject of diſcourſe; ſince it is one art, enabling us to aſſimilate every thing to every thing, both ſuch things as are capable of aſſimilation, and thoſe to which they are able to be aſſimilated; and, beſides this, to lead them into light, nothwithſtanding their being aſſimilated and concealed by ſomething elſe.

Phædr. How do you mean?

Soc. My meaning will appear in the following inquiries: Does deception ſubſiſt in things which differ much, or but a little, from each other?

Phædr. In things which differ but a little.

Soc. But, by making a tranſition according to ſmall advances, you will effect a greater concealment, while paſſing on to that which is contrary, than you will by a tranſition according to great advances.

Phædr. How ſhould it not be ſo?

Soc. It is neceſſary, therefore, that he who is about to deceive another ſhould accurately know the ſimilitude and diſſimilitude of things.

Phædr. It is neceſſary.

Soc. Is it poſſible, therefore, that he who is ignorant of the truth of every thing can judge concerning the ſimilitude, whether great or ſmall, which ſubſiſts in other things?

Phædr. It is impoſſible.

Soc.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, that ſuch as conceive opinions contrary to the truth of things, and who are deceived, are thus affected through certain ſimilitudes.

PHÆDR. The caſe is ſo.

Soc. Can, therefore, he who is ignorant about the nature of each particular, artificially deliver any thing, by paſſing according to ſmall advances into its contrary, through ſimilitudes? Or can ſuch a one avoid falling into error?

PHÆDR. He cannot.

Soc. Hence then, my friend, he who is ignorant of truth, and is led by opinion, will, as it appears, exhibit a ridiculous and inartificial rhetoric.

PHÆDR. It appears ſo.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, both in the oration of Lyſias, which you now carry about you, and in that which we delivered, to ſee what we have aſſerted without art, and what is agreeable to art?

PHÆDR. I am above all things willing. For we ſpeak at preſent in a trifling manner, as we are without ſufficient examples.

Soc. But, indeed, as it appears, ſome reaſons have been given, through the aſſiſtance of a certain fortune, which have all the force of examples, evincing that he who knows the truth will, even while he jeſts in his diſcourſe, attract his auditors. And I conſider, O Phædrus, the local Gods as the cauſe of this. Perhaps, alſo, the interpreters of the Muſes, ſinging over our heads, have inſpired us with this ability: for I myſelf participate of no art [1] belonging to diſcourſe.

PHÆDR. Let it be as you ſay; only render what you aſſert evident.

Soc. Come then, read over the beginning of Lyſias's oration.

PHÆDR. "You are well acquainted with the ſtate of my affairs; and you

[1] It was uſual with Socrates to deny that he poſſeſſed any invention of his own, and to refer all things to the Gods. But there is, ſays Hermeas, a communion between us and the Gods, our ſoul being thence illuminated both without a medium, and through the middle genera of beings. Providence, therefore, ſays he, is twofold; for it is either that of the ſuperior Gods themſelves, or it takes place through the more excellent genera, ſuch as angels, dæmons, and heroes, and the local Gods. Socrates, therefore, aſcribes ſuch an order and management of words to the local Gods. But he ſignifies by the ſinging over his head the more excellent genera, the attendants of the Gods. For it is always requiſite to call that which tranſcends, a dæmon; as, for inſtance, the rational is the dæmon of the irrational part, and a God is the dæmon of intellect.

have

have heard, I think, that it is moſt conducive to my advantage for them to ſubſiſt in this manner. But it appears to me, that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wiſh to obtain, becauſe I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their deſires ceaſe, repent themſelves of the benefits which they have beſtowed."

Soc. Stop there: are we not then to ſhow, in what he is faulty, and in what reſpect he has acted without art?

Phædr. Certainly.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, manifeſt to every one, that when we ſpeak upon certain ſubjects we are unanimous in our conceptions; but when upon others, that we are diſcordant in our opinions?

Phædr. I ſeem to underſtand what you ſay; but, notwithſtanding this, ſpeak more plainly.

Soc. When any one pronounces the name of iron or ſilver, do we not all underſtand the ſame thing?

Phædr. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But when we pronounce that of the juſt, or the good, are we not of different opinions? and do we not doubt both with others and ourſelves?

Phædr. Very much ſo.

Soc. In ſome things, therefore, we agree in ſentiments, and in others not.

Phædr. We do ſo.

Soc. Where, then, are we more eaſily deceived? And in which of theſe is rhetoric able to accompliſh the moſt?

Phædr. Evidently in thoſe about which we are dubious.

Soc. He, therefore, who is about to purſue the rhetorical art, ought firſt of all to diſtinguiſh theſe in order; to conſider the character of each ſpecies; and to perceive in what the multitude muſt neceſſarily be dubious, and in what not.

Phædr. He who is able to accompliſh this, Socrates, will underſtand a beautiful ſpecies.

Soc. Afterwards, I think, he ought not to be ignorant when he comes to particulars, but to perceive acutely to what genus the ſubject of his future diſcourſe belongs.

Phædr. What then?

Soc.

Soc. With reſpect to Love, ſhall we ſay that it belongs to things dubious, or to ſuch as are not ſo?

PHÆDR. To things dubious, certainly.

Soc. Do you think he would permit you to aſſert that reſpecting him which you have now aſſerted, that he is pernicious both to the beloved and the lover; and again, that he is the greateſt of all goods?

PHÆDR. You ſpeak in the beſt manner poſſible.

Soc. But inform me alſo of this (for, through the enthuſiaſtic energy, I do not perfectly remember), whether I defined love in the beginning of my diſcourſe.

PHÆDR. By Jupiter you did, and that in a moſt wonderful manner.

Soc. O how much more ſagacious do you declare the Nymphs of Acheloüs, and Pan the ſon of Mercury, to be, than Lyſias the ſon of Cephalus, with reſpect to orations! Or do I ſay nothing to the purpoſe? But did not Lyſias, in the beginning of his diſcourſe, compel us to conceive of love, as a certain ſomething ſuch as he wiſhed it to be, and, referring what followed to this, complete in this manner the whole of his oration? Are you willing that we ſhould again read over the beginning of his oration?

PHÆDR. If you are ſo diſpoſed; though you will not find what you ſeek for there.

Soc. Read, however, that I may again hear it.

PHÆDR. "You are well acquainted with the ſtate of my affairs, and you have heard, I think, that it is moſt conducive to my advantage for them to ſubſiſt in this manner. But it appears to me, that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wiſh to obtain, becauſe I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their deſires ceaſe, repent themſelves of the benefits which they have beſtowed."

Soc. He ſeems here to have been very far from accompliſhing what we are now ſeeking after; ſince he endeavours to paſs through his diſcourſe, not commencing from the beginning, but from the end, after a certain contrary and reſupine mode of proceeding; and begins from what the lover, now ceaſing to be ſuch, ſays to his once beloved. Or perhaps, my dear Phædrus, I ſay nothing to the purpoſe.

PHÆDR. But it is the end, Socrates, which is the ſubject of his diſcourſe.

Soc. But what, do not all the other parts of the diſcourſe appear to be promiſcuouſly

promiſcuouſly ſcattered? Or does it appear to you, that what is aſſerted in the ſecond place ought to rank as ſecond from a certain neceſſity; or any thing elſe which he ſays? For to me, as a perſon ignorant of every thing, it appears, that nothing ought to be careleſsly aſſerted by a writer. But do you not poſſeſs a certain neceſſary method of compoſing orations, according to which he thus diſpoſed the parts of his oration in ſucceſſion to each other?

PHÆDR. You are pleaſant, Socrates, in ſuppoſing that I am ſufficient to judge concerning compoſitions ſo accurate as his.

SOC. But I think this is evident to you, that every diſcourſe ought in its ſtructure to reſemble an animal, and ſhould have ſomething which can be called its body; ſo that it may be neither without a head, nor be deſtitute of feet, but may poſſeſs a middle and extremes, adapted to each other, and to the whole.

PHÆDR. How ſhould it not be ſo?

SOC. Conſider, therefore, the diſcourſe of your aſſociate, whether it ſubſiſts with theſe conditions, or otherwiſe; and you will find, that it is in no reſpect different from that epigram which certain perſons report was compoſed on the Phrygian Midas.

PHÆDR. What was the epigram, and what are its peculiarities?

SOC. It was as follows;

A brazen virgin traveller am I,
Whom fate decrees in Midas' tomb to lie:
And while ſtreams flow, and trees luxuriant bloom,
I here ſhall ſtay within the mournful tomb;
And this to every paſſenger atteſt,
That here the aſhes of king Midas reſt.

But that it is of no conſequence as to the connection, which part of it is read firſt or laſt, you yourſelf, I doubt not, perceive.

PHÆDR. You deride our oration, Socrates.

SOC. Leſt you ſhould be angry, therefore, let us drop it; though it appears that many examples might be found in it, from an inſpection of which we might derive the advantage of not attempting to imitate them. But let us proceed to the diſcuſſion of other orations: for they contain ſomething, as it appears to me, which it is proper for thoſe to perceive who are willing to ſpeculate about orations.

PHÆDR. But what is this ſomething?

SOC. That they are in a certain reſpect contrary to each other. For one kind aſſerts that the lover, and the other that he who is void of love, ought to be gratified.

PHÆDR. And it aſſerts this, indeed, moſt ſtrenuouſly.

SOC. I ſhould have thought that you would have anſwered more truly, "and indeed furiouſly ſo." But what I inquire after is this—Do we ſay that love is a certain mania, or not?

PHÆDR. A mania, certainly.

SOC. But there are two ſpecies of mania; the one ariſing from human diſeaſes; but the other from a divine mutation, taking place in a manner different from eſtabliſhed cuſtoms.

PHÆDR. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But there are four parts of the divine mania, diſtributed according to the four divinities which preſide over theſe parts. For we aſſign prophetic inſpiration to Apollo, teleſtic or myſtic to Bacchus, poetic to the Muſes; and the fourth or amatory mania, which we aſſert to be the beſt of all, to Venus and Love. And I know not how, while we are repreſenting by images the amatory paſſion, we perhaps touch upon a certain truth; and perhaps we are at the ſame time hurried away elſewhere. Hence, mingling together an oration not perfectly improbable, we have produced a certain fabulous hymn, and have with moderate abilities celebrated your lord and mine, Phædrus, viz. Love, who is the inſpective guardian of beautiful youths.

PHÆDR. And this, indeed, ſo as to have rendered it far from unpleaſant to me your auditor.

SOC. Let us, therefore, from this endeavour to underſtand how our diſcourſe has paſſed from cenſure to praiſe.

PHÆDR. What do you mean by this?

SOC. To me we ſeem to have really been at play with reſpect to the other parts of our diſcourſe: but I think that if any one is able to comprehend, according to art, theſe two ſpecies which we have ſpoken of, through a certain fortune, he will not be an ungraceful perſon.

PHÆDR. How do you mean?

SOC. By looking to one idea, to bring together things every way diſperſed; that, by thus defining each, he may always render manifeſt that

which he is desirous to teach: just as we acted at present with respect to our definition of Love, whether good or bad. For certainly our discourse by this means became more clear, and more consistent with itself.

Phædr. But what do you say respecting the other species, Socrates?

Soc. That this again should be cut into species according to members, naturally; not by breaking any member, like an unskilful cook, but, as in the above discourse, receiving the foam of the dianoëtic energy, as one common species. But as, in one body, members which are double and synonymous are called right or left, so our discourse considered the species of delirium within us as naturally one. And dividing the one part into that which is on the left hand, and giving this another distribution, it did not cease till it there found a certain sinister Love, and, when found, reviled it, as it deserves. But the other part conducted us to the right hand of mania, where we found a certain divine Love synonymous to the former; and, extending our praise, we celebrated him as the cause of the greatest good to us.

Phædr. You speak most true.

Soc. But I, O Phædrus, am a lover of such divisions and compositions as may enable me both to speak and understand. And if I think that any other is able to behold the one and the many, according to the nature of things, this man I follow, pursuing his footsteps as if he were a God. But whether or not I properly denominate those who are able to accomplish this, Divinity knows. But I have hitherto called them men conversant with dialectic. Tell me, therefore, by what name it is proper to call them, according to your opinion and that of Lysias. Or is this that art of speaking, which Thrasymachus and others employing, became themselves wise in oratory, and rendered others such, who were willing to bestow gifts on them, as if they had been kings?

Phædr. Those were indeed royal men, but yet not skilled in the particulars about which you inquire. But you appear to me to have properly denominated this species in calling it dialectic; but the rhetorical art appears as yet to have escaped us.

Soc. How do you say? Can there be any thing beautiful which is destitute of these particulars, and yet be comprehended by art? If this be the case, it is by no means to be despised by me and you; but we must relate what remains of the rhetorical art.

PHÆDR. And there are many things, Socrates, which are delivered in books about the art of ſpeaking.

SOC. You have very opportunely reminded me. For I think you would ſay that the procemium ought to be called the firſt part of the oration; and that things of this kind are the ornaments of the art.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. And, in the ſecond place, a certain narration; and this accompanied with teſtimonies. In the third place, the reaſoning. In the fourth, probable arguments: and beſides this, I think that a certain Byzantine, the beſt artificer of orations, introduces confirmation and approbation.

PHÆDR. Do you not mean the illuſtrious Theodorus?

SOC. I do. For he diſcovered how confutation, both in accuſation and defence, might not only take place, but alſo be increaſed. But why ſhould we not introduce the moſt excellent Evenus, the Parian? For he firſt diſcovered ſub-declarations, and the art of praiſing: and, according to the reports of ſome perſons, he delivered his reprehenſions in verſe for the ſake of aſſiſting the memory. For he is a wiſe man. But ſhall we ſuffer Tiſias [1] and Gorgias to ſleep, who placed probabilities before realities; and, through the ſtrength of their diſcourſe, cauſed ſmall things to appear large, and the large ſmall; likewiſe old things new, and the new old; and who beſides this diſcovered a conciſe method of ſpeaking, and, again, an infinite prolixity of words? All which when Prodicus once heard me relate, he laughed, and aſſerted that he alone had diſcovered what words this art required; and that it required neither few nor many, but a moderate quantity.

PHÆDR. You was, therefore, moſt wiſe, O Prodicus.

SOC. But ſhall we not ſpeak of Hippias? for I think that he will be of the ſame opinion with the Elean gueſt.

PHÆDR. Why ſhould we not?

SOC. But what ſhall we ſay of the muſical compoſition of Polus [2], who employed the doubling of words, a collection of ſentences, ſimilitudes, and elegance of appellations, in order to give ſplendour to his orations, according to the inſtruction which he had received from Lycimnion?

[1] This Tiſias is ſaid by Cicero to have been the inventor of rhetoric.

[2] Polus was a diſciple of Gorgias the Leontine. See the Gorgias.

PHÆDR. But were not the orations of Protagoras, Socrates, of this kind?

Soc. His diction was indeed proper, and contained beſides this many other beautiful properties: but the Chalcedonian orator excelled in exciting commiſeration from the diſtreſſes of poverty, and the infirmities of old age. He was beſides moſt ſkilful in rouſing the multitude to anger, and when enraged appeaſing them, as he ſaid, by inchantment; and highly excelled in framing and diſſolving calumnies, from whence the greateſt advantage might be derived. But all ſeem to agree in opinion with reſpect to the concluſion of the oration, which ſome call the repetition, but others give it a different denomination.

PHÆDR. Do you ſay that the concluſion ſummarily recalls into the memory of the auditors all that had been ſaid before?

Soc. I do, and any thing elſe beſides, which you may have to ſay about this art.

PHÆDR. What I have to ſay is but trifling, and not worth mentioning.

Soc. Let us, therefore, diſmiſs trifling obſervations, and rather behold in the clear light, in what particulars the power of this art prevails, and when it does ſo.

PHÆDR. Its power, Socrates, is moſt prevalent in the aſſociation of the multitude.

Soc. It is ſo. But, O dæmoniacal man, do you alſo ſee, whether their web appears to you, as it does to me, to have its parts ſeparated from each other?

PHÆDR. Show me how you mean.

Soc. Tell me then: If any one addreſſing your aſſociate Eryximachus, or his father Acumenus, ſhould ſay, I know how to introduce certain things to the body, by which I can heat and cool it when I pleaſe; and beſides this, when I think proper I can produce vomiting, and downward ejection, and a variety of other things of this kind, through the knowledge of which I profeſs myſelf a phyſician, and able to make any one elſe ſo, to whom I deliver the knowledge of theſe particulars;—what do you think he who heard him ought to reply?

PHÆDR. What elſe, than inquiring whether he knows to whom, when, and how far, each of theſe ought to be applied?

Soc.

Soc. If, therefore, he ſhould ſay that he by no means underſtands all this, but that he who is inſtructed by him ought to do ſo and ſo; what then would be his anſwer?

Phædr. He would anſwer, I think, that the man was mad; and that, having heard from ſome book about things of this kind, or met with ſome remedies, he thought he might become a phyſician without knowing any thing about the art.

Soc. But what if any one, addreſſing Sophocles and Euripides, ſhould ſay that he knew how to compoſe a prolix diſcourſe on a very trifling ſubject, and a very ſhort one on a great occaſion; and that when he pleaſed he could excite pity, and its contrary, horror and threats, and other things of this kind; and that by teaching theſe he thought that he delivered the art of tragic poetry?

Phædr. And theſe alſo, I think, Socrates, would deride him, who ſhould fancy that a tragedy was any thing elſe than the compoſition of all theſe, ſo diſpoſed as to be adapted to each other, and to the whole.

Soc. And I think they would not ruſtically accuſe him; but, juſt as if a muſician ſhould meet with a man who believes himſelf ſkilled in harmony, becauſe he knows how to make a chord ſound ſharp and flat, he would not fiercely ſay to him, O miſerable creature, you are mad; but, as being a muſician, he would thus addreſs him more mildly: O excellent man! it is neceſſary that he who is to be a muſician ſhould indeed know ſuch things as theſe; but at the ſame time nothing hinders us from concluding, that a man affected as you are may not underſtand the leaſt of harmony: for you may know what is neceſſary to be learned prior to harmony, without underſtanding harmony itſelf.

Phædr. Moſt right.

Soc. In like manner, Sophocles would reply to the perſon who addreſſed him, that he poſſeſſed things previous to tragedy, rather than tragedy itſelf: and Acumenus, that the medical pretender underſtood things previous to medicine, and not medicine itſelf.

Phædr. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But what if the mellifluous Adraſtus, or Pericles, ſhould hear thoſe all-beautiful artificial inventions, conciſe diſcourſes, ſimilitudes, and other things which we ſaid ſhould be diſcuſſed in the light, do you think that they would

would be angry, as we were through our ruſticity, with thoſe who wrote about and taught ſuch things as if they were the ſame with rhetoric? Or rather, as being wiſer than us, would they not thus reprove us? It is not proper, Phædrus and Socrates, to be angry with ſuch characters; but you ought rather to pardon thoſe who, being ignorant of oratory, are unable to define what rhetoric is, and who in conſequence of this paſſion, from poſſeſſing a knowledge of things previous to the art, think that they have diſcovered rhetoric itſelf; and, by teaching theſe to others, imagine that they teach rhetoric in perfection: but who at the ſame time leave to the proper induſtry of their diſciples the art of diſpoſing each of theſe, ſo as to produce perſuaſion, and of compoſing the whole oration, as if nothing of this kind was neceſſary for them to accompliſh.

PHÆDR. Such indeed, Socrates, does that art appear to be which theſe men teach and write about as rhetoric; and you ſeem to me to have ſpoken the truth: but how and from whence ſhall we be able to acquire the art of true rhetoric and perſuaſion?

SOC. It is probable, Phædrus, and perhaps alſo neceſſary, that the perfect may be obtained in this as in other conteſts. For, if you naturally poſſeſs rhetorical abilities, you will become a celebrated orator, by the aſſiſtance of ſcience and exerciſe: but if you are deſtitute of any one of theſe, you will be imperfect through this deficiency. But the method employed by Lyſias and Thraſymachus does not appear to me to evince the magnitude of this art.

PHÆDR. But what method then does?

SOC. Pericles, moſt excellent man, appears with great propriety to have been the moſt perfect of all in the rhetorical art.

PHÆDR. Why?

SOC. All the great arts require continual meditation, and a diſcourſe about the ſublime parts of nature. For an elevation of intellect, and a perfectly efficacious power, appear in a certain reſpect to proceed from hence; which Pericles poſſeſſed in conjunction with his naturally good diſpoſition. For meeting, I think, with Anaxagoras, who had theſe requiſites, he was filled with elevated diſcourſe, and comprehended the nature of intellect and folly, which Anaxagoras diffuſely diſcuſſed: and from hence he transferred to the art of diſcourſe whatever could contribute to its advantage.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. How is this?

SOC. In a certain reſpect the method of the rhetorical and medicinal art is the ſame.

PHÆDR. But how?

SOC. In both it is requiſite that a diſtribution ſhould be made, in one of the nature of body, in the other of the ſoul, if you are deſirous in the firſt inſtance of giving health and ſtrength by introducing medicine and nutriment according to art, and not by exerciſe and experience alone; and in the ſecond inſtance, if you wiſh to introduce perſuaſion and virtue into the ſoul, by reaſon and legitimate inſtitutions.

PHÆDR. It is probable it ſhould be ſo, Socrates.

SOC. But do you think that the nature of the ſoul can be ſufficiently known without the nature of the univerſe?

PHÆDR. If it is proper to be perſuaded by Hippocrates, the ſucceſſor of Æſculapius, even the nature of body cannot be known without this method.

SOC. He ſpeaks in a becoming manner, my friend. But it is neceſſary, beſides the authority of Hippocrates, to examine our diſcourſe, and conſider whether it is conſiſtent.

PHÆDR. I agree with you.

SOC. Conſider, then, what Hippocrates and true reaſon aſſert concerning nature. Is it not, therefore, neceſſary to think reſpecting the nature of every thing, in the firſt place, whether that is ſimple or multiform about which we are deſirous, both that we ourſelves ſhould be artiſts, and that we ſhould be able to render others ſo? And, in the next place, if it is ſimple, ought we not to inveſtigate its power, with reſpect to producing any thing naturally, or being naturally paſſive? And if it poſſeſſes many ſpecies, having numbered theſe, ought we not to ſpeculate in each, as in one, its natural power of becoming active and paſſive?

PHÆDR. It appears we ſhould, Socrates.

SOC. The method, therefore, which proceeds without theſe, is ſimilar to the progreſſion of one blind. But he who operates according to art, ought not to be aſſimilated either to the blind or the deaf; but it is evident that whoever accommodates his diſcourſes to any art, ought accurately to exhibit the eſſence of that nature to which he introduces diſcourſes; and this is doubtleſs the ſoul.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. Without doubt.

SOC. Will not, therefore, all the attention of ſuch a one be directed to this end, that he may produce perſuaſion in the ſoul?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. It is evident, therefore, that Thraſymachus, and any other perſon who applies himſelf to the ſtudy of the rhetorical art, ought firſt, with all poſſible accuracy, to deſcribe, and cauſe the ſoul to perceive whether ſhe is naturally one and ſimilar, or multiform according to the form of body: for this is what we call evincing its nature.

PHÆDR. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But, in the ſecond place, he ought to ſhow what it is naturally capable of either acting or ſuffering.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. In the third place, having orderly diſtinguiſhed the genera of diſcourſes and of the ſoul, and the paſſions of theſe, he ſhould paſs through all the cauſes, harmonizing each to each, and teaching what kind of ſoul will be neceſſarily perſuaded by ſuch particular diſcourſes, and through what cauſe; and again, what kind of ſoul ſuch diſcourſes will be unable to perſuade.

PHÆDR. Such a method of proceeding will, as it appears, be moſt beautiful.

SOC. He, therefore, who acts in a different manner will neither artificially write nor diſcourſe upon this or any other ſubject. But writers on the art of rhetoric of the preſent day (whom you yourſelf have heard) are crafty, and conceal from us that their knowledge of the ſoul is moſt beautiful. However, till they both ſpeak and write according to this method, we ſhall never be perſuaded that they write according to art.

PHÆDR. What method do you mean?

SOC. It will not be eaſy to mention the very words themſelves which ought to be employed on this occaſion; but as far as I am able I am willing to tell you how it is proper to write, if we deſire to write according to art.

PHÆDR. Tell me then.

SOC. Since the power of diſcourſe is attractive of the ſoul, it is neceſſary that the future orator ſhould know how many ſpecies ſoul contains: but theſe are various, and ſouls poſſeſs their variety from theſe. Souls, therefore,

of ſuch a particular nature, in conſequence of certain diſcourſes, and through a certain cauſe, are eaſily perſuaded to ſuch and ſuch particulars. But ſuch as are differently affected are with difficulty perſuaded through theſe means. It is neceſſary, therefore, that he who ſufficiently underſtands all this, when he afterwards perceives theſe particulars taking place in actions, ſhould be able to follow them with great celerity through ſenſible inſpection; or otherwiſe he will retain nothing more than the words which he once heard from his preceptor. But when he is ſufficiently able to ſay, who will be perſuaded by ſuch and ſuch diſcourſes, and ſagaciouſly perceives that the perſon preſent is ſuch by nature as was ſpoken of before, and that he may be incited by certain diſcourſes to certain actions; then, at length, ſuch a one will be a perfect maſter of this art, when to his former attainments he adds the knowledge of opportunely ſpeaking, or being ſilent, the uſe or abuſe of conciſe diſcourſe, of language plaintive and vehement, and of the other parts of rhetoric delivered by his maſters; but never till this is accompliſhed. But he who fails in any of theſe particulars, either in ſpeaking, teaching, or writing, and yet aſſerts that he ſpeaks according to art, is vanquiſhed by the perſon he is unable to perſuade. But what then (perhaps a writer of orations will ſay to us); does it appear to you, Phædrus and Socrates, that the art of ſpeaking is to be obtained by this method, or otherwiſe?

PHÆDR. It is impoſſible, Socrates, that it ſhould be obtained otherwiſe, though the acquiſition ſeems to be attended with no ſmall labour.

SOC. You ſpeak the truth. And, for the ſake of this, it is neceſſary, by toſſing upwards and downwards all diſcourſes, to conſider whether any eaſier and ſhorter way will preſent itſelf to our view for this purpoſe; leſt we ſhould in vain wander through a long and rough road, when we might have walked through one ſhort and ſmooth. If, therefore, you can afford any aſſiſtance, in conſequence of what you have heard from Lyſias, or any other, endeavour to tell it me, by recalling it into your mind.

PHÆDR. I might indeed do this for the ſake of experiment, but I cannot at preſent.

SOC. Are you willing, therefore, that I ſhould relate to you the diſcourſe which I once heard concerning things of this kind?

PHÆDR. How ſhould I not?

Soc. It is ſaid therefore, Phædrus, to be juſt, to tell what is reported of the wolf.

PHÆDR. Do you therefore act in the ſame manner.

Soc. They ſay, then, that there is no occaſion to extol and magnify theſe particulars in ſuch a manner, nor to deduce our diſcourſe from on high, and afar of. For, as we ſaid in the beginning of this diſcourſe, he who intends to be ſufficiently ſkilful in rhetoric ought not to participate the truth reſpecting *things* juſt and good, or *men* who are ſuch, either from nature or education. For, in judicial matters, no attention whatever is paid to the truth of theſe, but to perſuaſion alone; and that this is the probable, which ought to be ſtudied by him who is to ſpeak according to art. For he ought never to ſpeak of tranſactions, unleſs they are probable; but both in accuſation and defence probabilities ſhould always be introduced: and, in ſhort, he who ſpeaks ſhould purſue the probable, and, if he ſpeaks much, ſhould bid farewell to truth. For, when this method is obſerved through the whole of a diſcourſe, it cauſes all the perfection of the art.

PHÆDR. You have related thoſe particulars, Socrates, which are aſſerted by the ſkilful in rhetoric; for I remember that we briefly touched upon this in the former part of our diſcourſe. But to ſuch as are converſant with theſe matters, this appears to be a thing of great conſequence: but you have indeed ſeverely reviled Tiſias himſelf.

Soc. Let then Tiſias himſelf tell us, whether he calls the probable any thing elſe than that which is apparent to the multitude.

PHÆDR. What elſe can he call it?

Soc. He alſo appears to have diſcovered and written about the following crafty and artificial method: that if ſome imbecil but bold man ſhould knock down one who is robuſt but timid, taking from him at the ſame time a garment, or ſomething elſe, and ſhould be tried for the aſſault, then neither of theſe ought to ſpeak the truth; but that the coward ſhould ſay, the bold man was not alone when he gave the aſſault; and that the bold man ſhould deny this, by aſſerting that he was alone when the pretended aſſault was given, and ſhould at the ſame time artfully aſk, How is it poſſible that a man ſo weak as I am could attack one ſo robuſt as he is? That then the other ſhould not acknowledge his cowardice, but ſhould endeavour, by deviſing ſome falſe

allegation, to accuſe his opponent. And in other inſtances, things of this kind muſt be ſaid according to art. Is not this the caſe, Phædrus?

PHÆDR. Entirely ſo.

SOC. O how craftily does Tiſias appear to have diſcovered an abſtruſe art, or whoever elſe was the inventor, and in whatever other name he delights! But ſhall we, my friend, ſay this or not?

PHÆDR. What?

SOC. This: O Tiſias, ſome time ſince, before your arrival, we affirmed that the probable, with which the multitude are converſant, ſubſiſted through its ſimilitude to truth: and we juſt now determined that ſimilitudes might every where be found in the moſt beautiful manner, by him who was acquainted with truth. So that, if you aſſert any thing elſe about the art of diſcourſe, we ſhall readily liſten to you; but if not, we ſhall be perſuaded by our preſent determinations, that unleſs a perſon enumerates the different diſpoſitions of his auditors, and diſtributes things themſelves into their ſpecies, and again is able to comprehend the ſeveral particulars in one idea, he will never be ſkilled in the art of ſpeaking to that degree which it is poſſible for man to attain. But this degree of excellence can never be obtained without much labour and ſtudy; and a prudent man will not toil for its acquiſition, that he may ſpeak and act ſo as to be pleaſing to men; but rather that, to the utmoſt of his ability, he may ſpeak and act in ſuch a manner as may be acceptable to the Gods. For men wiſer than us, O Tiſias, ſay that he who is endued with intellect ought not to make it the principal object of his ſtudy how he may gratify his fellow ſervants, but how he may pleaſe good maſters, and this from good means. So that, if the circuit is long, you ought not to wonder: for it is not to be undertaken in the manner which ſeems proper to you, but for the ſake of mighty concerns. And theſe, if any one is ſo diſpoſed, will be moſt beautifully effected by this mean, as reaſon herſelf evinces.

PHÆDR. This appears to me, Socrates, to be moſt beautifully ſaid, if there is but a poſſibility that any one can accompliſh the arduous undertaking.

SOC. But to endeavour after beautiful attainments is beautiful, as likewiſe to endure whatever may happen to be the reſult of our endeavours.

PHÆDR. Very much ſo.

SOC. And thus much may ſuffice concerning a knowledge and ignorance of the art of rhetoric.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. Does it not therefore remain, that we ſhould ſpeak concerning the elegance and inelegance of writing?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. Do you know how you may in the higheſt degree pleaſe the divinity of diſcourſe both in ſpeaking and acting?

PHÆDR. Not at all. Do you?

SOC. I have heard certain particulars delivered by the antients, who were truly knowing. But if we ourſelves ſhould diſcover this, do you think we ſhould afterwards be at all ſolicitous about human opinions?

PHÆDR. Your queſtion is ridiculous; but relate what you ſay you have heard.

SOC. I have heard then, that about Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of their antient Gods, to whom a bird was ſacred, which they call *Ibis*; but the name of the dæmon himſelf was Theuth [1]. According to tradition, this God firſt diſcovered number and the art of reckoning, geometry and aſtronomy, the games of cheſs and hazard, and likewiſe letters. But Thamus was at that time king of all Egypt, and reſided in that great city of the Upper Egypt

[1] The genus of diſciplines belonging to Mercury contains gymnaſtics, muſic, arithmetic, geometry, aſtronomy, and the art of ſpeaking and writing. This God, as he is the ſource of invention, is called the ſon of Maia; becauſe *inveſtigation*, which is implied by *Maia*, produces *invention*: and as unfolding the will of Jupiter, who is an intellectual God, he is the cauſe of matheſis, or diſcipline. He firſt ſubſiſts in Jupiter, the artificer of the world; next, among the ſupermundane Gods; in the third place, among the liberated Gods; fourthly, in the planet Mercury; fifthly, in the Mercurial order of dæmons; ſixthly, in human ſouls who are the attendants of this God; and in the ſeventh degree his properties ſubſiſt in certain animals, ſuch as the ibis, the ape, and ſagacious dogs. The narration of Socrates in this place is both allegorical and anagogic, or reductory. Naucratis is a region of Egypt eminently ſubject to the influence of Mercury, though the whole of Egypt is allotted to this divinity. Likewiſe in this city a certain man once flouriſhed, full of the Mercurial power, becauſe his ſoul formerly exiſted in the heavens of the Mercurial order. But he was firſt called Theuth, that is, Mercury, and a God, becauſe his ſoul ſubſiſted according to the perfect ſimilitude of this divinity. But afterwards a dæmon, becauſe from the God Mercury, through a Mercurial dæmon, gifts of this kind are tranſmitted to a Mercurial ſoul. This Mercurial

Egypt which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; but the God himſelf they denominate Ammon. Theuth, therefore, departing to Thamus, ſhowed him his arts, and told him that he ought to diſtribute them amongſt the other Egyptians. But Thamus aſked him concerning the utility of each; and upon his informing him, he approved what appeared to him to be well ſaid, but blamed that which had a contrary aſpect. But Theuth is reported to have fully unfolded to Thamus many particulars reſpecting each art, which it would be too prolix to mention. But when they came to diſcourſe upon letters, This diſcipline, O king, ſays Theuth, will render the Egyptians wiſer, and increaſe their powers of memory. For this invention is the medicine of memory and wiſdom. To this Thamus replied, O moſt artificial Theuth, one perſon is more adapted to artificial operations, but another to judging what detriment or advantage will ariſe from the uſe of theſe productions of art: and now you who are the father of letters, through the benevolence of your diſpoſition, have affirmed juſt the contrary of what letters are able to effect. For theſe, through the negligence of recollection, will produce oblivion in the ſoul of the learner; becauſe, through truſting to the external and foreign marks of writing, they will not exerciſe the internal powers of recollection. So that you have not diſcovered the medicine of memory, but of admonition. You will likewiſe deliver to your diſciples an opinion of wiſdom, and not truth. For, in conſequence of having many readers without the inſtruction of a maſter, the multitude will appear to be knowing in many things of which they are at the ſame time ignorant; and

curial ſoul, and at the ſame time dæmon, relate their inventions to king Thamus. And though a man named Thamus once reigned in Egypt, yet anagogically Thamus is a Mercurial divinity either celeſtial or ſuperceleſtial. But Ammon is that ſuperior Jupiter who comprehends the Mercurial gifts. Laſtly, invention belongs to natural inſtinct and conception, but judgment and diſcrimination to reaſon and perfect intelligence, which are far more excellent. But each at the ſame time belongs to Jupiter Ammon; though, when taken ſeparately, invention, and as it were the material form of art, muſt be referred to a dæmoniacal or human Mercury; but judgment and uſe, and that which leads to the end, to Thamus, who is ſuperior both to a human and dæmoniacal Mercury. Though the narration ſeems to comprehend Thamus and Ammon under the ſame perſon, yet accurate reaſoning is able to diſtinguiſh them. They relate that the Egyptian ibis was ſimilar to a ſtork, that it had the figure of a heart, that it walked in a very unequal manner, and that it brought forth its eggs through its throat, juſt as Mercury delivers his progeny into light. And theſe and the other Mercurial ſymbols ſignify wiſdom, geometry, eloquence, and interpretation.

will become troubleſome aſſociates, in conſequence of poſſeſſing an opinion of wiſdom, inſtead of wiſdom itſelf.

PHÆDR. You with great facility, Socrates, compoſe Egyptian diſcourſes, and thoſe of any other nation, when you are ſo diſpoſed.

SOC. But, my friend, thoſe who reſide in the temple of Dodonean Jupiter aſſert that the firſt prophetic diſcourſes iſſued from the oak. It was ſufficient, therefore, for thoſe antients, as they were not ſo wiſe as you moderns, to liſten to oaks and rocks, through their ſimplicity, if theſe inanimate things did but utter the truth. But you perhaps think it makes a difference who ſpeaks, and to what country he belongs. For you do not alone conſider, whether what is aſſerted is true or falſe.

PHÆDR. You have very properly reproved me; and I think the caſe with reſpect to letters is juſt as the Theban Thamus has ſtated it.

SOC. Hence, he who thinks to commit an art to writing, or to receive it, when delivered by this mean, ſo that ſomething clear and firm may reſult from the letters, is endued with great ſimplicity, and is truly ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon; ſince he is of opinion, that ſomething more is contained in the writing than what the things themſelves contained in the letters admoniſh the ſcientific reader.

PHÆDR. Moſt right.

SOC. For that which is committed to writing contains ſomething very weighty, and truly ſimilar to a picture. For the offſpring of a picture project as if they were alive; but, if you aſk them any queſtion, they are ſilent in a perfectly venerable manner. Juſt ſo with reſpect to written diſcourſes, you would think that they ſpoke as if they poſſeſſed ſome portion of wiſdom. But if, deſirous to be inſtructed, you interrogate them about any thing which they aſſert, they ſignify one thing only, and this always the ſame. And every diſcourſe, when it is once written, is every where ſimilarly rolled among its auditors, and even among thoſe by whom it ought not to be heard; and is perfectly ignorant, to whom it is proper to addreſs itſelf, and to whom not. But when it is faulty or unjuſtly reviled, it always requires the aſſiſtance of its father. For, as to itſelf, it can neither reſiſt its adverſary, nor defend itſelf.

PHÆDR. And this, alſo, you appear to have moſt rightly aſſerted.

SOC. But what, ſhall we not conſider another diſcourſe, which is the genuine

genuine brother of this, how legimate it is, and how much better and more powerful it is born than this?

PHÆDR. What is this? and how do you ſay it is produced?

SOC. That which, in conjunction with ſcience, is written in the ſoul of the learner, which is able to defend itſelf, and which knows to whom it ought to ſpeak, and before whom it ought to be ſilent.

PHÆDR. You ſpeak of the living and animated diſcourſe of one endued with knowledge; of which written diſcourſe may be juſtly called a certain image.

SOC. Entirely ſo. But anſwer me with reſpect to this alſo: Will the huſbandman, who is endued with intellect, ſcatter ſuch ſeeds as are moſt dear to him, and from which he wiſhes fruit ſhould ariſe? Will he ſcatter them in ſummer in the gardens of Adonis, with the greateſt diligence and attention, rejoicing to behold them in beautiful perfection within the ſpace of eight days? Or rather, when he acts in this manner, will he not do ſo for the ſake of ſome feſtive day, or ſport? But, when ſeriouſly applying himſelf to the buſineſs of agriculture, will he not ſow where it is proper, and be ſufficiently pleaſed, if his ſowing receives its conſummation within the ſpace of eight months?

PHÆDR. He would doubtleſs act in this manner, Socrates, at one time ſowing ſeriouſly, and at another time for diverſion.

SOC. But ſhall we ſay that the man who poſſeſſes the ſcience of things juſt, beautiful and good, is endued with leſs intellect than a huſbandman, with reſpect to the ſeeds which he ſows?

PHÆDR. By no means.

SOC. He will not, therefore, with anxious and haſty diligence write them in black water, ſowing them by this mean with his pen in conjunction with diſcourſes; ſince it is thus impoſſible to aſſiſt them through ſpeech, and impoſſible ſufficiently to exhibit the truth.

PHÆDR. This, therefore, is not proper.

SOC. Certainly not. He will, therefore, ſow and write in the gardens which letters contain for the ſake of ſport, as it appears; and when he has written, having raiſed monuments as treaſures to himſelf, with a view to the oblivion of old age, if he ſhould arrive to it, and for the like benefit of others who tread in the ſame ſteps, he is delighted on beholding his delicate progeny

of

of fruits; and while other men purſue other diverſions, irrigating themſelves with banquets, and other entertainments which are the ſiſters of theſe, he on the contrary paſſes his time in the delights which converſation produces.

PHÆDR. You ſpeak, Socrates, of a moſt beautiful diverſion, and not of a vile amuſement, as the portion of him who is able to ſport with diſcourſe, and who can mythologize about juſtice, and other particulars which you ſpeak of.

SOC. For it is indeed ſo, my dear Phædrus. But, in my opinion, a much more beautiful ſtudy will reſult from diſcourſes, when ſome one employing the dialectic art, and receiving a ſoul properly adapted for his purpoſe, plants and ſows in it diſcourſes, in conjunction with ſcience; diſcourſes which are ſufficiently able to aſſiſt both themſelves and their planter, and which are not barren, but abound with ſeed; from whence others ſpringing up in different manners, are always ſufficient to extend this immortal benefit, and to render their poſſeſſor bleſſed in as high a degree as is poſſible to man.

PHÆDR. This which you ſpeak of is ſtill far more beautiful.

SOC. But now, Phædrus, this being granted, are we able to diſtinguiſh and judge about what follows?

PHÆDR. What is that?

SOC. Thoſe particulars for the ſake of knowing which we came hither; that we might inquire into the diſgrace of Lyſias in the art of writing; and that we might inveſtigate thoſe diſcourſes which are either written with or without art. To me, therefore, it appears that we have moderately evinced that which is artificial, and that which is not ſo.

PHÆDR. It appears ſo.

SOC. But again we ought to remember that no one can acquire perfection in the art of ſpeaking, either with reſpect to teaching or perſuading, till he is well acquainted with the truth of the particulars about which he either ſpeaks or writes: till he is able to define the whole of a thing; and when defined, again knows how to divide it according to ſpecies, as far as to an indiviſible: and, according to this method, contemplating the ſoul, and diſcovering a ſpecies adapted to the nature of each, he thus diſpoſes and adorns his diſcourſe; accommodating various and all-harmonious diſcourſes to a ſoul characterized by variety; but ſuch as are ſimple, to one of a ſimple diſpoſition.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. It appears to be ſo in every reſpect.

SOC. But what ſhall we ſay to the queſtion, whether it is beautiful or baſe to ſpeak and write orations; and in what reſpect this employment may be blameable or not? unleſs what we have ſaid a little before is ſufficient for this purpoſe.

PHÆDR. What was that?

SOC. That whether Lyſias, or any other, has at any time written, or now writes, ſo as to eſtabliſh laws, either privately or publicly, compoſing a political work, and thinking that it contains great ſtability and clearneſs; this is baſe in a writer, whether any one ſays ſo or not. For to be ignorant of the difference between true viſions and the deluſions of ſleep, between juſt and unjuſt, evil and good, cannot fail of being really baſe, though the whole rout of the vulgar ſhould unite in its praiſe.

PHÆDR. It cannot be otherwiſe.

SOC. But he who in a written oration thinks that there is a great neceſſity for amuſement, and who conſiders no diſcourſe, whether in proſe or verſe, deſerving of much ſtudy in its compoſition or recital, like thoſe rhapſodiſts who without judgment and learning recite verſes for the ſake of perſuaſion, while in reality the beſt of thoſe diſcourſes were written for the ſake of admoniſhing the ſkilful; but who thinks, that the clear, the perfect, and the ſerious, ought only to take place in diſcourſes which teach and are delivered for the ſake of learning, and which are truly written in the ſoul, about the juſt, the beautiful and the good; and who judges that diſcourſes of this kind ought to be called his legitimate offſpring; that, in the firſt place, which is inherent in himſelf, if he ſhould find it there, and afterwards whatever offſpring, or brethren, ſpring in a becoming manner from this progeny of his own ſoul in the ſouls of others, bidding at the ſame time farewell to all others;—a man of this kind, Phædrus, appears to be ſuch a one as you and I ſhould pray that we may be.

PHÆDR. I perfectly deſire and pray for the poſſeſſion of what you ſpeak of.

SOC. We have, therefore, moderately ſpoken thus much about diſcourſes, as it were in play: it only remains that you tell Lyſias, that, deſcending with intellect to the ſtream of the Nymphs and Muſes, we heard certain diſcourſes, which they ordered us to acquaint Lyſias with, and every other

writer of orations, likewiſe Homer, and any other who may compoſe either naked poetry, or that which is adorned with the ſong; and in the third place Solon, and all who may commit political inſtitutions to writing;—that if their compoſitions reſult from knowing the truth, and if they are able to defend their writings againſt the objections of adverſaries who declare that they can evince the improbity of their diſcourſes,—then, they ought not to be denominated from works of this kind, but from what they have ſeriouſly written.

PHÆDR. What appellations, then, will you aſſign them?

SOC. To call them wiſe, Phædrus, appears to me to be a mighty appellation, and adapted to a God alone; but to denominate them philoſophers, or ſomething of this kind, ſeems to be more convenient and proper.

PHÆDR. There is nothing indeed unbecoming in ſuch an epithet.

SOC. He, therefore, who cannot exhibit any thing more honourable than what he has written, and who turns upwards and downwards his compoſition, for a conſiderable ſpace of time, adding and taking away,—may not ſuch a one be juſtly called a poet, or a writer of orations or laws?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. Relate theſe particulars, therefore, to your aſſociate.

PHÆDR. But what will you do? For it is not proper that your companion ſhould be neglected.

SOC. Who is he?

PHÆDR. The worthy Iſocrates. What will you tell him, Socrates? and what character ſhall we aſſign him?

SOC. Iſocrates as yet, Phædrus, is but a young man; but I am willing to tell you what I propheſy concerning him.

PHÆDR. What?

SOC. He appears to me to poſſeſs ſuch excellent natural endowments, that his productions ought not to be compared with the orations of Lyſias. Beſides this, his manners are more generous; ſo that it will be by no means wonderful, if, when he is more advanced in age, he ſhould far ſurpaſs, in thoſe orations which are now the objects of his ſtudy, all the other boys who ever meddled with orations; or, if he ſhould not be content with a purſuit of this kind, I think that a more divine impulſe will lead him to greater attainments: for there is naturally, my friend, a certain philoſophy in the diano-

ëtic part of this man. Tell, therefore, my beloved Iſocrates this, as a piece of information which I have received from the Gods of this place; and do you likewiſe acquaint Lyſias with the particulars which reſpect his character and purſuits, as a perſon who is the object of your warmeſt attachment.

PHÆDR. Be it ſo; but let us depart, ſince the heat has now abated its fervour.

SOC. But it is proper we ſhould pray before we depart.

PHÆDR. Undoubtedly.

SOC. O beloved Pan, and all ye other Gods, who are reſidents of this place [1], grant that I may become beautiful within, and that whatever I poſſeſs externally may be friendly to my inward attainments! Grant, alſo, that I may conſider the wiſe man as one who abounds in wealth; and that I may enjoy that portion of gold, which no other than a prudent man is able either to bear, or properly manage! Do we require any thing elſe, Phædrus? for to me it appears that I have prayed tolerably well.

PHÆDR. Pray alſo in the ſame manner for me: for the poſſeſſions of friends are common.

SOC. Let us then depart.

[1] By Pan, and the other Gods, underſtand local deities under the moon. But Pan is denominated as it were *all*, becauſe he poſſeſſes the moſt ample ſway in the order of local Gods. For, as the ſupermundane Gods are referred to Jupiter, and the celeſtial to Bacchus, ſo all the ſublunary local Gods and dæmons are referred to Pan.

END OF THE PHÆDRUS.

THE GREATER HIPPIAS,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE BEAUTIFUL

CONSIDERED AS SUBSISTING IN SOUL.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

THE deſign of this dialogue, which has the addition of *greater* to its name Hippias, in contradiſtinction to another of the ſame name which is ſhorter, is gradually to unfold the nature of *the beautiful* as ſubſiſting in ſoul. That this is the real deſign of it will be at once evident by conſidering that logical methods are adapted to whatever pertains to ſoul, in conſequence of its energies being naturally diſcurſive, but do not accord with intellect, becauſe its viſion is ſimple, at once collected, and immediate. Hence this dialogue is replete with *trials* [1] and *confutations*, *definitions* and *demonſtrations*, *diviſions*, *compoſitions*, and *analyſations*; but that part of the Phædrus in which *beauty* according to its firſt ſubſiſtence is diſcuſſed, has none of theſe, becauſe its character is enthuſiaſtic.

It is neceſſary however to remark, that in ſaying the deſign of the dialogue is concerning the beautiful as ſubſiſting in ſoul, we do not merely mean the human ſoul, but ſoul in general:—in other words, it is concerning that beauty which firſt ſubſiſts in the ſoul of the univerſe, which in Platonic language is the monad of all ſouls, and is thence imparted to all the ſubſequent orders of ſouls.

It is well obſerved by Mr. Sydenham [2], that Plato conceals the importance of his meaning in this dialogue, by a vein of humour and drollery which runs throughout the whole. The introductory part of the dialogue

[1] Πειραι και ελεγχοι, και ορισμοι, και αποδειξεις, και διαιρεσεις, συνθεσεις τε και αναλυσεις.

[2] I am ſorry that I could not give the whole of his argument to this dialogue; but as he was not profoundly ſkilled in the philoſophy of Plato, he is miſtaken in many points, and particularly in the deſign of the dialogue, which according to him is concerning the higheſt or the ſovereign beauty.

is

is purely ironical, and ſeems intended by deriding to purify the ſophiſts from their twofold ignorance; expoſing with this view their love of gain, their polymathy, or various knowledge, of itſelf uſeleſs to the prime purpoſes of life, and their total want of that true wiſdom whoſe tendency is to make men virtuous and happy. Mr. Sydenham alſo obſerves, that the character of the compoſition of this dialogue is ſo perfectly dramatic, that, but for the want of fable, it might be preſented on the ſtage by good comedians with great advantage. He adds: Nay, ſo highly pictureſque is it in the manners which it imitates, as to be a worthy ſubject for the pencil of any moral painter. Some of the antients, it ſeems, placed it among the dialogues which they called *anatreptic*, or *the ſubverting*; but it appears to me that it ought rather to be ranked among thoſe of the *piraſtic* and *maieutic* [z] kind.

Should it be aſked, ſince it is by no means poſitively aſſerted in this dialogue, what *the beautiful* in ſoul is, we reply, that it is a vital *rational* form, the cauſe of ſymmetry to every thing in and poſterior to ſoul. The propriety of this definition will be obvious by conſidering that the higheſt beauty is a vital *intellectual* form, the ſource of ſymmetry to all things poſterior to the ineffable principle of all, as we have ſhown in the Notes on the Parmenides; and that conſequently ſoul, in participating this beauty, will preſerve all its characteriſtic properties entire, except the *intellectual* peculiarity, which in the participation will become rational.

[z] i. e. Among thoſe which explore and obſtetricate the conceptions of the ſoul.

THE

THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPIAS.

SCENE[1].—*THE LYCÆUM.*

SOCRATES.

HIPPIAS, the fine [2] and the wiſe! what a long time it is ſince laſt you touched [3] at Athens!

HIP.

[1] The ſcene of this dialogue is clearly the Lycæum, a ſtructure of aſtoniſhing grandeur and beauty, at a ſmall diſtance from the city, by the ſide of the Ilyſſus; the largeſt and moſt magnificent of thoſe three built at the public coſt for the purpoſe of bathing and the gymnic exerciſes. The other two were within the city, lying convenient for the uſe of the ordinary citizens and men of buſineſs. But this was the moſt frequented by men of larger fortune and more leiſure; with many of whom Socrates was intimately acquainted. Hither, as we learn from Plato's Sympoſium, it was his uſual cuſtom to reſort, accompanied by his friends, and to ſpend here the greateſt part of the day. That the Sophiſts, whenever they came to Athens, frequented the ſame place, appears from Iſocrates in Orat. Panathen.; as indeed it is natural to ſuppoſe; the nobler part of the youth being daily there aſſembled: for theſe were extremely inquiſitive after knowledge, and great admirers of philoſophy; and the Sophiſts profeſſed the teaching it, and the making, for a certain ſtipulated ſum of money, any man a philoſopher. To carry on this buſineſs of their profeſſion, they were continually travelling about, like the Rhapſodiſts, from city to city, (ταχεως πανταχε γιγνομενοι, ſays Iſocrates,) wherever philoſophy and knowledge were in eſteem; but viſited Athens the oftener, where above all places thoſe ornaments of the mind were highly valued.—S.

[2] Hippias was remarkable for the finery of his apparel, as we ſhall ſee further on. This ſtriking the eyes of Socrates immediately on meeting him occaſioned his addreſſing him firſt with this epithet.—S.

[3] Socrates in this ſentence humerouſly makes uſe of a ſea term to repreſent the life led by the Sophiſts, as reſembling that of mariners; who are roving inceſſantly from port to port, and never

Hip. It is becauſe I have not had leiſure [1], Socrates. For the Eleans, you are to know, whenever they have any public affairs to negotiate with any of the neighbouring cities, conſtantly apply to me, and appoint me their ambaſſador for that purpoſe, in preference to all others: becauſe they conſider me as a perſon the ableſt to form a right judgment of what is argued and alleged by every one of the cities, and to make a proper report of it to them. My embaſſies [2], therefore, have been frequent to many of thoſe powers; but oftener, and upon points the moſt in number, as well as of the higheſt importance, have I gone to Sparta to treat with the Lacedæmonians. This is the reaſon, then, in anſwer to your queſtion, why ſo ſeldom I viſit theſe parts.

Soc. This it is, Hippias, to be a man truly wiſe and perfectly accompliſhed. For, being thus qualified, you have, in your private [3] capacity, great

continue long in one place. But poſſibly there is a further meaning; it may be intended to prepare us for obſerving that inſtability of Hippias himſelf, his notions and opinions, which is afterwards to appear throughout the dialogue; an inſtability ariſing from his want of the fixed principles of ſcience, the only ſure foundation of ſettled opinions. At the ſame time, there is a propriety in this expreſſion from the mouth of an Athenian, to whom it muſt have been habitual; Athens being ſeated near the ſea, the Athenians the principal merchants, and their ſtate the greateſt maritime power then in the world.—S.

[1] Plato acquaints us always as ſoon as poſſible with the character of his ſpeakers. In this firſt ſpeech of Hippias, the vain and oſtentatious ſophiſt, the ſolemn and formal orator, both appear in a ſtrong light, and prepare us at once for all which is to follow, agreeably to thoſe characters.—S.

[2] See Philoſtrat. p. 495. ed. Olear.—S.

[3] Hippias is here repreſented as being both a ſophiſt and an orator. For the better apprehending this double character of his, and the more fully underſtanding thoſe many paſſages of Plato where theſe profeſſions are mentioned, it may be uſeful to give a ſummary account of their riſe and nature. The Grecian wiſdom then, or philoſophy, in the moſt antient times of which any records are left us, included phyſics, ethics, and politics, until the time of Thales the Ionian; who giving himſelf up wholly to the ſtudy of Nature, of her principles and elements, with the cauſes of the ſeveral phænomena, became famous above all the antient ſages for natural knowledge; and led the way to a ſucceſſion of philoſophers, from their founder and firſt maſter called Ionic. Addicted thus to the contemplation of things remote from the affairs of men, theſe all lived abſtracted as much as poſſible from human ſociety; revealing the ſecrets of nature only to a few ſelect diſciples, who ſought them out in their retreat, and had a genius for the ſame abſtruſe inquiries, together with a taſte for the ſame retired kind of life. As the fame of their wiſdom ſpread, the curioſity of that whole inquiſitive nation, the Grecians, was at length excited. This

great preſents made you by the young men of the age; and are able to make them ample amends by the greater advantages which they derive from you: then, in your public character, you are able to do ſervice to your country, as a man ought who would raiſe himſelf above contempt, and acquire reputation among the multitude. But, Hippias, what ſort of reaſon can be given, why thoſe in former days, who are ſo highly famed for wiſdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and Thales the Mileſian, with his diſciples, ſucceſſors, and followers, down to Anaxagoras, if not all, yet moſt of them, are found to have lived the lives of private men, declining to engage in public affairs?

HIP. What other reaſon, Socrates, can you imagine beſide this, that they

gave occaſion to the riſe of a new profeſſion, or ſect, very different from that of thoſe ſpeculative ſages. A ſet of men, ſmitten, not with the love of wiſdom, but of fame and glory, men of great natural abilities, notable induſtry and boldneſs, appeared in Greece; and aſſuming the name of Sophiſts, a name hitherto highly honourable, and given only to thoſe by whom mankind in general were ſuppoſed to be made wiſer, to their antient poets, legiſlators, and the Gods themſelves, undertook to teach, by a few leſſons, and in a ſhort time, all the parts of philoſophy to any perſon, of whatever kind was his diſpoſition or turn of mind, and of whatever degree the capacity of it, ſo that he was but able to pay largely for his teaching. In the ſame age with Thales lived Solon the Athenian; who took the other part of philoſophy to cultivate, and, applying himſelf chiefly to moral and political ſcience, became ſo great a proficient in thoſe ſtudies, that he gave a new ſyſtem of excellent laws to his country. Hence aroſe in Athens a race of politicians, ſtudious of the laws, and of the art of government. During this ſucceſſion, through force of natural genius, good polity, commerce and riches among the Athenians, great improvements were made in all the liberal arts: but that of oratory flouriſhed above the reſt, for this reaſon; becauſe the Athenians lived under a popular government, where the art of ruling is only by perſuaſion. Eloquence then being one of the principal means of perſuaſion, and perſuaſion the only way to acquire and maintain power, all who were ambitious of any magiſtracy or office in the government ſtudied to become eloquent orators: and the arts of rhetoric and polity were thus united in the ſame perſons. Accordingly, we learn from the Attic writers of thoſe days, that the moſt popular orators at Athens were appointed to embaſſies, to magiſtracies, to the command of armies, and the ſupreme adminiſtration of all civil affairs. See particularly Iſocrates in Orat. de Pace, & Panathen. In this dialogue we find that the ſame ſpirit prevailed at Elis. Now in men of great abilities the predominant paſſion is ambition more frequently than avarice. Thoſe of the Sophiſts, therefore, who excelled in quickneſs of underſtanding, compaſs of knowledge, and ingenuity, ſuch as Hippias was, added to their other attainments the arts of popular oratory, and by thoſe means got into the management of the ſtate. Thus much for the preſent: the ſequel and the ſupplement of this ſhort hiſtory, ſo far as they are neceſſary to our purpoſe, will appear on fit occaſions.—S.

had not a ſufficient reach of prudence for the conduct of their own private affairs, and thoſe of the public at the ſame time?

Soc. Tell me then, in the name of Jupiter, whether, as all other arts are improved, and the workmen of former times are contemptible and mean in compariſon with ours, ſhall we ſay that your art, that of the Sophiſts, hath in like manner received improvement; and that ſuch of the antients as applied themſelves to the ſtudy of wiſdom were nothing, compared to you of the preſent age?

Hip. Perfectly right: that is the very caſe.

Soc. So that, were Bias to be reſtored to life again in our days, he would be liable to ridicule, appearing in competition with you Sophiſts: your caſe being parallel to that of our modern ſtatuaries, who tell us that Dædalus, were he alive, and to execute ſuch works as thoſe to which he owed his great name, would but expoſe himſelf, and become ridiculous.

Hip. The truth of the matter, Socrates, exactly is what you ſay. I myſelf, however, make it my cuſtom to beſtow my commendations rather upon the antients, and upon all ſuch as flouriſhed in times precedent to our own; giving them the preëminence and precedence [1] above ourſelves; in order to eſcape the envy of the living, and for fear of incurring the reſentment of the dead [2].

Soc.

[1] Adliterations, adnominations, and repetitions of the ſame word, were ſome of thoſe prettineſſes of ſtyle, or graces, where they are employed with judgment, which are ſaid to have been invented by the rhetorical Sophiſts. Plato, therefore, frequently in his dialogues, with great propriety, puts them into the mouths of ſuch ſpeakers. On what occaſions, and how differently from the uſe made of them by thoſe ſophiſtical orators, he introduces them into his own ſtyle at other times, will be obſerved elſewhere.—S.

[2] There was a law at Athens, the author of which was Solon, ordaining μη λεγειν κακως τον τεθνηκοτα, *not to revile the dead:* a law made, ſays Plutarch, partly from a political conſideration, to hinder the perpetuating of enmities; partly from a motive of juſtice, which forbids the attacking thoſe who are not in a capacity of defending themſelves; and partly from a principle of religion, agreeably to which the departed are to be looked on as ſacred: και ὁσιον τους μεθεστωτας ἱερους νομιζειν. Plut. in Vit. Solon. p. 89. E. That this ſentiment was of much earlier antiquity than the age of Solon, appears from the following paſſage of Archilochus, cited by Clemens Alex. Strom. l. vi. p. 619. ed. Sylburg.

Ου γαρ (inf. f. ταδ') εσθλα, κατθανουσι κερτομειν
Ὑπ' ανδρασι.——

For

Soc. In my opinion, Hippias, you ſee the matter in a juſt light, and conſider it thoroughly well. I myſelf can witneſs the truth of what you ſay. It is indeed certain, that your art is in this reſpect really improved, in that you are able to manage the concerns of the public, and at the ſame time give attention to your own private intereſts. For Gorgias [1], that great ſophiſt of Leontium, came hither on a public embaſſy from his country, as the ableſt man among the Leontines to negotiate their affairs of ſtate: and here he acquired glory by his fine harangues in the aſſembly of the people; at the ſame time that by his exhibitions before private companies [2], and

> For this is evil, with heart-biting taunt
> To perſecute men dead.——

And from this of Homer ſtill earlier,

> Ουκ ὁσιον φθιμενοισιν επ' ανδρασιν ευχεταασθαι.
>
> Odyſſ. l. xxii. ver. 412.
>
> With boaſtful ſpeech to glory o'er the dead
> Is impious.——

This piece of antient religion aroſe partly from an opinion, that ſouls freed from their earthly bodies were in a ſtate of being ſuperior to that of mortals, and ought, therefore, to be honoured by them; and partly was owing to a belief that the ſhadowy ghoſts, or ſpirits, (which they diſtinguiſhed from the intellectual ſouls,) of dead perſons had it in their power to hurt the living, by haunting and diſturbing them at leaſt, if no other way. It is on the foundation of this belief that Virgil repreſents Dido thus threatening Æneas,

> Omnibus umbra locis adero: dabis, improbe, pœnas.
>
> Æneid. l. iv. ver. 386.
>
> Be where thou wilt, my ſhade ſhall ſtill be there:
> Yes; thou ſhalt ſuffer for thy cruelty,
> Baſe man!——

And hence likewiſe came to be inſtituted the religious rite of offering θελκτηρια, pacificatory ſacrifices, to the ghoſts of thoſe whom they were afraid of having offended. See Eurip. Iphigen. in Taur. ver. 166.—S.

[1] The character of Gorgias is painted by Plato at full length in a dialogue inſcribed with his name. It will be ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe to obſerve, that Gorgias was by profeſſion, like Hippias, an orator as well as ſophiſt; and ſet up for teaching both philoſophy and the art of rhetoric: and that the price of his teaching was 100 μναι, which is of our money 322l. 18s. 4d. from each of his ſcholars.—S.

[2] The profeſſion or buſineſs of a ſophiſt conſiſted of three branches: one of which was to perfect and accompliſh the fine gentleman, according to the idea which the Grecians had of ſuch a character in that age of ſophiſm: not to form him from the firſt rudiments throughout, or in any

and his teaching our young men, he collected and raiſed very conſiderable ſums of money from this city. Or, if you would have another inſtance, there is my own friend, the famous Prodicus [1]; who has frequently been ſent hither on ſeveral public embaſſies: but the laſt time, not long ſince, when he came as ambaſſador from Ceos, his ſpeeches before the council gained him great honour; and his private exhibitions in the mean time, together with the tuition of our young men, procured him an immenſe heap of money. But not one of thoſe antient ſages ever thought proper to exact money by way of fee or reward for his teaching; or ever took it into his head to diſplay his wiſdom before a mixed multitude. So ſimple were they, and ſo much a ſecret was it to them, how valuable a thing was

any part, (for this taſk they thought beneath them,) but, after a courſe of liberal education had been gone through, and the ſtudies and exerciſes of youth were ended, to give him then the finiſhing touches; qualifying him to ſpeak plauſibly upon all ſubjects, to ſupport with ſpecious arguments either ſide of any queſtion or debate, and by falſe oratory and fallacious reaſoning, afterwards from them called ſophiſtical, to corrupt the hearers, ſilence the oppoſers, and govern all in all things. To attain theſe admired accompliſhments, the young gentleman was conſtantly to attend, and follow them every where, as long as he thought fit himſelf; obſerving in what manner they diſputed *de quolibet ente*, on any point which offered; and learning by degrees to imitate them. Hence, that which we tranſlate tuition, or teaching, is every where in Plato termed συνειναι τοις νεοις, the being accompanied by the young men. Another part of the ſophiſt's occupation, quite diſtinct from the former, though carried on at the ſame time, was to read lectures at a certain price to each auditor, before as many as they could procure beforehand to become ſubſcribers to them. Theſe lectures, the ſubjects of which were choſen indifferently, were in the way of declamations, diſſertations, or what we commonly call eſſays, ready compoſed and written down. They were not contrived, however, for the purpoſe of teaching or inſtruction: nor could they indeed effectually ſerve that end; for long ſpeeches and lectures are eaſily forgotten: but they were calculated merely for entertainment and oſtentation; and properly enough, therefore, entitled by the Sophiſts themſelves επιδειξεις, exhibitions. The third branch of their trade, the only one cultivated gratuitouſly, for the ſake of fame, though probably with a view, beſides, of gaining cuſtomers in thoſe other the lucrative branches, was to anſwer all queſtions propoſed to them; like the antient oracle at Delphi, or the authors of the Athenian oracle in the laſt age; alluſions to which practice of theirs we ſhall meet with frequently in Plato. But in this paſſage he had occaſion only to mention their other two employments, from which immediately accrued their gain.—S.

[1] In Prodicus alſo were united the two characters of orator and ſophiſt: as Philoſtratus (in Vit. Sophiſt.) confirms. That Socrates condeſcended to attend his lectures, and contracted an intimacy with him, we learn from ſeveral of Plato's dialogues. The price paid by each of his auditors at thoſe laſt exhibitions of his, here mentioned, was 50 δραχμαι, or 1l. 12s. 3½d. See Plat. in Cratyl. p. 384. and Ariſtot. Rhet. l. iii. c. 14.—S.

money.

money. Whereas each of the others, whom I mentioned, has made more money of his wiſdom, than any other artificer [1] could ever earn from any art whatever: and prior to theſe Protagoras did the ſame.

Hip. You know nothing, Socrates, of what high advantages belong to our profeſſion. If you knew but how great have been my own gains, you would be amazed. To give you only one inſtance: Going upon a certain time to Sicily, where Protagoras then reſided, high in reputation and reverend in years; I, though at that time in age greatly his inferior, gained in a very ſhort time more than a hundred and fifty minas [2]: nay, from one place only, and that a very little one, Inycum, I took above twenty [3]. This when I brought home with me, and preſented to my father, it ſtruck him and my other friends in the city with wonder and aſtoniſhment. To ſay the truth, I am inclined to think, that not any two of the ſophiſts, name which you pleaſe, taken together, have acquired ſo much money as myſelf.

Soc. A fair and a notable evidence have you produced, Hippias, proving not only your own wiſdom, but how wiſe the world, too, is become now-a-days; and what difference there is between the modern wiſdom and the antient in point of excellence. For of theſe predeceſſors of yours there is reported great folly, according to your account of things [4]. To Anaxagoras, for inſtance, it is ſaid, happened the contrary of that lucky fate which befel you. For, when great wealth had been left him, he through negligence,

[1] Αλλος δημιουργος. The reaſon why Plato uſes this word, rather than τεχνικος, his uſual term for artiſt, will appear in his dialogue named The Sophiſt; where he debaſes that profeſſion below the rank of the meaneſt artificer in any uſeful or honeſt way.—S.

[2] Equal to 484l. 7s. 6d. Engliſh money.—S.

[3] Equal to 64l. 11s. 8d. In all our calculations we have followed the uſual way of computing; in which an ounce of the ſilver coin of Athens is valued but at 5s. 2d. and the Attic δραχμη is ſuppoſed equal to the Roman denarius; though, as Dr. Arbuthnot judiciouſly obſerves, there is reaſon to think it was of greater value.—S.

[4] Των γαρ προτερων περι Αναξαγορου. In our tranſlation we have omitted this laſt word; apprehending it to have been at firſt one of thoſe, ſo frequently of old written on the margin of books by way of explication or illuſtration, and ſo frequently, when thoſe books came to be copied afterward, aſſumed into the text. For, if permitted to remain, it confounds or much diſturbs the conſtruction; and ſo greatly puzzled the old tranſlators, that they have ſeverally given this paſſage four different meanings, all of them, compared with what follows, evidently ſpoiling the ſenſe. We ſhould chooſe, therefore, to read των γαρ προτερων περι, λεγεται κ. τ. λ.—S.

they

they ſay, loſt it all: ſo ſilly was he with his wiſdom. And of other antient ſages they relate ſtories of the ſame kind. A clear proof, I think, therefore, this which you exhibit, in what a wiſe age we live; and what diſproportion the wiſdom of it bears to that of former times. Many too, I know, are agreed in this opinion, that a wiſe man ought, in the firſt place, to be wiſe to himſelf. Now the ſtandard of this kind of wiſdom is, it ſeems, he who can get the moſt money. But ſo much for this. And now tell me, as to your own gains, from which of the cities whither you have travelled did you collect the largeſt ſums? Undoubtedly it muſt have been from Sparta, whither you have gone the oftenеſt.

HIP. Not from thence, Socrates, by Jupiter.

SOC. How ſay you? What, the leaſt ſum from thence?

HIP. Never any thing at all.

SOC. It is a prodigy what you relate: and I am amazed at it, Hippias. But tell me, as to that wiſdom of yours, has it not the power to improve in virtuous excellence all your followers who are converſant with it, and will learn?

HIP. In the higheſt degree, Socrates.

SOC. Were you able then to improve the ſons of the Inycians, yet wanted ſuch ability with regard to the ſons of Sparta?

HIP. Far from it.

SOC. The Sicilians then, I warrant, have a deſire of virtuous improvement; but the Spartans not ſo.

HIP. Strongly ſo, Socrates, have the Spartans.

SOC. Was their want of money then the reaſon why they followed you not?

HIP. By no means; for of money they have plenty.

SOC. What account then can be given in ſuch a caſe as this, when they were deſirous of improvement, and in no want of money to purchaſe it; and you able to furniſh them with the higheſt degrees of it; why they did not ſend you away loaded with riches? What; certainly the reaſon of it cannot be this, that the Spartans can educate their ſons in a better manner than you could educate them? Or ſhall we ſay they can? and do you admit this to be true?

HIP. By no means in the world.

SOC. Were you not able then to perſuade the young men at Sparta that, by

by the help of your converſation, they might make greater advances in virtue than ever they could hope to do from the company and converſe of their fathers? Or could you not perſuade thoſe fathers that they would do better to commit the inſtruction of their ſons to your management, than to undertake that care themſelves, if they had any affectionate regard for their offſpring? For it could not be that they envied their children the attainment of the higheſt excellence in virtue.

HIP. I have no ſuſpicion of their envying them ſuch an attainment.

SOC. Well now; and Sparta is really governed by good laws.

HIP. Who makes a doubt of it?

SOC. Very well; and in cities governed by good laws the higheſt value is ſet on virtue.

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. And how to teach virtue to others you know beſt of all men.

HIP. By much, Socrates.

SOC. Now the man who knows beſt how to teach and impart to others the art of horſemanſhip, of all countries in Greece would not ſuch a man meet with moſt honour, and acquire moſt wealth, in Theſſaly [1], and wherever elſe this art was cultivated moſt?

HIP. It is probable he would.

SOC. And will not the man who is capable of delivering the moſt valuable inſtructions with regard to virtue, meet with moſt honour, and pick up moſt money too, if he be that way inclined, in Sparta, and every other Grecian city governed by good laws? But in Sicily [2], my friend, rather do you ſuppoſe, or at Inycum? Ought we, Hippias, to give credit to this? for, if you ſay it, we muſt believe.

HIP. The truth is, Socrates, that the Spartans hold it ſacred [3] to make

[1] See the beginning of Plato's Meno.—S.

[2] The Sicilians were as infamous for luxury as the Spartans were illuſtrious for virtue. Whence the Greek proverb, Σικελικη τραπεζα; and the Latin, *Siculæ dapes*.—S.

[3] This ſacred authority, which the Spartans attributed to the laws of their country, was owing partly to the ſanction given to thoſe laws by the Delphian oracle; as appears from Xenophon's ſhort obſervations upon the Lacedæmonian polity; and partly to the ſanction of an oath taken by their anceſtors, through a ſtratagem of Lycurgus, to maintain his laws inviolable: for which ſee Plutarch's life of that legiſlator, towards the end.—S.

no innovation in their laws; and to educate their youth in no other way than what is agreeable to their antient uſages [1].

Soc. How ſay you? Do the Spartans hold it ſacred not to do what is right, but to do the contrary?

Hip. I would not ſay any ſuch thing, not I, Socrates.

Soc. Would not they do right then to educate their ſons in the better way, and not in the worſe?

Hip. It is true they would: but the laws do not permit them to have their youth educated by foreigners, or after a foreign mode [2]. For, be aſſured, if any foreigner ever acquired wealth at Sparta by teaching or inſtructing their youth, much more ſo ſhould I; ſince they take great pleaſure in hearing my diſſertations, and give me high encomiums: but in the affair of education, the law, as I ſaid, does not permit them the benefit of my inſtructions.

Soc. The law, Hippias, do you ſuppoſe miſchievous to the public, or beneficial?

Hip. It is inſtituted, I preſume, for the benefit of the public: but ſometimes, where the frame of the law is bad, it proves a public miſchief.

Soc. Well; but do not legiſlators always frame the law with a view of procuring for the public the greateſt good? and becauſe without law it were impoſſible to live in a ſtate of order and good government.

Hip. Without doubt, they do.

Soc. When thoſe, therefore, who undertake the making laws fail of procuring good, they have miſſed their end, and erred from good government and law. Or how ſay you otherwiſe?

Hip. Accurately ſpeaking, Socrates, I muſt own the thing is ſo; but men are not uſed to affix ſuch a meaning to the word *law*.

[1] The manner of the Spartan education may be ſeen at large in Cragius de Repub. Lacedæm. lib. iii.—S.

[2] The Spartans, above all people being attached to the antient conſtitution of their government and laws, were extremely jealous of having a taſte introduced among them for foreign manners and faſhions; becauſe they were well aware, that by theſe means an eſſential change in their conſtitution would gradually follow and take place. This jealouſy of theirs they carried to ſuch a height, that they ſuffered no foreigner, or perſon of foreign education, to take up his conſtant reſidence in Sparta; nor any of their own people to reſide for any conſiderable length of time in foreign countries.—S.

Soc. Do you ſpeak of men who know what law means, or of men who want that knowledge?

Hip. I ſpeak of the bulk of mankind, the multitude.

Soc. Are theſe ſuch as know the truth of things, this multitude?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. But thoſe who have that knowledge, the wiſe, hold that which is more beneficial, to be in reality, and according to the truth of things, more a law to all men than what is leſs beneficial. Do not you agree with them in this?

Hip. I agree that in reality ſo it is.

Soc. Is not the nature and the condition of every thing ſuch as thoſe hold it to be who are really knowing in the thing?

Hip. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Now to the Spartans, you ſay, an education under you a foreigner, and after a foreign manner, would be more beneficial than to be educated after the manner of their own country.

Hip. And I ſay what is true.

Soc. And that which is more beneficial is more a law. This you ſay likewiſe, Hippias.

Hip. I have admitted it ſo to be.

Soc. According, therefore, to your account, to have the ſons of the Spartans educated under Hippias, is more agreeable to law; and their education under their fathers is more repugnant to law; ſuppoſing that from you they would receive advantages really greater.

Hip. And ſo indeed would they, Socrates.

Soc. Now from hence it follows, that the Spartans violate the law in not making you preſents of money, and committing their ſons to your care.

Hip. Be it ſo: for you ſeem to argue thus in my favour; and it is not my buſineſs to controvert your argument.

Soc. Violators of the law then, my friend, we find theſe Spartans, and that in the moſt important article too; theſe, who are thought to be the greateſt obſervers of it. But, in the name of the Gods, Hippias, of what kind are thoſe diſſertations for which they give you thoſe high encomiums? and upon what topics do they take that great pleaſure in hearing you harangue?

No doubt, they muſt be the ſame in which you have ſo much excellent knowledge; thoſe which relate to the ſtars and the phænomena of the ſky.

HIP. They by no means endure to hear a word upon theſe ſubjects [1].

SOC. But they take pleaſure in hearing a lecture upon the ſubject of geometry.

HIP. Not at all: for many of the Spartans know not even the common rules of arithmetic; nay, ſcarcely, I may ſay, how to reckon.

SOC. They are far from enduring then to hear you diſcourſe on the nature of numbers and accounts.

HIP. Very far from that, by Jupiter.

SOC. The ſubjects, then, I warrant you, are thoſe upon which you are able to diſſert, divide, and diſtinguiſh, with the greateſt accuracy of all men; concerning the power of letters and ſyllables, of harmonies and rhythms [2].

HIP. What harmonies, or what letters, my good man, do they concern themſelves about?

SOC. Well; what are the ſubjects, then, upon which they attend to you with ſo much pleaſure to themſelves, and ſo much commendation of you? Tell me yourſelf, ſince I cannot find it out.

HIP. Concerning the genealogies, O Socrates, of the heroes and of men;

[1] The polity of the Spartans was contrived with a view of making them a military people. For this reaſon, the mechanical and neceſſary arts were left to ſervants and ſlaves; and ſuch part only of the liberal kind was admitted amongſt them as contributed to military ſkill, or fitted them for the toils and the ſtratagems of war. But philoſophy and the ſciences are ſaid to have been wholly excluded. Many paſſages from the antients in proof of this are collected by the annotators on Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. xii. c. 50. and by Nic. Craig, in his treatiſe before cited, l. iii. Perhaps, however, it was only ſo in appearance. It may be worth while to examine and conſider well what Plato ſays on this ſubject in his Protagoras.—S.

[2] The Spartans were not more remarkable for a contempt of grammar and mathematics, than was Hippias for his ſkill in thoſe ſciences, as appears from the ſhorter dialogue called by his name. This part of the Introduction, the third and laſt, receives much grace from both theſe circumſtances. For the mention of the ſciences here in this manner, with a mixture of compliment and humour, ſeems to ariſe naturally from the character of the perſon with whom Socrates is converſing, and from that of the people who are the preſent ſubject of this part of their converſation. Plato uſes ſuch exquiſite art in the œconomy of his dialogues, that whatever is brought upon the carpet appears to fall in naturally: at the ſame time that all the circumſtances of it harmonize together; and every particular contributes to carry on his deſigns, either the principal or ſubordinate; being indeed purpoſely introduced for the ſake of theſe.—S.

concerning

concerning the migration of tribes, and ſettling of colonies; the antiquity and firſt foundation of cities; in a word, concerning every thing in antient ſtory, they hearken to me with the utmoſt pleaſure. So that I have been obliged to ſtudy thoſe things myſelf for their ſakes, and to perfect myſelf in all that ſort of knowledge.

Soc. By Jupiter, Hippias, it was fortunate for you that the Spartans take no pleaſure in hearing a man reckon up our archons from the time of Solon [1]. For, if they did, the perfecting yourſelf in ſuch a catalogue would put you to no little trouble.

Hip. Why ſo, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names repeated only once, I will undertake to remember them.

Soc. It is true; but I did not conſider that you had an excellent memory. So now I conceive the reaſon why, in all probability, the Spartans are delighted with you: it is becauſe you know ſuch a multitude of things, and are of the ſame uſe to them that old women are to children, to entertain them with the recital of pretty fables and old ſtories.

Hip. And by Jupiter, Socrates, upon a manly ſubject too, that of beauty in manners. For, diſcourſing there lately of a complete rule of manners becoming a young man, I gained much applauſe. And I take this opportunity to inform you, that I have a diſſertation upon this ſubject extremely beautiful, finely framed in every reſpect, but particularly admirable for the choice of words [2]. The occaſion, or way of introducing my diſcourſe, is this:—

[1] This was the æra of the Athenian greatneſs. For the lenity of Solon's laws, the limitation which they gave to the formidable power of a perpetual ſenate, and the popular liberty which they eſtabliſhed, produced in the people ſuch a ſpirit—the conſequence always of lenity in the government, legal liberty, and a ſhare of power—that Athens ſoon grew able to rival Sparta, and to be her competitor for the chief ſway and leading in the general affairs of Greece. Plato here, therefore, intends a fine compliment to his country. That he could have no contrary view is evident; becauſe the archons, or chief magiſtrates of Athens, had been elected annually, nine in number, eighty years before the archonſhip of Solon, when his laws were inſtituted. Plato would not have bounded his liſt of archons with the time of Solon, had his intention been to *ſatirize* the Athenian conſtitution; as it may ſeem to ſome, who imagine him in all things to be in jeſt, and always ſatirical.—S.

[2] The Sophiſts were remarkably curious upon this head. The words which they affected to uſe were the ſmooth, the ſoft, and the delicate; the pompous, and the highly-compound; the ſplendid, the florid, the figurative and poetical; the quaint, and the uncommon; the antique, and

this:—After the taking of Troy, Neoptolemus is ſuppoſed to aſk advice of Neſtor, and to inquire of him, what courſe of life a young man ought to follow in order to acquire renown and glory. Upon this Neſtor ſpeaks, and lays down a great many excellent precepts concerning the beauty of manners and a well-regulated life. This [1] diſſertation I exhibited at Sparta; and three days hence am to exhibit the ſame here at Athens, in the ſchool of Phidoſtratus, together with ſeveral other pieces of mine worth the hearing. I do it at the requeſt of Eudicus, the ſon of Apemantes. You will not fail, I hope, being preſent at it yourſelf, and bringing others with you to be of the audience, ſuch as are capable judges of performances of this kind.

Soc. We ſhall do ſo, Hippias; if ſo it pleaſe God. But at preſent anſwer me a ſhort queſtion relating to your diſſertation. For you have happily reminded me. You muſt know, my friend, that a certain perſon puzzled me lately in a converſation we had together [2]—after I had been inveighing againſt ſome things for their baſeneſs and deformity, and praiſing ſome other things for their excellence and beauty—by attacking me with theſe queſtions in a very inſolent manner.—"Whence came you, Socrates, ſaid he, to know what things are beautiful, and what are otherwiſe? For can you tell me, now, what the beautiful is?" I, through the meanneſs of my knowledge, found myſelf at a loſs, and had nothing to anſwer him with any propriety. So, quitting his company, I grew angry with myſelf, reproached myſelf, and threatened that, as ſoon as ever I could meet with any one of you wiſe men, I would hear what he had to ſay upon the ſubject, and learn and ſtudy it thoroughly; and, that done, would return to my queſtioner, and battle the point with him over again. Now, therefore, as I ſaid, you are come hap-

and obſolete; with many new ones of their own invention; all, in ſhort, which any way ſerved to pleaſe the ſenſe, or amuſe the fancy, without informing the underſtanding. Inſtances of all which are recorded in the antient critics, and may be ſeen collected, many of them by Creſollius in Theat. Rhet. l. iii. c. 23. As to the diction of Hippias in particular, it is repreſented by Maximus Tyrius, c. 23. to have been empty and unmeaning, and his eloquence void of ſolidity.

[1] This boaſted diſſertation of Hippias was intitled Τρωϊκος, as we learn from Philoſtratus, in whoſe time it appears to have been extant. The plan of manners which it laid down, if we may conjecture from the title, was taken from the characters of the heroes in Homer's Iliad, chiefly from that of Achilles, Hippias's favourite. See the ſhorter dialogue called by his name.—S.

[2] This certain perſon was no other than the dianoëtic part or power of the ſoul of Socrates: for it is this part which inveſtigates truth, deriving its principles from intellect.—T.

pily

pily for me. Give me ample information then accordingly concerning the nature of the beautiful itſelf: and endeavour to be as accurate as poſſible in your anſwers to what I ſhall aſk you; that I may not be confuted a ſecond time, and deſervedly again laughed at. For you underſtand the queſtion, no doubt, perfectly well. To you ſuch a piece of knowledge can be but a little one, amongſt the multitude of thoſe which you are maſter of.

Hip. Little enough, by Jupiter, Socrates; and ſcarcely of any value at all.

Soc. The more eaſily then ſhall I learn it; and not be confuted or puzzled any more upon that point by any man.

Hip. Not by any man. For otherwiſe would my ſkill be mean, and nothing beyond vulgar attainment.

Soc. It will be a brave thing, by Juno, Hippias, to get the better of the man, as you promiſe me we ſhall. But ſhall I be any obſtacle to the victory if I imitate his manner, and, after you have anſwered ſome queſtion of mine, make objections to your anſwer; for the ſake only of more thorough information from you? for I have a tolerable ſhare of experience in the practice of making objections. If it be no difference therefore to you, I ſhould be glad to have the part of an objector allowed me, in order to be made a better maſter of the ſubject.

Hip. Take the part of an objector, then: for, as I ſaid juſt now, it is no very knotty point, that which you inquire about. I could teach you to anſwer queſtions much more difficult than this, in ſuch a manner that none ſhould ever be able to refute you.

Soc. O rare! what good news you tell me! But come, ſince you bid me yourſelf, I will put myſelf in the place of my antagoniſt, try to be what he is, to the beſt of my power, and in his perſon begin to queſtion you. Now, if he were of the audience, when you exhibited that diſſertation which you talk of, concerning the beauty of manners, after he had heard it through, and you had done ſpeaking, this point rather than any other would be uppermoſt in his mind to queſtion you upon, this relating to the beautiful: for he has a certain habit of ſo doing; and thus would he introduce it.—"Elean ſtranger! I would aſk you, whether it is not by having honeſty that honeſt men are honeſt?" Anſwer now, Hippias, as if he propoſed the queſtion.

Hip. I ſhall anſwer—It is by their having honeſty.

Soc. Is not this ſome certain thing then, this honeſty?

Hip.

Hip. Clearly ſo.

Soc. And is it not likewiſe by their having wiſdom that wiſe men are wiſe? and by having good in them that all good things are good?

Hip. Without diſpute.

Soc. And are not theſe ſome certain real things [1]? for they are not ſurely non-entities, by whoſe intimate preſence with other things thoſe things are what they are.

Hip. Undoubtedly, real things.

Soc. I aſk you then, whether all things which are beautiful are not in like manner beautiful by their having beauty?

Hip. They are, by their having beauty.

Soc. Some certain real thing, this beauty.

Hip. A real thing. But what is to come of all this?

Soc. Tell me now, friend ſtranger, will he ſay, what this thing is, this beauty, or the beautiful.

Hip. Does not the propoſer of this queſtion deſire to have it told him, what is beautiful?

Soc. I think not, Hippias: but to have it told him what the beautiful is.

Hip. How does this differ from that?

Soc. Do you think there is no difference between them?

Hip. There is not any.

Soc. You certainly know better. Obſerve [2], my good friend, what the queſtion is. For he aſks you, not what is beautiful, but what is the beautiful.

Hip. I apprehend you, honeſt friend. And to that queſtion, What is the beautiful? I ſhall give an anſwer, ſuch a one as can never be confuted. For be aſſured, Socrates, if the truth muſt be told, a beautiful maiden is the thing beautiful.

[1] This is levelled againſt thoſe who maintained that mind and the objects of mind have no real being; attributing reality to nothing but that which they are able απτεσθαι ταις χερσιν λαβεσθαι, ſays Plato, (Theætet. p. 155.) "to take faſt hold of with their hands;" or, at leaſt, which is the object of one or other of their ſenſes.—S.

[2] The Greek, as it is printed, is ὁμως—αθρει. But the ſenſe, as we apprehend, not admitting an adverſative adverb, the true reading probably is ὁμοσε or ὁμου—αθρει, that is, "Look cloſe, or near:" for the Attic writers uſed the word ὁμου to ſignify the ſame with εγγυς. See Harpocrat. p. 130, 131. ed. Gronov.—S.

Soc.

Soc. An excellent anſwer, by the dog [1], Hippias; and ſuch a one as cannot fail of being applauded. Shall I then, in anſwering thus, have anſwered the queſtion aſked me? and that ſo well as not to be refuted?

Hip. How ſhould you be refuted, Socrates, in avowing that which is the opinion of all the world; and the truth of which all who hear you will atteſt?

Soc. Be it ſo then, by all means. But now, Hippias, let me alone to reſume the queſtion, with your anſwer to it, by myſelf. The man will interrogate me after this manner: "Anſwer me, Socrates, and tell me, if there be any ſuch thing as the beautiful itſelf [2], to whoſe preſence is owing the beauty of all thoſe things which you call beautiful [3]?" Then ſhall I anſwer

[1] Plato has in his dialogues drawn the picture of his hero with an exactneſs ſo minute, that he ſeems not to have omitted the leaſt peculiarity in the ordinary converſation of that great man. Of this we have here an inſtance very remarkable. Socrates, it ſeems, in common diſcourſe uſed frequently to ſwear by brute animals. The different reaſons which have been aſſigned for his ſo doing, and the various cenſures paſſed on him, may be ſeen collected by Menage in Not. ad Laërt. p. 92, 93.; M. Maſſieu in the firſt tome of Les Mem. de l'Acad. des Inſcript. & Belles Lett. p. 205.; and by M. du Soul in Not. ad Lucian. vol. i. p. 556. ed. Hemſterhus. Thus much is evident, that the Cretans had a law or cuſtom, introduced amongſt them by Rhadamanthus, to uſe that very kind of oaths; on purpoſe to avoid naming on every trivial occaſion the Gods in whom they believed. See the authors cited by Olearius in Not. ad Philoſtrat. p. 257. n. 22. That the great Athenian philoſopher followed in this the example of the old Cretan judge and lawgiver, is the opinion of Porphyry, in. l. iii. de Abſtinent. § 16. and indeed is in the higheſt degree probable; becauſe we find Socrates ſwearing by the very ſame ſpecies of animals adjured commonly by the Cretans. The dog is named the moſt frequently in the oaths of both; probably becauſe domeſtic, and the moſt frequently in ſight when they were talking. See the Scholiaſt on Ariſtoph. Av. ver. 521. and Suidas in voce Ῥαδαμανθυος ὁρκος.—S.

[2] The Greek is, ει τι εστιν αυτο το καλον. Among the Attic writers ει has often the force of an adverb of interrogation, ſignifying "whether;" like the Engliſh particle "if." This is one of the many idioms of our language, correſponding with thoſe of the antient Attic Greek. But this idiom ſeems not to have been well known, or at leaſt not here obſerved, by any of the tranſlators: for they all interpret this part of the ſentence in a conditional ſenſe, making ει a conditional conjunction. Nor does it indeed appear to have been better known to thoſe old tranſcribers of the original, from whoſe copies are printed the editions we have of Plato. For their ignorance in this point ſeems to have occaſioned thoſe corruptions of the text taken notice of in the two following notes.—S.

[3] The whole ſentence in the preſent editions ſtands thus: Ιθι μοι, ὦ Σωκρατες, αποκριναι· ταυτα παντα ἁ φῃς καλα ειναι, ει τι εστιν αυτο το καλον, ταυτ' αν ειη καλα; In the latter part of this ſentence there is undoubtedly an omiſſion; which we ought to ſupply thus; ΔΙ. Ὁ ταυτ' αν ειη καλα, as we

 read

ſwer him thus: "A beautiful maiden is that beautiful, to whoſe preſence thoſe other things owe their beauty [1]."

Hip. Well. And do you imagine, after this, that he will ever think of refuting you? or attempt to prove your anſwer concerning the thing beautiful not a juſt anſwer? or, if he ſhould attempt it, that he would not be ridiculous?

Soc. That he will attempt it, friend, I am well aſſured: but whether in ſo doing he will be ridiculous, will appear in the attempt itſelf. However, I'll tell you what he will ſay.

Hip. Tell me then.

Soc. "How pleaſant you are, Socrates!" he will ſay. "Is not a beautiful mare then a thing beautiful? commended as ſuch even by the divine oracle [2]." What ſhall we anſwer, Hippias? Shall we not acknowledge, that a mare

read in the ſentence following, where Socrates repeats the terms of the queſtion: or rather, Ω κ. τ λ. the dative caſe having been uſed by Socrates juſt before, when he ſtated the queſtion firſt.—S.

[1] The Greek is printed thus: Εγω δε δη ερω, ὁτι ει παρθενος καλη, καλον εστι δι' ὁ ταυτ' αν ειη καλα. But the ſenſe evidently requires us to expunge the word ει before παρθενος, and to read ὁτι παρθενος καλη καλον εστι, κ. τ. λ. The author of this interpolation, no doubt, intended to make this ſentence anſwer to the former; and thus completed the ſeries of blunders, which aroſe gradually from that ignorance of the Attic idiom, uſed in the former ſentence, of which we accuſed the tranſcribers in note [2], p. 393. This laſt blunder has been the ſource of another, a moſt ridiculous one, made by Auguſtinus Niphus in a Latin treatiſe De Pulchro. His intention, in the former part of that work, is to illuſtrate the Greater Hippias of Plato. In purſuance of which he thinks it incumbent on him, in the firſt place, to prove the excellence of ſome particular beauty; ſuch as may beſt ſhow, we preſume he means, the perfection of the ideal pattern. For this purpoſe, he politely and gallantly urges the following argument, manifeſtly borrowed from the error complained of in this note: "If the princeſs Joan of Arragon be beautiful without a fault, then there muſt be ſomething abſolutely beautiful in the nature of things: But none can deny the faultleſs beauty of the princeſs Joan: Therefore, &c." And in proof of this laſt poſition, he gives us a long detail of the charms of that princeſs; ſuch as, beſides the beauties of her mind and ſweetneſs of her manners, her golden locks, blue eyes, dimpled chin, &c. &c. &c. from head to foot.—S.

[2] The oracle here meant is recorded at large by Jo. Tzetzes, chil. ix. cap. 291. of which only the following verſe relates to the preſent ſubject—

Ἱπποι Θρηϊκιαι, Λακεδαιμονιαι τε γυναικες.

The dames of Sparta and the mares of Thrace
Excel amongſt the females of their kind.

Out of this the Grecians, with a little alteration, made a proverb, current amongſt them,

Ἱππαν

a mare is beautiful likewiſe? meaning a beautiful mare. For, indeed, how ſhould we dare deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

Hip. True, Socrates. And no doubt the God rightly gave that commendation: for with us, too, there are mares exceedingly beautiful [1].

Soc. "Very well now," will he ſay: "but what, is not a beautiful lyre too a thing beautiful?" Shall we allow it, Hippias?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. After this he will ſay, (for with tolerable certainty I can gueſs he will, from my knowledge of his character,) "But what think you of a beautiful ſoup-pan, you ſimpleton you? is not that a thing beautiful then?"

Hip. Who is this man, Socrates? I warrant, ſome unmannerly and ill-bred fellow, to dare to mention things ſo mean and contemptible, upon a ſubject ſo noble and ſo reſpectable.

Soc. Such is the man, Hippias; not nice and delicate; but a mean ſhabby fellow, without conſideration or regard for aught except this, in every inquiry,—What is true?—The man, however, muſt have an anſwer: and in order to it, I thus premiſe—If the pan be made by a good workman,

Ἵππον Θεσσαλικὴν, Λακεδαιμονίην τε γυναῖκα.

A Spartan dame, and a Theſſalian mare.

See Barthius on Claudian, de 4to Conſ. Hon. ad ver. 543. pag. 697.

Hence it aroſe in time, that the words of the oracle itſelf ſuffered a change; and inſtead of Θρῄκιαι was ſubſtituted Θεσσαλικαι: with which alteration we find the oracle cited again by the ſame Tzetzes, chil. x. c. 330. That the former word is the true reading, and the latter a corruption, rather than the reverſe of this, is probable from the authority of a writer, the moſt antient of thoſe who cite this oracle, Euſebius, in Præp. Ev. l. v. c. xxvii. pag. 132. ed. R. Steph.—S.

[1] We learn from Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 303. that the people of Elis carried their mares into other countries to be covered. It is probable, therefore, that they encouraged only the female breed of that animal at home: eſpecially if it be true, what Pliny and Servius write, that mares are better for a long race. See the annotators on Virgil, Georg. i. ver. 59. The Eleans were undoubtedly thus curious about the breed, on account of the chariot-races in the Olympic games; which were celebrated in their country, and from which they derived the advantage of being ſuffered to enjoy a conſtant peace, with liberty and honour—

Et quas Elis opes ante parârat equis.

Propert. l. i. el. 8. ver. 36.

And by her mares, ſo fleet in race to run,
The wealth which Elis antiently had won.—S.

ſmooth and round, and well-baked; like ſome of our handſome ſoup-pans with two handles, thoſe which hold ſix coas [1], exceedingly beautiful in truth; if he mean ſuch a pan as theſe are, the pan muſt muſt be confeſſed beautiful. For how, indeed, could we deny that to be beautiful which has real beauty?

Hip. By no means, Socrates.

Soc. "Is not a beautiful ſoup-pan, then," he will ſay, "a thing beautiful? Anſwer."

Hip. Well then, Socrates, my opinion of the caſe is this: Even this veſſel, if well and handſomely made, is a beautiful thing likewiſe. But nothing of this kind deſerves to be mentioned as beautiful, when we are ſpeaking of a mare, and a maiden, or any other thing thus admirable for its beauty.

Soc. So; now I apprehend you, Hippias. When the man aſks ſuch a queſtion as that, we are thus, it ſeems, to anſwer him:—"Honeſt man! are you ignorant how it was ſaid well by Heraclitus, 'that the moſt beautiful ape, in compariſon with the human [2] kind, is a creature far from beautiful?' Juſt ſo, the moſt beautiful ſoup-pan is a thing far from beautiful in compariſon with the maiden kind; as it is ſaid by Hippias the wiſe." Is it not thus, Hippias, that we muſt anſwer?

Hip. By all means, Socrates: your anſwer is perfectly right.

Soc. Mind me now: for upon this, I am well aſſured, he will ſay to me thus:—"But ſuppoſe, Socrates, the maiden kind were to be ſet in compariſon with the Goddeſs kind; would not the ſame accident befall the maidens in that caſe, which happened to the ſoup-pans compared with them? Would

[1] According to the accurate Dr. Arbuthnot's computation, the Attic χους, or χοα, was a meaſure containing three quarts. So that the fine tureens here mentioned held $4\frac{1}{2}$ gallons.—S.

[2] In the Greek we read αλλῳ γενει. But, that we ought to read ανθρωπινῳ γενει, there is no occaſion, we preſume, for any arguments to prove. It will ſufficiently appear from what is quoted preſently after from the ſame Heraclitus. For, however *dark* or *myſterious* his writings might have been, as we are told they were, yet there is no reaſon to think he wrote *abſurdly*. But the abſurdity was eaſily committed by the tranſcribers of Plato; who probably ſometimes did not well underſtand his meaning, certainly were not always very attentive to it. For we learn from thoſe who are much converſant with antient manuſcripts, that ανθρωπῳ often, and ανθρωπινῳ ſometimes, is written in this conciſe manner, $\dot{\alpha}\nu\overline{\varphi}$. And no error is more common in the editions of Greek authors, than ſuch as are occaſioned by this very abbreviation.—S.

not

not the faireſt maiden appear far from being beautiful? Does not Heraclitus further teach this very doctrine, which you yourſelf muſt needs infer to be true [1], that the wiſeſt of men, compared with a God, will appear an ape in wiſdom and beauty and every other excellence [2] ?" Shall we own, Hippias, the faireſt maiden far from beautiful, in compariſon with a Goddeſs?

Hip. Who, Socrates, would preſume to call this in queſtion?

Soc. No ſooner then ſhall I have agreed with him in this, than he will laugh at me, and ſay, "Do you remember, Socrates, what queſtion you was aſked?"—"I do," I ſhall tell him; "it was this: What kind of thing was the beautiful itſelf?"—"When the queſtion then," he will ſay, "concerned the beautiful itſelf, your anſwer was concerning that which happens to be far frombeautiful, according to your own confeſſion, as beautiful as it is."—"So it ſeems," ſhall I ſay? Or what other reply, my friend, do you adviſe me to make him?

Hip. I think, for my part, you muſt reply in thoſe very words. For [3], when

[1] The Greek is thus printed, ὃν συ επαγῃ; and by all the tranſlators interpreted after this manner: "That Heraclitus, whoſe teſtimony you cite;" as if the word μαρτυρα was tacitly underſtood after επαγῃ. Whether this interpretation be agreeable to the words of Plato, or not; we ſee it plainly repugnant to the matter of fact: for it was not Hippias, but Socrates himſelf, who had juſt before cited Heraclitus. Suppoſing, however, that the writings of this philoſopher were cited frequently by Hippias; and that poſſibly, therefore, the meaning might be this: "He whoſe teſtimony you are uſed to cite;" yet the alteration of the word ὃν into Ὁ ΑΝ will, we preſume, to every attentive and judicious reader, appear to make better ſenſe and reaſoning. For the ſaying of Heraclitus, which follows, as this philoſopher inferred the truth of it, by analogy, from his compariſon between apes and men, is no leſs a proper inference, in the ſame way of reaſoning, from what Hippias had juſt before admitted to be his own meaning, and the amount of what he had ſaid concerning the ſoup-pan compared with a beautiful maiden. Our learned readers will alſo obſerve the conſtruction to be much eaſier, and more natural, when the ſentence is read thus: Η ου και Ἡρακλειτος ταυτον τουτο λεγει, ὁ αν συ επαγῃ.—S.

[2] In this quotation from Heraclitus every one will diſcern the original of that thought in Mr. Pope's Eſſay on Man—

Superior beings, when of late they ſaw
A mortal man unfold all nature's law,
Admired ſuch wiſdom in an earthly ſhape,
And ſhowed a Newton, as we ſhow an ape.—S.

[3] We entirely agree with Monſ. Maucroy, in aſſigning the following ſentence to Hippias; though all the other tranſlations, with the printed editions of the Greek, attribute it to Socrates.

The

when he ſays that the human kind compared with the divine is far from beautiful, without doubt he will have the truth on his ſide.

Soc. "But were I to have aſked you at firſt this queſtion," will he ſay, 'What is beautiful, and at the ſame time far from beautiful?' and you were to have anſwered me in the manner you did; would not you in that caſe have anſwered rightly? And does the beautiful then itſelf, by which every other thing is ornamented, and looks beautiful, whenever this form of beauty ſupervenes and inveſts it, imparting thus the virtue of its preſence,—does this ſtill appear to you to be a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?"

Hip. Truly, Socrates, if this be the queſtion which he aſks, it is the eaſieſt thing imaginable to anſwer it; and to tell him what that beautiful thing is, by which other things are ornamented; and which, by ſupervening and inveſting them, makes them look beautiful. So that he muſt be a very ſimple fellow, and entirely a ſtranger to things elegant and fine. For, if you only anſwer him thus, "that the beautiful, which he inquires after, is nothing elſe than gold," he will have no more to ſay, nor attempt ever to refute ſuch an anſwer. Becauſe none of us can be inſenſible that, wherever gold be applied or ſuperinduced, let the thing have looked ever ſo vile and ſordid before, yet then it will look beautiful, when it is inveſted or ornamented with gold.

Soc. You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how unyielding he is, and how hard in admitting any aſſertion.

Hip. What ſignifies that, Socrates? He muſt of neceſſity admit what is rightly aſſerted; or, in not admitting it, expoſe himſelf to ridicule.

Soc. And yet will he be ſo far from admitting this anſwer, my friend, that he will treat me with open deriſion, and ſay to me, "You that are ſo puffed up with the opinion of your own ſkill and knowledge, do you think Phidias was a bad workman?" And I believe I ſhall anſwer, that he was far from being ſo.

Hip. You will anſwer rightly, Socrates.

Soc. Rightly, without diſpute. But he, when I have agreed with him that Phidias was a good workman, will ſay, "Do you imagine, then, that Phidias

The error ſeems to have ariſen from want of obſerving, that the particle *και* in Plato has frequently the force of *γαρ*; and that *και δη*, though oftener *και μην δη*, anſwers to the Latin *enimvero*.—S.

was ignorant of that which you call the beautiful?"—"To what purpoſe do you aſk this?" I ſhall ſay.—"Becauſe Minerva's eyes," will he reply, "Phidias made not of gold, nor yet the reſt of her face; nor the feet, nor the hands neither: though ſhe would have looked handſomeſt, it ſeems, had ſhe been a golden Goddeſs: but he made theſe all of ivory [1]. It is evident that he committed this error through ignorance; not knowing that gold it was which beautified all things, wherever it was applied." When he talks after this manner, what anſwer ſhall we make him, Hippias?

Hip. There is no difficulty at all in the matter. We ſhall anſwer, "Phidias was in the right; for things made of ivory are alſo, as I preſume, beautiful."

Soc. "What was the reaſon, then," will he ſay, "why Phidias made not the pupil of the eyes out of ivory, but out of ſtone rather? chooſing for that purpoſe ſuch ſtone as (in colour) moſt reſembled ivory. Is a beautiful ſtone then a thing beautiful too?" Shall we admit it ſo to be, Hippias?

Hip. We will; in a place where the ſtone is becoming.

Soc. But, where it is unbecoming, ſhall I allow it to be unhandſome, or not?

Hip. Allow it; where the ſtone becomes not the place.

Soc. "Well now; and is it not the ſame with ivory and gold, you wiſe man you?" will he ſay. "Do not theſe, where they are becoming, make things appear handſome; but far otherwiſe where they are unbecoming?" Shall we deny this, or acknowledge the man to be in the right?

Hip. We muſt acknowledge this, that whatever is becoming to any thing makes it appear handſome.

Soc. Upon this, he will ſay thus: "When that fine ſoup-pan, then, which we have been ſpeaking of, is ſet upon the ſtove full of excellent ſoup [2], whether

[1] All the other parts, not here mentioned, were of maſſive gold: as we collect from Pliny's Natural Hiſtory, l. xxxvi. c. 6. compared with this place. For the Athenian Minerva was always painted or carved with martial habiliments. It became a Goddeſs to have theſe made of gold. And with equal propriety, no doubt, did Phidias make of ivory the parts ſuppoſed to be left naked. The Olympian Jupiter, and this admirable ſtatue, the ſize of which far exceeded the human, were eſteemed the capital works of that great maſter. See Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. xxxiv. c. 8. The Minerva ſtood in the Παρθενων, or temple of that Goddeſs, at Athens.—S.

[2] The fine compound ſoups of the Athenians, to prevent ſpoiling the contexture of ſome of the ingredients,

whether is a golden ſpoon the moſt becoming and proper for it, or a ſycamore ſpoon?"

HIP. Hercules! what a ſtrange ſort of man, Socrates, is he whom you are talking of! Will you not tell me who he is?

SOC. Should I tell you his name, you would not know him.

HIP. But I know already that he is ſome ignorant ſilly fellow.

SOC. He is a very troubleſome queſtioner indeed, Hippias. But, however, what ſhall we anſwer? Which of the two ſpoons ſhall we ſay is moſt becoming and proper for the ſoup and for the pan? Is it not clearly the ſycamore [1] ſpoon? For this gives a better ſcent and flavour to the ſoup; and at the ſame time, my friend, it would not break the pan, and ſpill the ſoup, and put out the fire, and, when the gueſts were come prepared for feaſting, rob them of an excellent diſh. But all theſe miſchiefs would be done by that golden ſpoon. We muſt, I think, therefore, anſwer, that the ſycamore ſpoon is more becoming and proper in this caſe than the golden ſpoon: unleſs you ſay otherwiſe.

HIP. Well, Socrates; more becoming and proper be it then: but, for

ingredients, and confounding the order of others, were, many of them, ſerved up to table in the very ſtewing-pans in which they were made. See Ariſtoph. Eq. act. iv. ſec. 1.; Athenæus, l. ix. p. 406.; and Caſaubon. in Athen. p. 693. For this reaſon, that elegant people was very curious about the beauty of theſe pans or diſhes. The matter of them ſeems to have been a kind of porcelain, and the form not unlike our tureens. If the curioſity of any of our readers ſhould lead them to inquire into the compoſition of theſe ſoups, they may ſatisfy it in ſome meaſure by looking into Athenæus and Apicius Cælius, l. v. c. 3.—S.

[1] In the Greek *συκινη*. But that we ought to read *συκαμινη*, there is great reaſon to ſuſpect. For the wood of the fig-tree was found ſo unfit a material in the making any domeſtic utenſils, &c. that the Grecians in common ſpeech metaphorically called whatever was uſeleſs, *συκινον, a fig-tree thing*, this or that. Upon which account Horace gives that wood the epithet of "*inutile*," l. i. ſat. 8. Whereas the wood of the ſycamore-tree, *συκαμινος*, is by Theophraſtus ſaid to be *ξυλον προς πολλα χρησιμον*, Hiſt. Plant. l. iv. c. 2. Not to inſiſt on the extreme bitterneſs of fig-tree wood to the taſte; and the offenſiveneſs of its ſmoke, when burning, beyond that of any other tree: (ſee Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 684.) qualities which ſeem to indicate the ſcent and flavour of it not to be very agreeable. The alteration of this word is eaſily accounted for. The *συκαμινος*, or *συκομορος*, being the ſame with the *συκη Αιγυπτια*, it is probable that the Alexandrian Platoniſts, to illuſtrate the word *συκαμινη*, wrote in the margin of their books *συκινη*: which afterwards the more eaſily took place of the other, becauſe the fig-tree was well known to be the moſt common of any tree in Attica.—S.

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my part, I would not hold diſcourſe with a fellow who aſked ſuch ſort of queſtions.

Soc. Right, my dear friend. For it would not be becoming or proper for you to be beſpattered with ſuch vile dirty words, ſo finely dreſſed [1] as you are from top to toe, and ſo illuſtrious for wiſdom through all Greece. But for me—it is nothing to dirty [2] myſelf againſt the man. Give me my leſſon, therefore, what I am to ſay; and anſwer in my name. For the man now will ſay thus: "If the ſycamore ſpoon then be more becoming and proper than the golden one, muſt it not be handſomer?"

Hip. Yes. Since the proper and becoming, Socrates, you have granted to be handſomer than the improper and unbecoming.

Soc. What, Hippias; and ſhall we grant him too, that the ſycamore ſpoon has more beauty in it than the golden ſpoon?

Hip. Shall I tell you, Socrates, what you ſhall ſay the beautiful is, ſo as to prevent him from all further cavilling and diſputing?

Soc. By all means: but not before you tell me whether of the two ſpoons we have been talking of is the moſt beautiful, as well as the moſt proper and becoming.

Hip. Well then; if it pleaſes you, anſwer him, "It is that made of the ſycamore tree."

Soc. Now ſay what you was juſt going to ſay. For this anſwer, in which I pronounce gold to be the beautiful, will be refuted; and gold will be demonſtrated, I find, not to be at all more beautiful than ſycamore wood. But what, ſay you, is the beautiful now?

Hip. I will tell you. For when you aſk me, "What is the beautiful?" you would have me, I perceive, give you for anſwer ſomething which ſhall never, in any place, or to any perſon, appear otherwiſe than beautiful.

Soc. By all means, Hippias. And now you apprehend me perfectly well. But obſerve what I ſay: Be aſſured, that if any man ſhall be able to

[1] The fine dreſs in which Hippias appeared at the Olympic games, is related by Plato in the leſſer dialogue of his name; and more at large by Apuleius, Florid. l. ii. Ælian alſo tells us, that the ordinary attire of that ſophiſt, whenever he appeared abroad, was of a ſcarlet colour, ſuch as in thoſe days peculiarly belonged to perſons of high dignity. Var. Hiſt. l. xii. c. 32.—S.

[2] Meaning, that he was accuſtomed to ſubmit his fancies and paſſions to the ſevere diſcipline and rough treatment of his higher principle.—S.

controvert our new anſwer, I ſhall vow never more to praiſe any thing for its beauty. Now in the name of the Gods proceed, and tell it me without delay.

Hip. I ſay then, that always, and to every perſon, and in every place it will appear the moſt beautiful, lovely, and deſirable thing in the world, to be rich, healthy, honoured by his country, to arrive at a good old age, to give his parents an honourable burial, and at length to have the laſt offices performed for himſelf honourably and magnificently by his own iſſue.

Soc. O brave! O rare! How admirable, how great, and how worthy of yourſelf, Hippias, is the ſpeech you have now ſpoken! By Juno, I receive with much pleaſure that hearty willingneſs of yours to give me all the aſſiſtance in your power. But we reach not the point yet. For now will the man laugh at us more than ever, you may be aſſured.

Hip. An ill-timed laugh, Socrates. For in laughing, when he has nothing to object, he will in reality laugh only at himſelf; and be the ridicule of all who happen to be preſent.

Soc. Perhaps ſo. But perhaps, alſo, as ſoon as I have thus anſwered, I ſhall be in danger, if I propheſy aright, of ſomething beſides the being laught at.

Hip. What beſides?

Soc. That, if he happens to have a cane in his hand, unleſs I run away and eſcape him, he will aim ſome very ſerious ſtrokes at me.

Hip. How ſay you? What, is the man ſome maſter of yours then? for, otherwiſe, would he not be puniſhed for the injury done you? Or, is there no juſtice in your city? but the citizens are permitted to aſſault and beat one another injuriouſly.

Soc. By no means are they permitted to do any ſuch thing.

Hip. Will he not, therefore, be condemned to puniſhment, as having beaten you injuriouſly?

Soc. I ſhould think he would not, Hippias; not having beaten me injuriouſly if I had made him ſuch an anſwer; but very deſervedly, as it ſeems to me.

Hip. It ſeems ſo then to me, Socrates; if you are of that opinion yourſelf.

Soc. Shall I tell you, why, in my own opinion, I ſhould have deſerved a beating, if I had ſo anſwered?—Will you condemn me too without trying the cauſe? or will you hear what I have to ſay?

Hip. It would be a hard caſe indeed, Socrates, ſhould I deny you a hearing. But what have you to ſay then?

Soc. I will tell you; but in the ſame way as I talked with you juſt now, aſſuming his character, whilſt you perſonate me. I ſhall do this, to avoid treating you in your own perſon with ſuch language as he will uſe in reprimanding me, with harſh and out-of-the-way terms. For I aſſure you that he will ſay thus:—"Tell me, Socrates; think you not that you deſerve a beating, for having ſung that pompous ſtrain, ſo foreign to the deſign of the muſic; ſpoiling thus the harmony, and wandering wide of the point propoſed to you?"—"How ſo?" I ſhall aſk him.—"How?" he will reply: "can you not remember that I aſked you concerning the beautiful itſelf, that which makes every thing beautiful, wherever it comes and imparts the virtue of its preſence; whether it communicates it to ſtone or wood, to man or God, to actions and manners, or to any part of ſcience. Beauty itſelf, man, I aſk you what it is: and I can no more beat into your head what I ſay, than if you were a ſtone lying by my ſide, nay a mill-ſtone too, without ears or brains." Now, Hippias, would not you be angry with me, if I, frightened with this reprimand, ſhould ſay to him thus:—"Why, Hippias ſaid, this was the beautiful; and I aſked him, juſt as you aſk me, what was beautiful to all perſons, and at all times."—What ſay you? will you not be angry if I tell him thus?

Hip. That which I deſcribed, Socrates, is beautiful, I am very poſitive, in the eyes of all men [1].

Soc. "And always will it be ſo?" he will ſay: "for the beautiful itſelf muſt be always beautiful."

Hip. To be ſure.

Soc. "And always was it ſo in former times?" he will ſay.

Hip. It always was ſo.

Soc. "What? and to Achilles too," he will ſay, "did the Elean ſtranger affirm it was a beautiful and deſirable thing to ſurvive his progenitors? and that it was the ſame to his grandfather Æacus, and the reſt

[1] At the end of this ſentence, in the Greek, are added the words καὶ δοξει. Theſe we have omitted to tranſlate; on a preſumption that they were at firſt but a marginal various reading of the words which follow, καὶ ἔστι, ſpoken by Socrates. For the difference between real and apparent beauty falls not under conſideration in this part of the argument.—S.

of thoſe who were the progeny of the Gods? nay, that it was ſo even to the Gods themſelves?"

HIP. What a fellow is this! Away with him [1]! Such queſtions as theſe are profane, and improper to be aſked.

SOC. But is it not much more profane for any man, when theſe queſtions are aſked him, to anſwer in the affirmative, and to maintain ſuch propoſitions?

HIP. Perhaps it is.

SOC. "Perhaps then you are this man," will he ſay, "who affirm it to be a thing always, and to every perſon, beautiful and deſirable, to be buried by his deſcendents, and to bury his parents. Was not Hercules one of theſe very perſons? and thoſe whom we juſt now mentioned, are not they alſo to be included in the number?"

HIP. But I did not affirm it was ſo to the Gods.

SOC. Nor to the heroes, I preſume.

HIP. Not to ſuch as were children of the Gods.

SOC. But to ſuch only as were not ſo.

HIP. Right.

SOC. Amongſt the number of heroes then, it ſeems, according to your account, to Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus, it would have been a ſad thing, a horrible profanation of deity, to ſuppoſe it, and a fatal blow to their own honour; but to Pelops, and others born of men like him, it was a glorious thing, beautiful and deſirable.

HIP. So I think it to be.

SOC. "You think this then to be true, the contrary of which you maintained juſt now," will he ſay, "that to ſurvive their anceſtors, and to be buried

[1] The Greek is, βαλλ' ες μακαριαν. Various explications of this proverb are given us by Timæus, (in Lexic. Platonic.) Heſychius, Suidas, and others. But to us none of them are ſatisfactory. Eraſmus, with his uſual acuteneſs and ſagacity, was the firſt, ſo far as we know, who diſcovered the moſt probable origin of it: though with his uſual Socratic modeſty he only ſays, It ſeems to be ſo; and after the accounts uſually given of it, offers his own, which is this: that the particular ſpot of ground, where a great part of the Perſian forces periſhed in the battle of Marathon, a deep marſh in which they ſunk and were overwhelmed, being, as he obſerves from Pauſanias, called Μακαρια, the Grecians uſed this proverbial ſpeech by way of deteſtation, when they curſed any man, "Throw him into Macaria!" the place where our deteſted enemies lie periſhed. See Eraſm. Adag. chil. ii. cent. 1. n. 98. Schottus gives the ſame interpretation, in the very words of Eraſmus; but, like many other learned commentators, without acknowledging his author, Schol. in Zenobium, p. 42.—S.

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by their deſcendants, is, in ſome caſes [1], and to ſome perſons [2], a diſhonourable and a horrible thing: nay more, it ſeems not poſſible that ſuch a thing ſhould be, or ever become, beautiful and deſirable to all. So that this which you now hold to be the beautiful, happens to be in the ſame caſe with thoſe your former favourites, the maiden and the gold; ſometimes it is beautiful, and ſometimes otherwiſe: but a circumſtance ſtill more ridiculous attends this; it is beautiful only to ſome perſons, whilſt to others it is quite the contrary. And not yet," will he ſay, "not all this day long, are you able, Socrates, to anſwer the queſtion which you were aſked,—What the beautiful is." In terms ſuch as theſe will he reproach me juſtly, ſhould I anſwer him as you directed me. Much after the manner, Hippias, which I have now repreſented to you, proceed the converſations uſually held between the man and me. But now and then, as if in pity to my ignorance and want of learning, he propoſes to me himſelf ſome particular matter of inquiry; and aſks me whether I think ſuch or ſuch a thing to be the beautiful; or whatever elſe be the general ſubject of the queſtion which he has been pleaſed to put to me, or upon which the converſation happens at that time to turn.

Hip. How mean you, Socrates?

Soc. I will explain my meaning to you by an inſtance in the preſent ſubject.—"Friend Socrates," ſays he, "let us have done with diſputing in this way: give me no more anſwers of this ſort; for they are very ſilly, and eaſily confuted. But conſider now, whether the beautiful be ſomething of this kind; ſuch as in our diſpute juſt now we touched upon, when we ſaid that gold, where it was proper and becoming, was beautiful; but otherwiſe, where it was improper and unbecoming: and that the beauty of all other things depended on the ſame principle; that is, they were beautiful only where they were becoming. Now this very thing, the proper and becoming, eſſential propriety and decorum itſelf, ſee whether this may not happen to be the beautiful." Now, for my part, I am uſed to give my aſſent, in ſuch matters, to every thing propoſed to me. For I find in myſelf nothing to object. But what think you of it? are you of opinion that the becoming is the beautiful?

Hip. Entirely am I, Socrates, of that opinion.

[1] Meaning the caſe of Achilles.—S.

[2] That is, to the heroes.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Let us conſider it, however; for fear we ſhould be guilty of ſome miſtake in this point.

Hip. I agree we ought ſo to do.

Soc. Obſerve then. That which we call the becoming, is it not either ſomething whoſe preſence, wherever it comes, gives all things a beautiful appearance; or ſomething which gives them the reality of beauty; or ſomething which beſtows both [1], and cauſes them not only to appear beautiful, but really ſo to be?

Hip. I think it muſt be one or other of theſe.

Soc. Whether of theſe then is the becoming? Is it that which only gives a beautiful appearance? as a man whoſe body is of a deformed make, when he has put on clothes or ſhoes which fit him, looks handſomer than he really is. Now, if the becoming cauſes every thing to look handſomer than it really is, the becoming muſt then be a kind of fraud or impoſition with regard to beauty, and cannot be that which we are in ſearch of, Hippias. For we were inquiring what that was by which all beautiful things are beautiful. As [2], if we were aſked what that was, by which all great things are great, we ſhould anſwer, "it was by ſurpaſſing other things of the ſame kind [3]." For thus it is, that all things are great: and though they may not all appear great to us, yet, in as much as they ſurpaſs others, great of neceſſity they muſt be. So is it, we ſay, with the beautiful; it muſt be ſomething by which things are beautiful, whether they appear to be ſo or not. Now this cannot be the becoming: for the becoming cauſes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, according to your account of it; concealing the truth

[1] A moſt egregious and groſs blunder has corrupted the Greek text in this place; where we read *ουδετερα*: inſtead of which we ought to read *αμφοτερα*: as will appear clearly in the courſe of the argument. Yet, groſs as the blunder is, all the tranſlators have given into it.—S.

[2] In the Greek we read *ὡσπερ ᾧ παντα τα μεγαλα εστι μεγαλα, τῳ ὑπερεχοντι.* Stephens in his Annotations ſays, he had rather the word *ᾧ* was omitted. Parallel places might be found in Plato, to juſtify in ſome meaſure the expreſſion as it ſtands. But were it neceſſary to make any alteration, we ſhould make no doubt of ſuppoſing the error lay in the laſt words; nor ſcruple to read them thus, *το ὑπερεχον* TI. For, in the ſentence preſently after, where this ſimilitude (as to the manner of defining) is applied, Plato uſes the ſame way of expreſſing himſelf, thus: *ουτω δη φαμεν και το καλον, ᾧ καλα παντα εστι,—*TI. *αν ειη.*—S.

[3] *Magnitude itſelf*, as we have ſhown in the Notes on the Parmenides, is, according to Plato, he cauſe of *tranſcendency* to all things.—T.

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of things, and not ſuffering this ever to appear. But that which cauſes them to be really beautiful, as I juſt now ſaid, whether they appear to be ſo or not, this it is our buſineſs to find out, and declare the nature of it: for this it is which is the ſubject of our ſearch, if we are ſearching for the beautiful.

Hip. But the becoming, Socrates, cauſes things both to be, and to appear beautiful, by virtue of its preſence.

Soc. If ſo, then it is impoſſible for things really beautiful to appear otherwiſe; inaſmuch as there is preſent with them the cauſe of beautiful appearance.

Hip. Admit it impoſſible.

Soc. Shall we admit this then, Hippias, that all laws, and rules of action, manners, or behaviour, truly beautiful, are beautiful in common eſtimation, and appear ſo always to all men? Or ſhall we not rather ſay quite the reverſe, that men are ignorant of their beauty, and that above all things theſe are the ſubjects of controverſy and contention, not only private but public, not only between man and man, but between different communities and civil ſtates [1]?

[1] For a full explication of this paſſage we refer our readers to Plato's Firſt Alcibiades, Vol. I. But more particularly we recommend to their peruſal, upon this occaſion, a converſation between Socrates and Hippias, related by Xenophon in his Memoirs of Socrates: becauſe it confirms the truth of many circumſtances in this dialogue; and, in particular, not only proves that Plato drew the character of Hippias ſuch as it really was, but that he attributed to Socrates thoſe ſentiments which were truly his. Xenophon introduces it thus, with his uſual ſimplicity: "I remember Socrates upon a certain time holding diſcourſe with Hippias of Elis concerning the rule or ſtandard of right. The occaſion of it was this: Hippias, on his arrival at Athens, where he had not been for a long time before, happened to meet Socrates, at a time when he was in conference with ſome other perſons," &c. The whole converſation is too long to be here inſerted. But the following paſſage in it agrees with and illuſtrates this of Plato now before us. It follows a boaſt made by Hippias, that concerning the rule, by which to judge of right and wrong, he had ſome new things to deliver, which it was impoſſible for Socrates or any other perſon ever to controvert. Νη την Ἡραν, εφη, μεγα λεγεις αγαθον ευρηκεναι, ει παυσονται μεν οι δικασται δικα ψηφιζομενοι, παυσονται δ' οι πολιται περι των δικαιων αντιλεγοντες τε και αντιδικουντες και στασιαζοντες, παυσονται δ' αι πολεις διαφερομεναι περι των δικαιων και πολεμουσαι. "By Juno (ſaid Socrates), the diſcovery which you talk of having made, will be of great ſervice to the world, if it will put an end to all diverſity of opinions amongſt the judges concerning what is agreeable to juſtice: if there ſhall be no more controverſies, nor ſuits at law, nor factions among the citizens concerning what is right and what is wrong; nor any more differences or wars between the cities, occaſioned by thoſe very queſtions." Ξενοφ. Απομνημ. βιβ. δ.—S.

Hip.

Hip. Thus indeed rather, Socrates, that in thoſe points men are ignorant of the beautiful.

Soc. But this would not be the caſe if thoſe beautiful things had the appearance of beauty, added to the reality: and this appearance would they have, if the becoming were the beautiful, and cauſed things, as you ſay it does, both to be and to appear beautiful, beſtowing on them real and apparent beauty at the ſame time. Hence it follows, that if the becoming ſhould be that by which things are made truly beautiful, then the becoming muſt be the beautiful which we are in ſearch of, not that by which things are only made beautiful in appearance. But if the becoming ſhould be that by which things are made beautiful only in appearance, it cannot be the beautiful which we are in ſearch of; for this beſtows the reality of beauty. Nor is it in the power of the ſame thing to cauſe the appearance and the reality, both, not only in the caſe of beauty, but neither in any other inſtance whatever. Let us chooſe now, whether of theſe two we ſhall take for the becoming, that which cauſes the appearance of beauty, or that which cauſes the reality.

Hip. The becoming, Socrates, I take it, muſt be that which cauſes the appearance.

Soc. Fie upon it, Hippias! Our diſcovery of the beautiful is fled away, and hath eſcaped us. For the becoming has turned out to be a thing different from the beautiful.

Hip. So it ſeems; and very unaccountably too.

Soc. But however, my friend, we muſt not give it up for loſt. I have ſtill ſome hope left, that the nature of the beautiful may come forth into light, and ſhow itſelf.

Hip. With great clearneſs, Socrates, beyond doubt: for it is by no means difficult to find. I am poſitive that, if I were to go aſide for a little while, and conſider by myſelf, I ſhould deſcribe it to you with an accuracy beyond that of any thing ever ſo accurate.

Soc. Ah! talk not, Hippias, in ſo high a tone. You ſee what trouble it has given us already; and I fear leſt it ſhould grow angry with us, and run away ſtill further than before. But I talk idly: for you, I preſume, will eaſily find it out, when you come to be alone. Yet, in the name of the Gods, I conjure you, make the diſcovery while I am with you: and, if it be agreeable

able to you, admit me, as you did before, your companion in the ſearch. If we find it together, it will be beſt of all: and, if we miſs it in this way of joint inquiry, I ſhall be contented, I hope, with my diſappointment, and you will depart and find better ſucceſs without any difficulty. Beſides, if we now find it, I ſhall not, you know, be troubleſome afterwards, teaſing you to tell me what was the event of that inquiry by yourſelf, and what was the great diſcovery which you had made. Now therefore conſider, if you think this to be the beautiful. I ſay then, that it is. But pray obſerve, and give me all your attention, for fear I ſhould ſay any thing fooliſh, or foreign to the purpoſe. Let this then be in our account the beautiful, that which is uſeful. I was induced to think it might be ſo by theſe conſiderations. Beautiful, we ſay, are eyes; not thoſe which look as if they had not the faculty of ſight; but ſuch as appear to have that faculty ſtrong, and to be uſeful for the purpoſe of ſeeing. Do we not?

HIP. We do.

SOC. And the whole body alſo, do we not call it beautiful with a view to its utility; one for the race, another for wreſtling? So further, through all the animal kind, as a beautiful horſe, cock, and quail: in the ſame manner all ſorts of domeſtic utenſils, and all the conveniencies for carriage abroad, be they land vehicles, or ſhips and barges for the ſea; inſtruments of muſic likewiſe, with the tools and inſtruments ſubſervient to the other arts: to theſe you may pleaſe to add moral rules and laws. Every thing almoſt of any of theſe kinds we call beautiful upon the ſame account; reſpecting the end for which it was born, or framed, or inſtituted. In whatever way it be uſeful, to whatever purpoſe, and upon whatever occaſion; agreeably to theſe circumſtances we pronounce it beautiful. But that which is in every reſpect uſeleſs, we declare totally void of beauty. Are not you of this opinion, Hippias?

HIP. I am.

SOC. We are right, therefore, now in ſaying, that above all things the uſeful proves to be the beautiful.

HIP. Moſt certainly right, Socrates.

SOC. Now that which is able to operate or effect any thing, is it not uſeful ſo far as it has power, and is able? But that which is powerleſs and unable, is it not uſeleſs?

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. Power then is beautiful, and want of power is the contrary.

HIP. Quite right. And many things there are, Socrates, which evince the truth of this concluſion: but particularly it holds good in politics. For the having ability in public affairs, and power in the ſtate of which we are members, is of all things the moſt beautiful: and want of ſuch power, with a total defect of any ſuch ability, has of all things the meaneſt aſpect.

SOC. You ſay well. In the name of the Gods then, Hippias, does it not follow from all this, that ſkill and knowledge are of all things the moſt beautiful, and want of them the contrary?

HIP. Ay, what think you of this, Socrates [1]?

SOC. Softly, my dear friend: for I am under ſome fears about the rectitude of our preſent concluſions.

HIP. What are you afraid of, Socrates? For the buſineſs of our inquiry is now in a fair way, and goes on as we could wiſh.

SOC. I would it were ſo. But let you and I conſider together upon this point. Could any man execute a work, of which he has neither knowledge nor any other kind of abilities for the performance?

HIP. By no means. For how ſhould a man do that, for the doing of which he has no abilities?

SOC. Thoſe people then who do wrong, and who err in the execution of any thing, without erroneous or wrong intention, would they ever have done or executed things wrong, had they not been able to do or execute them in that manner?

HIP. Clearly they would not.

SOC. But the able are able through their abilities: for it is not inability which any way enables them.

HIP. Certainly not.

SOC. And all who do any thing are able to do what they do.

HIP. True.

[1] Hippias is much flattered, and highly elevated, by this whole deſcription of the beautiful now drawn; preſuming himſelf intereſted deeply in it, on account of his ſuppoſed political abilities, his various knowledge, and that ſkill in arts, as well the mechanic as the polite, for which he is celebrated in the Leſſer Hippias.—S.

SOC.

Soc. And all men do many more wrong things than right; and commit errors from their infancy, without intending to do wrong, or to err.

Hip. The fact is ſo.

Soc. Well then: thoſe abilities, and thoſe means or inſtruments, which help and are uſeful in the doing or executing any thing wrong, whether ſhall we ſay they are beautiful? or are they not rather far from being ſo?

Hip. Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. The able and uſeful, therefore, Hippias, in our opinion, it ſeems, no longer is the beautiful.

Hip. Still it is ſo, Socrates, if it has power to do what is right, or is uſeful to a good purpoſe.

Soc. That account is then rejected, that the able and uſeful ſimply and abſolutely is the beautiful. But the thought, Hippias, which our mind laboured with, and wanted to expreſs, was this, that the uſeful and able for the producing of any good, that is the beautiful.

Hip. This indeed ſeems to be the caſe.

Soc. But the thing thus deſcribed is the profitable. Is it not?

Hip. It is.

Soc. From hence then is derived the beauty of bodies, the beauty of moral precepts, of knowledge and wiſdom, and of all thoſe things juſt now enumerated; they are beautiful, becauſe profitable.

Hip. Evidently ſo.

Soc. The profitable, therefore, Hippias, ſhould ſeem to be our beautiful.

Hip. Beyond all doubt, Socrates.

Soc. But the profitable is that which effects or produces good.

Hip. True.

Soc. And the efficient is no other thing than the cauſe. Is it?

Hip. Nothing elſe.

Soc. The cauſe of good, therefore, is the beautiful.

Hip. Right.

Soc. Now the cauſe, Hippias, is a thing different from that which it cauſes. For the cauſe can by no means be the cauſe of itſelf. Conſider it thus: Did not the cauſe appear to be the efficient?

Hip. Clearly.

Soc. And by the efficient no other thing is effected than that which is produced or generated; but this is not the efficient itſelf.

Hip. You are in the right.

Soc. Is not that then which is produced or generated one thing, and the efficient a thing different?

Hip. It is.

Soc. The cauſe, therefore, is not the cauſe of itſelf; but of that which is generated or produced by it.

Hip. Without doubt.

Soc. If the beautiful be then the cauſe of good, good itſelf muſt be produced or generated by the beautiful. And for this reaſon, it ſhould ſeem, we cultivate and ſtudy prudence, and every other fair virtue, becauſe their production and their iſſue are well worth our ſtudy and our care, as being good itſelf. Thus are we likely to find from our inquiries, that the beautiful, as it ſtands related to good, has the nature of a kind of father.

Hip. The very caſe, Socrates. You are perfectly right in what you ſay.

Soc. Am I not right alſo in this, that neither is the father the ſon, nor is the ſon the father?

Hip. Right in that alſo.

Soc. Nor is the cauſe the production, nor the production, on the other hand, the cauſe.

Hip. Very right.

Soc. By Jupiter then, my friend, neither is the beautiful good, nor is the good beautiful. Do you think it is poſſible it ſhould be ſo? Is it conſiſtent with what we have ſaid, and are agreed in?

Hip. By Jupiter, I think not.

Soc. Would this opinion pleaſe us then, and ſhould we chooſe to abide by it, that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful?

Hip. By Jupiter, no; it would not pleaſe me at all.

Soc. Well ſaid [1], by Jupiter, Hippias: and me it pleaſes the leaſt of any

[1] As the ſubject of this dialogue is, as we have obſerved in the Introduction to it, the beauty which ſubſiſts in ſoul, and as ſuch beauty is conſubſiſtent with the good which alſo ſubſiſts in the ſoul, hence it follows, that every thing which is beautiful in the ſoul is good, and every thing there

any of thoſe deſcriptions or accounts which we have hitherto given of the beautiful.

Hip. So I perceive.

Soc. That definition of it, therefore, which we thought juſt now the moſt excellent of all, that the profitable, the uſeful and able to produce ſome good or other, was that beautiful, is in danger of loſing all its credit with us; and of appearing, if poſſible, more ridiculous than our former accounts of it, where we reckoned the maiden to be the beautiful, or any other particular whoſe defect we have before diſcovered.

Hip. It ſeems ſo, indeed.

Soc. And for my own part, Hippias, I ſee no way where to turn myſelf any more, but am abſolutely at a loſs. Have you any thing to ſay?

Hip. Not at preſent. But, as I ſaid juſt now, after a little conſidering I am certain I ſhall find it out.

Soc. But I fear, ſo extreme is my deſire of knowing it, that I ſhall not be able to wait your time. Beſides, I have juſt met with, as I imagine, a fair kind of opening to the diſcovery. For conſider that which gives us delight and joy, (I ſpeak not of all kinds of pleaſure, but of that only which ariſes in us through the hearing and the ſight,) whether we ſhould not call this the beautiful. And how, indeed, could we diſpute it[1]? ſeeing that it is the beautiful of our own ſpecies, Hippias, with the ſight of whom we are ſo delighted: that we take pleaſure in viewing all beautiful works of the loom or needle; and whatever is well painted, carved, or moulded. It is the ſame with the hearing: for well-meaſured ſounds and all muſical harmony, the beauties of proſaic compoſition alſo, with pretty fables and well-framed ſtories, have the like effect upon us, to be agreeable, to be

there which is good is beautiful. This reciprocation, however, does not take place between *the good*, the ineffable principle of things, and the beautiful itſelf, the ſource of every kind of beauty: for the former is ſupereſſential, but the latter is an intelligible idea. See the ſixth book of the Republic, and p. 516 of the Additional Notes on the Firſt Alcibiades. The aſſertion of Mr. Sydenham, therefore, in his note on this part, is very erroneous, "that, according to Socrates and Plato, the ſovereign beauty is the ſource of *all* good."—T.

[1] In the Greek we read thus, Πως τι αρ' αν αγωνιζοιμεθα; But, ſince we know of no precedent in Plato for the uſe of two interrogatives in this manner, that is, without the conjunction η (or) between them; we ſuppoſe it ought to be read either Πως ΓΑΡ αν αγωνιζοιμεθα; or ΠΡΟΣ τι ΓΑΡ κ. τ. λ. "To what purpoſe ſhould we contend about it?"—S.

delightful, and to charm. Were we to give, therefore, that petulant and ſaucy fellow this anſwer—"Noble ſir, the beautiful is that which gives us pleaſure through the hearing, and through the ſight," do you think we ſhould not reſtrain his inſolence?

Hip. For my part, Socrates, I think the nature of the beautiful now truly well explained.

Soc. But what ſhall we ſay of the beauty of manners, and of laws, Hippias? Shall we ſay it gives us pleaſure through the hearing, or through the ſight? or is it to be ranked under ſome other kind?

Hip. Perhaps the man may not think of this.

Soc. By the Dog, Hippias, but that man would, of whom I ſtand in awe the moſt of all men; and before whom I ſhould be moſt aſhamed if I trifled, and pretended to utter ſomething of great importance, when in reality I talked idly, and ſpoke nothing to the purpoſe.

Hip. Who is he?

Soc. Socrates, the ſon of Sophroniſcus; who would no more ſuffer me to throw out ſuch random ſpeeches, or ſo readily decide on points which I had not thoroughly ſifted, than he would allow me to talk of things which I am ignorant of, as if I knew them.

Hip. Why, really, I muſt own, that to me myſelf, ſince you have ſtarted the obſervation, the beauty of laws ſeems referable to another kind.

Soc. Softly, Hippias. For, though we have fallen into freſh difficulties, equal to our former ones, about the nature of the beautiful, we are in a fair way, I think, of extricating ourſelves out of them.

Hip. How ſo, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you how the matter appears to me: whether or no there be any thing material in what I ſay, you will conſider. The beauty then of laws and of manners, I imagine, may poſſibly be found not altogether abſtracted from that kind of ſenſation which ariſes in the ſoul through the ſenſes of hearing and of ſight. But let us abide awhile by this definition, that "what gives us pleaſure through theſe ſenſes is the beautiful," without bringing the beauty of laws the leaſt into queſtion. Suppoſe then, that either the man of whom I am ſpeaking, or any other, ſhould interrogate us after this manner: "For what reaſon, Hippias and Socrates, have you ſeparated from the pleaſant in general that ſpecies of it in which you ſay

conſiſts

conſiſts the beautiful; denying the character of beautiful to thoſe ſpecies of pleaſure which belong to the other ſenſes, to the pleaſures of taſte, the joys of Venus, and all others of the ſame claſs? Do you refuſe them the character of pleaſant alſo, and maintain that no pleaſure neither is to be found in theſe ſenſations, or in any thing beſide ſeeing and hearing?" Now, Hippias, what ſhall we ſay to this?

Hip. By all means, Socrates, we muſt allow pleaſure to be found alſo in theſe ſenſations; a pleaſure very exquiſite.

Soc. "Since theſe ſenſations then afford pleaſure," will he ſay, "no leſs than thoſe others, why do you deprive them of the name of beautiful, and rob them of their proper ſhare of beauty[1]?" "Becauſe there is no one who would not laugh at us," we ſhall anſwer, "were we to call eating a beautiful thing, inſtead of a pleaſant; or the ſmelling ſweet odours, were we to ſay, not that it was pleaſant, but that it was beautiful. Above all, in amorous enjoyments, all the world would contend, there was the higheſt degree of the ſweet and pleaſant; but that whoever was engaged in them ſhould take care not to be ſeen, the act of love being far from agreeable to the ſight, or beautiful." Now, Hippias, when we have thus anſwered, he may reply, perhaps, in this manner:—"I apprehend perfectly well the reaſon why you have always been aſhamed to call theſe pleaſures beautiful; it is becauſe they ſeem not ſo to men. But the queſtion which I aſked you was not, What ſeemed beautiful to the multitude; but, What was ſo in reality." Then ſhall we anſwer, I preſume, only by repeating our laſt hypotheſis, that "we ourſelves give the name of beautiful to that part only of the pleaſant which ariſeth in us by means of our ſight and hearing." But have you any thing to ſay which may be of ſervice to our argument? Shall we anſwer aught beſides, Hippias?

Hip. To what he has ſaid, Socrates, it is unneceſſary to make any further anſwer.

Soc. "Very well now," will he ſay. "If the pleaſant then, ariſing through the ſight and hearing, be the beautiful, whatever portion of the pleaſant hap-

[1] This ſentence is ill pointed by H. Stephens in two places: in the firſt of which, at leaſt, we think it was done with deſign; ſo as to give us this conſtruction:—"What? Do you deprive," &c. That learned editor was fond of doing the ſame in many other ſentences; and particularly in one, a little before this, he has in the margin propoſed the like alteration.—S.

pens.

pens not to be this, it is clear it cannot be the beautiful." Shall we admit this?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. "Is that portion of the pleaſant then," he will ſay, "which ariſes through the ſight, the ſame with that which ariſes through the ſight and hearing? Or is that which ariſes through the hearing, the ſame with that which ariſes through the hearing and the ſight?" "That which ariſeth in us through either of thoſe ſenſes alone, and not through the other," we ſhall anſwer, "is by no means the ſame with that which ariſes through them both. For this ſeems to be the import of your queſtion. But our meaning was, that each of theſe ſpecies of the pleaſant was, by itſelf ſeparately, the beautiful; and that they were alſo, both of them together, the ſame beautiful." Should we not anſwer ſo?

HIP. By all means.

SOC. "Does any ſpecies of the pleaſant then," he will ſay, "differ from any other, whatever it be, ſo far as it is pleaſant? Obſerve; I aſk you not if one pleaſure is greater or leſs than another, or whether it is more or leſs a pleaſure: but whether there is any difference between the pleaſures in this reſpect, that one of them is pleaſure, the other not pleaſure." In our opinion there is no difference between them, of this kind. Is there any?

HIP. I agree with you, there is not any.

SOC. "For ſome other reaſon, therefore," he will ſay it is, "than becauſe they are pleaſures, that you have ſelected theſe ſpecies of pleaſure from the reſt, and given them the preference. You have diſcerned that there is ſomething or other in them by which they differ from the reſt; with a view to which difference you diſtinguiſh them by the epithet of beautiful. Now the pleaſure which ariſeth in us through the ſenſe of ſeeing, deriveth not its beauty from any thing peculiarly belonging to that ſenſe [1]. For, if this were the cauſe of its being beautiful, that other pleaſure which ariſes through the hearing never would be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the ſenſe of ſeeing." "You are in the right," ſhall we ſay?

HIP. We will.

[1] That is, not from colour, or from figure; but from the due degree and proper diſpoſition of the colours; or from the juſt ſize, fit arrangement and proportion of the parts; in a word, from meaſure, harmony, and order.—S.

SOC.

Soc. "So neither, on the other hand, does the pleaſure produced in us through the ſenſe of hearing derive its beauty from any circumſtance which peculiarly attends the hearing [1]. For, in that caſe, the pleaſure produced through ſeeing would not be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the ſenſe of hearing [2]." Shall we allow, Hippias, that the man is in the right when he ſays this?

Hip. Allow it.

Soc. "But both theſe pleaſures now are beautiful, you ſay." For ſo we ſay: do we not?

Hip. We do.

Soc. "There is ſomething in them, therefore, the ſame in both, to which they owe their beauty, a beauty common to them both. There is ſomething, I ſay, which they have belonging to them both in common, and alſo in particular to each. For otherwiſe they would not, both and each of them, be beautiful." Anſwer now, as if you were ſpeaking to him.

Hip. I anſwer then, that, in my opinion [3], you give a true account of the matter.

Soc. Should there be any circumſtance, therefore, attending on both theſe pleaſures of the ſight and hearing taken together; yet if the ſame circum-

[1] That is, not from ſound, but from its juſt degree and proper tone; from the concord of ſounds and their orderly ſucceſſion; from theſe numbers and proportions by which ſound is meaſured.—S.

[2] The Greek of this paſſage is thus printed, ουκουν ετι γε δι' ακοης ηδονη. So, in the ſpeech of Socrates, immediately preceding, where the reaſoning is the ſame, only the terms inverted, we read ουκουν ετι γε δι' οψεως ηδονη. In both paſſages the ſenſe is thus very lame. Stephens propoſes this reading, ουκουν εστι γε κ. τ. λ. which is found, he ſays, in ſome old manuſcript. But the ſenſe is very little amended by this alteration. Cornarius, whether from that manuſcript in the Haſſenſtein library which he was favoured with the uſe of, or from his own ſagacity, has recovered a part, at leaſt, of the true reading; thus, ουκ ουσα ετι γε κ. τ. λ. For, that we ought to read ουκ ουσα, there can be no doubt; the argumentation ſhows it ſufficiently: but this amendment may, we imagine, be improved by reading ουκ ουσα ηγε δι' ακοης (and in the former paſſage δι' οψεως) ηδονη.—S.

[3] In the edition of Plato by Stephens we read the Greek of this paſſage thus, εμοι δοκει εχειν, ως λεγει; and by a marginal note we find, that it was ſo printed by deſign. But the editions of Aldus and of Walder give us the laſt word, λεγεις, which is certainly right: for, in reading λεγει, Hippias is made to ſpeak *of* the man, not *to* him, contrary to the intention of Plato expreſſed in the preceding ſentence.—S.

ſtance attend not on each taken ſeparately; or ſhould any attend on each ſeparately [1], yet not on both together; they cannot derive their beauty from this circumſtance.

HIP. How is it poſſible, Socrates, that any circumſtance whatever, which attends on neither of them, ſhould ever attend on both?

SOC. Do you think this impoſſible?

HIP. I muſt be quite ignorant, I own, in things of this ſort; as I am quite unuſed to ſuch kind of diſputes.

SOC. You jeſt, Hippias. But I am in danger, perhaps, of fancying that I ſee ſomething, ſo circumſtanced, as you aver to be impoſſible.

HIP. You are in no danger of any ſuch fancy, Socrates; but are pleaſed to look aſquint purpoſely: that is all.

SOC. Many things, I aſſure you, of that kind appear to me very evident. But I give no credit to them; becauſe they are not evident to you, who have raiſed a larger fortune than any man living, by the profeſſion of philoſophy; and becauſe they appear only to me, who have never in that way earned a farthing. I have ſome ſuſpicion, however, that poſſibly you are not in earneſt with me, but deſign to impoſe upon me: ſo many things of that kind do I perceive ſo plainly.

HIP. No one will know better than yourſelf, Socrates, whether I am in earneſt with you or not, if you will but begin and tell me, what thoſe things are which you perceive ſo plainly. You will ſoon ſee that you talk idly. For you will never find a circumſtance attending us both together, which attends ſeparately neither you nor me.

SOC. How ſay you, Hippias? But perhaps you have reaſon on your ſide, and I may not apprehend it. Let me, therefore, explain to you my meaning more diſtinctly. To me then it appears, that ſome circumſtance of being, which attends not my individual perſon, nor yours, ſomething which belongs neither to me, nor to you, may yet poſſibly belong to both of us, and attend both our perſons taken together: and, on the other hand [2], that certain circumſtances

[1] In the Greek text, after this firſt part of the ſentence, Ει αρα τι αυται αι ηδοναι αμφοτεραι πεπονθασιν, εκατερα δε μη, there is a manifeſt omiſſion of the following words, η εκατερα μεν, αμφοτεραι δε μη, as will appear afterwards, where Socrates refers to this very ſentence.—S.

[2] The Greek of this paſſage is thus printed: ετερα δ' αυ, α ουκ αμφοτεροι πεπονθαμεν ειναι, ταυτα ουδε-

cumſtances of being, not attending us both taken together, may attend each of our ſeparate and ſingle perſons.

HIP. You tell me of prodigies ſtill greater, I think, now [1], Socrates, than thoſe which you told me of juſt before. For conſider: if both of us are honeſt, man, muſt not each of us be honeſt? or, ſuppoſing each of us diſhoneſt, muſt we not both be ſo? If both are ſound and well, is not each alſo? Or, ſhould each of us now be tired of any thing [2], or come off ill in ſome combat between us, or be amazed and confounded, or be affected any other way, would not both of us be in the ſame plight? To go further: in caſe that we had, both of us, images of ourſelves made of gold, or ſilver, or ivory; or that both of us, if you will give me leave to ſay it, were generous, or wiſe, or honourable; did both of us happen to be old or young; or to be poſſeſſed of any other human quality; or to be in any condition whatever incident to human life; muſt not each of us be, of abſolute neceſſity, that very ſame kind of man, and in thoſe very ſame circumſtances?

SOC. Beyond all doubt.

HIP. But you, Socrates, with your companions and fellow diſputants, conſider not things univerſally, or in the whole. Thus you take the beau-

τερον ειναι ἡμων. By which the ſenſe of this part of the ſentence is made exactly the ſame with that of the former part. But the words ἑτερα δ' αν plainly indicate, that ſomething different is intended. And what this preciſely is, will appear in the beginning of page 421; where this ſentence of Socrates is repeated in other words, and ridiculed by Hippias. In conformity with which undoubted meaning of this paſſage, we are obliged to make an alteration here in the Greek text, and to read it thus, ἑτερα δ' αυ, ἁ ΜΗ αμφοτεροι πεπονθαμεν ειναι, ταυτα ΕΚΑΤΕΡΟΝ ειναι ἡμων.—S.

[1] Inſtead of αυ, we preſume that we ought here to read νυν, as oppoſed to ολιγον προτερον at the end of the ſentence.—S.

[2] Whoever has any taſte for humour cannot fail of obſerving the drollery with which Hippias is here made to confeſs in what condition he finds himſelf; tired of the converſation upon a ſubject, the tendency of which he is ignorant of, confuted over and over, and at length quite puzzled with a ſeeming paradox. His ſly inſinuation alſo here, that Socrates was in the ſame condition with himſelf; and his other, juſt before, that Socrates reaſoned unfairly, like himſelf and his brother ſophiſts; theſe ſtrokes of humour will be obvious to all who are acquainted with Plato's artful and humorous way of writing. But thoſe who have a delicacy of taſte to diſcern the ſeveral kinds of humour, will have an additional pleaſure in diſtinguiſhing the coarſe ſarcaſms and buffoon manner of Hippias, both in this ſpeech and before in page 402, from the genteel and fine raillery always uſed by Socrates.—S.

tiful and chop it into pieces: and every thing in nature, which happens to be the ſubject of your diſcourſe, you ſerve in the ſame manner, ſplitting and dividing it [1]. Hence you are unacquainted with the greatneſs of things [2], with

[1] It was the manner of Socrates in converſation, whatever was the ſubject of it, to aſcend to the conſideration of the thing in general; to divide it into its ſeveral ſpecies; and to diſtinguiſh each ſpecies from the reſt by ſome peculiar character, in order to come at the definite and preciſe nature of the very thing in queſtion.—S.

[2] All things in nature, diſtinguiſhed into their ſeveral kinds, general and ſpecific, are, according to the Platonic doctrine, the unfolding of univerſal form and beauty. That this principle, which every where bounds every part of nature, may appear in a brighter light; that oppoſite principle, infinitude or the infinite, is here exhibited to view: and amongſt the various repreſentations given of it by the antient phyſiologiſts, that of Anaxagoras is ſingled out from the reſt; probably for this reaſon, becauſe it affords the ſtrongeſt contraſt: the infinite, according to his doctrine, being, if the expreſſion may be allowed us, infinite the moſt of all; or, as Simplicius ſtyles it, απειραχις απειρον, infinitely infinite. A ſummary account of which may be neceſſary to a full comprehenſion of the paſſage before us.—Down to the time of Anaxagoras, all the philoſophers agreed in the doctrine of one infinite, material, principle of things. This was held by Pythagoras and his followers to be nothing elſe than a common ſubject-matter of the four elements, or primary forms of nature: from the various combinations of which four, in various proportions, are made all other natural bodies. By the diſciples of Anaximander it was ſuppoſed to have form, though indiſtinct and indeterminate; out of which all contrarieties aroſe through ſeparation. Others imagined the infinite to have ſome determinate and diſtinct form: and theſe again were divided. For ſome, at the head of whom was Thales, thought it a watery fluid, or moiſture, replete with the ſeeds of all things; every thing being produced from ſome ſeminal principle by evolution and dilatation, through the action of the moiſt fluid. In the opinion of others, of Anaximenes and his ſchool, it was a kind of air; from the rarefaction and condenſation of which were produced other great and uniform kinds of body throughout the univerſe, by mixture making the leſſer the compoſite. Such were the moſt antient accounts of the material cauſe of things, and their origin out of the one infinite. But Anaxagoras ſtruck out a new road to the knowledge of nature. For, denying the origin of things from any infinite one, whether determinate or indeterminate, formed or unformed; denying the exiſtence of any primary or elementary bodies; denying all eſſential change in nature, even any alteration in any thing, except ſuch as aroſe from local motion, or the ſhifting of parts from one body to another; he taught, that the corpuſcula, or component parts of things, were always what they are at preſent: for that the forms of nature, innumerable in their kinds, were compoſed of ſimilar and homogeneous parts. Further he taught that each of theſe minute bodies, though homogeneous with that whole of which it was a part, was itſelf compoſed of parts diſſimilar and heterogeneous, infinite in number; there being no bounds in nature to minuteneſs: that theſe heterogeneous bodies, infinitely minute, were of all kinds; ſo that all things, in ſome meaſure, were together every where; and each of thoſe corpuſcula, apparently ſo uniform, contained all the various principles of things; that the predo-

with bodies of infinite magnitude, through the natural continuity of being. And now ſo much are you a ſtranger to the vaſtneſs of this view of the univerſe, as to imagine that any thing, whether being or circumſtance of being, can poſſibly belong to both thoſe pleaſures which we are ſpeaking of, taken together, yet not belong to each of them; or, on the other hand, may belong to each, without belonging to both. So void of thought and

minance of ſome one of theſe principles, that is, the quantity of it exceeding that of the reſt, conſtituted the nature of each minute body; fitting it alſo for union with bodies homogeneous to it, that is, with other bodies, where the ſame principle was predominant: that, all things being in perpetual motion, which firſt began, and is continued on by active mind, diſpoſing all things; the predominance of each principle was continually fluctuating and changing; the deſtruction of the preſent predominance was the diſſolution of each temporary being; and a new predominance, that of ſome other principle, was the generation of what we call a new being. For inſtance; whereas every drop of water contains aërial particles within it; as ſoon as theſe begin to predominate in any watery drop, it riſes in air; and, receiving there an increaſe of the aërial principle, by degrees becomes united to the air. So, air refines into fire, and thickens into water, through the overpowering of the one or the other of theſe neighbour principles, with which it ever had maintained a ſecret correſpondence. So the earthy particles, accumulated in the water, produce mud, by degrees hardening into earth; thence into various mineral bodies, ſtones, and metals, according to the kind of earth predominant in each place through motion. Theſe again crumble into common earth: from which all the various vegetable beings ariſe in like manner, nouriſhed and increaſed by the accumulation of particles homogeneous; and into which they fall, and are diſſolved again, through the decay and diminution of thoſe particles, whoſe ſuperior number and ſtrength to reſiſt others of a different kind had before conſtituted the being. In the ſame manner all the parts of animals, whether muſcular, membranous, bony, or any other, receive nouriſhment, or admit decay, by addition or ſubtraction of homogeneous particles. It will be eaſy for a thinking mind to purſue nature acting in this method, according to Anaxagoras, through all things. The principles of things are thus made infinite, not only in number and minuteneſs; but there being alſo a continuity of ὁμοιομερειαι, or homogeneous particles, ἁφῃ συνεχιζομεναι, through the univerſe, every ὁμοιομερια, that is, every kind of things, is a natural body, infinite in magnitude, and infinitely diviſible into ſuch parts as are wholly agreeing in their kind. Simplicius, in his commentary on the Phyſics of Ariſtotle, to which ineſtimable magazine of antient phyſiology we are indebted for the chief part of this note, draws the ſame concluſion: his words are theſe: εκ των ειρημενων προχειρον συννοειν, ὁτι ει παν εκ παντος εκκρινεται, και παντα εν πασιν εστιν, ου μονον το παν αλλα και ἑκαστον, ου τῳ πληθει μονον αλλα και τῳ μεγεθει, απειρακις απειρον εσται. "From the account now given it is eaſy to conceive, that if every thing is made out of every thing by ſeparation, and all things are in all, not only the univerſe, but every kind of things therein, is infinitely infinite, not only in the number of its parts, but alſo in magnitude." See Ariſtot. Phyſic. l. i. c. 4. and l. iii. c. 4. Simplic. Com. fol. 6. and 105. b. 106. a.—S.

conſideration,

conſideration, ſo ſimple, and ſo narrow-minded are you and your companions.

Soc. Such is the lot of our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man will, ſays the common proverb, but what he can. However, you are always kind in aſſiſting us with your inſtructions. For but juſt now, before you had taught me better, how ſimple my mind was, and how narrow my way of thinking, I ſhall give you ſtill a plainer proof, by telling you what were my thoughts upon the preſent ſubject:—if you will give me leave.

Hip. You will tell them to one who knows them already, Socrates. For I am well acquainted with the different ways of thinking, and know the minds of all who philoſophize. Notwithſtanding, if it will give pleaſure to yourſelf, you may tell me.

Soc. To me, I confeſs, it will. You muſt know then, my friend, that I was ſo fooliſh, till I had received from you better information, as to imagine of myſelf and you, that each of us was one perſon; and that this, which each of us was, both of us were not, as not being one, but two perſons.—Such a ſimpleton was I!—But from you have I now learnt, that if both of us are two perſons, each of us alſo by neceſſity is two; and that, if each of us be but one, it follows by the ſame neceſſity, that both of us are no more. For, by reaſon of the continuity of being, according to Hippias, it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe; each of us being of neceſſity whatever both of us are, and both whatever each [a]. And now, perſuaded by you to believe theſe things, here I ſit me down and reſt contented. But firſt inform me, Hippias, whether we are one perſon, you and I together; or whether you are two perſons, and I two perſons.

Hip. What mean you, Socrates?

Soc. The very thing which I ſay. For I am afraid of entering with you into a further diſcuſſion of the ſubject, becauſe you fall into a paſſion with me, whenever you ſay any thing which you take to be important.

[a] The words of Anaxagoras, as cited by Simplicius, pag. 106. b. really favour ſuch a concluſion. For he expreſsly ſays, that his ſyſtem of the continuity of being included τα παθη και τας εξεις, every thing which any being had, or ſuffered: that is, in ſcholaſtic language, all the properties and accidents of being; or, in common ſpeech, the condition and circumſtances of things; which, as he tells us, inſeparably follow and attend their ſeveral natures.—S.

To

To venture for once, however; tell me—Is not each of us one? and is not the being one a circumſtance attendant upon our being?

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. If each of us then be one, each of us muſt be alſo odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

HIP. I think it is.

SOC. Are we odd both together then, notwithſtanding that we are two?

HIP. That is abſurd, Socrates.

SOC. But both together, we are even. Is it not ſo?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. Now, becauſe both of us together we are even, does it follow from thence that each of us ſingly too is even?

HIP. Certainly not.

SOC. There is not, therefore, ſuch an abſolute neceſſity, as you ſaid juſt now there was, that, whatever both of us were, each ſhould be the ſame; and that, whatever each of us was, the ſame muſt we be both.

HIP. Not in ſuch caſes as theſe, I acknowledge; but ſtill it holds true in ſuch as I enumerated before.

SOC. That ſuffices, Hippias. I am contented with this acknowledgment, that it appears to be ſo in ſome caſes, but in others otherwiſe. For, if you remember from whence the preſent diſpute aroſe, I ſaid, that the pleaſures of ſight and hearing could not derive their beauty from any circumſtance which attended on each, yet not on both; neither from any which attended on both, yet not on each: but that the beauty of them was derived from ſomething which they had belonging to both of them in common, and in particular to each. And this I ſaid, becauſe you had admitted the beauty of them both together, and of each ſeparately. From which I drew this conſequence, that they were indebted for their beauty to ſome being, whoſe preſence ſtill followed and attended on them both; and not to ſuch as fell ſhort of either. And I continue ſtill in the ſame mind. But anſwer me, as if we were now beginning this laſt inquiry afreſh. Pleaſure through the ſight and pleaſure through the hearing, then, being ſuppoſed beautiful, both of them and each; tell me, does not the cauſe of their beauty follow and attend on both of them taken together, and upon each alſo conſidered ſeparate?

HIP.

Hip. Without doubt.

Soc. Is it then becauſe they are pleaſures, both and each of them, that they are beautiful? Or, if this were the cauſe, would not the pleaſures of the other ſenſes be beautiful, as well as theſe? For it appeared that they were pleaſures as well as theſe:—if you remember.

Hip. I remember it well.

Soc. But becauſe theſe pleaſures ariſe in us through ſight and hearing, this we aſſigned for the cauſe of their being beautiful.

Hip. It was ſo determined.

Soc. Obſerve now, whether I am right or not: for, as well as I can remember, we agreed that the pleaſant was the beautiful; not the pleaſant in general, but thoſe ſpecies of it only which are produced through ſight and hearing.

Hip. It is true.

Soc. Does not this circumſtance then attend on both theſe pleaſures taken together? and is it not wanting to each of them alone? For by no means is either of them alone, as was ſaid before, produced through both thoſe ſenſes. Both of them are indeed through both, but not ſo is each. Is this true?

Hip. It is.

Soc. They are not beautiful, therefore, either of them, from any circumſtance which attends on either by itſelf. For we cannot argue from either to both; nor, from what each is ſeparately, infer what they both are jointly. So that we may aſſert the joint beauty of both theſe pleaſures, according to our preſent hypotheſis of the beautiful: but this hypotheſis will not ſupport us in aſſerting any beauty ſeparate in either. Or how ſay we? Is it not of neceſſity ſo?

Hip. So it appears.

Soc. Say we then that both are beautiful, but deny that each is ſo?

Hip. What reaſon is there to the contrary?

Soc. This reaſon, my friend, as it ſeems to me; becauſe we had ſuppoſed certain circumſtances attendant upon things with this condition, that, if they appertained to any two things, both together, they appertained at the ſame time to each; and, if they appertained to each, that they appertained alſo to both. Of this kind are all ſuch circumſtances and attendants of things as were enumerated by you. Are they not?

Hip.

HIP. They are.

SOC. But ſuch circumſtances or appendages of being, as thoſe related by me, are otherwiſe: and of this kind are the being each, and the being both. Have not I ſtated the caſe rightly?

HIP. You have.

SOC. Under which kind then, Hippias, do you rank the beautiful? Do you rank it among thoſe mentioned by yourſelf? as when you inferred that if I was well and hearty, and you well and hearty, then both of us were well and hearty: or, if I was honeſt and you honeſt, then both of us were honeſt: or, if we both were ſo, it followed that ſo was each of us. Does the ſame kind of inference hold true in this caſe? If I am beautiful, and you are beautiful, then both of us are beautiful; and if both of us, then each. Or is there no reaſon why it ſhould not here be as it is in numbers [1]? two of which, taken together, may be even; though each ſeparately is perhaps odd, perhaps even: or, as it is in magnitudes [2]; where two of them, though each is incommenſurable with ſome third, yet both together may perhaps be commenſurable with it, perhaps incommenſurable. A thouſand ſuch other things there are, which I perceived, as I ſaid, with great clearneſs. Now, to whether of theſe two orders of being do you refer the beautiful? Does the proper rank of it appear as evident to you as it does to me? For to me it appears highly abſurd, to ſuppoſe both of us beautiful, yet each of us not ſo; or each of us beautiful, yet not ſo both; no leſs abſurd, than it is to ſuppoſe the ſame kind of difference between the natures of both and

[1] For inſtance; the two odd numbers, ſeven and three, together make the even number, ten: and the two even numbers, ſix and four, make the very ſame number.—S.

[2] For inſtance; let there be ſuppoſed a line ten inches in length, meaſured by whole inches: a line of three inches $\frac{1}{4}$, and another line of two inches $\frac{1}{4}$, are each of them incommenſurable with the firſt given line; becauſe neither of them can be meaſured completely by any line ſo long as a whole inch: yet both together making ſix inches, they are commenſurable with the line of ten inches, by the inch-meaſure.—It is the ſame with the powers of two lines. The power of either may be incommenſurable with that of the other, and alſo with ſome given magnitude: yet the power ariſing from both may be commenſurable with that third magnitude. See Euclid. Elem. lib. x. prop. 35.—To the preſent purpoſe alſo is applicable the following theorem. The diameter of a ſquare is demonſtrated by Euclid (Elem. x. 97.) to be incommenſurable with its ſide: and conſequently ſo is a line twice as long as the diameter. Yet the rectangular ſpace comprehended by that diameter and by a line of twice its length, is equal to a ſquare, whoſe ſide is commenſurable with the ſide of the given ſquare.—S.

each in any of the caſes put by you. Do you agree with me then in ranking the beautiful among theſe, or do you refer it to the oppoſite claſs of things?

HIP. I entirely agree with you, Socrates.

SOC. You do well, Hippias: becauſe we ſhall thus be freed from any further inquiry upon this article. For, if the beautiful be in that claſs of things where we agree to place it, the pleaſant then, which ariſes in us through ſight and hearing, can no longer be ſuppoſed the beautiful. Becauſe that which comes through both thoſe ſenſes jointly, may make the pleaſures which ariſe from thence beautiful indeed both taken together; but cannot make either of them ſo, conſidered as ſeparate from the other. But that the beautiful ſhould have ſuch an effect, or communicate itſelf in this manner, is abſurd to ſuppoſe; as you and I have agreed, Hippias.

HIP. We agreed it was ſo, I own.

SOC. It is impoſſible, therefore, that the pleaſant, ariſing in us through ſight and hearing, ſhould be the beautiful; becauſe from this hypotheſis an abſurdity would follow.

HIP. You have reaſon on your ſide.

SOC. "Begin again then, and tell me," will he ſay, "for you have miſſed it now, what is that beautiful, the aſſociate of both theſe pleaſures, for the ſake of which you give them the preference to all others, by honouring them with the name of beautiful?" It appears to me, Hippias, neceſſary for us to anſwer thus; that "theſe are of all pleaſures the moſt innocent and good, as well both of them taken together, as each taken ſingly [1]." Or can you tell me of any circumſtance beſide, in which they differ from other pleaſures?

HIP. I know of none beſide: for they are indeed the beſt of all.

SOC. "This then," he will ſay, "do you now maintain to be the beautiful, pleaſure profitable?"—"It is ſo in my opinion," I ſhall anſwer.—What anſwer would you make?

HIP. The ſame.

SOC. "Well then," will he ſay: "the profitable, you know, is that which is the efficient of good. And the efficient, as we agreed lately, is a thing

[1] See the latter part of the Philebus.

different

different from the effect. Our reaſoning, therefore, has brought us round to the ſame point again: for thus neither would the good be beautiful, nor would the beautiful be good; each of theſe being, upon this hypotheſis, different from the other." "Moſt evidently ſo;" is the anſwer we muſt make, Hippias, if we are of ſound mind. For the ſacredneſs of truth will never ſuffer us to oppoſe the man who has truth with him on his ſide.

HIP. But now, Socrates, what think you all theſe matters are which we have been diſputing about? They are the ſhreds and tatters of an argument, cut and torn, as I ſaid before, into a thouſand pieces. But the thing which is beautiful, as well as highly valuable, is this: to be able to exhibit a fine ſpeech, in a becoming and handſome manner, before the council, or court of juſtice, or any other aſſembly or perſon in authority, to whom the ſpeech is addreſſed; ſuch a ſpeech as hath the power of perſuaſion; and having ended to depart, not with mean and inſignificant trophies of victory, but with a prize the nobleſt, the preſervation of ourſelves, our fortunes, and our friends. This you ought to be ambitious of, and bid adieu to ſuch petty and paltry diſputes; or you will appear as if you had quite loſt your ſenſes, playing with ſtraws and trifles, as you have been now doing.

SOC. O friend Hippias! you are happy that you know what courſe of life it is beſt for a man to follow, and have followed it, according to your own account, ſo ſucceſsfully yourſelf. But I ſeem fated to be under the power of a dæmoniacal nature, who keeps me wandering continually in ſearch of truth, and ſtill at a loſs where to find it. And whenever I lay my difficulties and perplexities before you wiſe men, I meet with no other anſwer from you than contumely and reproach. For you all tell me the ſame thing which you tell me now, "That I buſy myſelf about ſilly, minute, and inſignificant matters." On the other hand, when, upon giving credit to what you all tell me, I ſay, as you do, "That to be able to exhibit a fine ſpeech in a court of juſtice, or any other aſſembly, and to go through it in a proper and handſome manner, is the fineſt thing in the world; and that no employment is ſo beautiful, or ſo well becomes a man; I then meet with cenſure and obloquy from ſome who are here preſent [1], but eſpecially from that man who is always reproving me. For he is my neareſt of kin, and lives with me in

[1] Meaning his philoſophic friends.

the ſame houſe. So, whenever I return home, and am entered in, as ſoon as he hears me talking in this ſtrain, he aſks me if I am not aſhamed to pronounce, with ſo much confidence, what profeſſions and employments are fine, or beautiful, or becoming; when I have plainly ſhown myſelf ſo ignorant with regard to things beautiful, as not to know wherein the nature of beauty conſiſts.—"And how can you judge," ſays he, "who has ſpoken a beautiful or fine ſpeech, or done any thing elſe in a handſome manner, and who not, ignorant as you are what the beautiful and handſome is? Such then being the diſpoſition of your mind, is it poſſible that you can think life more eligible to you than death?" Thus have I had the ill fortune, as I told you, to ſuffer obloquy and reproach from you, to ſuffer obloquy alſo and reproach from him. But, perhaps, it is neceſſary to endure all this. If I have received benefit or improvement from it, there is no harm done. And I ſeem to myſelf, Hippias, improved and benefited by the converſation of you both. For the meaning of the proverb, "Things of beauty are things of difficulty," if I am not miſtaken in myſelf, I know.

THE END OF THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

THE

THE BANQUET,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

LOVE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE BANQUET.

THE compoſition, ſays Mr. Sydenham [1], of this dialogue is of a ſingular caſt, and different from that of any other. For the principal part of it conſiſts of oratorical ſpeeches, ſpoken at a certain banquet or entertainment, by ſome of the company in their turns, upon a ſubject propoſed by one of their number.—The ſpeakers are theſe ſix, Phædrus, Pauſanias, Eryximachus, Ariſtophanes, Agatho, and Socrates. Their ſeveral ſpeeches are finely diſtinguiſhed by different ſtyles of oratory, and with great propriety diſplay the peculiar character of each ſpeaker.—The firſt of them, Phædrus, was a young gentleman of the moſt ingenuous diſpoſition, modeſt, candid, and a lover of truth; refined, elevated, and heroic in his ſentiments; the ſame perſon whoſe character Plato has thus drawn at large in a dialogue inſcribed with his name. From thence alſo we learn that he was a great admirer of Lyſias the orator: accordingly, the ſpeech made by him in this Banquet ſavours much of the ſtyle of Lyſias, ſuch as it is characterized by Plato [2] himſelf; the diction being pure and elegant; the periods round and well turned; but expreſſing the ſame ſentiments over and over again in variety of language; and where the ſentiments are various, void of all method or order in the ranging them.—The next ſpeech, reported in the dialogue, is that of Pauſanias; who appears to have been a ſtateſman or politician, a great admirer

[1] Nearly the whole of this Introduction is extracted from Mr. Sydenham's argument to this dialogue. As he is miſtaken in certain parts of his argument, from the want of a more profound knowledge of Plato's philoſophy, I found it impoſſible to give it entire.—T.

[2] See the Phædrus.

of both the Spartan and the Athenian laws, and an enemy to all other ſyſtems of government and manners. The ſtyle of his oratory correſponds exactly with the character which Hermogenes gives us of the ſtyle uſed by Iſocrates: for he is clear and diſtinct, and divides his ſubject properly; is profuſe in ornaments, and rather too nice and accurate; diffuſe and ample in his ſentiments, though not in his expreſſion; and taking a large compaſs of argument in the coming to his point. We find him however free from thoſe faults for which that critic juſtly reprehends Iſocrates: for in the ſpeech of Pauſanias there is no languor nor tedioufneſs; nor is he guilty of preaching, or of being didactic; vices in oratory which are the uſual concomitants of old age, and in Iſocrates perhaps were principally owing to that cauſe: certain it is, that moſt of his orations now extant were compoſed in the decline of his life, and that in the lateſt of them thoſe blemiſhes are the moſt conſpicuous. But at the time when the ſpeeches, reported in this dialogue, were ſuppoſed to have been ſpoken, Iſocrates was in the flower both of his age and of his eloquence. Add to this, that Pauſanias here immoderately affects ſome of thoſe little graces of ſtyle for which Iſocrates was remarkable in his younger years moſt [1]; ſuch as *αντιθεσεις*, or oppoſitions; *παρισωσεις*, or parities, where one member of a ſentence anſwers either in ſound or ſentiment to another; and thoſe merely verbal or literal ſimilarities, of adnominations, adliterations, and the ſame beginnings or endings of two or more words near one another. One of theſe ornaments, improperly uſed, Plato ridicules in the way of mimicry, as ſoon as the ſpeech of Pauſanias is ended: which alone ſeems a ſufficient evidence that Plato in framing that ſpeech purpoſely imitated the ſtyle of Iſocrates. His intention in ſo doing, as appears probable, we think, from the beginning of the ſpeech itſelf, was to ſet in contraſt thoſe two celebrated orators, Lyſias and Iſocrates; and to exhibit the former as treating his ſubject in a general, indiſcriminating, indeterminate way, copious in his language, but jejune in matter: the other, as diſtinguiſhing and methodical, full of matter, and ample in particulars, from having ſtudied the nature of his ſubject more diſtinctly, philoſophically, and minutely. It may be pertinent to obſerve, that Plato ſeems to have

[1] See Hermogenes *περι ιδεων*, l. i. c. 12. The ſame critic *περι μεθοδου*, c. 13. and 16. Vit. Homer. inter Opuſc. Mythолog. ex ed. 2da, pag. 300, 301. Quintilian. Inſtitut. Orat. l. ix. c. 3. and Demetrius Phaler. *περι ἑρμηνειας*, § 29.

had the ſame view in introducing the mention of Iſocrates near the concluſion of his dialogue named Phædrus.—The next ſpeaker to Pauſanias is Eryximachus; whoſe profeſſion was that of medicine: and his ſpeech is ſuitable to his profeſſion; for he conſiders the ſubject in a more extenſive view; and, beginning from the human body, both in its ſound and morbid ſtate, goes on like a thorough naturaliſt, and purſues his inſtances through every part of nature, through earth, air and ſky, up to that which is divine. His oratory, to the beſt of our little judgment in theſe matters, agrees with what Hermogenes [1] reports of Pericles, that of all the antient orators, meaning before the time of Demoſthenes, he had in appearance, as well as in reality, the moſt of the δεινοτης, that is, weight with his hearers, and power over their paſſions. For, according to that critic, the real δεινοτης of an orator conſiſts in a ready and apt uſe of his general knowledge, or an opportune and proper application of it, in managing his ſubject; and the δεινοτης is moſt apparent, he ſays, when the εννοιαι, the thoughts and ſentiments, are profound, curious, and out of the common road, yet ſtriking and forcible. Now the real and the apparent δεινοτης, as thus deſcribed, are both of them remarkable in the only oration of Pericles we have left, inſerted by Thucydides in his hiſtory: and both ſeem affectedly uſed in the ſpeech of Eryximachus; which we preſume, therefore, Plato compoſed in imitation of Pericles.—Next after him ſpeaks Ariſtophanes, the celebrated comic poet; through whoſe comedies, ſuch at leaſt as are ſtill remaining, runs the ſame rich vein of humour, the ſame lively and redundant wit, which characterize his ſpeech in the Banquet.—The next ſpeech is made by Agatho, the donor of the feaſt. Agatho was at this time a young man of a large fortune, generous, magnificent, and poliſhed in his manners; much admired by all for the comelineſs of his perſon; and celebrated by Plato in the Protagoras for his fine parts and excellent natural diſpoſition. His genius inclined him to poetry, and particularly to that of the tragic kind; in which he was ſo ſucceſsful, as to win the prize from all his antagoniſts, in one of thoſe competitions for excellence in writing tragedies annually held at the feaſt of Bacchus. Upon this occaſion it was that he gave his friends that entertainment which Plato has immortalized by this fine dialogue. We have no

[1] See his treatiſe περι ιδεων, l. ii. c. 9.

piece of his writing extant; but it is highly probable that the ſpeech here attributed to him gives a juſt repreſentation of his ſtyle: for the language of it is extremely poetical, florid, and abounding with metaphors; and the ſentiments are wonderfully elegant, ingenious, and full of fancy, but have not ſo much as an appearance of truth for their foundation.—The laſt ſpeaker on the ſubject is Socrates: and his ſpeech is in every reſpect worthy of the man. For in his whole conduct he was modeſt, and careful to avoid the leaſt degree of oſtentation; in all his diſcourſe he was ſolicitous above all things for the truth in every ſubject[1], and propoſed to himſelf that as the principle end in all his diſputes, inquiries, and reſearches; and whenever he took the lead in converſation, he began from things eaſy, common, and obvious, but gradually roſe to ſpeculations the moſt difficult, ſublime, and excellent. Agreeably to this character, he delivers in his ſpeech nothing as from himſelf; but introduces another perſon, aſſuming the magiſterial airs of a teacher, yet condeſcending, gentle, and affable. This perſon is Diotima, a lady at that time in high reputation for her intercourſe with the Gods, and her predictions of future events. The ſpeech of Socrates contains the recital of a converſation between himſelf and this prophetic lady; into whoſe mouth he puts what he has a mind to teach, on purpoſe to inſinuate that his ſpeech was indiſputably true, was worthy of being thought divinely inſpired, and conveyed the knowledge of divine things. The eloquence of it exemplifies that doctrine taught by Plato in his Phædrus and his Gorgias, that the man who beſt knows the truth in every ſubject he treats of, and intends the good of thoſe whom he endeavours to perſuade, he who has the moſt knowledge of human nature, and of the various diſpoſitions of men, and conſequently can adapt his ſpeech to the temper of his audience, he is likely to make the ableſt and beſt ſpeaker; the other qualifications requiſite to form an orator being comparatively mean, and, ſo far as art is concerned in them, eaſily attainable. The truth of this doctrine was ſoon after abundantly confirmed in Demoſthenes, who, forming himſelf upon the rules laid down by Plato, became at once the moſt perfect patriot, politician, and orator of his (I had almoſt ſaid of any) age.—After theſe ſix ſpeeches are ended, a new character is brought upon the

[1] See the Greater Hippias.

ſtage,

ſtage,—Alcibiades, a young nobleman of the firſt rank in Athens, of great natural and acquired abilities, chiefly thoſe of the military kind, but of diſſolute and thoroughly debauched manners. Being ambitious of power and government in the ſtate too early, before he was qualified for them by knowledge and experience, he had for ſome time been a follower of Socrates, whoſe eloquence and reaſoning he ſaw prevailing always over thoſe of the Sophiſts: for he hoped to acquire, in his company and converſe, the ſame ſuperior power of perſuaſion; in order to employ that power with the people, and gratify the views of his ambition. He is introduced into the banquet-room, far from ſober; and his behaviour and ſpeech (for he is engaged by the company to make a ſpeech) perfectly agree with the character of his manners. The ſubject on which he ſpeaks is profeſſedly, and in all appearance, foreign to the point ſpoken to by the reſt, as the diſorderly and unthinking condition which he is in requires it ſhould be; but it is far from being ſo in reality. Plato has not only woven it into his deſign in this incomparable dialogue, but has made it one of the moſt eſſential parts, without which the work had been wholly defective in the end for which it was framed [1]. Theſe ſpeeches, with the converſation and occurrences at the banquet, make the principal part of this dialogue; and are introduced, not in a dramatic, but a narrative way. The introduction is partly narrative, and partly dramatic; by which means it is ſomewhat intricate. For the dialogue opens with a converſation between two perſons only, Apollodorus and ſome friend of his, though in the preſence of others, ſuch as dramatic writers call mute perſons. At the very beginning Apollodorus relates a ſhort converſation lately held between himſelf and Glauco; and tells his friend, that he then gave Glauco an account of what had paſſed at the banquet given by Agatho; which account, repeated by him here again, conſtitutes all the reſt of the dialogue. He ſays, it was delivered to him by Ariſtodemus, one of the company; who had begun his narrative with the recital of a ſhort converſation held between Socrates and himſelf, and of ſome other occurrences previous to the banquet. The ſame recital here made by Apollodorus to his friend, and to the company at that friend's houſe, immediately introduces the narrative or hiſtory of that truly noble entertainment. Such is the manner, and ſuch the method, in which this dialogue is compoſed. It is

[1] See the Notes on the Speech of Alcibiades.

uſually and very properly intitled, "Concerning Love," becauſe the ſpeculation of love is its leading object.

With reſpect to the ſpeeches, that of Phædrus takes the word *love* in a general ſenſe, ſo as to comprehend love toward perſons of the ſame ſex, commonly called friendſhip, as well as that toward perſons of a different ſex, peculiarly and eminently ſtyled love.—Pauſanias diſtinguiſhes between love of the mind, and love merely of the body, proving them to be affections of very different kinds, becauſe productive of very different effects.—Eryximachus conſiders love as that univerſal principle in nature which attracts, unites, or aſſociates one thing to another in a regular way; the effect of whoſe operation is harmony or concord: that which heals alſo the breaches made by the oppoſite, the diſuniting and dividing principle, the cauſe of irregular motions and of diſcord.—Ariſtophanes treats of love as other writers of comedy do, taking it only in the groſſeſt ſenſe of the word, as it means the paſſion common to man with all brute animals.—And Agatho talks about it in a vague manner, without any determinate or fixed meaning at all; taking it in various ſenſes; commonly, indeed, for the refinement of that paſſion between the ſexes, but ſometimes for great liking or attachment of the mind to any object; and then, all at once, uſing the word, like Eryximachus, to ſignify concord and harmony, not only between rational beings, but even the unintelligent parts of nature. But when Socrates comes to ſpeak upon the ſubject, he goes much deeper into it by degrees: in the firſt place, he premiſes certain univerſal truths relating to love; that the object of it is beauty; the eſſence of it deſire; its aim or end the poſſeſſion of beauty, or, if already poſſeſſed of it, the perpetuity of that poſſeſſion. Next, he conſiders love as the deſire of good; whatever is beautiful being alſo good, ſo far as it is beautiful; and love, peculiarly ſo called, being part of that univerſal love or deſire of good, common to all beings, intelligent and ſentient. He conſiders this univerſal love, or deſire of good, as the link between the eternal nature and the mortal, between the plenitude of good and the total want of it. He conſiders, that the aim of this deſire, agreeably to a certain property of it before obſerved, is not only to enjoy good, but to immortalize that enjoyment. The deſire of immortality, therefore, is of neceſſity, he ſays, annexed to the deſire of good, or love of beauty. But perſonal immortality being impoſſible to be attained by any being whoſe nature is mortal,

tal, every ſuch being, prompted by nature, ſeeks to continue itſelf, and its enjoyment of good, in the only way poſſible, the propagation of its ſpecies, and the production of ſome being reſembling itſelf, another ſelf, to ſucceed, and to continue as it were the enjoyment of the ſame good. Hence, the love of that beauty, with which every animal is moſt ſmitten in the beautiful of its own kind, is accompanied with an inſtinct, or natural deſire, to mix and unite with it, and thus to generate another animal of the ſame kind. From corporeal beauty, and that lower ſpecies of love regarding it, man, as his mind opens more and is improved, naturally proceeds further; attaining the ſight of that beauty which is ſeen only by the eye of intellect, in the temper and diſpoſition of ſome fellow-mind; and fired with that love which attends the ſight of mental beauty. To this love alſo is annexed, ſays Socrates, the deſire of generating, of ſtamping upon that other mind its own thoughts, and of raiſing up and nurturing between them an intellectual progeny, of generous ſentiments and fair ideas. By means of this mixture and this enjoyment, that is, by converſe, ſuch as improves the underſtanding, the mind, he obſerves, riſes higher, and attains to view beauty in thoſe things themſelves, the ſubjects of their converſation; firſt, in virtuous purſuits, ſtudies, and employments; next, in the ſciences, and every branch of knowledge. In the embraces of theſe beauties the mind generates an offspring of the faireſt kind and the moſt durable; the poet, his immortal writings; the hero, through the force of his example, continual copies of his virtue; the founder of civil polities, through his inſtitutions, a long ſucceſſion of patriot actions; and the legiſlator, wiſe and beneficial laws, to bleſs the lateſt poſterity. But if the ſoul be endowed with a genius of the higheſt kind, ſhe reſts not here, nor fixes her attachment on any one of theſe mental excellencies or beauties in particular: the genuine lover of truth riſes from hence to the ſurvey of that univerſal, original, and exemplar beauty from which every thing beautiful, both in the intelligible and ſenſible world, proceeds. The love and the purſuit of this ſupreme beauty Plato calls philoſophy; and to the embraces or enjoyment of it, and to no other cauſe, does he here aſcribe the generation and the growth of true virtue.

With reſpect to the ſpeech of Alcibiades, it has been already obſerved, that it is one of the moſt eſſential parts of the dialogue. This will be at once evident, when it is conſidered that the intention of Plato in it was to exemplify

in the character of Socrates, as one who had been initiated in the myſteries of love, that perfection of virtue which ſuch an initiation is capable of effecting. Mr. Sydenham, therefore, was very unfortunately perſuaded to abandon the deſign of publiſhing his tranſlation of this ſpeech; and much was he miſtaekn in thinking that ſome part of it is ſo groſsly indecent that it may offend the virtuousand encourage the vicious. For it will appear in our notes, that this apparent indecency is introdueced conformably to the machinery of the myſteries, with no other view than to purify the reader from every thing indecent, and to liberate him, in ſhort, from vulgar love, by exciting the amatory eye of intellect to the viſion of objects ineffably beautiful and truly divine.

The antients, not without reaſon, generally rank this dialogue among thoſe of the ethic claſs [1]; but the character of it is of the mix-d kind, that is, partly narrative and partly dramatic: and the genius of it takes its colour from the didactic part, the ſpeech of Socrates; the reaſoning of which is wholly analytical, reſolving all love into its principles, and tracing all beauty upward to that ſource from whence it is derived to every order of being.

[1] Modern interpreters, with a view to the ſublimer part of the ſpeech of Socrates, but without regarding the drift of it, call this dialogue metaphyſical or theological. And among the antient Platoniſts, Albinus, as if he was attentive chiefly to the ſpeech of Pauſanias, and referred all the other ſpeeches to that, calls it political.—S.

THE

THE BANQUET.

PERSONS[1] *OF THE DIALOGUE.*

APOLLODORUS[2],	PAUSANIAS,
FRIEND[3] OF APOLLODORUS,	ARISTOPHANES,
GLAUCO[4],	ERYXIMACHUS,
ARISTODEMUS[5],	PHÆDRUS,
SOCRATES[6],	DIOTIMA,
AGATHO,	ALCIBIADES.

SCENE[7].—*Principally within the City of ATHENS.*

[1] The readers of Plato will obſerve, that before each of his dialogues the names of the ſpeakers in it are recited, not in the order either of their real dignity, or of their importance to the dialogue, as the manner is of modern poets before their tragedies and comedies; but according to the order in which they ſeverally make their firſt appearance; and, ſince in every ſcene of converſation two or more muſt appear at the ſame time together, theſe are named according to the order in which they firſt ſpeak: after the manner we find the perſons of the drama enumerated before all the dramatic writings of the antients.

[2] Apollodorus was a diſciple of Socrates, but of no long ſtanding at this time. His character, therefore, in the dialogue is properly marked by the vehemence of his attachment to philoſophy, and admiration of his maſter.

[3] This friend is not mentioned by name: a circumſtance which alone ſeems to have induced ſome to imagine, that by the friend of Apollodorus Plato here meant himſelf.

[4] If this be the ſame Glauco who was brother to Plato, and Plato be the friend here introduced, it ſeems ſtrange that Apollodorus ſhould ſpeak of Plato's brother to Plato himſelf, as of one utterly unknown to Plato, mentioning his name, afterwards, only as it were by accident.

[5] Ariſtodemus was a conſtant, humble follower of Socrates.

[6] For the characters of all the following perſons we refer to the firſt part of the preceding Introduction.

[7] The ſcene of converſation between Apollodorus and his friend, the only dramatic part of the dialogue, and where all the reſt of it is introduced in the way of narrative, appears to be the houſe of this friend; as proper a place as any for ſo long a recital as Apollodorus had to make him; and the moſt proper where to come to him with that intention. The way from Phalerus to Athens, a long walk, is, with no leſs propriety, made the ſcene of the converſation related by Apollodorus between himſelf and Glauco; to whom, he ſays, he then made the ſame long recital. The ſcene of the ſhort diſcourſe next related between Ariſtodemus and Socrates is made the ſtreet; by which piece of conduct, the breaking it off ſo abruptly is ſuitable to the decorum of place. And Agatho's houſe is the grand ſcene of the principal part, the ſpeeches at the entertainment.—S.

APOL-

APOLLODORUS.

THE affair concerning which ye inquire I think myſelf now not quite unprepared to relate to you. For it happened [1] a few days ſince, as I was walking up to the city from my houſe at Phalerus [2], that an acquaintance of mine, who was going the ſame way, ſeeing me at a conſiderable diſtance before him, called out to me; and by way of joke [3] at the ſame time ſaid, Apollodorus, you Phalerean, will not you ſtop a while till I come up to you? Upon which I ſtopped, and ſtayed for him. As ſoon as he had joined me, Apollodorus, ſaid he, I was juſt now inquiring after you; from a deſire I have to be thoroughly acquainted with what paſſed in the converſation between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the reſt who were of the party, at an entertainment where the ſubject of their diſcourſe was Love. I ſhould be glad to be informed by you what was ſaid on the occaſion. For the perſon who gave me ſome account of it, ſuch as he received from Phœnix the ſon of Philippus, told me that you knew every particular: but that, as to himſelf, he did not pretend to be at all perfect or exact in his relation. Do you then give me an account of it yourſelf; for you have the beſt right to relate a converſation in which an intimate friend of your own had the moſt diſtinguiſhed ſhare. But firſt, ſaid he, tell me, were you yourſelf one of the company?—It appears plainly, ſaid I, indeed, that your author by no means gave you an exact account of the circumſtances of that converſation, if you ſuppoſe it paſſed ſo lately as to admit a poſſibility of my being of the company.—Really I imagined ſo, replied he.—How could it be, ſaid I,

[1] The word πρωην, which the older editions give us in this place, is, careleſsly as it ſeems, omitted in that of Stephens: which error, as well as many others, we the rather take notice of, to prevent a repetition of the ſame in any future edition of Plato where the text of Stephens is likely to be made the ſtandard.—S.

[2] Phalerus was a ſea-port town, between four and five miles from the city of Athens; where frequently were furniſhed out, by way of ſpectacles of entertainment to the people, pompous cavalcades, iſſuing probably from thence, and marching to the city. See Xenophon in Hipparchic. p. 560. ed. 2da Steph.—S.

[3] What the joke is, will eaſily be diſcerned by help of the preceding note. For it lies in a humorous oppoſition between the haſte with which Apollodorus ſeems to have been walking, agreeably to his character, and the ſlowneſs uſual in cavalcades of pomp, with the frequent ſtopping of thoſe who are foremoſt, till the more dilatory train behind them is come up.—S.

Glauco?

Glauco? Do you not know that Agatho has not been at Athens for theſe many years? whereas it is not yet three ſince I firſt became a follower of Socrates, and began, as I have continued ever ſince, daily to obſerve and ſtudy all his ſayings and actions. Before that time, running about here and there, wherever chance led me, and fancying myſelf all the while well employed, no mortal was in ſo wretched a condition as I: it was ſuch as you are in at preſent, who give every ſtudy and every purſuit the preference to that of philoſophy.—Leave off railing, ſaid he, and tell me when that converſation happened.—Before we wrote ourſelves men, replied I. It was at the time when Agatho brought his firſt tragedy upon the ſtage, and won the prize with it. It was the very next day after that himſelf and his chrous-ſingers [1] had offered the uſual thankſgiving-ſacrifice for his victory.—It is then, ſaid he, a long time ſince, it ſeems. But who was it, continued he, that related the converſation to you? Was it Socrates himſelf?—Not Socrates, by Jupiter, replied I; but the ſame perſon who related it to Phœnix. It was one Ariſtodemus, a Cydathenian [2], a man of remarkably low ſtature [3], who always

[1] Thoſe who acted and ſung the chorus parts in his play.—S.

[2] In all the editions of the Greek we here read Κυδαθηνευς: but it ought certainly to be printed Κυδαθηναιευς; as appears from Stephanus de Urb. and from an old inſcription on a pillar at Athens publiſhed in Spon. de Pagis Attic. voce Κυδαθηναιον. See alſo Meurſius de Pop. Attic. in eadem voce.—S.

[3] Xenophon informs us, that Ariſtodemus was ſurnamed *the Little*. This circumſtance, therefore, ſerves to aſcertain the man. From the ſame author we learn, that this little man was alſo one of the minute philoſophers of that age, till better taught by Socrates. For Xenophon repreſents him as ουτε θυοντα τοις θεοις μηχανωμενον, ουτε μαντικη χρωμενον, αλλα και των ποιουντων ταυτα καταγελωντα. We quote the very words of this paſſage, for the ſake of propoſing to our learned readers an emendation of the word μηχανωμενον. For we are not ſatisfied with μητε ευχομενον, the conjecture of H. Stephens, nor with the ουτε ευχομενον of Leunclavius; becauſe ſacrifice to the Gods, we apprehend, always implied either petition or thanſgiving: nor can we acquieſce in retaining the word μηχανωμενον, making it to ſignify, *when he undertook any thing*, and accordingly ſuppoſing, with Erneſtus, the word τι to be tacitly underſtood; becauſe the ſuppoſition ſeems not agreeable to any idiom of the Greek language. We approve rather the prudence of Beſſarion, who, in his Latin tranſlation of this paſſage, took no notice at all of the word μηχανωμενον. But, as we muſt not make ſo bold with the original, we propoſe, inſtead of that word, to be read as in a parentheſis, μη εκοντα μεν ουν: by which alteration the ſenſe will be this, that Ariſtodemus offered no ſacrifices to the Gods, *no voluntary ones at leaſt*, but in compliance only with cuſtom, or in obedience

ways went barefoot [1]. He was of the party; being one of thoſe who at that time were the moſt attached to the perſon and company of Socrates. Not but that I aſked Socrates himſelf concerning ſome of the particulars reported by Ariſtodemus; and he allowed they were reported juſtly.—Why then, ſaid Glauco, ſhould not you favour me with that relation? The way to the city is perfectly convenient for people to converſe together, as they go along.—Upon which we reſumed our walk, and entered into the relation which my friend deſired. So that I am now, as I ſaid, not quite unprepared upon the ſubject. If then I am to relate that affair over again to you, ſo it muſt be. Beſides, I muſt own, that when I am diſcourſing myſelf, or hearing the diſcourſe of others, upon philoſophical ſubjects, abſtracted from the conſideration of improvement, I am beyond meaſure delighted. But when I hear converſation of any other kind, eſpecially the uſual diſcourſe between you rich people, who are ſtill contriving to heap up money, I feel a tediouſneſs in myſelf, and a concern for you my friends, who imagine you are employing your time to good purpoſe, while you are only trifling. On the other hand, it is poſſible you may think that I lead an unhappy life; and I believe thoſe thoughts of yours are juſt: but as to you, I do not ſay that I believe, for I know, the ſtate which you are in to be unhappy.

FRIEND. You are always the ſame man, Apollodorus, always railing at yourſelf and the whole world. You ſeem to me as if you abſolutely thought all men wretched, and yourſelf in the firſt place; excepting none but Socrates. Whence you acquired the ſurname of the madman [2], for my part I know

ence to the laws. And this may appear to be the true meaning, when we conſider that atheiſts in all ages are ready enough to join in public acts of divine worſhip; and, therefore, not the neglect of theſe, but of ſuch as were *voluntary*, could be any indication to Socrates of the real ſentiments of Ariſtodemus. See Xenophon in Memorabil. l. i. c. 4.—S.

[1] By this circumſtance Ariſtodemus was diſtinguiſhed, it ſeems, as much as by his littleneſs. It is probable that, like his fellow diſciple Antiſthenes the cynic, he imitated what appeared the moſt rigid and ſevere in his maſter's way of life, as being beſt ſuited to the natural roughneſs of his own temper, and the rudeneſs of his manners; which led him to entertain atheiſtical notions of the cauſes of things, and to ridicule thoſe who paid real worſhip to what was divine in nature. This circumſtance recalls to our mind thoſe epithets of *rough*, *hard*, and *unyielding*, τραχεια και αντιτυπος, given to atheiſm by Plutarch at the end of his treatiſe περι δεισιδαιμον —S.

[2] Xenophon in his Apology, and Plato in his Phædo, near the beginning, and again toward the

concluſion

know not: for, in your diſcourſe, you are always the ſame as you are now, ſevere upon yourſelf and all other people,—Socrates alone excepted.

APOL. My deareſt friend, it is evident enough now, that the entertaining ſuch notions of myſelf, and of all you, proves me beyond queſtion out of my ſenſes and a madman.

FRIEND. It is not worth the while, Apollodorus, to diſpute about this at preſent. Only do what I deſired of you, and give me an account of the ſpeeches made at that banquet.

APOL. The ſpeeches then were as follows:—But I had better, I think, give you the whole hiſtory of that affair from the beginning, juſt as Ariſtodemus gave it me. For he told me, that he met Socrates freſh out of the bath, and perfectly clean, a condition which he was not in very often; wearing on his feet likewiſe a handſome pair of ſlippers [1], a part of dreſs which he uſed only on rare occaſions: and that upon aſking him, whither he was going, that he had made himſelf ſo ſpruce and fine, Socrates told him, he was going to Agatho's houſe to ſup with him. For yeſterday at the ſacrifice, ſaid he, I quitted his company, for fear of the crowd; but promiſed to be with him to-day. Now thus fine have I made myſelf, that I may viſit ſo honourable and fine a perſon in a manner not unbecoming. But what

concluſion of it, repreſent Apollodorus as a man ſimple and ſincere, but with ſuch a kind of weakneſs in his mind, as made him remarkably haſty, negligent of decorum, and apt to ſpeak inconſiderately and without diſcretion.—S.

[1] Socrates, in his ordinary way of life, accuſtomed himſelf to endure voluntary hardſhips: from which he drew this advantage, that he ſuffered leſs than other men when called to bear hardſhips that were neceſſary. In like manner the Cynics and Stoics, in imitation probably of Socrates, did many things ασκησεως ενεκα, that is, for the ſake of habituating, through exerciſe, their minds and bodies to endurance. But Socrates, unlike the Cynics, made all this conſiſtent with a regard to the decencies of civil and ſocial life, a due compliance with cuſtom, and conformity to faſhion. For he always readily relaxed from his ſeverity, whenever, as on the preſent occaſion, he deemed the practice of it unſeaſonable. This civility diſtinguiſhes the manners of Socrates from the ſavage ruſticity of Ariſtodemus before mentioned. And we cannot help thinking, that theſe two ſeemingly ſlight circumſtances, in the deſcription of theſe two perſons, were mentioned by Plato ſo near together, on purpoſe to make that diſtinction the more eaſy to be noted. We learn from Ælian, in Var. Hiſt. l. iv. c. 18. that Socrates was charged, probably by the Cynics, with being curious and nice about his houſe, and his bed, and his fine ſlippers. Which confirms the truth of our obſervation in this note.—S.

think you, ſaid he, Ariſtodemus, of going to ſupper there yourſelf, without invitation? How do you find yourſelf diſpoſed upon that point?—And I replied, ſaid Ariſtodemus, that I was entirely at his diſpoſal.—Follow me then, ſaid Socrates; to corrupt the old proverb [1], by altering it,—and proving, that

When made by worthy men are feaſts,
The worthy go, unbidden gueſts.

Homer, before us, ſeems not merely to have corrupted, but to have offered violence to the proverb, by reverſing it. For, notwithſtanding that he deſcribes Agamemnon as a man excellent in all military virtues, and Menelaus as a man weak in arms, who

[2] ——————— Failed of manly force
To fling the well-aimed javelin;

yet, on occaſion of a ſacrifice and feaſt made by Agamemnon, he has brought Menelaus

[1] The proverb here alluded to, Athenæus, pag. 178. and Zenobius, c. 2. 19. have given us in this verſe, which the latter quotes from Eupolis the comic poet,

Αυτοματοι δ' αγαθοι δειλων επι δαιτας ιασιν.

When made by meaner men are feaſts,
Their betters go, unbidden gueſts.

That is, when they are pleaſed to honour with their preſence ſuch as could not preſume to invite them.—S.

[2] Μαλθακον αιχμητην. Menelaus is ſo called in the 17th book of the Iliad, ver. 588. Athenæus is very angry with Plato for receiving this character of Menelaus as true; and for not conſidering that Homer puts it into the mouth of Apollo, a partial friend to the Trojans, and of conſequence enemy to Menelaus. He, therefore, ſtands up very ſtoutly againſt Apollo and Plato, to prove, by many inſtances in Homer, that Menelaus was no coward. But in reality he only proves himſelf ſo inveterate an enemy to Plato, as, for the ſake of abuſing him, to miſinterpret Homer; who, by the word μαλθακον, meant no more in that paſſage than, as the old ſcholiaſt rightly explains it, ανειμενον τη ισχυι, ασθενη; and juſt ſo much Athenæus himſelf confeſſes true of Menelaus, that he was τη ῥωμη καταδεεστερος, ſomewhat deficient in ſtrength. Thus much may ſerve to vindicate Plato in this place againſt Athenæus. But a better critic than Athenæus, unleſs he were well verſed in Plato's peculiar manner of writing, would, with more ſhow of juſtice, reprehend him here for the ſeemingly cold and inſipid length of this digreſſion about the proverb. And, indeed, were this part merely a digreſſion, the criticiſm would in reality be juſt. But Plato intended it for a part highly

Menelaus to the banquet uninvited [1], a meaner man to the banquet of his betters.—Perhaps I too, replied Ariſtodemus, on hearing this, ſhall incur the imputation of a conduct, not, Socrates, ſuch a one as you have ſuppoſed, but like that in Homer, if I go to the banquet of a man of great abilities, without being intitled to it either by merit or invitation. Will you, therefore, if you lead me thither, make an apology for ſo doing? for, as to myſelf, I ſhall not confeſs my coming without invitation, but ſhall plead that I was invited by you.—Well, ſays Socrates,

[2] With ſocial ſteps, companions of the way,

as we walk along, we will conſult together what ſpeech to make. But come, let us be going.—After this little talk together, he ſaid, on they went. But in the way, Socrates muſing, and attentive to ſomething in his own mind, was outwalked by him; and, obſerving him to ſtop, bid him walk on. When he was come to Agatho's houſe, the door of which was open, an incident, he ſaid, happened, which put him into ſome confuſion. For a ſervant, who was coming out, meeting him there upon the ſpot, led him directly to the banquet-room, where he found the company juſt going to ſupper. Immediately Agatho, on ſeeing him enter the room, ſaid,—Ariſto-

highly important to his dialogue; to guard it againſt the miſconſtruction to which it might be liable from men of ſevere, ſour, and malignant tempers; to ſignify, that not all people were worthy, or properly qualified, to partake as it were of the banquet he had provided; and to point out, for whom it was particularly improper to be preſent, τους μαλθακους, *molles*, the voluptuous, or men of effeminate minds and manners: in which ſenſe the word μαλθακος is often taken. See particularly Xenophon in Mem. l. iii. c. 11. § 10. where it is applied to libidinous love, and oppoſed to that which inſpires the ſentiments of friendſhip. Homer, it is true, had a different meaning, ſuch as we have before explained; and Plato uſes a kind of catachreſis in adapting this paſſage to his purpoſe. But it was ſufficient for him, if any way it was applicable. Some paſſage or other in Homer was here to be introduced, and the reader's mind to be detained on it for ſome time. For this obſervation will be found to hold true throughout all Plato's writings, that, whenever he cites a verſe out of any poet, eſpecially out of Homer, he does it not, like writers of a lower claſs, to embelliſh the plainneſs of proſe with fine tags of poetry; but his view is always either to ſtrike the mind of his reader more forcibly in the conveying ſome important meaning, and to make it ſink the deeper in his memory; or elſe to prepare him for ſomething of importance which is to follow, by uſhering it in with the ſolemnity of verſe, and, what in thoſe days was of much weight, the authority of the poet.—S.

[1] See Homer's Iliad, b. ii. ver. 408.

[2] Iliad, b. x. ver. 224.

demus,

demus, you are come very opportunely to ſup with us. But if any other purpoſe brings you hither, defer it to another time. I was looking about for you in the temple yeſterday, with intention to deſire your company, and could not ſee you. But how came you not to bring us Socrates with you?—Upon which I looked back, ſaid he, but could no where ſee Socrates following me, as I had imagined. However, I declared I came along with Socrates, upon his invitation hither to ſupper.—You did well, ſaid Agatho; but where is he then himſelf?—He was following me in but juſt now, ſaid I; and for my part, I wonder where he can be.—Boy, ſaid Agatho to one of his ſervants, will you go and ſee if you can find Socrates, and conduct him in?—Then, turning to me, Do you, Ariſtodemus, ſaid he, take your place next to Eryximachus. And immediately he ordered a ſervant to come and waſh my feet clean[1], that I might take my place upon the couch[2]. Juſt then the boy

[1] Thus in the original: Και εμε εφη απονιζειν τον παιδα, ινα που κατακεοιτο. The remarkable enallage, or tranſition here, in ſpeaking of himſelf, from the firſt perſon to the third, is no unuſual thing in Plato; but is too bold, and would be a ſoleciſm in Engliſh. For, tranſlated as literally as poſſible, the ſentence runs in this manner: "Immediately he bid the [proper] ſervant to waſh off [the dirt] from me, that [ſays he] he may lie down ſomewhere." The words included within hooks, we have added to complete the ſenſe. The firſt part of the ſentence, we ſee, is merely narrative, and the latter part repreſents Agatho ſpeaking. But the word εφη, having been uſed juſt before, though in a different ſenſe, is here omitted, probably to avoid a repetition of it. Harry Stephens, not aware of this tranſition, has raiſed doubts about the right reading of this paſſage; and has endeavoured, without any neceſſity, to amend it, by altering κατακεοιτο into κατακεοιμην. The ſame learned printer and editor has, in a paſſage of the Euthyphro, where there is a like tranſition, propoſed altering the text in the ſame manner, from want of obſerving this peculiarity in Plato's ſtyle, as Dr. Forſter has judiciouſly remarked in his notes on thoſe five dialogues, publiſhed by him, pag. 328.—S.

[2] In that polite age, luxury and too great a delicacy and ſoftneſs of manners had ſo far prevailed even amongſt the brave Grecians, that when they made their evening meal, or ſupper, which was with them the principal meal of the day, as dinner is with us, they uſed not to ſit on chairs, ſtools, or benches, at the table, like the modern Europeans; nor to ſit or lie upon mats or carpets laid over the floor, like ſome of the Eaſtern nations; but their cuſtom was to recline themſeves on ſofas, couches, or day-beds; the heads of which being placed at the ſides of the table, an oblong ſquare, were covered with cuſhions; and on theſe they leaned their elbows. It was neceſſary, therefore, that Ariſtodemus ſhould have his dirty feet waſhed before he was fit to lie on one of thoſe ſofas. This little incident ſeems thrown in by Plato, to confirm the account before given of the manners of Ariſtodemus, and to exhibit them in a ſtronger light, as oppoſite in this particular to thoſe of Socrates, about whom we ſee no ſuch ceremony uſed, becauſe unneceſſary.

Different

boy who had been ſent out returned, and told us, that Socrates had withdrawn himſelf into the porch of ſome neighbouring houſe, and was there ſtanding; and when I called to him, ſaid the boy, he refuſed to come.—Abſurd! ſaid Agatho: go and call him again; and do not leave him in that manner.—But Ariſtodemus told me, that he himſelf oppoſed it, and deſired that Socrates might be let alone, for that it was uſual with him ſo to do. As he goes along he will ſometimes ſtop, ſaid he, without regarding where, and ſtand ſtill a while. I make no doubt but he will be here preſently. Let me entreat you, therefore, not to diſturb him, but leave him at quiet.—Be it ſo then, if you think it beſt, ſaid Agatho; but let the reſt of us, however, proceed to ſupper.—Then, turning to his ſervants, Boys, ſaid he, ſerve us up ſomething or other; it is left to you what, for there is nobody to give you any particular directions: you know it is not my way on theſe occaſions.—You are now to ſuppoſe me and theſe gentlemen, my friends here, invited by you to ſupper: entertain us handſomely, therefore, that you may have our commendations.—Immediately upon this, he ſaid, they went to ſupper; but Socrates was ſtill miſſing. Agatho [1], therefore, would every now and then

Different from either of theſe is the caſe of Alcibiades, further on in the dialogue. For, as he comes in drunk and dirty, in the midſt of his rakehelly rambles about the town, ſlippers are ordered to be brought him, and not his feet to be waſhed, as he wore ſhoes. So minute is Plato in his detail of every circumſtance that may contribute to throw light on the characters of thoſe perſons he introduces. Whatever weight there is in this obſervation, be it great or little, ſo much of importance is there in the blunder committed by all the Latin tranſlators, and by the Italian after them, in making Agatho order water to waſh the hands of Ariſtodemus inſtead of his feet: and in the ſame degree is praiſe due to the judgment and accuracy of Monſ. Racine, who, in his tranſlation of this dialogue into French, corrects this error; and though he might juſtly be ſuppoſed prejudiced in favour of waſhing the hands before meals, after the modern French faſhion, as well as the antient Grecian, yet explains rightly the orders of Agatho; as being ſenſible, no doubt, that waſhing the feet of Ariſtodemus, not his hands, was a proper preparative for his laying up his legs on the ſofa. But he omits this reaſon of Agatho's for giving thoſe orders, though expreſsly mentioned by Plato; probably becauſe he was at a loſs how to tranſlate the words, being puzzled by the doubts raiſed about them by Stephens, as mentioned in the preceding note.—S.

[1] There is none of Plato's dialogues in which Socrates is uſhered in with ſo much ceremony as in this. In the firſt place, that recital of the converſation paſſed between Apollodorus and Glauco, with which the piece ſets out, ſeems introduced only for the ſake of giving the reader a high opinion of the character of Socrates. To this purpoſe tend the reflections made by Apollodorus upon the ſingular wiſdom of his maſter. To the ſame end is directed his account of the alteration

then be giving orders to his people to call Socrates in; but I, ſaid he, conſtantly oppoſed it. At length Socrates, having ſtaid away, as uſual, not very long, entered; about the time, at furtheſt, when ſupper was half over. Agatho then, who lay on the couch at the lower end of the table, alone, ſaid, Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourſelf down by me; that, by being cloſe to you, I may have the benefit of that piece of wiſdom [1], which you made a new acquiſition of in the porch. For it is plain that you found it, and are in poſſeſſion; otherwiſe you would never have deſiſted from the purſuit.—Socrates then, ſitting down on the couch, ſaid, It would be well, Agatho, if wiſdom were a thing of ſuch a nature, as to paſs from thoſe who abound with it into ſuch as want it, when they ſit cloſe to one another, and are in contact; like water running through the wool [2] out of the fuller veſſel into the

alteration produced in him by ſtudying that wiſdom. And for the ſame reaſon is mention made of the many admirers of that truly admirable man. But all theſe circumſtances are made to appear ſimple and artleſs, the more irreſiſtibly to operate their intended effect upon the reader's mind. The ſhort converſation which follows, between Apollodorus and his friend, carries on the ſame intention; but goes greater lengths of praiſe in the character there given of Socrates. Then comes a narration of ſome little circumſtances, immediately previous to the celebrated banquet, ſerving to prejudice the reader's mind with an idea of the excellence of the company aſſembled at Agatho's: of this kind is the extraordinary care which Socrates we ſee has taken of his perſon and dreſs, as a proper mark of reſpect to that aſſembly; and another of the ſame kind is the argument which he politely urges to Ariſtodemus, when he is perſuading him to be of the party. The circumſtances ſubſequent, the profound meditation of Socrates in his way to Agatho's, his ſtealing aſide immediately on his coming there, plainly with deſign to finiſh his ſpeculations, his ſtaying away till ſupper was half over, and, during that ſtay, the converſation turning on Socrates, as the principal perſon wanting, together with the impatience of Agatho at his abſence, are all contrived on purpoſe to raiſe the expectation of that great figure Socrates is ſoon to make, and of that high part he is to bear in a converſation where all the ſpeakers ſhine in their ſeveral characters, upon the fineſt and moſt intereſting ſubject in human life.—S.

[1] In the Greek ὁ σοὶ προσεστη. Perhaps it ſhould be προσετεθη. Whether Cornarius found it ſo written in the Heſſenſtein manuſcript, he has not told us; but he here tranſlates, as if he had, *quæ tibi accepta*.—S.

[2] Διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου. It is poſſible this may mean a woollen bag, made in the manner of our flannel jelly-bags, to ſtrain and purify the liquor running through. Or perhaps it means a ſtring of wool lightly twiſted, faſtened at one end about the mouth of the cock, in a ewer, or other veſſel out of which the water is to run, and hanging down into ſome baſon, or other receptacle; that the water, as it runs along, may leave behind it in the nappineſs of the wool any dirt or impure particles with which it may be loaded. This latter conjecture is made the more probable by the information

the emptier. If this quality attend wiſdom, I ſhall ſet a high value upon partaking of your couch: for I ſhall expect to have wiſdom flow into me from you in great quantity, and of a kind which appears the faireſt. As for the little which I have, it muſt be mean and trivial [1], doubtful and queſtionable, ſeeming but a dream [2]. But the wiſdom [3] you are maſter of is ſplendid, and promiſes a future great increaſe of brightneſs, having already in the morning of your age ſhone out with ſo much glory; as more than thirty thouſand Grecians, before whom it appeared [4] the other day, can witneſs.—You are a joker, Socrates, ſaid Agatho. But this controverſy between us about our wiſdoms ſhall be tried by and by, and Bacchus ſhall decide the cauſe. At preſent, turn your thoughts to the table.—Upon this, he told me, Socrates

information we have from a certain friend, a man of credit and veracity, that in ſome parts of Wiltſhire the like method is practiſed of purifying water, by letting it run down in the manner we have deſcribed, along twiſted wool, which they there call accordingly *the twiſt*. Cornarius ſays in his Eclogæ, that he cannot conceive what wool could have to do in the affair; and therefore he ſuppoſes, that inſtead of the word εριου ſhould be read οργανου, meaning, he ſays, a conduit-pipe to convey water out of one ciſtern, when full, into another. But by this alteration of the word a very humorous part of the ſimilitude is loſt; that which repreſents wiſdom ſtreaming out of one man into another, as it were, by a ſtrong tranſpiration, through their woollen or cloth garments being in contact together.—S.

[1] See the Greater Hippias.

[2] Socrates taught that outward things, the objects of ſenſe, were the images only of thoſe general ideas which are the objects of mind or intellect; though, like images in dreams, they ſeemed the very things themſelves. The ſophiſts of his time, on the other hand, agreed with the multitude in maintaining that objects of ſenſe were the only realities, and that thoſe ideal things which Socrates cried up for real and true were at beſt but ſhadows, outlines, or faint images of the former. So that each ſeemed to the other to be as it were in a dream, taking the image for the ſubſtance. Accordingly, it was queſtioned between them, who was the dreamer, and who had the perception of a man whoſe mind was truly awake. See a paſſage to this purpoſe in the Theætetus. See alſo the fifth book of the Republic.—S.

[3] Plato has in his writings uſed the word "wiſdom" in two very different general ſenſes: the one was the philoſophical ſenſe of it, as it ſignified the knowledge of nature, and of the principles of things, the ſcience of mind, or ſcience univerſal; the other was the vulgar one; the word being at that time commonly uſed, as it is in this place, to ſignify excellence in every particular ſcience or art, any knowledge or ſkill beyond vulgar attainment. See the former part of Plato's Theages, and Ariſtotle's Nicomachean Ethics, l. vi. c. 7. After this obſervation made, it will every where be eaſy to determine, which meaning is intended.—S.

[4] Thoſe who were ſpectators at the acting of his tragedy.

reclined himſelf, and made his ſupper. After he and the reſt of them had done, performed their libations, ſung the praiſes of the God, and gone through the other uſual ceremonies, they were beginning to ſit-in to drinking; when Pauſanias, he ſaid, opened the converſation thus:—Well, gentlemen, ſaid he, what method ſhall we take to find moſt pleaſure in our bottles to-night? For my own part, I confeſs to you that laſt night's debauch ſits very heavy upon me, and I want a little reſpite. I imagine too that many more of us are in the ſame condition, ſuch as were here at the entertainment yeſterday. Conſider, therefore, what way is the beſt to make drinking agreeable and eaſy to us.—Ariſtophanes then ſaid, It is a good propoſal of yours, Pauſanias, in my opinion, this, that we ſhould by all means procure ourſelves an eaſy drinking-bout. For I am one of thoſe who were well ſoaked yeſterday.—Upon hearing this, Eryximachus the ſon of Acumenus ſaid, Both of you ſay well. But I ſhould be glad to be informed about one other perſon, and that is Agatho; in what condition of ſtrength he finds himſelf with regard to drinking.—I am by no means very ſtrong at preſent myſelf neither, ſaid Agatho.—It is lucky for us, ſaid Eryximachus, for me, and Ariſtodemus, and Phædrus, and the reſt of us here, if you fail and are diſabled, you ſtout men at the bottle. For we are at all times weak in that reſpect. Socrates, indeed, I except; for he is equally well qualified to drink, or to let it alone. So that he will be ſatisfied, and ready to comply, whichever courſe we take. Since none of the company, therefore, ſeem inclined to drink hard, I may be the leſs diſpleaſing, perhaps, if I ſpeak the truth about this matter in plain terms. For I have been convinced myſelf, from the experience acquired in our profeſſion, that hard drinking is uſually attended with ill conſequences. For which reaſon, I ſhould neither chooſe to venture far in drinking myſelf, nor adviſe it to any other perſon, eſpecially when oppreſſed with the load of the laſt night's debauch.—As for me, ſaid Phædrus, addreſſing himſelf to Eryximachus, I am accuſtomed to hearken to your advice in every thing, eſpecially in what relates to your own profeſſion: but now I find all the reſt of the company are in the ſame complying diſpoſition.—This they all aſſented to, and agreed not to make the preſent meeting a debauch; but to drink, every man, juſt as much as might be agreeable to him.—This point then being determined, ſaid Eryximachus,

that

that we are to drink at our own pleaſure, and that no compulſion is to be uſed; the next thing I have to offer is this, that the piper-girl [1], who has

[1] It was cuſtomary with the antients, at or after their feaſts and banquets, to entertain their minds, without the laborious exerciſe of thinking, through thoſe nobler ſenſes which have a near affinity with the mind; regaling their ears with vocal and inſtrumental muſic, and their eyes with ſpectacles either beautiful or wonderful. The performers, therefore, and exhibiters in theſe ſeveral ways uſed to attend on theſe occaſions. Accordingly in the banquet of Xenophon one of each kind is introduced; and after they have all performed their parts the converſation begins.—Plato has been accuſed of want of elegance and politeneſs in not taking the ſame method in his banquet, but diſmiſſing the female muſician ſo roughly. Thoſe who make this objection ſeem not to diſcern the difference between the banquets deſcribed by theſe two excellent writers; nor to be ſenſible that they framed theſe, as well as other of their works, on different plans, though on the ſame ſubjects. The gueſts at the entertainment given by Callias, and deſcribed by Xenophon, were a mixed company, compoſed partly of Autolycus and his friends, who either themſelves excelled in bodily exerciſes, or admired moſt the excellencies of that kind in others; and partly of Socrates and his friends, whoſe abilities and excellencies lay rather another way, in the exerciſes of the mind. Such a promiſcuous aſſembly it was proper to entertain in the uſual manner. But the gueſts of Agatho were a ſelect party, who had all a high reliſh for the rational pleaſures of converſation, good ſenſe, wit and humour; and every one of whom probably expected the enjoyment of thoſe pleaſures only that evening, and to be able afterward to ſay to each other, like our poet Cowley to his friend Harvey,

We ſpent it not in toys, in luſt, or wine,
But ſearch of deep philoſophy,
Wit, eloquence, and poetry,
Arts which I loved, for they, my friend, were thine.

It ſeems alſo as if Agatho had aſſembled them for that very purpoſe; for he had the day before made his grand feaſt, (as it was the cuſtom to do after a thankſgiving ſacrifice,) to which not only his friends and intimates, but a crowd of acquaintance, all ſuch as were known to him, had been invited; and where, as it appears, they had drunk hard, and conſequently converſed little. Further; at Callias's entertainment, in order to furniſh matter for ſome little talk, a propoſal was made, that each of the company ſhould declare, on what he moſt valued himſelf, and why. This gave occaſion to much pleaſantry, to many ingenious and ſhrewd ſayings and repartees, on various ſubjects, in few words: after which, Socrates alone made a diſcourſe, of no conſiderable length, on the ſubject of Love; to give time for ſome ſhort preparations, making without, for playing an interlude of Bacchus and Ariadne. The whole is ſhort, and ends early enough for ſome of the company to take their accuſtomed evening walk. But the converſation at Agatho's had an air of ſolemnity and formality; as it conſiſted of oratorical ſpeeches on one ſubject, but ſo ample and diverſified in matter, ſo prolix, and protracted to ſo late an hour of the night, that a variety of other entertainments of a different kind would have been inconſiſtent, unneceſſary, improper and abſurd.—S.

juſt entered the room, may be diſmiſſed, to pipe to herſelf, or, if ſhe pleaſes, to the women in the inner rooms; and that we enjoy one another this evening in the way of converſation. The manner and the ſubject, I am ready, if you permit me, to propoſe.—To this they all unanimouſly gave conſent, and deſired him to propoſe accordingly.—Eryximachus then ſaid, I ſhall begin my propoſal after the manner of Euripides in his prologue to the Melanippe, for

The tale I have to tell is not my own [1];

I have it from Phædrus here. For Phædrus is continually ſaying to me, with an air of indignation, Is it not aſtoniſhing, ſays he, Eryximachus, that

[1] The old Grecian tragedies were dramatic repreſentations, each, of ſome ſingle event, uncommon and important, chiefly ſuch as had happened long before, and made a part of their fabulous or antient ſtory; the whole of which, not being then recorded in any writings, but handed down through oral tradition, was ſubject to much variety in the telling. This not only permitted the tragic poets great latitude in the choice of their fables, or fabulous ſtories, to repreſent; but allowed room alſo for much invention of their own; eſpecially with regard to circumſtances, both of things and perſons, and what had happened previous to thoſe ſignal events celebrated in their tragedies. Of theſe circumſtances, and theſe prior accidents, which the poet made the foundation of his fable, it was neceſſary to inform the audience; becauſe they might poſſibly have heard thoſe ſtories related with different circumſtances; and muſt certainly have been ignorant of ſuch as were *ignota indictaque*, or of the poet's own invention. This was the riſe of prologues; in which the audience had the neceſſary information given them. The prologue was ſpoken now and then in the perſon of ſome deity, the ſecret cauſe or leader of the great event going to be repreſented, but more frequently in the dramatic character of one of the actors in the drama; in either of which caſes the prologue made a part of the play itſelf. Sometimes the player ſpoke it in his own proper character of player, according to the modern cuſtom: and very rarely, the author ſpoke it himſelf, appearing openly and profeſſedly as author; or the player, appearing for him, as his repreſentative. An inſtance of this kind is the caſe here cited by Plato: and the reaſon why Euripides choſe ſuch a prologue to his Melanippe probably was this. He had given, it ſeems, great offence to the ladies in that age, by drawing ſo many of his female characters bad, and making their infamous actions ſo frequently the ſubject of his plays. But none of his characters, except that of Phædra, were likely to be thought more injurious to the ſex than this of Melanippe. And in fact ſo it proved; for we learn from Ariſtophanes in Θεσμοφορ. that Euripides incurred the diſpleaſure of the fair by no plays more than by theſe two. When his Melanippe, therefore, was to be brought upon the ſtage, his buſineſs was to ward off this blow, as well as he was able, by an apology beforehand. Accordingly, as in his prologue to the Hippolytus, he had artfully made Venus take upon herſelf the whole blame of Phædra's

that the poets have made hymns and odes in honour of ſome other of the Deities; and yet not one poet, amongſt ſo many in every age, has ever compoſed a panegyric upon Love; but the praiſes of a God ſo powerful, and of ſo excellent a nature, to this day remain unſung? The ſame complaint I have to make againſt the ſophiſts: the beſt of whom, as you will find, have, in their proſaic compoſitions, made encomiums on Hercules, and other great and illuſtrious perſons; as the celebrated Prodicus [1] has done, for inſtance. This, however, is not greatly to be wondered at. But I have lately met with a treatiſe, written by one of thoſe wiſe men, containing a high panegyric upon ſalt on account of its utility [2]. And many other

Phædra's unhappy conduct, ſo in his prologue to the Melanippe, as appears by the line here quoted, (for the prologue and the play are both loſt,) he humorouſly excuſes and exculpates himſelf, by declaring, with an air of ſimplicity, that the plot of the play was ready made to his hands, and that he had no finger in it; from whence it was to be concluded, that if Melanippe was a bad woman, he could not help it. The verſe of Euripides ſeems to have been this,

Εμος γαρ ουκ ὁ μυθος, ὁν μελλω λεγειν.

Or, if the γαρ be added by Plato, to weave it into his own ſtyle, the verſe probably was this,

Ὁ μυθος ουκ εμος εστιν, ὁν μελλω λεγειν.

The intended application of this paſſage out of the poet is as follows: Eryximachus, being of a grave profeſſion, thought it incumbent on a man of his character to apologize in the ſame way for introducing ſuch a propoſal as this,—that Love ſhould be the ſubject of diſcourſe that evening; a propoſal which would ſeem much more decent to be made by the youthful and handſome Phædrus; to whom, therefore, he is pleaſed to attribute it. That is, in fine, Plato himſelf with infinite addreſs, as uſual, apologizes in this manner for making Love the ſubject of his dialogue. For, as he always exhibits his ſubject in every light which it can poſſibly be viewed in, and thoroughly ſifts the nature of it, he could not avoid introducing here, amongſt the reſt of the ſpeeches, thoſe which ſeemed the moſt exceptionable. At the ſame time, alſo, by beginning like one of the prologues of Euripides, and with a verſe taken from thence, he ſignifies (to ſuch as are acquainted with his manner) his intention, that this firſt ſpeech of Eryximachus ſhould be, or be taken for, the prologue to the following dramatic entertainment.—S.

[1] Plato here means the diſſertation of Prodicus, intitled Ὡραι, ſo often exhibited, and ſo much admired; as we learn from Philoſtratus in his Lives of the Sophiſts, and from Xenophon in his Memoirs of Socrates. The allegorical ſtory, or fable, of the judgment of Hercules, related in that diſſertation, is recorded by the laſt-mentioned excellent writer, though, as he tells us himſelf, not in the pompous words of the original author, but in his own ſimplicity of ſtyle, much more elegant. Concerning Prodicus, ſee notes to the Greater Hippias.—S.

[2] The Greek of this paſſage runs thus,—βιβλιω—εν ᾧ ενησαν ἁλες, επαινον θαυμασιον εχοντες προς ωφελειαν.

other things of as little worth you may ſee ſet off with great encomiums [1]. That ſo much pains ſhould be beſtowed upon ſubjects ſo mean, and yet that no man ſhould ever to this day have undertaken to give Love his due praiſes, but that ſo great a God has been neglected to ſuch a degree, is it not aſtoniſhing? Now Phædrus, in all this, which I have repeated from his mouth, ſeems to me to plead well. I ſhould be glad, therefore, to have him gratified, and to contribute my ſhare to his gratification. Beſides that I think it highly becoming this aſſembly to decorate with all poſſible honours the Deity of Love. If all of you then are of the ſame opinion with me, we may ſpend our time agreeably enough to-night in diſcourſing. For my propoſal is, that every man of us ſhould deliver an oration in praiſe of Love [2], as proper and handſome a one as he is able, *the right hand way down*; and that Phædrus ſhould take the lead, as he is at the upper end, and is, beſides, the father and founder of the argument.—You may be aſſured, Eryxima-

ωφελειαν. In tranſlating which words into Engliſh, we have thought it moſt adviſable to follow all the tranſlators before us into other languages, juſt as they ſeem to have followed one another, down from Ficinus; not becauſe we approve their interpretation, for the Greek words will by no means bear ſuch a one; but becauſe we are at a loſs for the true meaning, ourſelves: the text in this place being apparently ſo much corrupted, as to require an abler critic than we deem ourſelves to be, for the amendment of it.—S.

[1] Eraſmus, in a long liſt, enumerates many ſuch, ſome as antient as the time when Plato lived; which he cites as precedents, in the ſame manner, and for the ſame reaſon, that Plato ſpeaks of ſome ſuch here; that is, to introduce with the better grace, or perhaps to apologize for, a diſſertation of his own of the like kind, A Panegyric on Folly: as may be ſeen in that incomparable piece of humour, near the beginning, and in his Epiſtle to Sir Thomas More prefixed to it.—S.

[2] Ιστεον, ὁτι παντα οἱ Ἑλληνες, ἀ δυναμιν εχοντα ἑωρων, ουκ ανευ επιστασιας θεων την δυναμιν αυτων ενεργειν ενομιζον· ἑνι δε ονοματι το τε την δυναμιν εχον και τον επιστατουντα τουτῳ θεον ωνομαζον. "It is proper to know that the Greeks held an opinion, that every thing in nature, in which they ſaw any power (force, or virtue) inherent, exerciſed not its power without the ſuperintendence of the Gods: and alſo, that they called by one and the ſame name that thing which had the power and that Deity who preſided over it." This ſentence, with which Moſcopulus begins his commentary on Heſiod, will ſerve very properly inſtead of a preliminary note to all the following ſpeeches concerning Love.—S.

It will be neceſſary to add in explanation of the above ſentence from Moſcopulus, that, as according to the Grecian theologiſts every Deity is the leader of a ſeries which poſſeſſes his characteriſtic properties, in conſequence of originating from him, and which extends to the laſt of things, every link of this ſeries (the golden chain of Homer) was very properly denominated by them after the ſame manner as its monad, or leader. This obſervation, when properly underſtood, is, as I have obſerved in my Notes on Pauſanias, the true key to antient mythology.—T.

chus,

chus, ſaid Socrates, that none of us will put a negative on your propoſal. For by no means ever ſhould I, who pretend not to the knowledge of any other matters than thoſe which belong to Love [1]: neither would Agatho, nor Pauſanias: no more will Ariſtophanes, without diſpute; for his whole time is taken up about Bacchus and Venus: nor indeed will any other perſon whom I ſee preſent. We indeed, who ſit loweſt, and are to ſpeak laſt, ſhall have the diſadvantage. However, if the prior ſpeakers ſpeak well and fully to the point, we ſhall deſire nothing more. Let Phædrus then, with our beſt wiſhes to attend him, begin, and make his panegyric upon Love.—To this all the reſt of the company conſented, and joined with Socrates in the encouraging Phædrus to begin. Now what was ſaid by each of the ſeveral ſpeakers Ariſtodemus did not perfectly remember; neither can I, indeed, all that he told me: but the ſpeeches of thoſe whom I looked on as the moſt conſiderable perſons, and every thing which I thought moſt worth remembering, I will endeavour to relate to you diſtinctly.

He told me then, that Phædrus, in compliance with the requeſt made him, ſpoke firſt; and began ſomewhat in this way, with ſaying—

THE SPEECH OF PHÆDRUS.

That Love was powerful [2], and wonderfully great, both on earth and amongſt the Gods: that ſuperior dignity belonged to him on many accounts, but eſpecially with regard to his generation.—For to be one of the eldeſt of the Gods, ſaid he, is a circumſtance redounding highly to his honour. And that he enjoys this advantage, appears in that he had no parents [3]; and that never any writer, whether uninſpired or poet, pretended that he had. But Heſiod ſays,

Chaos

[1] From the concluſion of the ſpeech, hereafter ſpoken by Socrates, it will appear what his meaning is in this place.—S.

[2] The beginning of Phædrus's ſpeech is not recited in the very words of it, but is related in the way of narration; by which means the tranſition from the narrative ſtyle to the oratorical, and from the preceding narration to the firſt formal ſpeech, is made the more gentle, eaſy, and elegant.—S.

[3] Love conſidered according to his higheſt ſubſiſtence, i. e. as ſubſiſting at the extremity of the intelligible triad, has not indeed Venus for his mother, becauſe this Goddeſs firſt ſubſiſts in the ſupermundane which is ſubordinate to the intelligible order, as will be ſhown in our Notes on

Chaos was firſt produced; Earth roſe the next,
Wide-boſom'd, a fix'd ſeat ſecure to all
For ever yielding; and with her roſe Love.

Here the poet tells us, that next after Chaos were born theſe two, Earth and Love. Parmenides relates the generation thus,

Firſt from th' eternal council forth came Love,
Firſt of the Gods.——

Acuſilaus ſays the ſame thing with Heſiod. On ſo many different hands[s] is it agreed, that Love is among the moſt antient of the Gods. And as he is thus of higheſt antiquity in the nature of things, ſo is he the cauſe of the greateſt good to human kind. For to young perſons, at their firſt ſetting out in life, I know no greater good than love; to the party beloved, if ſhe has a worthy lover; or to the lover himſelf, if his miſtreſs be worthy: becauſe that, which ſhould be our leading principle in order to right conduct in every circumſtance of life, conſanguinity has not the power to excite in us, neither have honours, nor riches, nor aught elſe, ſo effectually as love. The principle I mean is the ſenſe of ſhame attending a baſe conduct, together with a ſenſe of honour in the doing what is honourable. For, without ſuch a principle, no civil community nor private perſon can execute any thing great or noble. In confirmation of this, I take upon me to aſſert that if a man in love be found committing a baſe action, or ſuffering baſe uſage from any, through cowardice, or without taking his revenge, he is not in ſo much pain at being ſeen by his father, by his intimates, or by any

the Cratylus; but he derives his ſubſiſtence from the firſt and ſecond monads of the intelligible triad, and prior to theſe from the ineffable principle of all things. For a full account of Love ſee the notes on the ſpeech of Socrates.—T.

[s] This expreſſion may ſeem ſtrange, when only three writers have been cited. But each of them, on account of his excellence, ſtands as at the head of a numerous tribe; and may, therefore, juſtly be ſuppoſed, and taken for, the repreſentative of that tribe to which he belongs. Heſiod is ſingled out from amongſt all the poets, to be cited, as being the beſt of thoſe who compoſed poems περι θεογονιας, or concerning the generation of the Gods. His beautiful poem on that ſubject, from whence the quotation here is made, is ſtill extant.—Parmenides, a philoſopher of the Italic ſect, wrote in verſe, as did alſo moſt of the diſciples of the ſame ſchool; but, on account of his ſuperior reputation, is choſen to repreſent all his brother philoſophers who taught the principles of things.—And Acuſilaus, a writer unfortunately loſt, treated of the firſt or moſt remote antiquities, and the genealogies of the Gods and Heroes.—S.

other perſon, as at being ſeen by his miſtreſs. The ſame effect we ſee it has upon the party beloved, to be more aſhamed of her lover's ſight than of the eyes of the whole world, if ſhe be diſcovered doing aught diſhonourable. If, therefore, there could be any contrivance to have a city or an army compoſed of lovers and their beloved, the intereſt of the whole could not be promoted by any better way than this; in which every individual would have a care not to behave baſely, and a zeal to behave nobly, excited by a deſire to gain the good opinion of ſome other. Such a people fighting ſide by ſide in battle, a handful of them would conquer, I could almoſt ſay, the world. For a lover deſerting his rank, or throwing down his arms, would leſs endure to be ſeen by his beloved than by all mankind. Rather than bear this, he would chooſe to die a thouſand deaths: ſo would he, rather than forſake the defence of his beloved [1], or rather than forbear flying to her aid, if ſhe had fallen into danger. There is not any man ſuch a daſtard, whom Love himſelf would not inſpire, and make an enthuſiaſt in virtue: ſo that he ſhould become equal to a man born with a diſpoſition the moſt excellent. For what Homer ſays of certain of his heroes, that ſome God inſpired them with a force reſiſtleſs [2], this in reality Love does to lovers; ſuch an effect being produced in them by Love alone. And then to die for another, only lovers are ready; not only men, but women too. A ſignal inſtance of this appears in the daughter of Pelias, Alceſtis; who, as the ſtory goes among the Grecians, undertook to reprieve her huſband's life by her own death, when no other mortal could be found, willing to die for him [3], though he had

[1] In the Greek text of this paſſage, *και μην εγκαταλιπειν*, there is a manifeſt omiſſion of the very material word *ἡ*, or ſome other equivalent to it, immediately before the word *εγκαταλιπειν*.—S.

[2] The paſſage particularly alluded to, *εμπνευσε μενος*, is in the twentieth book of the Iliad, ver. 110. But expreſſions of the ſame import occur in many other places of Homer, ſuch as *ἡκε μενος*, *ὠρσε μενος*, &c.—S.

[3] The thought in this ſentence is evidently taken from the Alceſtis of Euripides; in the prologue to which are theſe lines,

Παντας δ' ελεγξας και διεξελθων φιλους,
Πατερα, γεραιαν θ' ἡ σφ' ετικτε μητερα,
Ουχ' εὑρε πλην γυναικος, ἡτις ηθελε
Θανειν προ κεινου——

He try'd his friends all round, their love profeſt

had both a father and a mother then living. But Love wrought in her heart an affection for him ſo far ſurpaſſing theirs, that ſhe proved them to be, in compariſon with herſelf, ſtrangers to his blood, and in name only his relations. When, therefore, ſhe had executed her undertaking, the Gods themſelves, as well as men, deemed the achievement ſo ſingularly noble, that out of many perſons, eminent for many virtues, ſhe was added to the number of thoſe ſelect few diſtinguiſhed by being reſtored to life again after death as a reward for their diſtinguiſhed excellence: for to her alſo was her departed ſoul ſent back again by the Gods, admiring at the heroic greatneſs of her reſolution. So much do they encourage us to make love our care, by beſtowing ſuperior honours on all ſuch as exerciſe upon that ſubject in particular ſuperior virtue. But Orpheus the ſon of Oeager the Gods diſmiſſed from thoſe inviſible regions, without granting him to ſucceed in the purpoſe of his journey thither; ſhowing him only the phantom of his wife, but not reſtoring to him the reality: for that he appeared effeminate and cowardly, ſuitable to his profeſſion, that of a mere fidler; not daring to die for the ſake of love, like Alceſtis; but contriving actually to go alive to the other world. For this did the Gods aſſign him an adequate puniſhment, ordaining his death to be by women. In a very different way diſpoſed they of Achilles, the ſon of Thetis, in ſending him to the iſlands of the bleſt: becauſe, though he had heard from the goddeſs his mother [1], that he muſt ſoon die himſelf after he had ſlain Hector—but that, if he ſlew not Hector, he ſhould return home and live to a good old age,—he dared to make death his choice; not only hazarding his life in aid of his friend Patroclus, as ready to die that he might ſave him, but afterwards avenging his death at the expence of his own life, as reſolute not to ſurvive him. This exalted

> Proving how real; his father who begat,
> His mother fond who bore him; yet found none,
> None but the faithful partner of his bed,
> Content to die, his dearer life to ſave.

The next ſentence alludes to ſome paſſages in the ſcene between Admetus and his father Pheres in the ſame play: to which we refer ſuch of our readers as ſtudy oratory, and know the uſefulneſs of comparing together paſſages in fine writers, where different turns are given to a thought fundamentally the ſame.—S.

[1] See Homer's Iliad, book 18th.

virtue of his the Gods paid a ſingular regard to; and rewarded with their choiceſt favours the regard which he had ſhown to friendſhip, in ſetting ſo high a value on the man who admired and loved him. For Æſchylus talks idly, when he ſays that Achilles was the admirer of Patroclus; Achilles, whoſe excellence, though he was but in the dawn of manhood, ſurpaſſed not only Patroclus, but all the other Grecian heroes. True it is, that the Gods confer ſuperior honours on all virtue, to the exerciſe of which love and friendſhip miniſter occaſion: but they more wonder, more approve, and beſtow greater rewards, where the perſon admired feels all the force of friendſhip and affection for the admirer, than where the nobleſt offices of friendſhip are performed by the other party. For the admirer has more of divinity in him than the perſon admired, as being full of the God who inſpires and poſſeſſes him. For this cauſe did the Gods reward Achilles with a higher degree of happineſs than they did Alceſtis; for to her they gave only a ſecond life on earth, but to the hero they aſſigned his manſion in the iſlands of the bleſt. Thus have I performed my part, in aſſerting Love to be the eldeſt in age and of higheſt dignity amongſt the Gods; and to be in a peculiar manner the author of virtue and happineſs to all of human kind, whilſt they continue in life, and when departed.

Such, Ariſtodemus told me, was the diſcourſe made by Phædrus. After Phædrus, ſpoke ſome others, whoſe ſpeeches, he ſaid, he did not well remember: omitting theſe, therefore, he repeated next that of Pauſanias, who began thus:—

THE SPEECH OF PAUSANIAS.

IN my opinion, Phædrus, the ſubject was not fairly and diſtinctly ſet before us, when it was propoſed in general terms, that we ſhould make encomiums upon Love. This, indeed, would have been right, were there but one Love, or if Love were but of one kind. But ſince the truth is otherwiſe, the better way is to declare firſt, which Love it is our preſent buſineſs to praiſe. To put this matter, therefore, on a right footing, I ſhall, in the firſt place, diſtinguiſh that Love whoſe praiſes we ought to celebrate; and then do my beſt to celebrate them myſelf, in a manner worthy of his Deity. We all know that it is the office of Love to attend always upon Venus. If then there

were only one Venus, there had been no occasion for more than one Love. But since there are two Venuses, there must of necessity be two Loves. For it is undeniable, that two different Goddesses[1] there are, each of whom is a Venus: one of them elder, who had no mother, and was born only from Uranus, or Heaven, her father; she is called the celestial Venus: the other, younger, daughter of Jupiter and Dione; and to her we give the name of the vulgar Venus. Agreeably to this account, it is proper to call that Love who attends on the latter Venus by the name of the vulgar Love, the other by the name of the celestial. All the Gods, indeed, it is our duty to honour with our praises: but we ought to distinguish, as well as we are able, each by his peculiar attributes; that we may give to each his due praise. For every action or operation is attended with this condition: the doing it, considered simply in itself, is neither base nor honourable: as for instance, every one of the things[2] we are now doing, drinking, singing, or discoursing, is in itself a matter of indifference; but the manner of doing it determines the nature of the thing. Rightly performed, it is right and honourable; performed in a wrong manner, it is wrong and dishonourable. So

[1] This distinction between the two Venuses, laid down by Pausanias as the foundation of his argument throughout his speech, is not a fanciful one of his own; but is a part of antient mythology. It is sufficiently confirmed and illustrated by the following passage in Xenophon's Symposium; a sentence which he puts into the mouth of Socrates. Ει μεν ουν μια εστιν Αφροδιτη, ἢ διτται, ουρανια τε και πανδημος, ουκ οιδα· (και γαρ Ζευς, ὁ αυτος δοκων ειναι, πολλας επωνυμιας εχει·) ὁτι γε μεντοι χωρις ἑκατερᾳ βωμοι τε εισι και ναοι και θυσιαι, τῃ μεν πανδημῳ ῥαδιουργοτεραι, τῃ δ' ουρανιᾳ ἁγνοτεραι, οιδα. εικασαις δ' αν και τους ερωτας την μεν πανδημον των σωματων επιπεμπειν, την δ' ουρανιαν της ψυχης τε και της φιλιας και των καλων εργων. "Now, whether in reality there be one Venus only, or whether there be two, a celestial Venus and a vulgar one, I know not: (for Jupiter also, whom I presume to be but one and the same being, has many surnames given him:) but this I know, that altars are raised, temples built, and sacrifices offered to each of these two Venuses distinctly; to the vulgar one, such as are common, trivial, and of little worth; to the celestial one, such as are more valuable, pure, and holy. Agreeably to this, it may be supposed of the different Loves, that those of the corporeal or sensual kind are inspired by the vulgar Venus; but that love of the mind, and friendship, a delight in fair and comely deeds, and a desire of performing such ourselves, are inspired by Venus the celestial."—S. For a theological account of these two Venuses, see the notes on the Cratylus.—T.

[2] In the Greek, instead of ὁιον, ὁ νυν ἡμεις ποιουμεν, we suppose it ought to be read, οἱον, ὡν νυν η. π· For the sentence thus proceeds, ἢ πινειν, ἢ αδειν, ἢ διαλεγεσθαι, (in every one of which verbs the article του seems to be implied,) ουκ εστι τουτων αυτο καθ' αυτο καλον ουδεν.—S.

likewise,

likewiſe, not every Love is generous or noble, or merits high encomiums; but that Love only who prompts and impels men to love generouſly and nobly. The attendant of the vulgar Venus is a Love truly vulgar, ſuffering himſelf to be employed in any the meaneſt actions: and this Love it is who inſpires the mean and the worthleſs. Thoſe who are the moſt addicted to this love, are, in the firſt place, the leaſt diſpoſed to friendſhip; in the next place, they are more enamoured of the bodies than of the minds of their paramours; and beſides, they chooſe from the objects of their paſſion the ſillieſt creatures they can light on: for, confining their views to the gratification of their paſſion by the act of enjoyment, they are regardleſs in what manner they gratify it, whether baſely or honourably. Hence it comes, that in the purſuit of their loves, and afterwards in the enjoyment, they are equally ready for any action which offers itſelf, whether good or bad, indifferently. For the Love who inſpires them is born of that younger Venus, in whoſe generation there is a mixture of the male and the female; whence it is that ſhe partakes of both. But the other Love is ſprung from the celeſtial Venus; from her whoſe properties are theſe:—in the firſt place, ſhe partakes not of the female, but of the male only; whence ſhe is the parent of friendſhip: then, ſhe is in age the elder, and a ſtranger to brutal luſt; and hence it happens, that as many as are inſpired by this love addict themſelves to friendſhip, conceiving an affection for that which by nature is of greater ſtrength and underſtanding. Now, whether the man who is under the influence of love feels the genuine impulſe of this generous affection, is eaſy to diſcern. For, if ſo, he fixes not his love on any perſon who is not arrived at the maturity of her underſtanding. But, commencing their loves from this date, one may well preſume them duly qualified, both of them, to live together throughout life, partners in all things. Nor is the lover likely in this caſe to act like one who, after diſcovering ſome childiſh folly in the perſon he has choſen, expoſes her, and turns her into ridicule, forfeits his faith to her and forſakes her, and attaches himſelf to a new miſtreſs. To prevent this, there ought to be a law, that no man ſhould make choice of too young a perſon for the partner of his bed; becauſe, what ſo young a perſon may hereafter prove, whether good or bad, either in mind or body, the event is ſo uncertain. Men of virtue indeed themſelves to themſelves make

this

this a law: but upon thoſe vulgar lovers we ſhould put a public reſtraint of this kind; in the ſame manner as we reſtrain them, as much as poſſible, from entering into amorous intrigues with any women above the rank of ſervitude. For they are of this ſort of lovers, they who bring upon their miſtreſſes reproach and ſhame; and have given occaſion to that verſe of one of the poets, in which he has dared to vilify the power of Love, by pronouncing,

'Tis loſs of honour to the fair
To yield, and grant the lover's prayer.

But he ſaid this only with a view to lovers of this kind, from ſeeing their untimely haſte and eagerneſs, their ingratitude and injuſtice. For certainly no action governed by the rules of juſtice and of decency can any way merit blame. Now, the rules concerning love eſtabliſhed in other ſtates are eaſy to be underſtood, as being plain and ſimple; but our own laws, and thoſe of Sparta upon this head, are complex and intricate. For in Elis [1], and amongſt the Bœotians, and in every other Grecian ſtate where the arts of ſpeaking flouriſh not, the law [2] in ſuch places abſolutely makes it honourable to gratify the lover; nor can any perſon there, whether young or old, ſtain ſuch a piece of conduct with diſhonour: the reaſon of which law, I preſume, is to prevent the great trouble they would otherwiſe have in courting the fair, and trying to win them by the arts of oratory, arts in which they have no abili-

[1] It is remarkable that Xenophon, in his Banquet, where he diſtinguiſhes between the virtuous friendſhip eſtabliſhed among the Spartans, and the libidinous commerce authorized by faſhion and common practice amongſt the Bœotians and Eleans, cites this Pauſanias as one who had confounded them together, and given them equal praiſes. He there likewiſe attributes to Pauſanias ſome of the ſame ſentiments, and thoſe of the moſt ſtriking kind, which Plato records as delivered by Phædrus in his ſpeech. We cannot help imagining that Xenophon, in citing Pauſanias, alludes to what was ſaid at Agatho's entertainment: and if our conjecture be true, that little circumſtantial difference confirms the account given by Plato in the main, and argues it to have ſome foundation at leaſt in real fact.—S.

[2] The word *law* here, and wherever elſe it occurs in this ſpeech, from hence to the end of it, means not a written law, a poſitive precept or prohibition in expreſs terms, but cuſtom and faſhion. For the general acceptance of any rule of conduct, whether rational or not, obtains by length of time the authority of law with the people who follow it; as it receives the eſſence of law in a civil ſenſe, from the common conſent which firſt eſtabliſhed it.—S.

ties.

ties. But in Ionia, and many other places [1], and in all barbarian countries univerſally, the ſame conduct is ordained and held to be diſhonourable. For the tyrannical governments under which the people of thoſe countries live, diſcountenance that way of mutual love; and bring it into diſrepute. But the ſame fate in thoſe countries attends philoſophy, or the love of wiſdom; as it does no leſs the love of manly exerciſes. And the reaſon, I preſume, in all theſe caſes is the ſame; it is not the intereſt of the rulers there to have their ſubjects high-ſpirited or high-minded; nor to ſuffer ſtrong friendſhips to be formed amongſt them, or any other ties of a common or joint intereſt: and theſe are the uſual and natural effects of love, as well as of thoſe other ſtudies and practices prohibited by tyrants. Thoſe who formerly tyrannized over Athens experienced this to be true. For the firm and ſtable friendſhip between Ariſtogiton [2] and Harmodius was the deſtruction of their tyranny. Thus we find, that wherever the ſtricter ties of love and friendſhip are forbidden or diſcouraged, it is owing to vice, to luſt of power, and of whatever is the private intereſt of the governor; to want of ſpirit and courage, and every other virtue, in the governed: and that wherever they are enjoined or encouraged ſimply and without reſtriction, it is owing to a littleneſs and lazineſs of ſoul in thoſe who have the making of the laws. But in our own ſtate the laws relating to this point are put upon a better footing; though, as I ſaid before, it is not obvious or eaſy to comprehend their meaning. For, when we conſider, that with us it is reputed honourable for men openly to profeſs love, rather than to make a ſecret of it; and to fix their beſt affections on ſuch as excel in the accompliſhments of mind, though inferior to others of their ſex in outward beauty; that every one highly favours and

[1] The Greek text in this place is greatly corrupted. Stephens has tried to amend it by ſome alterations, but without ſucceſs: for it is probable that more than a few words are wanting. We have, therefore, contented ourſelves with the ſenſe of this paſſage; which we think miſrepreſented by the former tranſlators. For, by the "many other places," we imagine that Plato means, beſides Sicily, (where in thoſe days tyranny or arbitrary ſway commonly prevailed,) all thoſe northern parts of Greece likewiſe, where the government was abſolutely monarchical. For Ionia, Sicily, and all places where the Greek language was ſpoken by the people, Plato would certainly diſtinguiſh from thoſe countries where the vulgar language was different; theſe laſt being by the Grecians termed barbarians.—S.

[2] The ſtory is told by Thucydides, and many other antient writers; but in a manner the moſt agreeable to the mind of our author in this place by Herodotus.—S.

applauds

applauds the lover, as not thinking him engaged in any deſigns which are baſe or unbecoming a man; that ſucceſs in love is held an honour to the lover; diſappointment, a diſhonour; and that the law allows the lover liberty to do his utmoſt for the accompliſhing his end; and permits ſuch ſtrange actions to be commended in him, ſuch, as were a man to be guilty of in any other purſuit than that of love, and as the means of ſucceeding in any other deſign, he would be ſure of meeting with the higheſt reproaches from philoſophy. For if, with a view either of getting money out of any perſon, or of attaining to any ſhare in the government, or of acquiring power of any other kind, a man ſhould ſubmit to do ſuch things as lovers ordinarily practiſe to gain their miſtreſſes, ſupplicating and begging in the humbleſt manner, making vows and oaths, keeping nightly vigils at their doors, and voluntarily ſtooping to ſuch ſlavery as no ſlave would undergo, both his friends and his enemies would prevent him from ſo doing; his enemies reproaching him for his ſervility and illiberality; his friends admoniſhing him and aſhamed for him. But in a lover all this is graceful; and the law grants him free leave to do it unceníured, as a buſineſs highly commendable for him to undertake and execute. But that which is more than all the reſt prodigious is, that the Gods, though they pardon not the crime of perjury in any beſides, yet excuſe in a lover the violation of his oath, if the opinion of the multitude be true; for oaths in love, they ſay, are not binding. Thus the Gods, as well as men, give all kinds of licence to the lover; as ſays the law eſtabliſhed in our ſtate. Viewing now the affair in this light, a man would imagine that among us not only love in the lover, but a grateful return likewiſe from the beloved party, was reputed honourable. But when we ſee the parents of the youthful fair appointing governeſſes and guardians over them, who have it in their inſtructions not to ſuffer them to hold diſcourſe in private with their lovers; when we ſee their acquaintance, and their equals in age, and other people beſides, cenſuring them, if they are guilty of ſuch a piece of imprudence, and the old folks not oppoſing the cenſurers, nor reprehending them as guilty of unjuſt cenſures; in this view, a man would be apt to think that, on the contrary, we condemned thoſe very things which he might otherwiſe ſuppoſe we had approved of. But, upon the whole, the caſe, I believe, ſtands thus: The affair of love, as I ſaid at firſt, conſidered ſimply and generally, is neither right nor wrong; but, carried on and accompliſhed with

honour, is fair and honourable; tranſacted in a diſhonourable manner, is baſe and diſhonourable. Now, it is a diſhonour to a maiden to gratify a vicious and bad lover, or to yield to him from baſe and unworthy motives: but in granting favours to a good and virtuous lover, and complying with his love from generous and noble views, ſhe does herſelf an honour. The vicious lover is he of the vulgar ſort, who is in love with the body rather than the mind. For he is not a laſting lover, being in love with a thing which is not laſting; ſince, with the flower of youth [1] when that is gone which he admired, the lover himſelf too takes wing and flies away, ſhaming all his fine ſpeeches and fair promiſes. But the man who is in love with his miſtreſs's moral character, when her diſpoſition and manners are ſettled in what is right, he is a lover who abides through life, as being united with that which is durable and abiding. Our law wills accordingly, that all lovers ſhould be well and fairly proved; and that, after ſuch probation, upon ſome the favours of the fair ſhould be beſtowed, to others they ſhould be conſtantly refuſed. It encourages, therefore, the lover to purſue, but bids the beloved party fly: by all ways of trial, and in every kind of combat, making it appear of which ſort the lover is, and of which ſort his miſtreſs. For this reaſon it is that the law deems it diſhonourable, in the firſt place, to be won ſoon or eaſily; in order that time may be gained; for of the truth of many things time ſeems to be the faireſt teſt: in the next place, it is held diſhonourable for the fair one to be won by conſiderations of profit or power; whether ſhe be uſed ill, or terrified, and therefore yield, through want of noble endurance; or whether ſhe be flattered with riches or rank, and deſpiſe not ſuch kind of obligations. For none of theſe things appear fixed or durable; much leſs can they give riſe to any generous friendſhip. There remains then one only way, in which, according to our law, the fair one may honourably yield, and conſent to her lover's paſſion. For, as any kind of ſervitude which the lover undergoes of his own free choice in the ſervice

[1] The Greek of this paſſage, ἁμα γαρ τῳ του σωματος ανθει ληγοντι, ὑπερ ηρα, we have tranſlated according to the following minute alteration of only one word, ἁμα γαρ—ανθει, ληγοντος ὑπερ ηρα. The very next words, οιχεται αποπταμενος, allude to a verſe of Homer's, the 71ſt in the ſecond book of the Iliad; where he ſpeaks of the departure of the dream ſent to Agamemnon. By which alluſion Plato teaches the fair and young, that the promiſes of ſuch lovers as are here ſpoken of are flattering and deceitful, and, like that falſe dream, tend only to delude and ruin.—S.

of his miſtreſs is not by our law deemed adulation, nor accounted a matter of diſgrace; ſo, on the other part, there is left only one other ſervitude or compliance not diſgraceful in the fair; and this is that which is for the ſake of virtue. For it is a ſettled rule with us, that whoever pays any court or attendance, whoever yields any ſervice or compliance to another, in expectation of receiving by his means improvement in wiſdom, or in any other branch of virtue, is not by ſuch voluntary ſubjection guilty of ſervility or baſe adulation. Now theſe two rules are to correſpond one with the other, and muſt concur to the ſame end, the rule relating to lovers, and this which concerns philoſophy and every other part of virtue, in order to make it honourable in the fair one to comply with her lover's paſſion. For, when the lover and his miſtreſs meet together, bringing with them their reſpective rules, each of them; the lover, his—that it is right to miniſter any way to the ſervice of his miſtreſs; the fair one, hers—that it is right to yield any ſervice or compliance to the perſon who improves her in wiſdom and in virtue; the one alſo, with abilities to teach and to make better; the other, with a deſire of inſtruction and the being bettered;—then, both thoſe rules thus correſponding and conſpiring, in theſe circumſtances only, and in no other, it falls out, by a concurrence of all the neceſſary requiſites, to be honourable in the fair one to gratify her lover. Beſides, in this caſe it is no diſhonour to her to be deceived: but, in the caſe of compliance on any other terms, ſhe incurs ſhame equally, whether ſhe be deceived or not. For if, on a ſuppoſition of her lover's being wealthy, ſhe yields to him with a view of enriching herſelf, but is diſappointed, and gets nothing from her paramour, whom at length ſhe diſcovers to be poor, it is not at all the leſs diſhonourable to her: becauſe ſuch a woman diſcovers openly her own heart, and makes it appear, that for the ſake of wealth ſhe would yield any thing to any perſon: and this is highly diſhonourable and baſe. But if, imagining her lover to be a good man, and with a view to her own improvement in virtue through the friendſhip of her lover, ſhe yields to him, and is deceived, finding him a bad man, unpoſſeſſed of virtue, her diſappointment, however, is ſtill honourable to her: for a diſcovery has been alſo made of her aims; and it has appeared evident, that as a means to acquire virtue, and to be made better, ſhe was ready to reſign to any man her all: and this is of all things the moſt generous and noble. So entirely and abſolutely honourable is it in the fair one to comply for the ſake

of

of virtue. This is that Love, the offspring of the celeſtial Venus, himſelf celeſtial; of high importance to the public intereſt, and no leſs valuable to private perſons; compelling as well the lover, as the beloved, with the utmoſt care to cultivate virtue. All the other Loves hold of the other Venus, of her the vulgar. Thus much, Phædrus, have I to contribute on this ſudden call to the ſubject you have propoſed to us, the praiſe of Love.

Pauſanias here pauſing,—for I learn from the wiſe to uſe parities [1] in ſpeaking, and words of ſimilar ſound; Ariſtodemus told me, it came next in turn to Ariſtophanes to ſpeak: but whether from repletion, or whatever elſe was the cauſe, he happened to be ſeized with a fit of the hiccups [2], and conſequently became unfit for ſpeech-making. Upon which, as he ſat next to Eryximachus the phyſician, he addreſſed him thus: Eryximachus, ſays he, you muſt either drive away my hiccups, or ſpeak in my turn till they have left me.—To which Eryximachus replied, Well; I will do both. I will ſpeak in your turn, and you, when your hiccups are gone, ſhall ſpeak in mine: and while I am ſpeaking, if you hold your breath for a conſiderable time, your hiccups, perhaps, will have an end. Should they continue, notwithſtanding, then gargle your throat with water. But if they are very obſtinate, take ſome ſuch thing as this feather, and tickle your noſe till you provoke a ſneezing. When you have ſneezed once or twice [3], your hiccups will ceaſe, be they ever

[1] Theſe little ornaments of ſtyle were introduced into oratory, and taught firſt by Gorgias; who, it is probable, had obſerved them there, where every beauty and ornament of ſpeech, great or little, is to be found, that is, in Homer. Iſocrates, who had ſtudied the art of oratory under Gorgias, ſeems to have received from him what his own judgment when mature afterwards rejected, the immoderate and ill-timed uſe of thoſe ſuperficial ornaments. The foregoing ſpeech of Pauſanias, in imitation of Iſocrates, abounds with various kinds of them, and thoſe the moſt puerile and petty; which it was impoſſible for us to preſerve or imitate, in tranſlating thoſe paſſages into Engliſh; becauſe, though all languages admit them, yet every language varies from every other in the ſignification of almoſt all thoſe words where they are found. An inſtance of this appears in the paſſage now before us, where the Greek Παυσανιου δε παυσαμενου, tranſlated juſtly, runs thus, "When Pauſanias had ceaſed ſpeaking," that is, had ended his ſpeech. But all ſimilarity of ſound would thus entirely be deſtroyed. As, therefore, it was neceſſary in this place to preſerve it in ſome meaſure, however imperfectly, we found ourſelves obliged here to make ſenſe give way to ſound.—S.

[2] See the Life of Plato by Olympiodorus, in Vol. I. of this work.—T.

[3] Hippocrates, in Aphoriſm. ſect. vi. n. 13. and Celſus, in lib. ii. c. 8. aſſure us, that "if ſneezing

ever ſo violent.—As ſoon as you begin your ſpeech, ſays Ariſtophanes, I ſhall ſet about doing what you bid me.—Eryximachus then began in this manner:

THE SPEECH OF ERYXIMACHUS.

SINCE Pauſanias, after ſetting out ſo excellently well, ended his diſcourſe imperfectly, it ſeems a taſk incumbent on me, to finiſh the argument which he began. For, in diſtinguiſhing two different kinds of Love, he made, I think, a very proper and juſt diſtinction. But that Love gives us an attraction not only to beautiful perſons, but to many other things beſide; and that he dwells not only in human hearts, but has alſo his ſeat in other beings, in the bodies of all animals, and in the vegetable productions of the earth; in fine, that he lives throughout all nature; my own art, that of medicine, has given me occaſion to obſerve; and to remark, how great and wonderful a God is Love, ſtretching every where his attractive power, and reaching at all things, whether human or divine. I ſhall inſtance firſt in medicine; that I may pay my firſt regards to my own profeſſion. I ſay then, that our bodies partake of this twofold love. For bodily health and diſeaſe bear an analogy to the two different diſpoſitions of the ſoul mentioned by Pauſanias. And as the body in a ſtate of health, and the body when diſeaſed, are in themſelves very different one from the other, ſo they love and long for very different things. The love in a healthy body is of one kind; the love in a diſeaſed body is of another kind, quite different. Now, as Pauſanias ſays, it is honourable to comply with a good lover, but diſhonourable to yield to one who is vicious: ſo is it with reſpect to the body: whatever is in a ſound and healthy ſtate, it is commendable and right to pleaſe; it is the phyſician's duty ſo to do, and the effectual doing of it

ing comes upon a man in a fit of the hiccups, it puts an end to the diſorder." Upon this general rule, no doubt, was founded the preſent preſcription of Eryximachus. Dr. G. E. Stahl, however, uſed to tell his pupils, as appears from his Collegium minus, caſ. 53. that the rule indeed was true, where the ſneezing was ſpontaneous, or the work of nature; but that a ſneezing procured by art, or forced, was never recommended. "Sternutationes," ſays he, "ſponte ſingultui ſupervenientes, ſolvunt quidem ſingultum; ſed arte productæ non commendantur." But we muſt remark, that this great modern is here putting the caſe, not of the hiccups when they are the only diſorder; but of a malignant fever, and thoſe ſymptomatic hiccups which are often the concomitants of that and other dangerous diſeaſes.—S.

denotes him truly a phyſician [1]. But to gratify that which is diſeaſed and bad, is blameable [2]; and the phyſician, who would practiſe agreeably to the rules of art, muſt deny it the gratification which it demands [3]. For medical ſcience, to give a ſummary and brief account of it, is the knowledge of thoſe amorous paſſions of the body, which tend to filling and emptying [4]. Accordingly, the man who in theſe paſſions or appetites can diſtinguiſh the right love from that which is wrong, he has moſt of all men the ſcience belonging to a phyſician. And the man who is able to effect a change, ſo as in the place of one of thoſe loves to introduce the other; and knows how to infuſe love into thoſe bodies which have it not, yet ought to have it; and how to expell a love with which they are but ought not to be

[1] The words uſed by Plato, in this place, are ſtill ſtronger, and ſignify—"denominates him a phyſician." For the preſervation of health, through a right uſe of the non-naturals, that is, ſuch a one as is agreeable to nature, reſpecting the difference of ſex, age, temperament of body, climate, ſeaſon of the year, and other circumſtances, was accounted in the days of Plato not only a part, but the principal one too, of the art of medicine; and was by the old Greek phyſicians carried to a degree of accuracy and perfection abſolutely unknown or totally neglected in after-ages.—S.

[2] This paſſage is illuſtrated by that of Hippocrates, near the end of his treatiſe de Morbo Sacro. Χρη—μη αυξειν τα νουσηματα, αλλα σπευδειν τρυχειν, προσφεροντας τη νουσῳ το πολεμιωτατον ἑκαστη, μη το φιλον και συνηθες· ὑπο μεν γαρ της συνηθειας θαλλει και αυξεται, ὑπο δε του πολεμιου φθινει και αμαυρουται. Having ſpoken of nouriſhment, he ſays, that "the phyſician ſhould take care not to nouriſh and increaſe diſeaſes, but as ſoon as poſſible to exhauſt and wear them out; applying to every diſeaſe that which is hoſtile and repugnant to it the moſt, not that which is friendly, of the ſame temper with it, or habitual to it: for by the latter it acquires growth and vigour; by the former it decays and is extinguiſhed." This, by the way, is the foundation of an excellent practic rule; and that is, in chronical diſeaſes ſometimes to change the medicines, though at firſt found ever ſo beneficial, when they are become too familiar, and the diſeaſe is habituated to bear them; for they would then by degrees loſe their efficacy.—S.

[3] To adminiſter proper remedies, ſays our great maſter, is to counteract the genius or nature of the diſeaſe; and never to concur or correſpond with it. Ιησις αντινοον, [f. και] μη ὁμονοειν τῳ παθει. Hippoc. Epidem. l. vi. § 5. n. 7.—S.

[4] What follows, when ſtript of the metaphor neceſſary on the occaſion, is the ſame thing with this of Hippocrates, Τα εναντια των εναντιων εστιν ιηματα. Ιατρικη γαρ εστι προσθεσις και αφαιρεσις· αφαιρεσις μεν των ὑπερβαλλοντων, προσθεσις δε των ελλειποντων. ὁ δε καλλιστα τουτο ποιεων, αριστος ιητρος. Lib. de Flatibus, not far from the beginning. "Contraries are a cure one for the other. For the practice of the art of medicine conſiſts of two operations, adding and ſubtracting; or ſupplying and drawing off; a drawing off of that which is over-abundant, a ſupplying of that which is deficient. Whoever can perform theſe in the beſt manner, he is the beſt phyſician."—S.

poſſeſſed;

poſſeſſed; he is a ſkilful practiſer of his art. For thoſe things in the body which are moſt at variance muſt he be able to reconcile to each other [1], and to conciliate amity between them and mutual love. The things moſt at variance are ſuch as are the moſt contrary one to the other; as the cold is to the hot, the bitter to the ſweet, the dry to the moiſt, and all others of that ſort [2]. Into theſe things, thus at variance, our anceſtor Æſculapius had power to inſpire a ſpirit of love and concord; and, as our friends here the poets tell us, and as I believe, framing into a ſyſtem the rules for ſo doing, was properly the author of our art. So that medicine, in the manner I have deſcribed, is all under the direction and management of Love. So is the gymnaſtic art in like manner [3]; and ſo is the art of agriculture [4]. And that muſic is ſo too, is evident to every man who conſiders the nature of this art with the leaſt attention; and is perhaps the very thing which Heraclitus meant to ſay: for his way of expreſſing himſelf is inaccurate and obſcure. "The one [5]," ſays he, "diſagreeing with itſelf, yet proceeds in amicable concord; like the harmony made by the bow and lyre." Now it

[1] See Hippocrates, throughout his treatiſe de Naturâ Hominis.—S.

[2] That is, all ſuch contrary qualities in the humours of the body as are diſtinguiſhable by ſenſe.—S.

[3] The end of the medical art is health; that of the gymnaſtic is ſtrength, or an athletic habit of body. But in the means they make uſe of to gain their ſeveral ends, favouring and indulging the diſpoſition of body which is right, counteracting and correcting ſuch as are wrong, theſe arts are exactly analogous one to the other.—S.

[4] The genius and condition of the ſoil bear an analogy to the temperament and preſent ſtate of the body; the different kinds of manure and other cultivation are analogous to food and medicine. A good ſoil is improved by a manure homogeneous to it; a bad ſoil meliorated by an oppoſite method of cultivation, altering its nature and condition. As to the metaphor, the ſame has been always uſed in agriculture to this day. We ſay, that ſuch a ſoil loves ſuch a manure; and that ſuch a tree, plant, or other vegetable, loves and delights in ſuch a ſoil; when they are correſpondent, when the nature of the one is fitted to that of the other, and is favourable to it in making it thrive and flouriſh.—S.

[5] The author of the treatiſe Περι κοσμου, *Concerning the world*, printed among the works of Ariſtotle, and uſually aſcribed to him, though not from any deciſive authority, cites the following paſſage from the ſame Heraclitus, which may ſerve to illuſtrate the preſent: συναψειας ουλα και ουχι ουλα, συμφερομενον και διαφερομενον, συναδον και διαδον, και εκ παντων εν, και εξ ενος παντα. i. e. "You muſt connect the perfect and the imperfect, the agreeing and the diſagreeing, the conſonant and the diſſonant, and from all things one, and from one all things." In which paſſage, by *the one from all things* he means the univerſe; and by *all things from one*, he inſinuates the ſubſiſtence of all things from *the one*, the ineffable principle of all.—T.

is very abſurd to ſay, that in harmony any diſagreement can find place; or that the component parts of harmony can ever diſagree. But his meaning perhaps was this; that things in their own nature diſagreeing, that is, ſounds, ſome ſhrill and others deep, at length brought to an agreement by the muſical art, compoſe harmony. For harmony cannot conſiſt of ſhrill and deep ſounds, whilſt they remain in diſagreement: becauſe harmony is conſonance, or a conſpiration of ſounds; and conſonance is one kind of agreement: but it is impoſſible that any agreement ſhould be between diſagreeing things, ſo long as they diſagree: and no leſs impoſſible is it, that things between which there is no agreement ſhould at the ſame time harmonize together, ſo as to produce harmony. And as it is with ſound ſo is it with motion; the quick meaſures and the ſlow ones, by nature diſagreeing, but afterwards brought to agree together, compoſe rhythm. In both theſe caſes [1], where things differ and are oppoſite to one another, it is the art of muſic which brings about the reconcilement and agreement; juſt as the art of medicine does in the former caſe [2]; inſpiring them in the ſame manner with the ſpirit of love and concord. And thus muſical ſcience is the knowledge of thoſe amorous conjunctions whoſe offspring are harmony and rhythm. Now in the ſyſtems themſelves, whether of harmony or of rhythm, there is no difficulty at all in knowing the amorous conjunctions: for here love is not diſtinguiſhed into two kinds. But when the intention is to apply rhythm and harmony to the ears of ſome audience, then comes the difficulty; then is there need of a ſkilful artiſt, whether in compoſing the odes, and ſetting them to muſic, or in making a right choice of thoſe ready compoſed and ſet [3], and properly adapting them to the geniuses of youth. For here that diſtinction takes place; here muſt we recur again to that rule of Pauſanias, that the decent, the well-ordered, and the virtuous it is right to gratify,

[1] That of diſagreeing ſounds, and that of diſagreeing meaſures of time.—S.

[2] That of the diſagreeing qualities of the humours in a human body.—S.

[3] Poetry and muſic were employed by the Grecian maſters of education as a principal means to form the manners of their youth, to inſpire them with becoming ſentiments, and excite them to worthy actions. In the choice, therefore, of poetry and muſic, proper for this purpoſe, great judgment was uſed, and much care taken. It was not left, as now-a-days, to the fancy or humour of men, whoſe profeſſion is only to teach words, or muſical notes, with their ſeveral combinations. Legiſlators and magiſtrates then thought it an object the moſt worthy of their own attention: and the

gratify, for the ſake of preſerving their love, and of improving ſuch as are yet deficient in virtue. The Love by whom theſe are inſpired is the noble, the celeſtial; that Love who attends the celeſtial muſe. But the attendant of Polyhymnia, and the follower of every muſe at random, is the other Love, he of the vulgar kind: whom we ought cautiouſly to indulge, whenever we indulge him; that he may enjoy his own pleaſures without introducing diſorder and debauchery. And this is an affair of no leſs difficulty than in our art it is to manage prudently the appetites which regard the table; ſo as to permit them the enjoyment of their proper pleaſures, without danger of diſeaſes. Thus, in the practice of muſic, and of medicine, and in every other employment, whether human or divine, we are to preſerve, as far as conſiſtently we may, both Loves: for both are to be found in all things [1]. Full of both is the conſtitution of the annual ſeaſons. And when thoſe contraries in nature before mentioned, the hot and the cold, the dry and the moiſt, under the influence of the modeſt Love, admit a ſober correſpondence together, and temperate commixture; they bring along with them, when they come, fair ſeaſons, fine weather, and health to men, brute animals, and plants, doing injury to none. But when that Love who inſpires lawleſs and ungoverned paſſion prevails in the conſtitution of the ſeaſon, he corrupts, injures and ruins many of the fair forms of nature. For the uſual fruits of this Love are plagues, and other preter-natural diſeaſes, which come upon animals, and vegetables too; mildews, hail-ſtorms, and blights being generated from the irregular ſtate of the amorous affections in thoſe elementary beings, and the want of temperance in their conjunctions: the knowledge of which their amorous affections, and conſequent conjunctions, conſidered as owing to the aſpects of the heavenly bodies, and as reſpecting the ſeaſons of the year, is called aſtronomy. Further, all kinds of ſacrifice, and all the ſubjects of the diviner's art [2], thoſe agents employed in carrying on

the greateſt philoſophers, who framed models of government according to ideal perfection, or laid down maxims fit to be obſerved by every wiſe ſtate, treat it as a ſubject of higheſt importance; and accordingly are very exact and particular in explaining the natural effects of every ſpecies of muſic, or muſical poetry, on the mind. See Plato's Republic, b. ii. and iii. his Laws, b. ii. and vii. and Ariſtotle's Politics, b. viii.—S.

[1] That is, the rational, the regular, and the ſober, together with the ſenſual, the lawleſs, and the wild or infinite. See Plato's Philebus, throughout.

[2] Such as dreams, omens, the flight of birds, &c.

a reciprocal

a reciprocal intercourſe between the Gods and mortals, are employed with no other view than to preſerve the right love, and cure that which is wrong. For every ſpecies of impiety is the uſual conſequence of not yielding to and gratifying the better Love, the regular; and of not paying to him, but to the other Love [1], our principal regards, in every thing we do relating to our parents, whether living or deceaſed, and in every thing relating to the Gods. In all ſuch caſes, to ſuperintend the Loves, to cheriſh the right, and cure the wrong, is the buſineſs of divination. And thus Divination is an artiſt, ſkilled in procuring and promoting friendlineſs and good correſpondence between the Gods and men, through her knowledge of what amorous affections in men tend to piety and juſtice, and what are oppoſite to theſe, and lead the contrary way. So widely extenſive, ſo highly predominant, or rather all-prevailing, is the power of Love. Of all love in general this is true; but eſpecially, and the moſt true is it, of that Love who attains his ends in the attainment of good things, and enjoys them without ever exceeding the bounds of temperance, or violating the laws of juſtice. For it is this Love who bears the chief ſway both in the human nature and the divine; it is this Love who procures for us every kind of happineſs; enabling us to live in ſocial converſe one with another, and in friendſhip with beings ſo much ſuperior to ourſelves, the Gods. It is poſſible now after all, that, in the panegyric I have made on Love, I may have omitted, as well as Pauſanias, many topics of his due praiſe: it has not, however, been done deſignedly; and if I have left aught unſaid, it is your buſineſs, Ariſtophanes, to ſupply that deficiency: or, if your intentions are to celebrate the God in a different way, now that your hiccups are over, you may begin.

To this Ariſtophanes replied; I am now indeed no longer troubled with my hiccups: but they would not be eaſy before I brought the ſneezings to them. I wonder that a modeſt and decent part of the body ſhould be in love with and long for theſe ticklings, or be pleaſed with ſuch boiſterous

[1] In the Greek text ſome corruption has here crept in. Stephens has endeavoured to amend it in a manner agreeable to Plato's ſtyle in other places, it muſt be confeſſed. Yet we muſt prefer the omiſſion of the word περι before τον ἑτερον, becauſe the ſentence is made much eaſier by this alteration; and becauſe the accidental inſertion of the word περι may eaſily be accounted for; as will appear to any good critic in this way, who will be pleaſed to conſult the original.—S.

roaring noiſes, ſuch as ſneezing is: for, as ſoon as I had procured it a good ſneezing, immediately it was quiet.—Eryximachus upon this ſaid, Friend Ariſtophanes, conſider what you are about: you are raiſing up a ſpirit of ridicule here, juſt as you are going to begin your ſpeech; and put me upon the watch, to lay hold of ſomething or other in it for the company to laugh at, when you might, if you pleaſed, have ſpoken in quiet.—To which Ariſtophanes in a good-humoured way replied, You are in the right, Eryximachus: what I ſaid juſt now, let it be looked on as unſaid. But, pray, do not watch me. For I am in pain for the ſpeech I am going to make; not for fear there ſhould be any thing in it to laugh at; for a laugh would be an advantage gained to me, and the natural product of my muſe; but for fear it ſhould be really in itſelf ridiculous.—You ſhoot your bolt, Ariſtophanes, ſaid Eryximachus, and then think to march off. But take care of what you ſay, and expect to be called to a ſtrict account for it. Perhaps, however, I ſhall be gracious enough to ſpare you.—Ariſtophanes then began:

THE SPEECH OF ARISTOPHANES.

MY intentions, Eryximachus, are to ſpeak in a way very different, I aſſure you, from the way taken by you and Pauſanias in your ſpeeches. To me men ſeem utterly inſenſible what the power of Love is. For, were they ſenſible of it, they would build temples and erect altars to him the moſt magnificent, and would offer to him the nobleſt ſacrifices. He would not be neglected as he is now, when none of theſe honours are paid him, though, of all the Gods, Love ought the moſt to be thus honoured. For, of all the Gods, Love is the moſt friendly to man, his relief [1] and remedy in thoſe evils the perfect cure of which would be productive of the higheſt happineſs to the whole human race. I will do my beſt, therefore, to make his power known to you, and you ſhall teach it to others. But you muſt firſt be informed what the human nature is, and what changes it has undergone. For our nature of old was different from what it is at preſent. In the firſt place,

[1] Ιατρος τουτων, that is, κακων, not ανθρωπων, as Racine, and all the former tranſlators except Cornarius, erroneouſly imagined. Their miſtake was owing plainly to the wrong punctuation in all editions of the original in this place.—S.

there

there were antiently three ſorts [1], or ſubordinate ſpecies, of the human kind; not as at preſent, only two, male and female; there being, then, a third ſpecies beſide, which partook of both the others: the name only of which ſpecies now remains, the ſpecies itſelf being extinct and loſt. For then exiſted actually and flouriſhed hermaphrodites, who partook of both the other ſpecies, the male and the female. But they are now become merely a name, a name of abuſe and of reproach. In the next place, the entire form of every individual of the human kind was cylindrical; for their bodies, back and ſides together, were every where, from top to bottom, circular. Every one had four hands, and the ſame number of legs. They had two faces, each, upon their round necks, every way both alike: but theſe two faces belonged, but to one head; on the ſides of which were placed theſe faces, oppoſite one to the other. Each had alſo four ears, and two diſtinctions of the ſex. From this deſcription, it is eaſy to conceive how all the other parts of the human body were doubled. They walked upon whichever legs they pleaſed, on any ſide; and, as they walk now, upright. But when any one wanted to go with expedition, then, as tumblers, after pitching on their hands, throw their legs upward, and bring them over, and thus tumble themſelves round; in the ſame manner did the people of thoſe days, ſupported by their eight limbs alternately, and wheeled along with great diſpatch. Now you are to know, that theſe three ſpecies of the human race were preciſely ſo many in number, and their bodies made in ſuch a form, for this reaſon,—becauſe the male kind was produced originally by the ſun, the female roſe from the earth, and the third, which partook of the other two, was the offspring of the moon;

[1] Plato is ſo far from being a careleſs writer, that he has always ſome concealed and important meaning, even in things apparently the moſt trivial and abſurd. For what can be apparently more abſurd than this account which Ariſtophanes gives of the changes which the human nature has undergone? And yet it occultly inſinuates a very important truth, that kindred human ſouls, both of a male and female characteriſtic, were in a more perfect ſtate of exiſtence united with each other, much more profoundly than they can be in the preſent ſtate. However, though it inſinuates a more perfect condition of being, yet it is by no means that of the ſoul in its higheſt ſtate of felicity. For the *cylindric* bodies indicate its being ſtill converſant with, or *rolling* about, generation, i. e. the regions under the moon. Plato, therefore, probably indicates in this fable an aërial condition of being. For though the ſoul, while living there in a deſcending condition, is in reality in a fallen ſtate, yet ſhe is more perfect than when reſident on the earth. Agreeably, and perhaps with alluſion to this fable, which I doubt not is of greater antiquity than Plato, Pythagoras defined a friend to be *a man's other ſelf*.—T.

for the moon, you know, partakes of both the others, the ſun and the earth. The bodies, therefore, of each kind were round, and the manner of their running was circular, in reſemblance of their firſt parents. Their force and ſtrength were prodigious; their minds elevated and haughty; ſo they undertook to invade heaven. And of them is related the ſame fact which Homer relates of Ephialtus and Otus, that they ſet about raiſing an aſcent up to the ſkies, with intention to attack the Gods. Upon which Jupiter and the other Deities conſulted together what they ſhould do to theſe rebels[1]; but could come to no determination about the puniſhment proper to be inflicted on them. They could not reſolve upon deſtroying them by thunder, as they did the giants; for thus the whole human race would be extinct; and then the honours paid them by that race would be extinct together with it, and their temples come to ruin. Nor yet could they ſuffer thoſe mortals to continue in their inſolence. At length Jupiter, after much conſideration of ſo difficult a caſe, ſaid, I have a device, by which the race of men may be preſerved, and yet an end put to their inſolence; as my device will much diminiſh the greatneſs of their ſtrength. For I intend, you muſt know, to divide every one of them into two: by which means their ſtrength will be much abated, and at the ſame time their number much increaſed, to our advantage and the increaſe of our honour. They ſhall walk upright upon two legs; and if any remains of inſolence ſhall even appear in them, and they reſolve not to be at quiet, I will again divide them, each into two; and they ſhall go upon one leg, hopping. As he ſaid, ſo did he; he cut all the human race in twain, as people cut eggs[2] to ſalt them for keeping. The face, together with the half-

[1] Human ſouls, though in a more excellent condition of being when living in the air than when inhabitants of the earth, yet when they are deſcending, or gravitating to earth, they may be juſtly called rebels, becauſe they not only abandon their true country, but are hoſtile to its manners and laws. Hence, as they no longer cheriſh, but oppoſe, legitimate conceptions of divine natures, they may be juſtly ſaid to be hoſtile to the Gods.—T.

[2] The Greek original in this place ſtands at full length thus: ὡσπερ οἱ τα ωα τεμνοντες και μελλοντες ταριχευειν, ἡ ὡσπερ οἱ τα ωα ταις θριξιν. Now the abſurdity of ſuppoſing eggs ever to have been cut with hairs, when knives, much better inſtruments for that purpoſe, were at hand, firſt led us to imagine that the paſſage might be corrupt. On a little examination, it appeared probable to us, from the repetition of the words ὡσπερ οἱ τα ωα, that the latter part of this ſentence was nothing more than a various reading in the margin of ſome antient copy. Trying, then, the two laſt words,

ταις

half-neck of every half-body, he ordered Apollo to turn half round, and fix it on that ſide where the other half of the body was cut off; with intention that all people, viewing themſelves on that ſide where they had ſuffered the loſs of half themſelves, might be brought to a ſober way of thinking, and learn to behave with more modeſty. For what remained neceſſary to be done, he bid him exerciſe his own healing art.—Accordingly, Apollo turned the face of every one about to the reverſe of its former ſituation: and drawing the ſkin together, like a purſe, from all parts of the body, over that which is now called the belly, up to one orifice or opening, he tied up at the middle of the belly this orifice, now called the navel. He then ſmoothed moſt part of the wrinkles of the ſkin, after having framed the bones of the breaſt under it; in the ſame manner as ſhoemakers ſmooth the wrinkles of the leather, when they have ſtretched it upon the laſt. But a few wrinkles, thoſe on the belly and navel, he let remain, for a memorial of their old crime and puniſhment. Now, when all the human race were thus biſected, every ſection longed for its fellow half. And when theſe happened to meet together, they mutually embraced, folded in each other's arms, and wiſhing they could grow together and be united. The conſequence of this was, that they both died, through famine, and the other evils naturally brought on by idleneſs. And if one of theſe halves died, and left the other behind, the ſurviving half was immediately employed in looking about for another partner; and whether it happened to meet with the half of a whole woman, (which half we now call a woman,) or with the half of a whole man, they were continually embracing. After all, Jupiter, ſeeing them thus in danger of deſtruction, took pity on them, and contrived another device; which was, to place the diſtinction of ſex before: for till then this had ſtill remained on the other ſide; and

ταις θριξιν, by the abbreviations common in old manuſcripts, we made our conjecture ſtill more probable (to ourſelves at leaſt) by reading the latter part of the ſentence thus:—ἢ, ὡσπερ τα ωα τεμνοντες εις ταριχευσιν, which words we ſuppoſe written in the margin after this manner, ἢ ὡσπερ οι τα ωα τ. εις ταριχσιν. the initial letter of τεμνοντες being put for the whole word, as uſual in ſuch caſes. Thus the laſt words, being read (as it was common to do for the greater expedition) by ſome ignorant librarian to the new copyiſt, literally as they were written, were eaſily miſtaken by a writer unattentive to the ſenſe, and made ταις θριξιν. That it was cuſtomary with the antients to ſalt and pickle eggs for keeping, after boiling them hard, (it is to be ſuppoſed,) and cutting them in two, we learn from Alexis the comic poet, as cited by Athenæus, pag. 57 and 60, as alſo from Columella: which laſt-mentioned author tells us further, that ſometimes they were hardened for that purpoſe in a pickle heated over the fire.—S.

they

they had engendered, not one with another, but with the earth, like graſs-hoppers. This ſcheme Jupiter carried into execution; and thus made the work of generation to be thenceforth carried on by both ſexes jointly, the female conceiving from the male. Now, in making this the ſole way of generating, Jupiter had theſe ends in view: that, if a man ſhould meet with a woman, they might, in the embrace, generate together, and the human kind be thus continued; but if he met with another man, that then both might be ſurfeited with ſuch commixture; and that, immediately ceaſing from their embraces, they might apply themſelves to buſineſs, and turn their ſtudies and purſuits to the other affairs of life. From all this it appears how deeply mutual love is implanted by nature in all of the human race; bringing them again to their priſtine form; coupling them together; endeavouring out of two to make one, and thus to remedy the evils introduced into the human nature. So that every one of us at preſent is but the tally of a human creature; which has been cut like a polypus[1], and out of one made two. Hence it comes, that we are all in continual ſearch of our ſeveral counterparts, to tally with us. As many men, accordingly, as are ſections of that double form called the hermaphrodite, are lovers of women: and of this ſpecies are the multitude of rakes. So, on the other hand, as many women as are addicted to the love of men are ſprung from the ſame amphibious race. But ſuch women as are ſections of the female form are not much inclined to men; their affections tend rather to their own ſex: and of this kind are the Sapphic lovers. Men, in like manner, ſuch as are ſections of the male form, follow the males: and whilſt they are children, being originally fragments of men, it is men they love, and it is in men's company and careſſes they are moſt delighted. Thoſe children and thoſe youths who are of this ſort are the beſt, as being the moſt manly in their temper and diſpoſition. Some people, I know, ſay, they are ſhameleſs and impudent: but in this they wrong them; for it is not impudence and want of modeſty, but it is manly aſſurance, with a manly temper and turn of mind, by which

[1] All learned naturaliſts know the great uncertainty we are in now-a-days concerning the rarer animals of all kinds mentioned by the antients. Under this difficulty of aſcertaining what animal is meant by the πολυπους mentioned here by Plato, we have tranſlated it a polypus, becauſe the wonderful property aſcribed here to the πολυπους is the ſame with that in the polypus, which a few years ſince afforded great entertainment to the virtuoſi in many parts of Europe.—S.

they

they are led to aſſociate with thoſe whom they reſemble. A ſhrewd conjecture may hence be formed, from what race they originally ſpring; a conjecture juſtified by their conduct afterwards. For only boys of this manly kind, when they arrive at the age of maturity, apply themſelves to political affairs [1]: and as they advance further in the age of manhood, they delight to encourage and forward the youth of their own ſex in manly ſtudies and employments; but have naturally no inclination to marry and beget children: they do it only in conformity to the laws, and would chooſe to live unmarried, in a ſtate of friendſhip. Such perſons as theſe are indeed by nature formed for friendſhip ſolely, and to embrace always whatever is congenial with themſelves. Now, whenever it fortunes that a man meets with that very counterpart of himſelf, his other half, they are both ſmitten with love in a wondrous manner; they recogniſe their antient intimacy; they are ſtrongly attracted together by a conſciouſneſs that they belong to each other; and are unwilling to be parted, or become ſeparate again, though for ever ſo ſhort a time. Thoſe pairs who of free choice live together throughout life, are ſuch as have met with this good fortune. Yet are none of them able to tell what it is they would have one from the other. For it does not ſeem to be the venereal congreſs. In all appearance, it is not merely for the ſake of this that they feel ſuch extreme delight in the company of each other; and ſeek it, when they have it not, with ſo eager a deſire. It is evident, that their ſouls long for ſome other thing, which neither can explain; ſomething which they can only give obſcure hints of, in the way of ænigmas; and each party can only gueſs at in the other, as it were, by divination. But when they are together, and careſſing each other, were Vulcan to ſtand by with his tools in his hand, and ſay, "Mortals! what is it ye want, and would have, one from the other?"—and finding them at a loſs what to anſwer, were he to demand of them again, and ſay, "Is this what ye long for; to be united together with the moſt entire union, ſo as never, either by night or day, to be ſeparate from each other? If ye long for this, I will melt you down, both of you together, and together form you both again; that, inſtead of two, ye may become one; whilſt ye live, living a joint life, as one perſon; and when ye

[1] Ariſtophanes in this ſentence hints at Pauſanias: but for fear his hint ſhould not be apprehended by the company, he takes care to explain it to them himſelf, near the concluſion of his ſpeech, by an ironical and affected caution in guarding againſt the being ſo underſtood.—S.

come

come to die, dying at once one death; and afterwards, in the ſtate of ſouls departed, continuing ſtill undivided. Conſider now within yourſelves, whether ye like the propoſal, and whether ye would be glad to have it carried into execution."—I am certain, that not a ſingle mortal to whom Vulcan ſhould make this offer would reject it. It would appear that none had any other wiſh; and every man would be conſcious to himſelf, that the ſecret deſire which he had of old conceived in his heart, was at length brought to light and expreſſed in clear language, that is, to be mingled and melted in with his beloved, and out of two to be made one. The cauſe of which deſire in us all is this, that our priſtine nature was ſuch as I have deſcribed it; we were once whole. The deſire and purſuit of this wholeneſs of our nature, our becoming whole again, is called Love. For, as I ſaid, we were antiently one: but now, as a puniſhment for our breach of the laws of juſtice, the Gods have compelled us to live aſunder in ſeparate bodies: juſt as the people of Arcady are treated by the Spartans[1]. If, therefore, we behave not to the Gods with reverence and decency, there is reaſon to fear we ſhall be again cleft in ſunder, and go about with our guilt delineated in our figure, like thoſe who have their crimes engraven on pillars, our noſes ſlit, and our bodies ſplit in two. The conſideration of this ſhould engage every man to promote the univerſal practice of piety toward the Gods; that we may eſcape this misfortune, and attain to that better ſtate, as it ſhall pleaſe Love to guide and lead us. Above all, let none of us act in oppoſition to this benign Deity; whom none oppoſe but ſuch as are at enmity with the Gods. For, if we are reconciled to Love, and gain his favour, we ſhall find out and meet with our naturally beloved, the other half of ourſelves; which

[1] As Arcadia conſiſted chiefly of plains and paſture lands, the people of that country had for many ages led a paſtoral kind of life, diſperſed in ſmall villages; and lived in the enjoyment of perfect peace and liberty. But in proceſs of time, when they were in danger of falling under the yoke of the Spartans, their neighbours, whom they obſerved a warlike people, growing in greatneſs, and aſpiring to the dominion of all the Peloponneſus, they began to build and fortify cities, where they aſſembled and conſulted together for their common intereſts. This union gave them courage, not only to be auxiliaries in war to the enemies of the Spartans, but at length, as principals themſelves, to make frequent inroads into the Spartan territories. The Spartans, therefore, carrying the war into the country of the Arcadians, compelled them to demoliſh the fortifications of their chief cities, and even to quit their habitations there, and return to their antient manner of living in villages.—S.

at preſent is the good fortune but of few. Eryximachus now muſt not carp at what I ſay, on a ſuſpicion that I mean Pauſanias and Agatho: though perhaps they may be of the fortunate few: but I ſay it of all in general, whether men or women, through the whole human race, that every one of us might be happy, had we the perfection of Love, and were to meet with our own proper paramours, recovering thus the ſimilitude of our priſtine nature. If this fortune then be the beſt abſolutely, it follows, that the beſt in our preſent circumſtances muſt be that which approaches to it the neareſt; and that is, to meet with partners in love, whoſe temper and diſpoſition are the moſt agreeable and ſimilar to our own. In giving glory to the divine cauſe of this ſimilarity and mutual fitneſs, we celebrate in a proper manner the praiſe of Love; a deity who gives us in our preſent condition ſo much relief and conſolation, by leading us to our own again; and further, gives us the faireſt hopes, that, if we pay due regard and reverence to the Gods, he will hereafter, in recovering to us our antient nature, and curing the evils we now endure, make us bleſt and happy.

Thus, Eryximachus, you have my ſpeech concerning Love, a ſpeech of a different kind from yours, and no way interfering with what you have ſaid. Therefore, as I deſired of you before, do not, I pray you, make a jeſt of it; that we may hear, peaceably and quietly, all the ſpeeches which remain to be ſpoken; or rather both the ſpeeches; for I think only thoſe of Agatho and Socrates are yet behind.—Well; I ſhall not diſobey you, ſaid Eryximachus: for I muſt acknowledge that I have been highly entertained and pleaſed with your ſpeech. If I was not perfectly well aſſured that Socrates and Agatho were deeply verſed in the ſcience of Love, I ſhould much fear they would be at a loſs for ſomething to ſay, ſo copiouſly and ſo variouſly has the ſubject been already handled. But now, notwithſtanding this, I am under no concern about the ſucceſs of thoſe great maſters.—I do not wonder, ſaid Socrates, that you are free from all concern, Eryximachus, about the matter; ſince you have come off ſo honourably yourſelf, and are out of all danger. But if you were in the circumſtances I am in, much more in thoſe which I ſhall be in when Agatho ſhall have made his ſpeech, your fears would be not a few, and your diſtreſſes, like mine at preſent, no trifles.—I ſee, ſaid Agatho, you have a mind, Socrates, by ſuch ſuggeſtions, to do as enchanters do with their drugs, that is, to diſorder and diſturb my

thoughts, with imagining this company here to be big with expectations of hearing ſome fine ſpeech from me.—I muſt have forgotten then, Agatho, ſaid Socrates, the courage and greatneſs of mind which you diſcovered lately, and of which I was a ſpectator, when you came upon the ſtage, together with the actors juſt going to exhibit your compoſitions; when you looked ſo large an audience in the face without being in the leaſt daunted; I muſt have forgotten this, if I thought you could be now diſturbed on account of us, who are comparatively ſo few in number.—I hope, Socrates, ſaid Agatho, you do not imagine me ſo full of a theatre, as not to know that a few men of ſenſe make an aſſembly more reſpectable and awful to a man who thinks juſtly, than a multitude of fools.—I ſhould be greatly miſtaken indeed, ſaid Socrates, if I imagined in you, Agatho, any thing which ſavoured of ruſticity or ill breeding. I am ſatisfied enough, that if you met with any whom you ſuppoſed wiſe, you would regard them more than you would the multitude. But I doubt we have no pretenſions to any ſuch particular regard, becauſe we were at the theatre, and made a part of that multitude. The caſe, I ſuppoſe, is in truth this: Were you in the preſence of other ſort of men, that is, the wiſe; in reverence to them, perhaps, you would be aſhamed if you were then employed in any action you thought unbecoming or diſhonourable. Is it not ſo? or how ſay you?—It is true, ſaid Agatho.—And would you not, ſaid Socrates to him again, revere the multitude too, and be aſhamed even in their preſence, if you were ſeen by them doing any thing you thought baſe or wrong?—Phædrus here interpoſed; and ſaid, My friend Agatho, if you go on giving anſwers to all the queſtions put to you by Socrates, he will be under no manner of concern, what becomes of our affair of the ſpeeches, or what the reſt of us here are doing in the mean time. It is ſufficient for him, if he has but ſomebody to talk with in his own way, eſpecially if it be a perſon who is handſome. I muſt confeſs I take much pleaſure myſelf in hearing Socrates diſpute: but it is neceſſary for me to look to the affair I ſet on foot myſelf, that of the panegyrics on Love, and to take care that I have a ſpeech from every perſon in this aſſembly. When you have, each of you, paid your tribute to the God, you may then diſpute, with all my heart, at your own pleaſure.—You ſay well, Phædrus, ſaid Agatho; and nothing hinders but that I begin my ſpeech. For I ſhall not want frequent opportunities of diſputing again with Socrates.

THE SPEECH OF AGATHO.

I SHALL begin by ſhowing in what way a panegyric on Love ought to be made [1], and then proceed that way in making one myſelf. For none of thoſe who have gone before me have, in my opinion, celebrated the praiſe of Love; but all have made it their ſole buſineſs to felicitate human kind upon the good they enjoy through the beneficence of that God. For what he is in himſelf, he from whom all this happineſs is derived, none of them has ſhown. Now, whatever the ſubject of our panegyric be, there is but one right way to take in the compoſing it: and that is, the ſhowing how excellent is the nature, and how good are the operations or effects, of that perſon or thing we are to praiſe. In this way it is that we ought to make our panegyrics on Love; praiſing, firſt, the excellence and abſolute goodneſs of his own nature, and then his relative goodneſs to us in the bleſſings he beſtows. According to this method, I take upon me, in the firſt place, to ſay, if without offence to what is ſacred and divine I may be allowed to ſay it, that, though all the Gods enjoy a ſtate of bleſſedneſs, yet Love is bleſt above all others, as he excells them all in beauty and in virtue. The moſt beautiful he muſt be, for theſe reaſons: firſt, in that he is the youngeſt of the Gods, my Phædrus! Of this he himſelf gives us a convincing proof, by his running away from Old Age, and outrunning him who is evidently ſo ſwift-footed. For Old Age, you know, arrives and is with us ſooner than we deſire. Between Love and him there is a natural antipathy: ſo that Love comes not within a wide diſtance of him [2]; but makes his abode with

[1] The following ſpeech abounds with wit; but it is wit of a rambling and inconſiſtent kind, without any fixed idea; ſo far is it from aiming at truth. The beginning of it is a juſt ſpecimen of the whole. For after Agatho has undertaken to give a deſcription of the perſon and qualities of Love under the very firſt article of this deſcription, the youthfulneſs of Love, he uſes the word *love*, in no fewer than four different ſenſes. In the firſt place, he means, as Socrates afterwards obſerves of him, that which is loved, rather than that which loves; that is, outward beauty, rather than the paſſion which it excites. Immediately he changes this idea for that of the paſſion itſelf. Then at once, without giving notice, he takes a flight to the firſt cauſe of orderly motion in the univerſe. And this he immediately confounds with the harmony of nature, the complete effect of that cauſe.

[2] We have taken the liberty of tranſlating here, as if in the Greek it was printed *ουδ' εγγυς πολλου πλησιαζειν*, and not *ουδ' ουτος, π. π.*—S.

youth, and is always found in company with the young. For, as the old proverb rightly has it, "Like always goes to like." I muſt own, therefore, though I agree with Phædrus in many other of his opinions, I cannot agree with him in this, that Love is elder than Saturn and Japetus. Of all the Gods, I affirm, he is the youngeſt, and enjoys perpetual youth. Accordingly I contend, that, if any ſuch events happened among the Gods as Heſiod and Parmenides report, they were occaſioned by the power of Neceſſity, not that of Love. For, had Love been with them, there had been no caſtrations [1], no chains, none of thoſe many other acts of violence had been done or ſuffered amongſt them: but friendſhip and peace had flouriſhed in heaven, as they now do, and have ever done, ſince Love began his reign, and became chief amongſt the Gods. Thus then it appears that Love is young. Nor is he leſs delicate and tender. But he wants a poet, ſuch as Homer was, to expreſs in fit terms how great his tenderneſs. Now Homer, where he tells us that Ate or Miſchief was a goddeſs, of a ſubtle and fine frame, thus deſcribes the tenderneſs and delicacy of her feet;

> The tender-footed Goddeſs ſhuns the ground;
> With airy ſtep, upon the heads of men
> Sets her fine treading, and from head to head
> Trips it along full nimbly.——

The poet here produces a fair proof, I think, of her tenderneſs, her going on the ſoft place rather than the hard. The ſame argument ſhall I make uſe of, to prove the tenderneſs of Love. For he neither walks on the ground, nor goes upon human heads (which in truth are places not altogether ſoft); but the ſofteſt places poſſible to be found does Love make the places of his range, and of his dwelling too. For in the manners and in the ſouls of Gods and men he fixes his abode: not in all ſouls indiſcriminately; for, if he lights on any whoſe manners are rough, away he marches, and takes up his reſidence in tender ſouls, whoſe manners are the ſofteſt. Since, therefore, with his feet, and all over his fine frame, he endures not to touch any but the ſofteſt perſons, nor in any but their ſofteſt parts, he cannot but be extremely delicate and tender. Thus have we ſeen that Love is full of

[1] For the proper manner in which theſe things are to be underſtood, ſee the apology for the fables of Homer, in Vol. I. of this work.—T.

youth, delicacy and tenderneſs. He is, beſides, of a ſoft and yielding ſubſtance. For it would be impoſſible for him to diffuſe himſelf through every part of us, and penetrate into our inmoſt ſoul, or to make his firſt entry and his final exit unperceived by us, if his ſubſtance were hard and reſiſting to the touch. But a clear proof of his yielding, eaſy and pliant form is that gracefulneſs of perſon, which it is certain belongs to him in the higheſt degree by the acknowledgment of all: for Ungracefulneſs and Love never agree, but are always viſibly at variance. That he excels in beauty of colour, is evident from his way of life, in that he is continually converſant with flowers, his own likeneſs. For Love reſides not in a body, or in a ſoul, or any other place, where flowers never ſprung; or, if they did, where they are all fallen, and the place quite deflowered. But wherever a ſpot is to be found flowery and fragrant, he there ſeats himſelf and ſettles his abode. Concerning the beauty of this deity thus much is ſufficient [1]; though much ſtill remains unſaid. I am to ſpeak next on the ſubject of his virtue [2]. And here the higheſt praiſe which can be attributed to any being is juſtly due to Love; that he does no injury to God or man; nor by God or man can he be injured. He never acts through compulſion or force himſelf; for compulſion or force cannot reach Love: nor ever forces he or compels others; for every being obeys freely and willingly every dictate and command of Love: where both parties then are willing, and each is freely conſenting to the other, thoſe in the city who are kings, the laws, ſay there is no injuſtice done. But not only the perfection of juſtice belongs to Love; he is equally endued with conſummate temperance. For to be ſuperior to pleaſure, and to govern the deſires of it, is every where called temperance. Now it is univerſally agreed, that no pleaſure is ſuperior to Love; but, on the contrary, that all pleaſures are his inferiors. If ſo, they muſt be ſubjects and ſervants, all of them, to Love; and he muſt rule, and be the maſter. Having dominion thus over all pleaſures and all deſires, in

[1] Thus far Agatho has confounded the object of Love, the amiable, with the paſſion itſelf, conſidered as refined, and peculiarly belonging to the human ſpecies.—S.

[2] From allegory, and metaphor, and true wit, Agatho deſcends to pun and quibble, and playing on words, with ſcarce a ſemblance of juſt thought. In this next part of his deſcription he means, by Love, that groſſer part of the paſſion, common to all animals: and this too he confounds with the ſatisfaction of it through enjoyment.—S.

the

the higheſt degree muſt he be temperate. Then, in point of valour, not Mars himſelf can pretend to vie with Love. For it is not, Mars has Love, but Love has Mars [1]; the Love, as fame ſays, of Venus. Now the perſon who has another in his poſſeſſion muſt have the maſtery over that perſon whom he poſſeſſes. The ſubduer and maſter then of him who in valour excels all others, muſt himſelf in that virtue excel without exception all. Thus we have already ſhown the juſtice, temperance, and fortitude of this God. To ſhow his wiſdom is yet wanting: and I muſt do my beſt to be no way wanting to my ſubject. In the firſt place then, that I may honour my own art, like Eryximachus, with my firſt regards, in the wiſdom of poetry Love is ſo great a maſter, that he is able to make any one a poet [2]. For, though a man be ever ſo much a ſtranger to the Muſes, yet, as ſoon as his ſoul is touched by Love, he becomes a poet. It concerns me to lay a particular ſtreſs on this argument, to prove Love an excellent poet [3], in all that kind of creative power [4] which is the proper province of the Muſes. For no being can impart to another that which itſelf has not, or teach another

[1] To apprehend the wit of this paſſage, we muſt obſerve, that the word *has* is here uſed in two ſenſes: in the firſt part of the ſentence, it means the ſoul being affected with the paſſion; in the next, it means the paſſion poſſeſſing the ſoul. There is the ſame double meaning of the word *habeo* in the Latin, and every modern language derived from it; and it is no ſoleciſm in Engliſh. But there ſeems to be more wit and ſmartneſs in a repartee of Ariſtippus, in which he played on the ſame word, though ſomewhat differently; when, on his being reproached with having Laïs, a celebrated courtezan, for his miſtreſs, he replied, Εχω, αλλ' ουκ εχομαι. True, I have her, that is, enjoy her; but ſhe has not me; that is, has me not in her power.—S.

[2] Agatho, in this part of his deſcription, uſes the word Love in three different ſenſes: firſt, as it means that fine paſſion in the human ſpecies only, which, by rouſing and improving the faculties of the ſoul, ſupplies the want and does the office of genius: next, as it means the paſſion, whoſe power is exerted chiefly in the body, and, by exciting every animal to the work of generation, executes the ends for which nature implanted it in them all: laſtly, as it means a particular genius or ſtrong bent of the mind from nature to ſome particular ſtudy, which ſeldom fails of improving and perfecting every art.—S.

[3] In this ſentence Agatho juſtifies the character which Socrates had given of him juſt before, and ſhows himſelf a truly polite and well-bred man. For, upon his mention of the art of poetry, in which he had lately appeared ſo excellent, he here modeſtly declines the attributing any merit in that reſpect to his own poetic genius, as if he was a favourite of the Muſes; and with great gallantry tranſfers the praiſe, beſtowed upon himſelf, to Love; as if Love, and not the Muſes, had inſpired him.—S.

[4] Plato has here contrived an opportunity for Agatho to play upon a word, or uſe it in more

other that which itſelf knows not. In the other kind of the creative power, the making of animals, it is undeniably to the wiſdom of this deity that all living things owe their generation and production. Then, for the works of the mechanic arts, know we not that every artiſt who hath Love for his teacher becomes eminent and illuſtrious; but that the artiſt whom Love inſpires not and animates never riſes from obſcurity? The bowman's art, the art of healing, and that of divination, were the inventions of Apollo, under the guidance of Love, and the influence of his auſpicious power. So that the God of Wiſdom himſelf, we ſee, was the diſciple of the God of Love. Prompted by Love, the Muſes invented the art of muſic, Vulcan the art of working metals, Minerva the art of weaving, and Jupiter the art of well governing the Gods and mortals. From the beginning of that æra were the affairs of the Gods well ſettled; from the time when Love aroſe and interpoſed among them,—the Love certainly of beauty; for diſorder and deformity are by no means the objects of Love. Anteçedent to that time it was, as I obſerved before, that thoſe many ſad and ſtrange accidents, they tell us, befell the Gods: it was when Neceſſity reigned and ruled in all things. But as ſoon as the charms of beauty gave birth to the God whom we celebrate, with him roſe every good which bleſſes either Gods or mortals.—Thus, Phædrus, in the firſt place Love, as he appears to me, is moſt excellent himſelf in beauty and in virtue; in the next place, he is the cauſe of the like excellencies in other beings. I feel within me an inclination to make a verſe or two on this ſubject, on the effects which Love produces:—

ſenſes than one. For the Greek word ποιησις, which we have tranſlated creative power, ſignifies not only making or creation, but poetry too: as the word ποιητης ſignifies both creator and poet. Taking advantage of theſe different meanings, Agatho attributes ποιησις, or creation, to each of the three kinds of Love mentioned in note 2, p. 486, as the work or effect of each. To the firſt he attributes poetry, an art which creates, as it were, or makes out of nothing real, out of the mere imagination of the poet, its own ſubject. To the next he juſtly aſcribes the making or generating of animals in a way peculiar to Nature; who, beginning from the ſmalleſt materials, and collecting all the reſt by inſenſible degrees from all neighbouring quarters, forming all the while, and animating whilſt ſhe forms, ſeems to create out of nothing too. And Love, in the ſenſe in which he uſes the word laſt, he no leſs juſtly ſuppoſes to have the principal hand in making the moſt excellent works of every art, where the artiſt hath his ſubject-matter ready created, and lying all at once before him, and apparently, therefore, creates nothing but the form.—S.

The

The rugged main he ſmooths, the rage of men
He ſoftens; thro' the troubled air he ſpreads
A calm, and lulls the unquiet ſoul to reſt.

It is he who frees us from reſerve and ſtrangeneſs; and who procures us openneſs and intimacy: it is he who eſtabliſhes ſocial meetings and aſſemblies, ſuch as this of ours: in feſtival entertainments, in dances, and in feaſts, he is the manager, the leader, and the founder; introducing courteſy and ſweetneſs, baniſhing ruſticity and ſavageneſs; diſpenſing abroad benevolence and kindneſs, reſtraining malignity and ill-will: propitious, gracious, and good to all: the admired ſpectacle of wiſe men, the heart-felt delight of Gods: the envy of thoſe to whoſe lot he falls not, the acquiſition of ſuch only as are fortunate: the parent of delicacy and tenderneſs, of elegance and grace, of attractive charms and amorous deſires: obſervant of good, overlooking evil: in difficulties, in fears, in ſilent wiſhes, and in ſoft addreſſes, the protector, the encourager, the patron, and the inſpirer: of Gods and men, of all linked together, the beauty and the ornament: a guide to all which is good and amiable, the beſt and the moſt charming: whom it is the duty of every one to follow; joining in chorus to his praiſe, or bearing part in that ſweet ſong ſung by Love himſelf, with which he ſoftens the heart and ſooths the mind of every God and mortal.—This is my ſpeech, Phædrus, which I conſecrate to Love; a ſpeech, partly jocoſe and partly ſerious, ſuch as the beſt of my poor abilities in wit and eloquence are able to furniſh out.

When Agatho had done ſpeaking, Ariſtodemus told me, the room rang with the applauſes of the company; all of them loudly declaring, that Agatho's ſpeech on Love was worthy of himſelf, and worthy of the God in whoſe honour it was ſpoken.—Upon which Socrates, directing his eyes to Eryximachus, ſaid, Well, what think you now, you ſon of Acumenus? Think you not that I had good grounds for thoſe fears I told you I was under? and that I ſpake prophetically, when I ſaid that Agatho would make an admirable ſpeech, and that I ſhould be driven to diſtreſs?—The firſt thing, replied Eryximachus, I think you foretold truly, "that Agatho's ſpeech would be excellent;"—but the other, that "yourſelf would be driven to diſtreſs," I do not believe was a true prophecy.—How, my good friend,

ſaid

ſaid Socrates, ſhould I avoid being at a loſs, and diſtreſſed for ſomething to ſay? or how, indeed, could any other perſon, who was to ſpeak, after a ſpeech on the ſame ſubject ſo full of beauty and variety? It was not, I muſt acknowledge, in all reſpects, and in all the parts of it, equally admirable: but who, that heard the concluſion, could help being aſtoniſhed at the elegant choice of words, and beauty of the diction? For my part, when I conſider how little I ſhall be able to ſay any thing that will not fall far ſhort of it, I ſhould be tempted to run away for very ſhame, had I any poſſibility of making my eſcape. For, whilſt he was ſpeaking, he put me in mind of Gorgias: and, to ſay the truth, that which Homer relates ſtruck me at that time very ſenſibly. Now, thought I, what if Agatho ſhould at the laſt ſend forth the head of that formidable ſpeaker Gorgias [1] to aſſault my imagination; and thus

[1] This paſſage in the Greek runs this:—Εφοβουμην μη μοι τελευτων ὁ Αγαθων Γοργιου κεφαλην δεινου λεγειν εν τῳ λογῳ επι τον εμον λογον πεμψας, κ. τ. λ. In this, as alſo in the preceding ſentence, where Gorgias is mentioned, Cornarius would have us read Γοργους, inſtead of Γοργιου, and conſequently, in this laſt, δεινος inſtead of δεινου, referring this attribute to Agatho; and quite inſenſible, as it ſeems, to the many ſtrokes of humour in this paſſage: for he gravely gives this notable reaſon for his alteration,—that the head of Gorgias, truly, had no ſuch power as is here attributed to it. But he has forgotten to clear up a ſmall difficulty which attends his alteration; and that is, how Agatho the Handſome, for ſo he was commonly called, or Agatho's handſome ſpeech, ſhould immediately put Socrates in mind of the Gorgon's head. The train of thought here is evidently this: Agatho put Socrates in mind of Gorgias, through the ſimilitude of their ſtyles; the thought of Gorgias put him in mind of Gorgon, through the ſimilitude of their names; and, perhaps, becauſe he thought them both alike πελωρα, prodigies; and the thought of Gorgon brought to his mind the following paſſage in Homer's Odyſſey, l. xi.

——————εμε δε χλωρον δεος ηρει,
Μη μοι Γοργειην κεφαλην δεινοιο πελωρου,
Εξ αϊδος πεμψειεν αγαυη Περσεφονεια.

Pale fear then ſeized me, and the dreadful thought,—
—Now ſhould the Gorgon's head, that prodigy
Terrific, by ſtern Proſerpine be ſent,
Forth from her viewleſs realm, to aſſault my eyes,
Viſible in all its horrors!——

It is eaſy to obſerve, that Socrates not only alludes humorouſly to Homer's thought in this paſſage, but, to heighten the humour, has uſed ſeveral of Homer's words. We have followed him in ſo doing, where it was poſſible for us; adapting theſe paſſages one to the other in the tranſlation.

thus ſhould, by the concluſion of his ſpeech, ſtop my ſpeech, and turn into ſtone my ſpeaking faculties!—I conſidered, how ridiculous it was in me to profeſs myſelf a great maſter in love matters, and conſent to bear a part with you in making panegyrics on Love, when at the ſame time I was entirely ignorant of the affair we undertook, and knew not the right way to celebrate the praiſe of any thing. For I was ſo ſilly[1] as to imagine that we ought never to ſay any thing but what was true in our encomiums on any ſubject whatever; that the real properties of it were the materials which lay before us, as it were, to work on; and that the buſineſs of a panegyriſt was nothing more than out of theſe materials to ſelect the handſomeſt and beſt, and frame them together in the moſt ſkilful and the beſt manner. Prepoſſeſſed with this imagination, I had entertained a ſtrong opinion that I ſhould ſpeak well on the ſubject propoſed, becauſe I well knew what praiſes were with truth to be aſcribed to Love. Whereas I now find that this is not the right way of making a panegyric; but that, when we praiſe, we are to attribute to our ſubject all qualities which are great and good, whether they truly belong to it or not. Should our encomiums happen to be falſe, the

doing, where it was poſſible for us; adapting theſe paſſages one to the other in the tranſlation. But in one of the words, an important one to the humour, we found it ſcarcely poſſible. For the word δεινος, here in Homer, ſignifies terrible, or frightful; and the ſame word as uſed here by Plato ſignifies great, weighty, or powerful. Now in Engliſh both theſe meanings are not to be expreſſed fully and exactly by the ſame word. The word "formidable," however, though it would weaken the ſenſe in Homer, may ſerve to expreſs the alluſion in Plato to Homer's "terrific." This double meaning of the word δεινος, and the ſimilitude of ſound between Gorgon and Gorgias, or between Γοργειη [κεφαλη] and Γοργιειη, ſeem to be humorous imitations of the ſtyle of Agatho and Gorgias, who were, both of them, fond of ſuch puns and puerilities. It is neceſſary to take notice of ſome other words in this paſſage, becauſe Stephens has thrown in a ſuſpicion of their not being genuine, the words εν τω λογῳ,—probably imagining them to be a marginal gloſs on the word λεγειν: whereas they are in truth abſolutely neceſſary to the ſenſe; λογῳ here being oppoſed to εργῳ, to the actual ſending forth, and preſenting viſibly, the head of Gorgias. Beſides that the omiſſion of thoſe words would much diminiſh the glare of another Gorgiaſm, which ſeems intended in λεγειν, λογῳ, and λογον, the repetition of the words "ſpeak" and "ſpeech."—S.

[1] Socrates, having ſatirized Agatho's ſtyle, with regard to the affected ornaments of it, and its want of ſimplicity; but doing it with that delicate and fine humour in which he led the way to all the politer ſatiriſts, particularly to the Roman poet Horace, and our own Addiſon; proceeds now, in that ironical way peculiar to himſelf, to ſatirize the ſentiments in Agatho's ſpeech, with regard to their want of truth, juſtneſs of thought, and pertinence to the ſubject.—S.

falſehood of them, to be ſure, is not material. For the propoſal, it ſeems, was this, that each of us ſhould make a panegyric, which, by common conſent, was to paſs and be taken for a panegyric made on Love; and not to make a panegyric properly belonging to Love, or ſuch a one as he truly merited. Hence it is, I preſume, that you gather from all quarters every topic of praiſe, and attribute to Love all kinds of perfection; repreſenting him and his operations to be of ſuch a nature, that he cannot fail of appearing in the higheſt degree beautiful and good—to all thoſe I mean who are unacquainted with him—for he certainly can never be deemed ſo by thoſe who know him: and thus the panegyric is made fine and pompous. But, for my part, I was an utter ſtranger to the compoſing of panegyrics after this manner; and in my ignorance it was that I agreed to be one of the compoſers. Only with my tongue, therefore, did I engage myſelf: my mind was no party to the agreement. And ſo farewell to it; for I ſhall never make panegyrics in this way: I ſhould not, indeed, know how. Not but that I am ready to ſpeak the truth concerning the ſubject propoſed, if you have any inclination to hear it, and if I may be allowed to ſpeak after my own manner; for I mean not to ſet my ſpeech in competition with any of yours, and ſo run the riſk of being deſervedly laughed at. Conſider, therefore, Phædrus, for it is your affair, whether ſuch a kind of ſpeech as you have to expect from me would be agreeable to you; and whether you would like to hear the truth ſpoken concerning Love in terms no higher than are adequate and fitting, and with ſuch a diſpoſition of the ſeveral particulars as ſhall happen to ariſe from the nature of the ſubject. Phædrus, then, and the reſt of the company, made it their joint requeſt to him, that he would ſpeak in the manner which he himſelf judged to be the moſt proper.—But ſtay, ſaid Socrates; give me leave firſt to propoſe to Agatho a few queſtions; that, after we have agreed together on ſome neceſſary premiſes, I may the better proceed to what I have to ſay. You have my conſent, ſaid Phædrus; ſo propoſe your queſtions.—Socrates then, as Ariſtodemus told me, began in this manner:—

INTRODUCTION TO THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

IN my opinion, my friend Agatho, you began your ſpeech well, in ſaying that we ought in the firſt place to ſet forth the nature of Love, what he

is in himſelf, and afterward to ſhow his effects, and what he operates in others. This introduction of yours I much approve of. Now, then, tell me further concerning Love: and ſince you have ſo fairly and amply diſplayed the other parts of his nature and character, anſwer me alſo to this queſtion, whether Love is a being of ſuch a kind as to be of ſomething[1]; or whether he is of nothing? I aſk you not, whether he is of ſome father or mother; for the queſtion, whether Love is the love of father or mother, would be ridiculous; but I mean it in the ſame ſenſe as if the ſubject of my queſtion was the very thing now mentioned, that is, a father; and the queſtion itſelf was, whether a father was the father of ſomething, or not: in this caſe you would certainly anſwer, if you anſwered rightly, that a father was the father of a ſon or of a daughter:—would you not?—Certainly I ſhould, ſaid Agatho.—And an anſwer of the ſame kind you would give me, ſaid Socrates, if I aſked you concerning a mother.—Agatho again aſſented.—Anſwer me now, ſaid Socrates, to a queſtion or two more, that you may the better apprehend my meaning. Suppoſe I were to aſk you concerning a brother, with regard to that very circumſtance, his being a brother, is he brother to ſome perſon or not?—Agatho anſwered in the affirmative.—And is not this perſon, ſaid Socrates, either a brother or a ſiſter?—To which when Agatho had aſſented, Try then, ſaid Socrates, to tell me concerning Love; is it the love of nothing, or of ſomething?—Of ſomething, by all means, replied Agatho.—Whatever you think that ſomething to be, ſaid Socrates, for the preſent keep your thought to yourſelf; only remember it. And let me aſk you this queſtion further, relating to Love: Does Love deſire that ſomething of which it is the love, or does it not?—Deſires it, anſwered Agatho, without doubt.—Whether, when poſſeſſed of that which it deſires, of that which it is in love with, does it then deſire it? or only when not poſſeſſed of it?—Only when not poſſeſſed of it, it is probable, replied Agatho.—Inſtead of being probable, ſaid Socrates, conſider if it be not neceſſary that every being which feels any deſire ſhould deſire only that which it is in want of; and that as far as any being is free from want, ſo far it muſt be free alſo from deſire. Now to me, Agatho, this appears in the higheſt

[1] That is, whether his nature is abſolute, not of neceſſity inferring the coexiſtence of any other being; or whether it is relative, in which the being of ſome correlative is implied.—S.

degree

degree neceſſary. But how does it appear to you?—To me in the ſame manner, replied Agatho.—You ſay well, ſaid Socrates. I aſk you then, Can a man whoſe ſize is large wiſh to be a man of large ſize? or a man who is ſtrong, can he wiſh to be ſtrong?—The impoſſibility of this, replied Agatho, follows from what we have juſt now agreed in. For the man who is what he would wiſh to be, muſt in that reſpect, and ſo far, be free from want.—True, ſaid Socrates: for, if it were poſſible that the ſtrong could wiſh to be ſtrong, the ſwift wiſh to be ſwift, and the healthy wiſh to be healthy, one might then perhaps imagine it equally poſſible in all caſes of the like kind, that ſuch as are poſſeſſed of any thing good or advantageous could deſire that which they already have. I mention this in general, to prevent our being impoſed upon. For the perſon who enjoys any of theſe advantages, if you conſider, Agatho, muſt appear to you to have of neceſſity at preſent that which he has, whether he wills it, or not: and how can this ever be the object of his deſire? Should any man, therefore, ſay thus: I, who am now in health, deſire to be healthy; or, I, who now have riches, deſire to be rich, and long for thoſe very things which I have; we ſhould make him this reply:—You mean, friend, you that are at preſent poſſeſſed of riches, or health, or ſtrength, would be glad to continue in poſſeſſion of them always: for at this preſent you poſſeſs them, whether you will or not. When you ſay, therefore, that you deſire what is preſent with you, conſider, whether you mean any other thing than this; you would be glad that what is preſent with you now might be preſent with you for the time to come. Would he not acknowledge, think you, that this was his only meaning[1]?—Agatho agreed that he would.—This then, ſaid Socrates, is to love and deſire that from which he is now at ſome diſtance, neither as yet has he; and that is, the preſerving of what he poſſeſſes at the preſent, and his continuing in poſſeſſion of it for the future.—It certainly is ſo, replied Agatho.—This man, therefore, ſaid Socrates, and every one who feels deſire, deſires that which lies not ready for his enjoyment, that which is not preſent with him,

[1] In Stephens's edition of the original we here read, αλλο τι ὁμολογοι' αν; as if the confeſſion was demanded from Agatho in his own perſon. In all the former editions, however, it is rightly printed, ὁμολογοιτ' αν. But we preſume they are all wrong in giving us αλλο τι [δια δυοιν] inſtead of αλλοτι [δι' ινος] *whether*; miſled probably by the preceding ſentence, where αλλο τι ſignifies *any other thing*, and is therefore rightly there divided into two words.—S.

that

that which he has not, that which he himſelf is not, and that which he is in want of; ſuch things only being the objects of love and of deſire.—Agatho to this entirely aſſented.—Come then, ſaid Socrates, let us agree upon theſe concluſions: Is not Love, in the firſt place, love of ſomething? in the next place, is it not love of that which is wanting?—Clearly ſo, replied Agatho.—Now then, ſaid Socrates, recollect what it was you told us in your ſpeech was the proper object of Love. But I, if you pleaſe, will remind you of it, I think you ſaid ſomething like this, "that the affairs of the Gods were put in good order, and well eſtabliſhed, through love of things beautiful: for that things of oppoſite kind to theſe could never be the objects of love." Did you not tell us ſome ſuch thing?—I own it, anſwered Agatho.—You own the truth, my good friend, replied Socrates. Now, if this be as you ſay, muſt not Love be love of beauty, and not of deformity?—I agree, ſaid Agatho.—And have you not agreed too, ſaid Socrates, that Love is love of ſomething which is wanting, and not of any thing poſſeſſed already?—True, replied Agatho.—It follows then, ſaid Socrates, that Love is not in poſſeſſion, but in want, of beauty.—It follows of neceſſity, ſaid Agatho.—Well then, ſaid Socrates, that to which beauty is abſolutely wanting, that which is totally unpoſſeſſed of beauty, do you call that beautiful?—Certainly not, replied Agatho.—Are you ſtill then, ſaid Socrates, of the ſame opinion, that Love is beautiful, if we have reaſoned rightly?—Agatho then made anſwer: I am in danger, Socrates, of being found ignorant in the ſubject I undertook to praiſe.—You have honeſtly and fairly ſpoken, ſaid Socrates. And now anſwer me to this little queſtion more: Think you not that every thing good is alſo fair and beautiful?—I do, replied Agatho.—If then, ſaid Socrates, Love be in want of beauty, and if every thing good be fair and beautiful, Love muſt be in want of good too.—I am not able, replied Agatho, to argue againſt you, Socrates; and therefore I admit it to be true what you ſay.—You are not able, my beloved Agatho, ſaid Socrates, to argue againſt the truth: for to argue againſt Socrates is nothing difficult. And here ſhall I diſmiſs you from being further queſtioned. But the diſcourſe concerning Love, which I heard formerly from Diotima the propheteſs, a woman wiſe and knowing in theſe and many other ſubjects; ſo profoundly knowing, that when the plague ſeemed to be approaching Athens, and when the people offered ſacrifice to avert it, ſhe cauſed the coming of that diſtemper

to

to be delayed for the ſpace of ten years; (ſhe it was who inſtructed me in the knowledge of all things that appertain to Love;) a diſcourſe, I ſay, on this ſubject, which I once heard from her, I will try if I can relate again to you; laying down, for the foundation of it, thoſe points agreed on juſt now between me and Agatho; but purpoſing, however, to relate the whole of this by myſelf, as well as I am able.

THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

RIGHT and proper is it, Agatho, to follow the method marked out by you; in the firſt place, to declare what kind of a being Love is, and afterwards to ſhow what are the effects produced by him. Now I think the eaſieſt way that I can take, in executing this plan, will be to lay before you the whole of this doctrine in the very manner and order in which I myſelf was examined and lectured on the ſubject by Diotima. She began with me, on my ſaying to her much the ſame things that were aſſerted juſt now by Agatho; that Love was a deity excellent in goodneſs, and was alſo one of thoſe who were fair and beautiful. And ſhe refuted me with the ſame arguments I have made uſe of to refute Agatho; proving to me that Love, according to my own account of him, was neither beautiful nor good. How ſay you, Diotima? then ſaid I. Is Love an ugly and an evil being?—Soft, replied ſhe; no abuſive language: do you imagine that every being who is not beautiful, muſt of courſe be ugly?—Without doubt, anſwered I.—And every being who is not wiſe, ſaid ſhe, do you conclude it muſt be ignorant? Do you not ſee there is ſomething between wiſdom and ignorance[1]?—I aſked her, what that could be.—To think of things rightly, as being what they really are, without being able to aſſign a reaſon why they are ſuch. Do you not perceive, ſaid ſhe, that this is not to have the ſcience or true knowledge of them? For, where the cauſe or reaſon of a thing remains unknown[2], how can there be ſcience? Nor yet is it ignorance: for that which

[1] See the Meno near the concluſion, and the fifth and ſeventh books of the Republic. It may ſuffice for the preſent to obſerve, that true opinion is a medium between wiſdom properly ſo called, i. e. an intellectual knowledge of the cauſes and principles of things, and ignorance.—T.

[2] We have here taken the liberty to paraphraſe a little, for the ſake of rendering this paſſage more

which errs not from the truth, how ſhould that be ignorance? Such then is right opinion, ſomething between wiſdom and ignorance.—You are certainly in the right, ſaid I.—Deem it not neceſſary then, ſaid ſhe, that what is not beautiful ſhould be ugly; or that what is not good muſt of conſequence be evil. To apply this to the caſe of Love; though you have agreed, he is neither good nor beautiful, yet imagine not he muſt ever the more on that account be ugly and evil; but ſomething between thoſe oppoſites.—Well, ſaid I, but he is acknowledged by all to be a powerful God, however.—By all who know him, do you mean, ſaid ſhe, or by all who know him not?—By all univerſally, replied I.—Upon which ſhe ſmiled, and ſaid, How, Socrates, ſhould he be acknowledged a powerful God by thoſe who abſolutely deny his divinity?—Who are they? ſaid I.—You yourſelf, replied ſhe, are one of them, and I am another.—Explain your meaning, ſaid I.—My meaning, ſaid ſhe, is eaſy to be explained. For anſwer me to this queſtion: Say you not that the Gods are, all of them, bleſt and happy? or would you offer to ſay of any one of the Gods, that he was not a bleſt and happy being?—Not I, for my part, ſaid I, by Jupiter.—By a happy being, ſaid ſhe, do you not mean a being poſſeſſed of things fair, beautiful and good?—It is granted, anſwered I.—And you granted before, ſaid ſhe, that Love, from his indigence and want of things good and beautiful, deſired thoſe things of which he was deſtitute.—I allowed it.—How then, ſaid ſhe, can he be a God, he who is deſtitute of things fair, beautiful and good?—It appears, ſaid I, that he by no means can.—You ſee then, ſaid ſhe, that, even in your own judgment, Love is no God.—What! ſaid I, muſt Love then be a mortal?—Far from that, replied ſhe.—Of what nature was he then? I aſked her.—Of like kind, anſwered ſhe, with thoſe natures we have juſt now been ſpeaking of, an intermediate one, between the mortal and

more eaſy to be underſtood. In the Greek it runs thus, αλογον γαρ πραγμα πως αν ειη επιστημη; Ariſtotle expreſſes the ſame meaning in the ſame conciſe way, thus, μετα λογου γαρ ἡ επιστημη. Ethic. Nicomach. lib. vi. cap. 6. where λογος is the ſame thing with that which Plato in his Meno calls λογισμος αιτιας, that is, the rational account of a thing, deriving it from its cauſe. For the cauſe [the formal cauſe] of every particular truth is ſome general truth, in which that particular is virtually included. Accordingly, in a perfect ſyllogiſm we may ſee the truth of the concluſion virtually included in the truth of the major propoſition. Nor can we properly be ſaid to know any one truth, till we ſee the whole of that higher truth, in which the particular one is contained.—S.

the immortal.—But what in particular, O Diotima?—A great dæmon [1], replied

[1] The following admirable account of Love, in which it is ſhown why he is called by Plato a great dæmon, is from the MS. commentary of Proclus on the Firſt Alcibiades:

There are different properties of different Gods: for ſome are artificers of wholes, of the form of beings, and of their eſſential ornament: but others are the ſuppliers of life, and are the ſources of its various genera: but others preſerve the unchangeable order, and guard the indiſſoluble connection of things: and others, laſtly, who are allotted a different power, preſerve all things by their beneficent energies. In like manner every amatory order is the cauſe to all things of converſion to divine beauty, leading back, conjoining, and eſtabliſhing all ſecondary natures in the beautiful, repleniſhing them from thence, and irradiating all things with the gifts of its light. On this account it is aſſerted in The Banquet that *Love* is a great dæmon, becauſe Love firſt demonſtrates in itſelf a power of this kind, and is the medium between the object of deſire and the deſiring nature, and is the cauſe of the converſion of ſubſequent to prior natures. The whole amatory ſeries, therefore, being eſtabliſhed in the veſtibule of the cauſe of beauty, calls upwards all things to this cauſe, and forms a middle progreſſion between the object of Love and the natures which are recalled by Love. Hence it pre-eſtabliſhes in itſelf the exemplar of the whole dæmoniacal order, obtaining the ſame middle ſituation among the Gods as dæmons between divine and mortal natures. Since, therefore, every amatory ſeries poſſeſſes this property among the Gods, we muſt conſider its uniform and occult ſummit as ineffably eſtabliſhed in the firſt orders of the Gods, and conjoined with the firſt and intelligible beauty; but its middle proceſs as ſhining forth among the ſupermundane Gods, with an intellectual condition; but its third progreſſion as poſſeſſing an exempt power among the liberated Gods; and its fourth as multifariouſly diſtributed about the world, producing many orders and powers from itſelf, and diſtributing gifts of this kind to the different parts of the world. But after the unific and firſt principle of Love, and after the tripartite eſſence perfected from thence, a various multitude of Loves ſhines forth with divine light, from whence the choirs of angels are filled with Love; and the herds of dæmons full of this God attend on the Gods who are recalled to intelligible beauty. Add too, that the army of heroes, together with dæmons and angels, are agitated about the participation of the beautiful with divine bacchanalian fury. Laſtly, all things are excited, revive and flouriſh, through the influx of the beautiful. But the ſouls of ſuch men as receive an inſpiration of this kind, and are naturally allied to the God, aſſiduouſly move about beauty, and fall into the realms of generation, for the purpoſe of benefiting more imperfect ſouls, and providing for thoſe natures which require to be ſaved. The Gods indeed and the attendants on the Gods, abiding in their proper habits, benefit all following natures, and convert them to themſelves: but the ſouls of men deſcending, and touching on the coaſt of generation, imitate the beneficent providence of the Gods. As, therefore, ſouls eſtabliſhed according to ſome other God deſcend with purity into the regions of mortality, and benefit ſouls that revolve in it; and ſome indeed benefit more imperfect ſouls by prophecy, others by myſtic ceremonies, and others by divine medicinal ſkill: ſo likewiſe ſouls that chooſe an amatory life are moved about the deity who preſides over beautiful natures, for the purpoſe of taking care of well-born ſouls. But from apparent beauty they are led back to divine beauty, and together with themſelves elevate thoſe who are the objects of their love.

replied ſhe. For the dæmon-kind [1] is of an intermediate nature between the divine and the human.—What is the power and virtue, ſaid I, of this intermediate

And this alſo divine Love primarily effects in intelligibles: for he unites himſelf to the object of love, extends to it the participants of his power, and inſerts in all things one bond, and one indiſſoluble friendſhip with each other, and with the beautiful itſelf. Souls, therefore, poſſeſſed with love, and participating the inſpiration thence derived, in conſequence of uſing an undefiled vehicle, are led from apparent to intelligible beauty, and make this the end of their energy. Likewiſe enkindling a light in more imperfect ſouls, they alſo lead theſe back to a divine nature, and are divinely agitated together with them about the fountain of all-perfect beauty.

But ſuch ſouls as from a perverſe education fall from the gift which is thence derived, but are allotted an amatory nature, theſe, through their ignorance of true beauty, are buſily employed about that which is material and diviſible, at which alſo they are aſtoniſhed in conſequence of not knowing the paſſion which they ſuffer. Hence they abandon every thing divine, and gradually decline into impiety and the darkneſs of matter. They appear indeed to haſten to a union with the beautiful, in the ſame manner as perfectly amatory ſouls; but they are ignorant of the union, and tend to a diſſipated condition of life, and to the ſea of diſſimilitude. They are alſo conjoined with the baſe itſelf, and material privation of form. For where are material natures able to pervade through each other? Or where is apparent beauty, pure and genuine, being thus mingled with matter, and replete with the deformity of its ſubject? Some ſouls, therefore, genuinely participate the gifts of Love, and by others theſe gifts are perverted. For as according to Plotinus the defluxion of intellect produces craft, and an erroneous participation of wiſdom ſophiſtry, ſo likewiſe the illumination of Love, when it meets with a depraved recipient, produces a tyrannic and intemperate life.

After this, in another part of the ſame admirable commentary, he preſents us, as he ſays, with ſome of the more arcane aſſertions concerning Love; and theſe are as follow:

Love is neither to be placed in the firſt nor among the laſt of beings. Not in the firſt, becauſe the object of Love is ſuperior to Love: nor yet among the laſt, becauſe the lover participates of Love. It is requiſite, therefore, that Love ſhould be eſtabliſhed between the object of love and the lover, and that it ſhould be poſterior to the beautiful, but prior to every nature endued with love. Where then does it firſt ſubſiſt? How does it extend itſelf through the univerſe, and with what monads does it leap forth?

There are three hypoſtaſes, therefore, among the intelligible and occult Gods; and the firſt indeed is characterized by *the good*, underſtanding *the good itſelf*, and reſiding in that place where according to the oracle the paternal monad abides: but the ſecond is characterized by wiſdom, where the firſt intelligence flouriſhes; and the third by *the beautiful*, where, as Timæus ſays, the moſt beautiful of intelligibles abides. But there are three monads according to theſe intelligible cauſes ſubſiſting uniformly according to cauſe in intelligibles, but firſt unfolding themſelves into light in

[1] For a copious account of dæmons, their nature, ſpecies, and employments, ſee the ſecond Note on the Firſt Alcibiades.

intermediate kind of being?—To tranſmit and to interpret to the Gods, ſaid ſhe,

in the ineffable order * of the Gods, I mean *faith*, *truth*, and *love*. And *faith* indeed eſtabliſhes all things in good; but *truth* unfolds all the knowledge in beings; and laſtly, *love* converts all things, and congregates them into the nature of the beautiful. This triad indeed thence proceeds through all the orders of the Gods, and imparts to all things by its light a union with intelligible itſelf. It alſo unfolds itſelf differently in different orders, every where combining its powers with the idioms of the Gods. And among ſome it ſubſiſts ineffably, incomprehenſibly, and unifically; but among others, as the cauſe of connecting and binding; and among others, as endued with a perfective and forming power. Here again it ſubſiſts intellectually and paternally; there, in a manner entirely motive, vivific, and effective: here, as governing and aſſimilating; there, in a liberated and undefiled manner; and elſewhere, according to a multiplied and diviſive mode. Love, therefore, ſupernally deſcends from intelligibles to mundane concerns, calling all things upwards to divine beauty. Truth alſo proceeds through all things, illuminating all things with knowledge. And laſtly, faith proceeds through the univerſe, eſtabliſhing all things unically in good. Hence the oracles aſſert that all things are governed by, and abide in, theſe. And on this account they order Theurgiſts to conjoin themſelves to divinity through this triad. Intelligibles themſelves, indeed, do not require the amatory medium, on account of their ineffable union. But where there is a union and ſeparation of beings, there alſo Love abides. For it is the binder and conciliator of natures poſterior and prior to itſelf; but the convertor of ſubſequent into prior, and the anagogic and perfecting cauſe of imperfect natures.

The oracles, therefore, ſpeak of Love as binding, and reſiding in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it alſo copulates us with the governments of dæmons. But Diotima calls Love a great dæmon, becauſe it every where fills up the medium between deſiring and deſirable natures. And, indeed, that which is the object of Love vindicates to itſelf the firſt order, but that which loves is in the third order from the beloved object? Laſtly, Love uſurps a middle ſituation between each, congregating and collecting together that which deſires and that which is deſired, and filling ſubordinate from better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods it unites intelligible intellect to the firſt and ſecret beauty by a certain life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologiſt of the Greeks calls this Love blind; for he ſays "feeding in his breaſt blind, rapid Love:" ποιμαινων πραπιδεσσιν ανομματον ωκυν ερωτα. But in natures poſterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination an indiſſoluble bond to all things perfected by itſelf: for a bond is a certain union, but accompanied with much ſeparation. On this account the oracles are accuſtomed to call the fire of this Love a copulator: for, proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all following natures with each other, and with itſelf. Hence, it conjoins all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and dæmons with Gods; but it conjoins us with both Gods and dæmons. In the Gods, indeed, it has a primary ſubſiſtence, in dæmons a ſecondary one, and in partial ſouls a ſubſiſtence through a certain third proceſſion from principles. Again, in the Gods it ſubſiſts above eſſence: for every genus of Gods is ſupereſſential. But in dæmons it ſubſiſts according to eſſence; and in ſouls according to illumination. And this triple order appears ſimilar to

* i. e. In the ſummit of that order which is called intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual.

ſhe, what comes from men; and to men, in like manner, what comes from the Gods; from men their petitions and their ſacrifices; from the Gods, in return, the revelation of their will. Thus theſe beings, ſtanding in the middle rank between divine and human, fill up the vacant ſpace, and link together all intelligent nature. Through their intervention proceeds every kind of divination, and the prieſtly art relating to ſacrifices, and the myſteries and incantations, with the whole of divination and magic. For divinity is not mingled with man; but by means of that middle nature is carried on all converſe and communication between the Gods and mortals, whether in ſleep or waking. Whoever has wiſdom and ſkill in things of this kind is a dæmoniacal man: the knowing and ſkilful in any other thing, whether in the arts, or certain manual operations, are illiberal and ſordid. Theſe dæmons are many and various. One of them is Love.—But, ſaid I, from what parents was he born?—The hiſtory of his parentage, replied ſhe, is ſomewhat long to relate: however, I will give you the relation. At the birth of Venus, the Gods, to celebrate that event, made a feaſt; at which was preſent, amongſt the reſt, Plenty [1], the ſon

the triple power of intellect. For one intellect ſubſiſts as imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as participated, of which alſo the ſouls of the Gods participate as of a better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in ſouls, and which is, indeed, their perfection. And theſe three diſtinctions of intellect Timæus himſelf ſignifies. That Love, therefore, which ſubſiſts in the Gods muſt be conſidered as analogous to imparticipable intellect: for this is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its nature. But dæmoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect: for this is eſſential, and is perfected from itſelf, in the ſame manner as participated intellect is proximately reſident in ſouls. And the third Love is analogous to intellect which ſubſiſts as a habit, and which inferts an illumination in ſouls. Nor is it unjuſtly that we conſider Love as coordinate with this intellectual difference: for in intelligible intellect it poſſeſſes its firſt and occult hypoſtaſis: and if it thence leaps forth, it is alſo eſtabliſhed there according to cauſe. And it appears to me that Plato, finding that intelligible intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great Dæmon, was himſelf pleaſed to celebrate Love in a ſimilar manner. Very properly, therefore, does Diotima call it a great dæmon; and Socrates conjoins the diſcourſe about Love with that concerning Dæmons. For, as every thing dæmoniacal is ſuſpended from the amatory medium, ſo alſo the diſcourſe concerning a dæmoniacal nature is conjoined with that concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the object of love and the lover; and a dæmon is a medium between man and divinity.—T.

[1] By *Plenty*, the ſon of Counſel, we muſt underſtand that divine cauſe of abundance which ſubſiſts in Jupiter the demiurgus of the world. For Jupiter is called Μητις, or Counſel, by Orpheus, as we are informed by Proclus in Tim. p. 102. *Poverty* is Matter, which in itſelf is deſtitute of

ſon of Counſel. After they had ſupped, Poverty came a-begging, an abundance of dainties being there, and loitered about the door. Juſt then Plenty, intoxicated with nectar[1], (for as yet wine[2] was not) went out into the gardens of Jupiter; and oppreſſed with the load of liquor that he had drunk, fell aſleep[3]. Poverty, therefore, deſiring through her indigence to have a child from Plenty, artfully lay down by him, and became with child of Love. Hence it is that Love is the conſtant follower and attendant of Venus, as having been begotten on the birth-day of that Goddeſs: being alſo, by his natural diſpoſition, fond of all beauty, he is the more attached to Venus herſelf on account of her being beautiful. Now, as Love is the ſon of Plenty and of Poverty, the condition of his life and fortune is as follows: In the firſt place, he is always poor; and is far from being either fair or tender, as the multitude imagine him; for he is rough, and hard, and dry, without ſhoes to his feet, and without a houſe or any covering to his head; always grovelling on the earth, and lying on the bare ground, at doors, and in the ſtreets, in the open air; partaking thus of his mother's diſpoſition, and living in perpetual want. On the other hand, he derives from his father's ſide qualities very different from thoſe others: for hence it is that he is full of deſigns upon the good and the fair: hence it is that he is courageous, ſprightly, and prompt to action; a mighty ſportſman, always contriving ſome new device to entrap his game: much addicted to thought, and fruitful in expedients; all his life philoſophizing; powerful in magic and enchantment, nor leſs ſo in ſophiſtry. His nature is not mortal, in the common

all things, but is filled as far as it can be filled from *Plenty*, whoſe overflowing fullneſs terminates in its dark and rebounding ſeat. Plato, therefore, in calling Love the offſpring of *Plenty* and *Poverty*, appears to comprehend its whole ſeries. For Love, conſidered as the ſame with Deſire, is, according to its ſubſiſtence in Jupiter, the ſon of *Plenty*; but, according to its ultimate ſubſiſtence, it is the offſpring of Matter: for Matter alſo deſires good, though her deſire is moſt debile and evaneſcent. But by *Poverty* being pregnant with Love at the birth of Venus, Plato occultly intimates that the divine abundance in the demiurgus of the world proceeds into matter in conjunction with the illuminations of divine beauty.—T.

[1] Intoxication with nectar ſignifies that deific energy through which divine natures are enabled to provide immutably for all things.—T.

[2] This ſignifies nothing more than that wine belongs to the ſenſible, and not to the intelligible world. By the gardens of Jupiter, we may conceive that the ſplendour, grace, and empyræan beauty of the demiurgic illuminations of the maker of the univerſe are ſignified.—T.

[3] Sleep, when applied to divine natures, ſignifies an energy ſeparate from ſenſibles.—T.

way

way of mortality, nor yet is it immortal, after the manner of the immortal Gods; for ſometimes, in one and the ſame day, he lives and flouriſhes, when he happens to fare well; and preſently afterwards he dies; and ſoon after that revives again, as partaking of his father's nature. Whatever abundance flows in upon him is continually ſtealing away from him: ſo that Love is never abſolutely in a ſtate either of affluence or of indigence. Again, he is ſeated in the midſt between Wiſdom and Ignorance. For the caſe is this with regard to wiſdom:—None of the Gods philoſophize, or deſire to become wiſe; for they are ſo; and if there be any other being beſide the Gods who is truly wiſe, neither does ſuch a being philoſophize. Nor yet does philoſophy, or the ſearch of Wiſdom, belong to the Ignorant [1]. For on this very account is the condition of Ignorance ſo wretched, that notwithſtanding ſhe is neither fair, good, nor wiſe, yet ſhe thinks ſhe has no need of any kind of amendment or improvement. So that the ignorant, not imagining themſelves in need, neither ſeek nor deſire that which they think they want not. —Who are they then, O Diotima, ſaid I, who philoſophize, if they are neither the wiſe nor the ignorant?—That is evident, ſaid ſhe: even a child may now diſcover that they muſt be ſuch as ſtand in the middle rank of being; in the number of whom is Love. For wiſdom is among the things of higheſt beauty; and all beauty is the object of love. It follows therefore of neceſſity, that Love is a philoſopher, or a lover of wiſdom; and that, as ſuch, he ſtands between the adept in wiſdom and the wholly ignorant. This, as well as all the reſt of his condition, is owing to his parentage; as he derives his birth from a father wiſe and rich in all things, and from a mother unwiſe and in want of all things. Such, dear Socrates, is the nature of this dæmon. But that you had other thoughts of that being, whom you took for Love, is not at all ſurpriſing. For, if I may gueſs from the deſcription you gave of him yourſelf, you ſeem to have taken for Love that which is beloved, not that which loves: and from this miſtake it aroſe, as I imagine, that Love appeared to you in all reſpects ſo beauteous. For the object of love, the amiable, is truly beauteous and delicate, is perfect and completely bleſt. But to the ſubject of love, the lover, belongs a different nature, ſuch a

[1] This paſſage in the Greek original is thus printed: αυτο γαρ τουτο εστι χαλεπον αμαθια; but we preſume that either the laſt word of theſe ſhould be printed αμαθια, figuratively meaning αμαθυ, or elſe, that the firſt words ſhould be thus printed, αυτῳ γαρ τουτῳ.—S.

one

one as I have deſcribed to you.—Be it granted ſuch, Diotima, ſaid I; for what you tell me bids fair to be the truth. But now, ſuch being his nature, of what advantage is he to human kind?—This, Socrates, ſaid ſhe, in the next place, I ſhall do my beſt to teach you. Already then it appears what kind of being Love is, and of what parents he was born: and that his object is beauty you yourſelf have aſſerted. Now what anſwer ſhall we make ſhould we be aſked this queſtion, "O Socrates and Diotima! how or in what reſpect mean ye, when ye ſay that beauty is the object of Love?"—To expreſs the meaning of my queſtion in plainer terms, ſaid ſhe, What is it which the lover of beauty longs for?—To be in poſſeſſion, ſaid I, of the beloved beauty.—Your anſwer, ſaid ſhe, draws on a further queſtion: What will be the ſtate or condition of that man who is in poſſeſſion of his beloved beauty?—I told her, I could by no means anſwer readily to ſuch a queſtion.—Suppoſe then, ſaid ſhe, that changing the ſubject of the queſtion, and putting good in the place of beauty, one were to aſk you thus, and ſay, Anſwer me, Socrates, to this queſtion, What is it which the lover of good longs for?—To be in poſſeſſion of that good, anſwered I.—And what, ſhe aſked me again, will be the ſtate of that man who is in poſſeſſion of good?—This, ſaid I, is a queſtion I can anſwer with much leſs difficulty, thus: that ſuch a man will be happy.—Right, ſaid ſhe; for by the poſſeſſing of good things it is that the happy are in that happy ſtate which they enjoy. Nor is there any room to queſtion further, and aſk, Why, or for the ſake of what, a man wiſhes to be happy; but a concluſive anſwer appears to have been given, fully ſatisfactory.—True, ſaid I, without diſpute.—Now this wiſhing and this longing, ſaid ſhe, let me aſk you, whether in your opinion it is common to all men; whether you think that all wiſh to be always in poſſeſſion of things good; or how otherwiſe?—I think juſt ſo, replied I, that ſuch a wiſh is common to all.—Well then, Socrates, ſaid ſhe, muſt we not acknowledge that all men are in love; ſeeing that the affections of them all are always fixed on the ſame things? or ſhall we ſay that ſome are in love, and ſome are not?—It is a thought, ſaid I, which, I confeſs, a little ſurpriſes me.—Be not ſurpriſed, ſaid ſhe; for the caſe is nothing more than this, that the name of love, which belongs to all love in general, we appropriate to one particular kind of love, ſingled out from the others, which we diſtinguiſh by other names.—To make me conceive your meaning more perfectly, ſaid I, can-

I, cannot you produce ſome other caſe parallel to this?—I can, ſaid ſhe. The following caſe is parallel: Making or creating, you know, comprehends many kinds of operation. For all cauſe by which any thing proceeds out of non-being into being[1] is creation. So that all the operations and all the works executed through any of the arts, are indeed ſo many creations: and all the artiſts and the workmen are real creators, makers, or poets.—True, ſaid I.—And yet you know, continued ſhe, they are not all of them called poets or makers, but are diſtinguiſhed by different names: whilſt one particular kind of creation, that which is performed in metre through the Muſe's art, is ſingled out from the other kinds; and the name, to which they have all an equal right, is given to that alone. For that alone is called poeſy or making: and the artiſts in this ſpecies of creation only are peculiarly diſtinguiſhed by the name of poets or makers.—*Perfectly right, ſaid I.*—Juſt ſo is it then in the caſe of Love, ſaid ſhe. Univerſally all deſire of things good, and all that longing after happineſs, which is in every individual of human kind, is the mighty Deity of Love, who by ſecret ways and ſtratagems ſubdues and governs the hearts of all. His votaries in many various ways, ſuch as thoſe engaged in the purſuit of wealth, or ſtrength of body, or wiſdom, are not ſaid to be in love; nor is the name of lover allowed to any ſuch. But to thoſe only who are devoted to Love in one particular way, and addict themſelves to one certain ſpecies of love, we appropriate thoſe terms of love, and lovers, and the being in love, which ought to be conſidered as general terms, applicable in common to all the different kinds.—In all appearance, ſaid I, you are entirely in the right.—She proceeded, however, to confirm the truth of what ſhe had ſaid, in the following manner:—There is a ſaying, continued ſhe, that lovers are in ſearch of the other half of themſelves. But my doctrine is, that we love neither the half, nor even the whole of ourſelves, if it happen not, my friend, ſome way or other to be

[1] *Being* does not here ſignify being or entity in general, but the particular form or eſſence of any thing, the being what it is. So non-being, juſt before, does not ſignify abſolute non-entity, but the non-being of ſome particular thing, or the want of ſome form, which is afterwards introduced into exiſtence. Accordingly *creation*, immediately after, ſignifies not what is now-a-days generally underſtood by that term, a making of ſomething out of mere nothing; for Plato ſeems to have had no notion of the poſſibility of this; but here is to be underſtood the making ſome form or being, in the ſenſe juſt now mentioned, newly to exiſt, a particular one, which exiſted not before.—S.

good,

good. For we are willing to have our feet and our hands cut off, though our own, if we deem them incurably and abſolutely evil. It is not to what is their own that men have ſo ſtrong an attachment, nor do they treat it ſo tenderly on that account, unleſs there be a man who thinks good to be his own, and properly belonging to him, but evil to be foreign to his nature. So true is it, that there is no other object of love to man than good alone. Or do you think there is?—By Jupiter, ſaid I, there appears to me no other.—Is this now ſufficient for us? ſaid ſhe: and have we done juſtice to our argument if we finiſh it with this ſimple and ſlender concluſion, that all men love what is good?—Why not? ſaid I.—What? ſaid ſhe; muſt we not add this, that they long to have poſſeſſion of the loved good?—This, ſaid I, muſt be added.—And not only now to have poſſeſſion of it, ſaid ſhe again, but to have poſſeſſion of it for ever too; muſt not this be added further?—This further, ſaid I.—Love then, in fine, ſaid ſhe, is the deſire of having good in perpetual poſſeſſion.—Moſt true, ſaid I; in every tittle you are right.—Since then, ſaid ſhe, this general deſire is found always to ſubſiſt and to operate in all, can you tell me in what particular way it operates on thoſe who are commonly ſaid to be in love? what the aim is of ſuch lovers, and what the work or effect of this kind of love?—Were I able to tell, O Diotima, replied I, I ſhould not have been ſo full of admiration at your wiſdom; nor ſhould I have applied myſelf to you to be taught theſe very things, if I already knew them.—Well, ſaid ſhe, I will teach you then. The aim of theſe lovers, and the work of this love, is to generate upon the beautiful as well in a mental way as in that which is corporeal.—Your words, ſaid I, have need of ſome diviner to interpret them: I confeſs I do not apprehend their meaning.—I will expreſs myſelf then, ſaid ſhe, in plainer language. All of human race, O Socrates, are full of the ſeeds of generation, both in their bodies and in their minds: and when they arrive at maturity of age, they naturally long to generate. But generate they cannot upon the ugly or uncomely, and only upon the fair and the agreeable. For the work of generation is carried on, you know, by means of the natural commerce between the two ſexes: and this is a work above human art, it is divine. For to conceive and to impregnate is to immortalize the kind: it is producing immortality out of an animal which is mortal. In each of the ſexes, therefore, is ſome immortal and divine principle, the cauſe of conception in the one, and of impregnation in

the other. But in neither of them can this principle operate effectually, unleſs the ſubject on which it operates be ſuitable to it and correſponding. Now deformity and uglineſs but ill ſuit with aught which is divine. Beauty alone agrees with it and correſponds. For Beauty is that celeſtial influence which favours, and that goddeſs who patronizes, the work of generation. Hence, whenever that which teems with generative power approaches that which is beautiful, it ſmiles benignly; and through the delight it feels, opening and diffuſing itſelf abroad, breeds or generates. But whenever it meets with that which is deformed or ugly, it grows moroſe, ſaddens, and contracts itſelf; it turns away, retires back, and generates not; but, reſtraining the ſwollen power within, which is ready to burſt forth, it bears the burthen with uneaſineſs. Hence it is that they who are full of this, and long to generate, employ much of their creative power upon that which is beautiful: it is becauſe the beautiful frees them from thoſe generative throes with which they labour. But, Socrates, this is not, as you imagined, the love of beauty.—What is it then? ſaid I.—It is the love, replied ſhe, of generating and begetting iſſue, there where we find beauty.—Be it ſo, ſaid I. —It certainly is ſo, ſhe replied.—But, ſaid I, what has Love to do with generating?—Becauſe generating, anſwered ſhe, perpetuates and in ſome manner immortalizes that which is mortal. Now, that the deſire of immortality muſt always accompany the love of good, follows from what we before agreed in, that love was the deſire of having good in perpetual poſſeſſion. For the neceſſary conſequence of that poſition is this, that Love deſires immortality.

All theſe things learned I formerly in a converſation with Diotima, diſcourſing upon Love. At another time ſhe thus queſtioned me: What do you imagine, Socrates, to be the cauſe of that love, and that deſire which lately was the ſubject of converſation between you and me? Do you not obſerve, how vehement are the paſſions of all brute animals [1] when the ſeaſon comes

[1] The following account of the generation of animals and their ſucceſſion in a continued ſeries of individuals, by which the kind is for ever kept up in exiſtence, gives us a juſt repreſentation of all outward nature: for it is in the ſame manner that the world itſelf, though continually paſſing away, and changing in every part, yet remains for ever the ſame in its whole and entire form; life continually ariſing, and repairing the ruins made by death in every kind of things; and

comes in which they couple? Birds as well as beaſts, you may perceive them all ſick with love: ſo intenſe is their deſire, in the firſt place, to generate and breed. Nor is their ardour leſs afterwards in the rearing of their young. In defence of theſe, you ſee them ready to engage in fight, the weakeſt animals with the ſtrongeſt. To ſupport theſe, you ſee them willingly themſelves periſhing with famine; in ſhort, doing and ſuffering for their ſakes the utmoſt poſſible. Thoſe indeed of human kind, continued ſhe, one might imagine acted thus from a motive of reaſon in themſelves: but, in brute animals, can you aſſign the cauſe why the affections of love ſhould be ſo deep and ſtrong?—I told her, I was at a loſs to account for it.—And do you think, ſaid ſhe, ever to become a thorough adept in the ſcience of love, if you are at a loſs in a caſe ſo eaſy?—It is for this very reaſon, ſaid I, Diotima, as I lately told you, that I come to you for inſtruction: it is becauſe I am ſenſible how much I want it. Do you, therefore, teach me what the cauſe is of thoſe vehement affections you mentioned juſt now, and of every other ſentiment and paſſion incident to love.—Upon which ſhe ſaid, If you believe that love is, what you have often owned it to be, the deſire of having good in perpetual poſſeſſion, you will be at no loſs to conceive what the cauſe is of thoſe affections. For the caſe of brute animals and that of the human kind are in this reſpect exactly the ſame; in both the ſame principle prevails; the mortal nature ſeeks to be perpetuated, and, as far as poſſible, immortalized. Now this is poſſible in one only way, that is, by generation; in which ſome new living thing is conſtantly produced to ſupply the place of the deceaſed old one. And in no other manner than this is life continued to any individual being, of which we ſay that it lives ſtill, and pronounce it to be the ſame being. Thus every man, for inſtance, from his infancy on to old age, is called the ſame perſon; though he never has any thing in him which abides with him, and is continually a new man; having loſt the man he was in his hair, in his fleſh, in his bones, in his blood, in fine in his whole body. Nor in his body only, but in his ſoul

and the freſh growth keeping pace with the decay. To preſerve this living beauty in ſuch its immortality and unfading youth, animals have thoſe affections, impulſes or inſtincts, here deſcribed, given to them, as imparted from the mundane ſoul: analogous to which are the powers of gravitation, attraction, mixture, coheſion, and others of like kind, which are indeed ſo many vital powers given to the inſenſible parts of the univerſe, as partaking of the life of nature.—S.

too, does he undergo inceſſant change. His ways, his manners, his opinions, his deſires and pleaſures; his fears and ſorrows; none of theſe ever continue in any man the ſame; but new ones are generated and ſpring up in him, whilſt the former fade and die away. But a paradox much greater than any yet mentioned is with regard to knowledge: not only ſome new portions of knowledge we acquire [1], whilſt we loſe others, of which we had before been maſters; and never continue long the ſame perſons as to the ſum of our preſent knowledge; but we ſuffer alſo the like change in every particular article of that knowledge. For what we call meditation ſuppoſes ſome knowledge to have actually, as it were, left us; and indeed oblivion is the departure of this knowledge: meditation then, raiſing up in the room of this departed knowledge a freſh remembrance in our minds, preſerves in ſome manner and continues to us that which we had loſt; ſo as to make the memory of it, the likeneſs, ſeem the very ſame thing. Indeed every thing mortal is preſerved in this only way, not by the abſolute ſameneſs of it for ever, like things divine, but by leaving behind it, when it departs, dies, or vaniſhes, another in its room, a new being, bearing its reſemblance. By this contrivance in nature, Socrates, does body, and every other thing naturally mortal, partake of immortality. Immortal after a different manner is that which naturally is immortal. Wonder not, therefore, that all beings are by nature lovingly affected towards their offspring. For this affectionate regard, this love, follows every being for the ſake of immortality.—Theſe things, ſaid I, O Diotima, wiſeſt of women! undoubtedly are ſo.—To which ſhe, in the language of the moſt accompliſhed ſophiſts, replied, You may be aſſured, Socrates, it is the truth. Nor is it leſs plain, from inſtances of a different kind, that immortality is the great aim and end of all. For, if you obſerve how the love of fame and glory operates on men, and what effect it has upon their conduct, you muſt wonder at their folly in labouring ſo much and ſuffering ſo greatly in the purſuit of it, unleſs you conſider the mighty power of that paſſion which poſſeſſes them, a zeal to become illuſtrious in after-ages, and to acquire a fame that may laſt for ever and be immortal. For this, more than for the ſake of their families or friends, are

[1] All this neceſſarily follows from the nature of the human ſoul; all her *energies* being *temporal*, though her *eſſence* is eternal. She is however able to energize ſuper-temporally through a union with an intellect ſuperior to her own.—T.

they

they ready to encounter dangers, to expend their treaſures, to undergo the ſevereſt hardſhips, and to meet death itſelf. Do you think, continued ſhe, that Alceſtis would have died for her huſband Admetus to preſerve his life? or that Achilles would have died for his friend Patroclus to avenge his death? or that your Athenian Codrus would have died for his children's ſake to ſecure to them the ſucceſſion of his kingdom? had they not imagined their virtue would live for ever in the remembrance of poſterity, as it actually does throughout all Greece at this very day. Aſſure yourſelf their conduct had been quite different, had they not been full of this imagination. For, with a view to the immortality of virtue, and the never-dying glory which attends it, have all great actions ever been performed; a view which inſpires and animates the performers, in proportion to the degree of their own perſonal worth and excellence. For they are governed by that univerſal paſſion, the deſire of immortality. But though immortality be thus ſought by all men, yet men of different diſpoſitions ſeek it by different ways. In men of certain conſtitutions, the generative power lies chiefly and eminently in their bodies. Such perſons are particularly fond of the other ſex, and court intimacies chiefly with the fair: they are eaſily enamoured in the vulgar way of love; and procure to themſelves, by begetting children, the preſervation of their names, a remembrance of themſelves which they hope will be immortal, a happineſs to endure for ever. In men of another ſtamp, the faculties of generation are, in as eminent a degree, of the mental kind. For thoſe there are who are more prolific in their ſouls than in their bodies; and are full of the ſeeds of ſuch an offſpring as it peculiarly belongs to the human ſoul to conceive and to generate. And what offſpring is this, but wiſdom and every other virtue? Thoſe who generate moſt, and who are parents of the moſt numerous progeny in this way, are the poets, and ſuch artiſts of other kinds as are ſaid to have been the inventors of their reſpective arts. But by far the moſt excellent and beauteous part of wiſdom is that which is converſant in the founding and well-ordering of cities and other habitations of men; a part of wiſdom diſtinguiſhed by the names of temperance and juſtice. When the ſoul of any man has been teeming with the ſeeds of this wiſdom from his youth (and of divine ſouls it is the native property thus to teem), as ſoon as he arrives at maturity of age, and thoſe ſeeds are fully ripened, he longs to

ſow

ſow them in the ſouls of others, and thus to propagate wiſdom. In this ſituation of his mind, his whole employment, I ſuppoſe, is to look about and ſearch for beauty, where he may generate; for never can he generate on aught which is ugly or uncomely. Meeting firſt then with outward beauty, that of the body, he welcomes and embraces it; but turns away from where he ſees deformity in the body; for his ſoul is full of love. But if, in his further and deeper ſearch, he has the good fortune to meet with the inward and hidden beauty of a well-natured and generous ſoul, he then entirely attaches himſelf, and adheres cloſely to the whole perſon in whom it is found, the compound of ſoul and body. He now finds in himſelf a facility and a copiouſneſs of expreſſion when he entertains this partner of his ſoul with diſcourſes concerning virtue; by what means it is acquired; what is a character completely good; what ſtudies ſhould be purſued; what arts be learnt; and how time ſhould be employed in order to the forming ſuch a character. Deſirous, therefore, thus to form and perfect the object of his love, he undertakes the office of preceptor. Indeed, whilſt he is converſing intimately with that which is fair, thoſe ſeeds of wiſdom, which he was before big with, burſt forth ſpontaneous, and he generates. From this time, whether in the preſence or abſence of his miſtreſs, his mind and memory become prompt and active; and he readily produces all his mental ſtore. Both the parents then join in cheriſhing, rearing up, and cultivating the fruits of their love and amorous converſe. Hence it is that a friendſhip of the firmeſt kind cements ſuch a pair; and they are held together by a much ſtricter band of union than by an offspring of their bodies; having a common and joint intereſt in an offspring from themſelves more beautiful and more immortal. Who would not chooſe to be the father of ſuch children, rather than of mortals ſprung from his body? Who that conſiders Homer, Heſiod, and other excellent poets, with the admiration they deſerve, would not wiſh for ſuch an iſſue as they left behind them, an iſſue of this mental kind, ſuch as perpetuates their memory with the higheſt honour, and procures for them an immortality of fame? Or ſuch a poſterity, ſaid ſhe, as that whoſe foundation Lycurgus laid at Lacedæmon, a race of which himſelf was the firſt father, the preſervers of their country and of all Greece? Amongſt yourſelves, what honours are paid to the memory of Solon, who begat the Laws! And abroad as well as at home how illuſtrious

are

are the names of many others, Barbarians as well as Grecians, who have exhibited to the world many noble actions, and have thus begotten all kinds of virtue! To men like theſe have temples often been erected, on account of ſuch their progeny: but never was any man thus honoured on account of his mortal merely human offspring. In the myſteries of Love thus far perhaps, Socrates, you may be initiated and advanced. [1] But to be perfected, and to attain the intuition of what is ſecret and inmoſt [2], introductory to which is all the reſt, if undertaken and performed with a mind rightly diſpoſed, I doubt whether you may be able. However, ſaid ſhe, not to be wanting in a readineſs to give you thorough information, I will do my beſt to conduct you till we have reached the end. Do but you your beſt to follow me. Whoever then enters upon this great affair in a proper manner, and begins according to a right method, muſt have been from his earlieſt youth converſant with bodies that are beautiful. Prepared by this acquaintance with beauty, he muſt, in the firſt place, if his leader [3] lead aright, fall in love with ſome one particular perſon, fair and beauteous; and on her beget fine ſentiments and fair diſcourſe. He muſt afterwards conſider, that the beauty of outward form, that which he admires ſo highly in his favourite fair one, is ſiſter to a beauty of the ſame kind, which he cannot but ſee in ſome other fair. If he can then purſue this corporeal beauty, and trace it wherever it is to be found, throughout the human ſpecies, he muſt want

[1] We have here a pauſe, or break, more ſolemn and awful than any to be met with elſewhere in Plato. But it has great propriety in this place, as it becomes the ſublime and myſterious character of Diotima; and as it is neceſſary, beſides, for uſhering in with the greater ſolemnity thoſe very ſublime and myſterious ſpeculations which follow it.—S.

[2] Great decorum of character is here obſerved in putting into the mouth of the propheteſs a metaphor, taken from the method of initiation into thoſe religious myſteries which at that time were held in the higheſt reverence. For, to make this initiation perfect, three orderly ſteps or degrees were to be taken. The firſt was called purgation, the ſecond illumination, and the third intuition; to which laſt but few perſons were ever deemed worthy to be raiſed.—Agreeable to this gradation is the method obſerved by Diotima in her initiation of Socrates into the myſteries of wiſdom. Her confutation of his pretended former notions, but, in reality, of the preceding ſpeeches in this dialogue, anſwers to the purgative part of initiation into the religious myſteries. Her ſucceeding poſitive inſtructions in the true doctrine of Love anſwer to the illuminative part. And what remains of her diſcourſe, as ſhe herſelf here plainly gives us to underſtand, alludes to the laſt part of the religious initiation, the intuitive.—S.

[3] That is, his dæmon.—T.

underſtanding not to conceive, that beauty is one and the ſame thing in all beauteous bodies. With this conception in his mind, he muſt become a lover of all viſible forms, which are partakers of this beauty; and in conſequence of this general love, he muſt moderate the exceſs of that paſſion for one only female form, which had hitherto engroſſed him wholly: for he cannot now entertain thoughts extravagantly high of the beauty of any particular fair one, a beauty not peculiar to her, but which ſhe partakes of in common with all other corporeal forms that are beauteous. After this, if he thinks rightly, and knows to eſtimate the value of things juſtly, he will eſteem that beauty which is inward, and lies deep in the ſoul, to be of greater value and worthy of more regard than that which is outward, and adorns only the body. As ſoon, therefore, as he meets with a perſon of a beauteous ſoul and generous nature, though flowering forth but a little in ſuperficial beauty, with this little he is ſatisfied; he has all he wants; he truly loves, and aſſiduouſly employs all his thoughts and all his care on the object of his affection. Reſearching in his mind and memory, he draws forth, he generates ſuch notions of things, ſuch reaſonings and diſcourſes, as may beſt improve his beloved in virtue. Thus he arrives, of courſe, to view beauty in the arts [1], the ſubjects of diſcipline and ſtudy; and comes to diſcover, that beauty is congenial in them all. He now, therefore, accounts all beauty corporeal to be of mean and inconſiderable value, as being but a ſmall and inconſiderable part of beauty. From the arts he proceeds further to the ſciences, and beholds beauty no leſs in theſe [2]. And by this time having

[1] The word here uſed by Plato is επιτηδευμασι, in which he means to include all the particulars of right diſcipline; every ſtudy, and every exerciſe enjoined or recommended by antient policy to the youth of good families and fortunes; in a word, all the accompliſhments formed by a liberal education. Theſe may all be reduced to three kinds; habits of regular and polite behaviour, knowledge of the liberal arts, and practice of the liberal exerciſes of the body. But as all of them depend on principles of art, and are acquired by ſtudy and diſcipline, we have uſed theſe very words *art*, *ſtudy*, and *diſcipline*, in tranſlating Plato's επιτηδευματα, as the moſt expreſſive of his whole meaning.—S.

[2] The ſciences here meant are thoſe by the Platoniſts termed mathematical, as being the μαθηματα, the learning, which they deemed a neceſſary preparation for the ſtudy of true philoſophy. Theſe were arithmetic, geometry, muſic in its theory, and aſtronomy. In theſe ſciences every ſtep which the mind takes is from beauty to beauty: for every theorem new to the mind in any of theſe

ing ſeen, and now conſidering within himſelf, that beauty is manifold and various, he is no longer, like one of our domeſtics who has conceived a particular affection for ſome child of the family, a mean and illiberal ſlave to the beauty of any one particular, whether perſon or art, ſtudy or practice; but betaking himſelf to the ample ſea of beauty, and ſurveying it with the eye of intellect, he begets many beautiful and magnificent reaſonings, and dianoëtic conceptions in prolific philoſophy, till thus being ſtrengthened and increaſed, he perceives what that one [1] ſcience is which is ſo ſingularly great, as to be the ſcience of ſo ſingularly great a beauty. [2] But now try, continued ſhe, to give me all the attention you are maſter of. Whoever then is advanced thus far in the myſteries of Love by a right and regular progreſs of contemplation, approaching now to perfect intuition, ſuddenly he will diſcover, burſting into view, a beauty aſtoniſhingly admirable; that very beauty, to the gaining a ſight of which the aim of all his preceding ſtudies and labours had been directed: a beauty, whoſe peculiar characters are theſe: In the firſt place, it never had a beginning, nor will ever have an end, but always is, and always flouriſhes in perfection, unſuſceptible of growth or of decay. In the next place, it is not beautiful only when looked at one way, or ſeen in one light; at the ſame time that, viewed another way, or ſeen in ſome other light, it is far from being beautiful: it is not beautiful only at certain times, or with reference only to certain circumſtances of things; being at other times, or when things are otherwiſe circumſtanced, quite the contrary: nor is it beautiful only in ſome

theſe ſciences opens to her view ſome proportion or ſymmetry, ſome harmony or order, undiſcovered before. Each different ſcience ſeems a different world of beauty, ſtill enlarging on the mind's eye, as her views become more and more extenſive in the ſcience. For proportion in arithmetic differs from proportion in geometry; muſical proportion differs from them both; and the ſcience of the celeſtial orbs, of their ſeveral revolutions, their mutual aſpects, and their diſtances from each other, and from their common centre, is converſant in each of thoſe three different proportions, and comprehends them all.—S.

[1] This one ſcience is comprehended in Plato's dialectic, concerning which ſee the Introduction to the Parmenides.—T.

[2] This, which is the laſt pauſe in the ſpeech, intended to renew and invigorate the attention, is very requiſite in this place; for it precedes a deſcription as admirable and as full of wonder as the being which it deſcribes: and accordingly the ſtrongeſt attention is here expreſsly demanded.—S.

places, or as it appears to ſome perſons; whilſt in other places, and to other perſons, its appearance is the reverſe of beautiful. Nor can this beauty, which is indeed no other than the beautiful itſelf, ever be the object of imagination; as if it had ſome face or hands of its own, or any other parts belonging to body: nor is it ſome particular reaſon, nor ſome particular ſcience. It reſides not in any other being, not in any animal, for inſtance; nor in the earth, nor in the heavens, nor in any other part of the univerſe: but, ſimple and ſeparate from other things, it ſubſiſts alone with itſelf, and poſſeſſes an eſſence eternally uniform. All other forms which are beauteous participate of this; but in ſuch a manner they participate, that by their generation or deſtruction this ſuffers no diminution, receives no addition, nor undergoes any kind of alteration. When from thoſe lower beauties, reaſcending by the right way of Love, a man begins to gain a ſight of this ſupreme beauty, he muſt have almoſt attained ſomewhat of his end. Now to go, or to be led by another, along the right way of Love, is this: beginning from thoſe beauties of lower rank, to proceed in a continual aſcent, all the way propoſing this higheſt beauty as the end; and uſing the reſt but as ſo many ſteps in the aſcent; to proceed from one to two, from two [1] to all beauteous bodies; from the beauty of bodies to that of ſouls [2]; from the beauty of ſouls to that of arts; from the beauty of arts to that of diſciplines; until at length from the diſciplines he arrives at that diſcipline which is the diſcipline of no other thing than of that ſupreme beauty; and thus finally attains to know what is the beautiful itſelf.—Here is to be found, dear Socrates, ſaid the ſtranger-propheteſs [3], here if any where, the happy life, the

[1] Plato, in ſpeaking of the aſcent in corporeal beauty, very properly ſays, that after paſſing from *one* to *two*, we muſt proceed to *all* beautiful bodies: for it is neceſſary to aſcend rapidly from the beauty of body to a higher beauty. Mr. Sydenham, therefore, by changing the word *two* (though uſed by Plato) for *many* in his tranſlation, has, I conceive, entirely perverted the accurate ſenſe of the preſent paſſage.—T.

[2] In the Greek original there ſeems here to be a conſiderable omiſſion, which we have endeavoured to ſupply as follows: the ſupplemental words being thoſe included between theſe marks []; απο των καλων σωματων [επι τας καλας ψυχας, και απο των καλων ψυχων] επι τα καλα επιτηδευματα, κ. τ. λ. Some ſuch words are plainly neceſſary to make this recapitulation agreeable to the account at large given before.—S.

[3] In all editions of the Greek original we here read Μαντινικη. This ſeems to have been the ground

the ultimate object of desire to man: it is to live in beholding this consummate beauty; the sight of which if ever you attain, it will appear not to be in gold [1], nor in magnificent attire, nor in beautiful youths or damsels: with such, however, at present, many of you are so entirely taken up, and with the sight of them so absolutely charmed, that you would rejoice to spend your whole lives, were it possible, in the presence of those enchanting objects, without any thoughts of eating or drinking, but feasting your eyes only with their beauty, and living always in the bare sight of it. If this be so, what effect, think you, would the sight of beauty itself have upon a man, were he to see it pure and genuine, not corrupted and stained all over with the mixture of flesh, and colours, and much more of like perishing and fading trash; but were able to view that divine essence, the beautiful itself, in its own simplicity of form? Think you, said she, that the life of such a man would be contemptible or mean; of the man who always directed his eye toward the right object, who looked always at real beauty, and was conversant with it continually? Perceive you not, said she, that in beholding the beautiful with that eye, with which alone it is possible to behold it, thus, and thus only, could a man ever attain to generate, not the images or semblances of virtue, as not having his intimate commerce with an image or a semblance; but virtue true, real, and substantial, from the converse and embraces of that which is real and true. Thus begetting true virtue, and bringing her up till she is grown mature, he would become a favourite of

ground on which Harry Stephens and Dr. Davis built their supposition, that the word μαντικη, where it occurred in a prior passage, was a corrupt reading, and should be changed into Μαντικικη. But we are inclined to think, that the passage now before us ought to be accommodated to that, rather than to this; especially since the reading of μαντικη in this place, as well as in that other, is favoured by the Latin translation of Ficinus; a translation which has always had the authority of a manuscript allowed it, as having been made from a manuscript copy, not consulted by any of the editors, with an exactness almost verbal, and accordingly with very little regard to style, and with no great attention to the sense.—S.

[1] I am sorry to say that nothing can be more absurd than the notes of Mr. Sydenham on this part of the dialogue. In consequence of being perfectly ignorant of the polytheism of the Greeks, he is continually offering violence to the meaning of Plato, in order to make that philosopher join with him in ridiculing the religion of Greece. Hence, according to Mr. Sydenham, Plato, when he here says that the beautiful itself is not in gold, nor in beautiful youths or damsels, intends by it to ridicule gilt statues, and the notion that such beautiful forms as those of Ganymede and Hebe were the ornaments of the court of heaven, and the delight of Jupiter himself!—T.

the Gods; and at length would be, if any man ever be, himſelf one of the immortals.—The doctrines which I have now delivered to you, Phædrus, and to the reſt of my friends here, I was taught by Diotima, and am perſuaded they are true. Full of this perſuaſion myſelf, I endeavour to perſuade others, and to ſhow them, that it is difficult for any man to find a better guide or aſſiſtant to him than Love, in his way to happineſs. And on this account, I further contend, that every man ought to pay all due honours to that patron of human nature. For my own part, I make it my chief ſtudy to cultivate the art which Love teaches, and employ myſelf upon the ſubjects proper for the exerciſe of that art with a particular attention; encouraging others to follow my example, and at all times, as well as now, celebrating the power and virtue of Love as far as I am able.—This ſpeech, Phædrus, you may accept, if you are ſo pleaſed, for a panegyric in praiſe of Love: or if you chooſe to call it by any other name, and to take it in any other ſenſe, be that its right name, and that its proper acceptation.

THE SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES having thus ſpoken, the reſt praiſed his oration; but Ariſtophanes endeavoured to ſay ſomething, becauſe Socrates in his ſpeech had mentioned him. On a ſudden, however, a loud knocking was heard at the door of the the porch, together with the voices of the intoxicated, and the ſound of the pipe. Upon this Agatho ſaid to the ſervants, See who are there; and if there is any one among them fit for this company, call him in: if not, ſay that we are no longer drinking. Not long after this the voice of Alcibiades, who was very much intoxicated, was heard in the court, aſking where Agatho was, and commanding to be led to him. The flute-player, therefore, and ſome other of his companions, brought him to Agatho, and ſtood with him at the doors, he being crowned with a garland of ivy and violets, having many fillets on his head, and exclaiming, All hail, my friends! Either receive as your aſſociate in drinking a man very much intoxicated, or let us depart, crowning Agatho alone, for whoſe ſake we came. For I could not, ſays he, be with you yeſterday; but now I come with fillets on my head, that, from my own, I may crown the head of the wiſeſt and the moſt beautiful perſon, if I may be allowed ſo to ſpeak. Do you, therefore, laugh at

me as one intoxicated? However, though you may laugh, I well know that I ſpeak the truth. But tell me immediately, whether I may come in to him or not; and whether you continue drinking or not?. All the company, therefore, was in an uproar, and ordered him to enter and ſeat himſelf; which he accordingly did, and called for Agatho. Agatho, therefore, came, led by his companions; and Alcibiades at the ſame time taking off his fillets, that he might crown him, did not ſee Socrates, though he ſat before him, but ſat near Agatho, and between him and Socrates: for Socrates had made way for him that he might ſit. Alcibiades, therefore, being ſeated, ſaluted and crowned Agatho: and then Agatho ſaid, Boys, take off the ſhoes of Alcibiades, that he may recline as the third among us. Alcibiades ſaid, By all means, but aſked, Who is this third drinking companion of ours? and at the ſame time turning himſelf round ſaw Socrates; but ſeeing him, he ſtarted, and exclaimed, O Hercules! what is this? Are you again ſitting here to enſnare me? as it is uſual with you to appear ſuddenly where I leaſt expected to find you. And now for what purpoſe are you here? And why do you ſit in this place, and not with Ariſtophanes, or with ſome other who is ridiculous, and wiſhes to be ſo? But you have contrived to ſit with the moſt beautiful of the gueſts. Then Socrates ſaid to Agatho, See if you can aſſiſt me; for the love of this man is not to me a vile thing; ſince from the time in which I began to love him I am no longer at liberty either to behold or ſpeak to any beautiful perſon. Or does not he, in conſequence of emulating and envying me in amatory affairs, contrive wonderful devices, and alſo revile and ſcarcely keep his hands from me? See, therefore, that he does not do this now, but conciliate us; or, if he ſhould attempt violence, aſſiſt me: for the mania of this man, and his amatory impulſe, very much terrify me.—Alcibiades then ſaid, There is no occaſion for any conciliation between you and me. I ſhall, however, at ſome other time take vengeance on you for theſe things. But now, Agatho, ſays he, give me ſome of the fillets, that I may crown the wonderful head of this man, that he may not blame me that I have crowned you, but not him who vanquiſhes all men in diſcourſe, not only lately as you have done, but at all times. And at the ſame time receiving the fillets, he crowned Socrates, and ſeated himſelf. Being ſeated, therefore, he ſaid, Come, gentlemen, drink, for you appear to me to be ſober. This, however, is not to be allowed; for it was agreed that we ſhould drink. I therefore engage to be

your

your leader in drinking, till you have drunk enough. But, Agatho, paſs the cup, if there is any large one. Or, rather, there is no occaſion for this; but Bring hither, boy, ſaid he, that cooling veſſel, which ſeems to hold more than eight cotylæ[1]. Having filled this veſſel, he firſt drank himſelf, and afterwards ordered them to pour out of it for Socrates, and at the ſame time ſaid, This ſtratagem of mine, gentlemen, is nothing to Socrates; for, let him drink as much as any one may command, he will not be in the leaſt intoxicated[2]. Socrates, therefore, the boy having poured out of the large veſſel, drank. But then Eryximachus ſaid, How ſhall we do, Alcibiades? Shall we neither ſay any thing, nor ſing any thing, over the cup; but act exactly like thoſe that are thirſty? Upon this Alcibiades ſaid, Hail, Eryximachus! beſt of men, ſprung from the beſt and moſt prudent of fathers. And hail to you, ſaid Eryximachus. But what ſhall we do? That which you order us; for it is neceſſary to be obedient to you. For a man who is a phyſician is equivalent to many others. Command, therefore, whatever you pleaſe. Hear then, ſaid Eryximachus. Before you entered, it ſeemed to us to be proper that every one, beginning at the right hand, ſhould deliver an oration in praiſe of Love, to the beſt of his ability. All the reſt of us, therefore, have delivered our orations; and it is juſt, ſince you have not ſpoken, but have drunk, that you alſo ſhould deliver one: and when you have ſpoken, you may order Socrates to do whatever you pleaſe, and he may alſo order him on his right hand, and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to the reſt. Eryximachus then ſaid, You ſpeak well, Alcibiades; but it is not equitable that a man intoxicated ſhould engage in a verbal competition with thoſe that are ſober. But, O bleſſed man, has Socrates perſuaded you with reſpect to any

[1] That is, $\frac{5}{12}$ths of a peck.

[2] What Plato ſays near the end of his firſt book of Laws concerning drinking largely, may ſerve as a comment on what is here, and in other parts of this oration, related of Socrates: "If ſome one," ſays he, "confiding in his own nature, and being properly prepared by meditation, ſhould not refuſe to exerciſe himſelf with many drinking aſſociates, and ſhould evince, in the neceſſary conſumption of the liquor, a power ſo tranſcendent and ſtrong, as neither greatly to err through impudence, nor to be changed through virtue; but towards the end of the liquor ſhould depart without being intoxicated, fearing any human potion the leaſt of all things;—in this caſe, he would do ſomething well." And to this Clinias, one of the perſons of the dialogue, replies: "Certainly. For ſuch a one, by thus acting, would conduct himſelf with temperance and modeſty." Plato, doubtleſs, alluded to Socrates in writing this.

thing

thing which he juſt now ſaid? Or do you know that every thing which he ſaid is juſt the contrary? For if I, he being preſent, ſhould praiſe any one, whether God or man, except himſelf, he would not keep his hands from me. Will you not predict better things? ſaid Socrates. By Neptune, ſaid Alcibiades, ſay nothing to theſe things; for I ſhall praiſe no other perſon when you are preſent. Do ſo then, ſaid Eryximachus: if you will, praiſe Socrates. How do you ſay? ſaid Alcibiades. Does it ſeem to you fit, O Eryximachus, that I ſhould attack this man, and revenge myſelf before you? So then, ſaid Socrates, what have you in your mind? Will you praiſe me for things ridiculous? or what will you do? I ſhall ſpeak the truth. But ſee if you permit me. Indeed, ſaid Socrates, I not only permit, but order you to ſpeak the truth. I ſhall by all means do ſo, ſaid Alcibiades. But obſerve, if I ſhould aſſert any thing that is not true, ſtop me when you pleaſe, and ſay that in this I have ſpoken falſely; for I ſhall not willingly lie in any thing. And do not wonder if, in conſequence of recollecting, I narrate different circumſtances from different places; for it is not an eaſy thing for a man in my condition to enumerate readily, and in ſucceſſion, thy wonderful nature. But, gentlemen, I will thus endeavour to praiſe Socrates through images. He indeed will, perhaps, ſuſpect that I ſhall turn my diſcourſe to things ridiculous; but the image will be for the ſake of truth, and not for the ſake of the ridiculous.

I ſay, then, that Socrates is moſt ſimilar to theſe Silenuses that are ſeated in the workſhops of ſtatuaries, which the artiſts have fabricated with pipes or flutes in their hands; and which, when they are biſected, appear to contain within ſtatues [1] of the Gods. And I again ſay, that he reſembles the

[1] Correſponding with this is the following paſſage from the Scholia of Maximus on the works of the Pſeudo-Dionyſius the Areopagite: Ἑλληνες γαρ (i. e. Græci) δια τινας ανδριαντας εποιουν, μητε χειρας, μητε ποδας εχοντας, ους ἑρμας εκαλουν. εποιουν δε αυτους διακενους θυρας εχοντας, καθαπερ τοιχοπυργιτικους. εσωθεν ουν αυτων ετιθεσαν αγαλματα, ὁν εσεβον θεων, εξωθεν δε απεκλειον τους ἑρμας· εφαινοντο ουν οι ἑρμαι ευτελεις, εσωθεν δε τουτων, θεων αυτων καλλωπισμους ειχον. Dionyſii Opera, tom. ii. p. 209. i. e. "The Greeks made certain ſtatues, having neither hands nor feet, which they called Hermæ. They faſhioned theſe with avenues, like turrets on a wall. Within theſe, therefore, they placed the ſtatues of the Gods whom they worſhipped; but they cloſed the Hermæ externally. Hence theſe Hermæ appeared to be things of no value; but inwardly they contained the ornaments of the Gods themſelves."

ſatyr

ſatyr Marſyas. That your outward form, therefore, is ſimilar to theſe, O Socrates, even you yourſelf will not deny; but that you alſo reſemble them in other things, hear in the next place. You are contumelious: or are you not? For, if you do not acknowledge it, I will bring witneſſes. Are you not alſo a piper much more wonderful than Marſyas[1]? For he charmed men through inſtruments, by a power proceeding from the mouth; and he alſo accompliſhes this even now, when any one uſes that modulation. For I call the modulation of Olympus[2] that of Marſyas, becauſe he inſtructed Olympus in it. That harmony, therefore, whether it is produced by a good piper, or by a bad female player on the pipe, alone detains the hearers, and manifeſts, becauſe it is divine, thoſe that ſtand in need[3] of the Gods and the myſteries; but you in this reſpect only differ from that harmony, that you effect this very ſame thing by mere words without inſtruments. We, therefore, when we hear ſome other perſon relating the diſcourſe of another, though he that relates it ſhould be a very good rhetorician, yet we pay, as I may ſay, no attention to it; but when any one hears you, or another perſon, relating your diſcourſes, though he that repeats them ſhould be a bad ſpeaker, and whether it be a woman, or a man, or a lad, that is the auditor, we are aſtoniſhed and poſſeſſed. I therefore, my friends, unleſs I ſhould appear to be very much intoxicated, will tell you upon oath in what manner I have been affected by the diſcourſes of this man, and how I am even now affected.

[1] A celebrated piper of Celæne in Phrygia. He was ſo ſkilful in playing on the flute, that he is generally conſidered as the inventor of it. It is fabled of him, that he challenged Apollo to a trial of his ſkill as a muſician; and, being vanquiſhed, the God flayed him alive.

[2] Olympus was both a poet and a muſician: he was the diſciple of Marſyas, and flouriſhed before the Trojan war.

[3] Proclus, in his MS. Commentary on the Firſt Alcibiades, where he makes a diviſion of muſical inſtruments, obſerves, that thoſe of an exciting nature were moſt adapted to enthuſiaſtic energy. Hence, ſays he, in the myſteries, and in the greateſt of myſtic ſacrifices, the pipe is uſeful: for they employ its motive power in order to excite the dianoëtic part to divinity. Τα δη κινητικα προς ενθουσιαν οικειοτατα· διο δη και εν τοις μυστηριοις και εν ταις τελεταις χρησιμος αυλος. χρωνται γαρ αυτου τη κινητικη προς την της διανοιας εγερσιν επι το θειον. Such, therefore, as were excited by the melody of the pipe in a very ſmall degree, may be ſuppoſed to be implied by thoſe that ſtand in need of the Gods and myſteries; as the other machinery of the myſteries, in conjunction with the pipe, would neceſſarily produce that excitation which the pipe alone was, in ſuch as theſe, incapable of effecting.

For

For when I hear him, my heart leaps much more than that of thoſe who celebrate the myſteries of the Corybantes; and my tears flow from his diſcourſes. I alſo ſee many others affected in the ſame manner. But when I hear Pericles, and other good rhetoricians, I think, indeed, that they ſpeak well, but I ſuffer nothing of this kind; nor is my ſoul agitated with tumult, nor is it indignant, as if it were in a ſervile condition. But by this Marſyas I am often ſo affected, that it appears to me I ought not to live while I lead ſuch a life as I do. You will not, Socrates, ſay that theſe things are not true. And even now I perceive that, if I were willing to liſten to him, I could not bear it, but ſhould be affected in the very ſame manner. For he would compel me to acknowledge, that, being yet deficient in many things, I neglect myſelf, but attend to the affairs of the Athenians [1]. By violence, therefore, reſtraining my ears, I depart from him, flying, as it were, from the Syrens, leſt I ſhould ſit with him till I became old. From him alone likewiſe, of all men, I ſuffer that which no one would think to be in me, to be aſhamed of ſomething. But I am abaſhed before him alone. For I am conſcious that I am unable to deny that what he exhorts me to do ought not to be done; but when I depart from him, I am vanquiſhed by the honour which I receive from the multitude. I therefore avoid, and fly from him; and when I ſee him I am aſhamed, in conſequence of what I had conſented to do. And often, indeed, it would be a pleaſure to me no longer to ſee him among men: and yet again, if this ſhould happen, I well know that I ſhould be in a much greater degree afflicted; ſo that I am ignorant in what manner I ſhould uſe this man. And from the modulations, indeed, of this ſatyr, both I and many others have ſuffered ſuch-like things.

But hear from me how much he reſembles ſuch things as I ſhall aſſimilate him to, and what a wonderful power he poſſeſſes. For be well aſſured of this, that no one of you knows him; but I will manifeſt him, ſince I have begun to ſpeak. You ſee then that he is diſpoſed in a very amatory manner towards beautiful things; and that he is always converſant with and aſtoniſhed about theſe. And again, he knows all things, and yet knows nothing [2]; ſo that this figure of him is very Silenical; for he is externally inveſted

[1] See the Firſt Alcibiades.

[2] Very few have penetrated the profound meaning of Socrates when he ſaid that he knew nothing.

inveſted with it, like a carved Silenus. But when he is opened inwardly, would you think, O my fellow gueſts, how replete he is with temperance? Know alſo, that neither if any one is beautiful, does he pay any attention to his beauty, but deſpiſes it far beyond what you would ſuppoſe; nor does he eſteem any one for being rich, or for poſſeſſing any other honour from the things which are conſidered as bleſſed by the multitude. But he thinks that all theſe poſſeſſions are of no worth, and that we are nothing. He alſo paſſes the whole of his life among men in irony and jeſt; but when he is ſerious and is opened, I know not whether any one of you has ſeen the images which are within. I however once ſaw them, and they appeared to me to be ſo divine, golden, all-beautiful and wonderful, that I was determined to act in every reſpect conformably to the advice of Socrates. Thinking too that he paid great attention to my beauty, I conſidered this as my gain, and as a circumſtance wonderfully fortunate, as I conceived that by gratifying Socrates I ſhould hear from him all that he knew. For I formed a great opinion of my beauty, and thought it admirable. Thus conceiving, as prior to this I had never been with him alone without an attendant, I then diſmiſſed my attendant, and remained with him alone: for it is neceſſary to narrate every thing to you truly.

But now attend to me; and if I lie, do you, Socrates, confute me. I was with him, O my fellow gueſts, I alone with him alone, and expected that he would immediately ſpeak to me in ſuch a manner as lovers are accuſtomed to ſpeak to the objects of their love in ſolitude; and I was delighted with the expectation. Nothing however of this kind took place; but he diſcourſed with me as uſual till evening, and then departed. After this, I incited him to engage with me in gymnaſtic exerciſes, expecting that I ſhould effect ſomething by this mean. We engaged, therefore, in theſe exerciſes, and often wreſtled together, no one being preſent. But what occaſion is there to ſay more? I did not in the leaſt accompliſh my purpoſe. Not ſucceeding, therefore, in this in any reſpect, it appeared to me that I ſhould attack the man more ſtrenuouſly, ſince it was my determination to enſnare him. Hear now then what the thing was. I invited him to ſup

thing. But he doubtleſs intended to ſignify by this the nothingneſs of human compared with divine knowledge. For to *know* that this is the true condition of human knowledge, it is neceſſary to know previouſly all the natures ſuperior to man.

with

with me, in reality forming the ſame ſtratagem as a lover would for the objects of his love. He did not readily accept my invitation: however, ſome time after he accepted it. But when he came, as ſoon as he had ſupped, he wiſhed to depart; and then I being aſhamed conſented to his going away. Again however attacking him, after ſupper, I diſcourſed with him a conſiderable part of the night; and when he again wiſhed to depart, obſerving that it was late, I compelled him to ſtay. He repoſed, therefore, in a bed next to mine, and in which he had ſupped; and no other perſon beſides us ſlept in the houſe. Thus far then, what I have ſaid is well, and might have been ſaid to any one; but you muſt not hear me narrate what follows without firſt admitting the proverb, that wine without childhood [1] and with childhood is true. Beſides, to leave in obſcurity the proud deed of Socrates appears to me unjuſt in one who undertakes to praiſe him. To which I may add, that I am affected in the ſame manner as he is who is bitten by a viper: for they ſay he is not willing to tell his feelings except to thoſe that are in a ſimilar condition, as they alone can know them, and will pardon every thing which he may dare to do and ſay through the pain. I, therefore, have been bit by that which gives more pain, and which indeed cauſes the moſt acute of all pains. For thoſe who have the heart or ſoul, or whatever elſe it may be proper to call it, bit and wounded by philoſophic diſcourſes, find the pain to be much more acute than that produced by the bite of the viper, and are impelled by it to do and ſay any thing; when ſuch diſcourſes are received in a ſoul juvenile and not ignoble. Again, therefore, looking at Phædrus, Agatho, Eryximachus, Pauſanias, Ariſtodemus, Ariſtophanes, and, in ſhort, Socrates, and the reſt of the company; Since all of you, ſaid he, partake with me of the mania and Bacchic fury of philoſophy, on this account let all hear me. For you will pardon what I then did, and what I now ſay. But let the ſervants, or any other profane [2] and ruſtic perſon that may be preſent, cloſe their ears with mighty gates.

[1] Meaning that wine makes both children and others ſpeak the truth.

[2] Plato when he wrote this had doubtleſs that Orphic verſe in his mind,

Φθέγξομαι οἷς θεμις ἐστι, θύρας δ' ἐπιθεσθε βεβηλοι.

i. e. "I ſpeak to thoſe to whom it is lawful; ſhut your gates, ye profane." And Proclus informs

gates. When, therefore, the lamp was exinguiſhed, and the ſervants had left the room, it appeared to me requiſite to employ no diſſimulation towards him, but freely to tell him my ſentiments. And I ſaid, moving him, Socrates, are you aſleep? Not yet, he replied. Do you know then, what I conceive? About what particularly? ſaid he. You appear to me, I replied, to be the only lover worthy of me, though you are not forward in courting me. But, as I am thus affected, I think it would be very ſtupid, not to gratify you in this particular, and in any thing elſe of which you may be in want, whether it be my property, or my friends: for nothing is to me more honourable than to become the beſt of men. But I think that no one can give me more aſſiſtance in this than you. And I ſhould much more fear the reprehenſions of the wiſe, in not gratifying ſuch a man, than I ſhould fear the many and the unwiſe by gratifying him. Socrates, having heard me, ſaid, very ironically, and very much after his uſual manner, O beloved Alcibiades, you appear in reality to be no vile perſon, if what you ſay concerning me is true, and there is in me a certain power, through which you can be made better, and if alſo you perceive in me an immenſe beauty, and very much excelling the elegance of your form. If, therefore, perceiving this, you endeavour to have communion with me, and to change beauty for beauty, you ſtrive to poſſeſs much more than I do; for inſtead of the opinion you endeavour to obtain the truth of beauty, and conceive that you ſhall in reality exchange braſs for gold. But, O bleſſed youth, conſider more maturely, nor let me be concealed from you, who am nothing. For then indeed the ſight

us in his MS. Commentary on the Firſt Alcibiades, that there was an inſcription in the Eleuſinian grove forbidding the uninitiated to enter into the adyta or ſecret receſſes of the temple. Τοις γαρ εις το των Ελευσινιων τεμενος εισιουσιν, εδηλον το προγραμμα μη χωρειν εισω των αδυτων, αμυητοις ουσι και ατελεστοις.

Alcibiades, therefore, as he is about to relate a circumſtance which, conſidered independently of the deſign with which it is mentioned, is indecent, very properly forbids the profane to be auditors of it. For in this he follows the myſteries, in which, as I have ſhown in my Diſſertation on them, p. 123, the indecent was introduced. In the myſteries too, as exhibitions of this kind were deſigned to free the initiated from licentious paſſions by gratifying the ſight, and at the ſame time vanquiſhing deſire through the awful ſanctity with which theſe rites were accompanied, ſo what is now related by Alcibiades is introduced by Plato, in order to liberate his countrymen from an unnatural vice. So that it benefits the reader at the ſame time that it exalts the character

ſight of the dianoëtic power begins to perceive acutely, when that of the eye loſes its acme. You, however, are as yet at a diſtance from theſe things. Having heard him, I replied, With reſpect to myſelf the particulars are ſuch as I have told you, nor have I ſaid any thing different from what I conceive; but do you adviſe in ſuch a manner as you may think beſt both for you and me. This, ſaid he, you ſay well: for in future let us, conſulting together, do that which appears to be beſt for us, both about theſe and other particulars. Having heard and replied to theſe things, and ceaſing to ſpeak, as if I had thought that he was wounded with a dart, I roſe, and would not ſuffer him to ſpeak any more; and wrapping myſelf round with this old garment (for it was winter), I reclined in it, embracing in my arms this truly divine and wonderful man, and thus lay the whole night. And again, Socrates, neither will you ſay that I have aſſerted theſe things falſely. But though I acted in this manner, yet he was victorious, and deſpiſed, ridiculed, and even inſulted my beauty. And as, O my fellow gueſts, you are judges of the haughtineſs of Socrates, I call the Gods and Goddeſſes to witneſs, that I roſe from Socrates no otherwiſe than if I had ſlept with my father, or my elder brother.

What then do you ſuppoſe were my thoughts after this, conceiving that I had been deſpiſed, but admiring the nature, the temperance and fortitude of this man? conceiving that I had met with ſuch a man for prudence and fortitude, as I ſhould never have expected to find? Hence I could not be in any reſpect angry with him, nor could I abandon his converſation, nor diſcover any means of alluring him. For I well knew that it is much more difficult to ſubdue him by money, than it was to vanquiſh Ajax by the

racter of Socrates. Admirably, therefore, is it obſerved by Jamblichus, (De Myſt. p. 22.) "that as in comedies and tragedies, on beholding the paſſions of others we repreſs our own, render them moderate, and are purified from them; in like manner in the myſteries, by ſeeing and hearing things indecent, we are liberated from the injury with which the performance of them is attended." He adds, "Things of this kind, therefore, are introduced for the ſake of healing our ſoul, moderating the maladies which adhere to it through generation, and freeing it from its bonds; and hence Heraclitus very properly called them *remedies*. Δια τουτο εν τη κωμωδια και τραγωδια αλλοτρια παθη θεωρουντες ισταμεν τα οικεια παθη, και μετριωτερα απεργαζομεθα, και αποκαθαιρομεν· εν τε τοις ἱεροις, θεαμασι τισι και ακουσμασι των αισχρων, απολυομεθα της επι των εργων απ' αυτων συμπιπτουσης βλαβης. Θεραπειας ουν ἑνεκα της εν ἡμιν ψυχης, και μετριοτητος των δια την γενεσιν προσφυομενων αυτη κακων, λυσεως τε απο των δεσμων, και απαλλαγης χαριν, τα τοιαυτα προσαγεται· και δια τουτο εικοτως αυτα ακεα Ἡρακλειτος προσειπεν.

ſword;

ſword; and that by which alone I thought he might be enſnared deceived me. Hence I wandered about dubious, and more enſlaved by this man than any one by any other. All theſe things, therefore, were at that time effected by me. After this, he was my aſſociate and my daily gueſt in the military expedition againſt Potidæa. And here, in the firſt place, he not only ſurpaſſed me, but all others, in labours. Hence, when we were compelled through a deficiency of proviſions to faſt, as is ſometimes the caſe in armies, the reſt were nothing to him with reſpect to endurance. Again, in feaſts at the military table, he alone was the only perſon that appeared to enjoy them; and though he was unwilling to drink, yet when compelled he vanquiſhed all the reſt. And what is the moſt wonderful of all, no one ever ſaw Socrates intoxicated. However, it ſeems to me that a confutation of this will immediately follow [1]. But with reſpect to endurance in the ſeverity of the winter (for the winter there is very ſevere), he performed wonders; and once, the cold being ſo dreadful that no one could venture out of his tent, or, if he did venture, he was very abundantly clothed, and had his feet bound and wrapt in wool and ſheep-ſkins, Socrates then went out with juſt the ſame clothing as before this he was accuſtomed to wear. He likewiſe marched through the ice without ſhoes, more eaſily than others with ſhoes. But the ſoldiers beheld him as one who deſpiſed them. And thus much for theſe particulars.

Again, what this ſtrenuous man did and endured in that army, it is worth while to hear. For thinking deeply about ſomething one morning, he ſtood conſidering it; and though he was not able to diſcover what he was inveſtigating, he did not deſiſt, but ſtood exploring. It was now too mid-day, and the ſoldiers perceived him, and wondering, ſaid one to the other, that Socrates had ſtood from the morning cogitating [2]. At length ſome of the Ionian

[1] Alcibiades ſays this as being intoxicated himſelf.

[2] Socrates is not the only inſtance of this dominion of the rational ſoul over the body, but a ſimilar abſtraction is related of other philoſophers. It is ſaid of Xenocrates, the diſciple of Plato, that he was for one hour every day abſtracted from body. Archimedes was ſo intent on geometrical figures that he was inſenſible to the capture of his country, and to the enemy ſtanding before him. Plotinus, as his diſciple Porphyry informs us, was often ſo abſtracted from body, as to be united by an ineffable energy with the higheſt God; and this alſo once happened to Porphyry. Heraclitus and Democritus, in order to obtain this abſtraction in perfection, withdrew into ſolitude.

Ionian ſoldiers when it was evening, having ſupped (for it was then ſummer), laid themſelves down on the bare ground, that they might obſerve whether he continued in the ſame poſture through the night. But he ſtood till it was morning and the ſun roſe; after which he departed, having firſt adored the ſun. If you are alſo willing, hear how he conducted himſelf in battle; for it is but juſt to relate this. For in that engagement in which the commanders of the army conferred on me thoſe rewards which are uſually given to ſuch as have conducted themſelves beſt in battle, no other man ſaved me than Socrates; for, as I was wounded, he was not willing to leave me, but preſerved both my arms and me. And I indeed, O Socrates, at that time urged the commanders to give you the rewards which are beſtowed on the moſt valiant; and for ſaying this, you neither blame me, nor accuſe me of ſpeaking falſely. The commanders, however, looking to my dignity, wiſhed to give me thoſe rewards, you alſo being more deſirous that I ſhould receive them than yourſelf.

Further ſtill, O fellow gueſts, it was well worth while to behold Socrates when our army fled from Delium; for I happened to be in that battle among the cavalry, but Socrates was among the foot. The ranks, therefore, being broken, he and Laches retreated; and I meeting with and ſeeing the troops, immediately exhorted them to take courage, and ſaid that I would not abandon them. Here then, I could ſee Socrates better than at Potidæa; for I was in leſs fear, becauſe I was on horſeback. In the firſt place, therefore, he greatly ſurpaſſed Laches in prudent caution; and, in the next place, he appeared to me, O Ariſtophanes, to carry himſelf loftily, as you alſo ſay he does here, and darting his eye around calmly to ſurvey both friends and enemies; ſo that it was manifeſt to every one, and even to him that was at a conſiderable diſtance, that he who touched this man

tude. Hence the former of theſe through intenſe ſtudy was of a ſorrowful aſpect; and the latter, when he began to recall his intellect from the ſenſes, and was impeded by his eyes, blinded himſelf. In ſhort, all thoſe who have made great diſcoveries in the regions of ſcience have accompliſhed this by retiring from body into the ſublime tower of intellect. Hence Plato ſays in the Phædrus, that the intellects of philoſophers eſpecially recover the wings of the ſoul, becauſe they are always attentive to divine concerns; and on this account he at one time calls ſuch philoſophers divine, and at another ſons of the Gods. Hence too Ariſtotle ſays, in his Problems, that all who have excelled in any art have been melancholy, whether they were born ſuch, or whether they became ſuch by continued meditation.

would

would be very ſtrenuouſly reſiſted. Hence both he and his companion retreated with ſecurity; for ſcarcely was any one attacked who thus conducted himſelf in the battle, but they purſued thoſe that fled rapidly and in diſorder.

There are many other things, indeed, in which Socrates is admirable, and for which he might be praiſed. And in other purſuits, others perhaps may merit the ſame praiſe; but to reſemble no man, neither of the antients nor the moderns, this is a circumſtance worthy of all wonder. For ſuch as Achilles was, ſuch alſo it may be conjectured was Braſidas [1] and others: and again, ſuch as Pericles was, ſuch alſo it may be ſaid were Antenor and Neſtor. And there are likewiſe others that after the ſame manner may be compared with others. But ſuch a prodigy is this man, both as to himſelf and his diſcourſes, that no one by ſearching will find any man that nearly reſembles him, neither among thoſe of the preſent age nor among the antients. He can, therefore, only be ſaid to reſemble, both in himſelf and his diſcourſes, thoſe things to which I have compared him, viz. no one among men, but the Silenuses and Satyrs. For I omitted to mention this before, that his diſcourſes are moſt ſimilar to the Silenuses when opened. For the diſcourſes of Socrates, to him who is willing to hear them, will at firſt appear to be perfectly ridiculous; ſince the nouns and verbs which he employs externally enfold a certain gift of a reviling Satyr. For he ſpeaks of aſſes and their burthens, of copper-ſmiths, ſhoe-makers and tanners, and he always appears to ſay the ſame things through the ſame; ſo that every unſkilful and ignorant man will ridicule his words. But he who beholds his diſcourſes when opened, and penetrates into their depth, will, in the firſt place, find that they alone of all other diſcourſes contain intellect within them; and, in the next place, that they are moſt divine, are replete with numerous images of virtue, and have a very ample extent, or rather extend themſelves to every thing which it is fit he ſhould conſider who intends to become a truly worthy man. Theſe then are the things, my fellow gueſts, for which I praiſe and alſo for which I blame Socrates. I have likewiſe inſerted in them the injuries which he has done me. Nor has he alone acted in thismanner towards me, but alſo towards Charmides the ſon of Glauco, Euthydemus the

[1] Braſidas was a famous Spartan general, who, after many great victories obtained over Athens and other Grecian ſtates, died of a wound at Amphipolis, which Cleon the Athenian had beſieged.

ſon

ſon of Diocles, and very many others; for he has deceived theſe, as if he had been their lover, when at the ſame time he rather became the beloved object himſelf. Hence, I caution you, O Agatho, not to be deceived by this man, but, knowing what I have ſuffered, take care, and do not, as the proverb ſays of fools, become wiſe by experience.

Ariſtodemus related, that when Alcibiabes had thus ſpoken, the freedom of his ſpeech excited a general laugh, becauſe he appeared to have for Socrates an amatory regard. Socrates, therefore, ſaid, You ſeem to me, O Alcibiades, to be ſober; for, otherwiſe, you would not have attempted in ſo elegant and circuitous a manner to conceal that for the ſake of which you have ſaid all theſe things, nor would you have aſſerted that which, as if foreign from the purpoſe, you have added at the end; as if the intention of all that you have ſaid was not to ſeparate me and Agatho. For you think that I ought to love you and no other, and that Agatho ought to be loved by you, and by no one beſides. Neither is this Satyric and Silenic drama of yours concealed from, but is perfectly evident to, us. But, dear Agatho, may none of theſe his contrivances ſucceed! and let us endeavour that nothing may ſeparate you and me. To this Agatho replied, Indeed, Socrates, you appear to ſpeak the truth; and I infer that he ſits between you and me, that he may ſeparate us. He will, however, derive no advantage from this; for I will come and ſit next to you. By all means, ſaid Socrates, come hither, and ſit below me. O Jupiter! Alcibiades exclaimed, how much do I ſuffer from this man! He thinks it is neceſſary to ſurpaſs me in every thing; but, O wonderful man, ſuffer Agatho, if no one elſe, to ſit between us. It is impoſſible, ſaid Socrates: for you have praiſed me, and it is neceſſary that I ſhould now praiſe him ſitting at my right hand. If, therefore, Agatho reclines under you, he certainly will not again praiſe me before he has been praiſed by me. But ceaſe, O dæmoniacal man, and do not envy my praiſe of the lad; for I very much deſire to paſs an encomium on him. Excellent! excellent! ſaid Agatho to Alcibiades: there is no reaſon why I ſhould ſtay here, but there is every reaſon that I ſhould change my ſeat, that I may be praiſed by Socrates. Theſe things, ſaid Alcibiades, are uſual: when Socrates is preſent, it is impoſſible for any other to ſhare the favours of the beautiful. And now obſerve how eaſily, and with what perſuaſive language, he draws this youth to him. After this Agatho roſe, that he might ſit by Socrates: but on a ſud-

den many revellers came to the gates, and, finding them open, in conſequence of ſome one having gone out, they entered and ſeated themſelves. Hence, all things were full of tumult; and as there was no longer any order obſerved, every one was compelled to drink a great quantity of wine. Ariſtodemus therefore ſaid, that Eryximachus and Phædrus, and ſome others, went home to take ſome ſleep; but that he ſlept there very abundantly, the nights being long, and roſe about daybreak, the cocks then crowing. When, therefore, he had riſen, he ſaw that ſome of the gueſts were aſleep, and that others had departed; but that Agatho, Ariſtophanes, and Socrates, were the only perſons awake, and were drinking to the right hand out of a great bowl. He alſo added, that Socrates was diſcourſing with them; but that he did not recollect what the diſcourſe was, becauſe he was not preſent at the beginning of it, as he was then aſleep. However, the ſum of it, he ſaid, was this, that Socrates compelled them to acknowledge that it was the province of the ſame perſon to compoſe comedy and tragedy; and that he who was by art a tragic, was alſo a comic poet. When they had aſſented to theſe things by compulſion, and not very readily, Ariſtodemus ſaid, they fell aſleep; and that Ariſtophanes fell aſleep firſt, and afterwards, it being now day, Agatho; but that Socrates, they being aſleep, riſing, went out, he as uſual following him. And laſtly, that Socrates went to the Lyceum, and, having waſhed himſelf as at another time, converſed there the whole day, and in the evening went home to reſt.

THE END OF THE BANQUET.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PARMENIDES

AND

PHÆDRUS

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PARMENIDES.

FROM THE MS. COMMENTARY* OF PROCLUS ON THAT DIALOGUE.

THE beginning of this admirable Commentary, which is dedicated to Aſclepiodotus the phyſician, is as follows:—"I beſeech all the Gods and Goddeſſes to lead my intellect to the propoſed theory, and, enkindling in me the ſplendid light of truth, to expand my dianoëtic power to the ſcience of beings, to open the gates of my ſoul to the reception of the divine narration of Plato, and, conducting, as to a port, my knowledge to the moſt ſplendid of being, to liberate me from an abundance of falſe wiſdom, and the wandering about non-beings, by a more intellectual converſe with real beings, through which alone the eye of the ſoul is nouriſhed and watered, as Socrates ſays in the Phædrus. And may the intelligible Gods impart to me a perfect intellect; the intellectual, an anagogic power; the ſupermundane rulers, an energy indiſſoluble and liberated from material knowledge; the governors of the world, a winged life;

* Though I have already cited largely from this admirable Commentary, yet I rejoice in the opportunity which is afforded me of making the following additions from it. There is not, perhaps, among the writings of the antients any one which, on the whole, is ſo well calculated to lead the lover of wiſdom gradually to a knowledge of the moſt ſublime, arduous, and felicitous doctrines of the philoſophy of Plato. Ineſtimably great are the benefits which I have derived from the ſtudy of it; and it is my earneſt wiſh that the reader of theſe and the preceding extracts may be able to ſtrengthen this teſtimony of its excellence by his own experience. For, if I may be allowed to propheſy, this Work, if not at preſent, will at ſome future period be the ſource of the greateſt good to mankind, and will be admired and ſtudied as it deſerves, while the duration of writings of a different kind, though now ſo popular, will, when compared with the extent of this, be fleeting like that of morning dreams.

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the angelic choirs, a true unfolding into light of divine concerns; beneficent dæmons, a plenitude of inſpiration from the Gods; and heroes, a magnanimity permanently venerable and elevated! And, in ſhort, may all the divine genera perfectly prepare me for the participation of the moſt inſpective and myſtic theory which Plato unfolds to us in the Parmenides, with a profundity adapted to the things themſelves! And mayeſt thou*, who art truly agitated with divine fury, in conjunction with Plato, who wert my aſſociate in the reſtoration of divine truth, my leader in this theory, and the true hierophant of theſe divine doctrines, fill me with thy moſt pure intellectual conceptions! FOR, WITH RESPECT TO THIS TYPE OF PHILOSOPHY, I SHOULD SAY, THAT IT CAME TO MEN FOR THE BENEFIT OF TERRESTRIAL SOULS; THAT IT MIGHT BE INSTEAD OF STATUES, INSTEAD OF TEMPLES, INSTEAD OF THE WHOLE OF SACRED INSTITUTIONS, AND THE LEADER OF SAFETY BOTH TO THE MEN THAT NOW ARE, AND TO THOSE THAT SHALL EXIST HEREAFTER†.—Ευχομαι τοις θεοις πασι και πασαις, ποδηγησαι μου τον νουν εις την προκειμενην θεωριαν, και φως εν εμοι στιλπνον της αληθειας αναψαντας αναπλωσαι την εμην διανοιαν επ' αυτην την των οντων επιστημην, ανοιξαιτε τας της ψυχης της εμης πυλας εις υποδοχην της ενθεου του Πλατωνος υφηγησεως, και ορμισαντας μου την γνωσιν εις το φανοτατον του οντος, παυσαιμε της πολλης δοξοσοφιας, και της περι τα μη οντα πλανης, τη περι τα οντα νοερωτατη διατριβη, παρ' ων μονον το της ψυχης ομμα τρεφεται τε και αρδεται καθαπερ φησιν ὁ εν τω Φαιδρω Σωκρατης. ενδουναι τε μοι, νουν μεν τελεον, τοις νοητοις θεοις· δυναμιν δε αναγωγον, τοις νοεροις· ενεργειαν δε αλυτον και αφειμενην των υλικων γνωσεων, τοις υπερ των οντων ολων ηγεμοναις· ζωην δε επτερωμενην, τοις τον κοσμον λαχονταις· εκφανσιν δε των θειων αληθην, τοις αγγελικοις χορος· αποπληρωσιν δε της παρα, θεων επιπνοιας, τοις αγαθοις δαιμοναις· μεγαλοφρονα δε και σεμνην και υψηλην κατα στασιν, τοις ηρωσι. παντα δε απλως θεια γενη, παρασκευην ενθειναι μοι τελεαν εις την μετουσιαν της εποπτικωτατης του Πλατωνος και μυστικωτατης θεωριας, ην εκφαινει μεν ημιν αυτος εν τω Παρμενιδη μετα της προσηκουσης τοις πραγμασι βαθυτητος. ανηπλωσε δε ταις εαυτου καθαρωταταις επιβολαις ὁ τω Πλατωνι μεν συ βακχευσας ως αληθως και ομοστιος καταστας (lege ὁμοστοιχος καταταστατης) της θειας αληθειας, της δε θεωριας ημιν γενομενος ταυτης ηγεμων, και των θειων

* Proclus here invokes his preceptor Syrianus; by which it appears that this Commentary was written after the death of that great philoſopher.

† This concluding ſentence forms the motto to this tranſlation of Plato's works.

τουτων λογων οντως ἱεροφαντης. ὁν εγω φαιην αν φιλοσοφιας τυπον εις ανθρωπους ελθειν επ' ευεργεσια των τηδε ψυχων, αντι των αγαλματων, αντι των ἱερων, αντι της ὁλης ἀγιστειας αυτης, και σωτηριας αρχηγον τοις γε νυν ουσιν ανθρωποις και τοις εισαὖθις γενησομενοις.

Page 37. *When we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, &c.*

The Italic philoſophers, ſays Proclus, being converſant with the ſpeculation of the forms of beings, concerned themſelves but little with the philoſophy of objects of opinion; but thoſe of Ionia paid little attention to the theory of intelligibles, but minutely conſidered nature, and the works of nature. Socrates and Plato, however, participating of both theſe philoſophies, gave perfection to the ſubordinate, and unfolded the more elevated. This, indeed, Socrates manifeſts in the Phædo, when he ſays, that formerly he was a lover of phyſiology, but that afterwards he recurred to forms and the divine cauſes of beings. Hence, that which they demonſtrate in their philoſophy, by giving perfection both to the Ionic and Italic doctrines, this Plato appears to me to have indicated by the preſent circumſtance; and what is wonderful in it, and ſufficiently explanatory of the things which are here diſcuſſed, thoſe from Ionia come to Athens, that they may partake of more perfect dogmas: but thoſe from Athens do not for the ſame reaſon go to Italy, that they may partake of the Italic philoſophy; but, on the contrary, being at Athens, they there communicate their proper dogmas. Thus, alſo, thoſe who are able to look to beings themſelves, will perceive that things firſt are every where preſent with unimpeded energy, as far as to the laſt of things, through ſuch as are middles; that ſuch as are laſt are perfected through middles; and that middles receive into themſelves that which is imparted by firſt natures, but move and convert to themſelves ſuch as are laſt. Let, therefore, Ionia be a ſymbol of nature; but Italy of an intellectual eſſence; and Athens of that which has a middle ſubſiſtence, through which, to excited ſouls, there is an aſcent from nature to intellect. This, therefore, Cephalus immediately ſays in the Introduction, that coming from Clazomenia to Athens for the ſake of hearing the diſcourſes of Parmenides, he met in the forum with Adimantus and Glauco, and through theſe becoming acquainted with Antiphon, heard the diſcourſes, which he related as he had learnt them from Pythodorus, who had heard them from Parmenides. Through this alſo it is indicated,

that

that he who is to be led back to an intelligible eſſence ought, in the firſt place, to be excited from body, and to fly from a communion with it: for the body is the habitation of the ſoul. In the next place, that he ſhould connect himſelf with the allotment of Minerva among wholes, through the participation of which allotment, it is no longer wonderful that the ſoul ſhould become a ſpectator of firſt entities, and through theſe arrive at the inſpection of the unities of beings. But if you are not only willing to ſpeak in this manner, but ſtill more univerſally, you may ſay, that the Gods who govern nature, and the all-various powers of material forms, and who alſo contain the whole of indiviſible and ſenſible reaſons, are ſuſpended from the firſt cauſe, and, being illuminated by Minerva, are converted to the intellectual region, and haſtily withdraw themſelves from the mundane ſyſtem; for this alſo is ſaid to be the habitation of the Gods which it contains. By this converſion, alſo, they are led to the united multitude of beings, and there, through divine power, proceed to the monad of all multitude. For what is here ſaid by Plato affords an image of theſe things to thoſe that are not entirely unacquainted with ſuch-like ſpeculations. For every phyſical form is worſe than multitude; but the multitude above this is, indeed, as it is ſaid to be, multitude, but alſo participates of a coordinate unity. But prior to this is the exempt one, to which there is an aſcent through the duad as a medium. The departure, therefore, from Clazomenia evinces an energy exempt from phyſical reaſons; but the meeting with Adimantus and Glauco in the forum indicates the dominion of the duad in united multitude; and the aſſociation with Antiphon through theſe, the returning to their unity, by which they derive perfection, and a plenitude of divine goods. For in every order of Gods there is a monad, and the dominion of the duad, and the whole of diſtributed is conjoined with the monad, through united multitude, and the duad it contains, which is the mother, and, as it were, root of this multitude.

Theſe things, as I have ſaid, afford an image of the Gods themſelves, and will preſent to thoſe who are willing to follow the analogy, an abundance of conception. For you may obſerve that the Clazomenians are many, but that Adimantus and Glauco are two; and through theſe two the many communicate with Antiphon, who is one. And it is evident that every where the multiplied enjoys the monad through the duad; that things ſecondary are always ſuſpended from the natures prior to them; and that

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all are extended to the one Parmenidean intellect. For the Clazomenians are in want of Adimantus and Glauco; theſe lead the Clazomenians to Antiphon; Antiphon fills them with the diſcourſes of Pythodorus; and Pythodorus is the meſſenger of the converſation of Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. Theſe two again are united to Parmenides, and wiſh to adhere to his doctrine; Socrates, indeed, looking to the multitude of forms, but Zeno uniting this multitude, and haſtening to *the one* itſelf. We may alſo contemplate their order as follows:—Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates, preſerve an image of the whole of the divine order; but thoſe that follow are aſſimilated to the ſecondary genera. And Pythodorus, indeed, may be ranked according to the ſummit of dæmons, announcing and tranſmitting to ſecondary ſuch things as proceed from primary natures. For both theſe pertain to this ſummit; the one as to that which is filled, the other as to that which fills. But Antiphon may be ranked according to the dæmoniacal order itſelf. For this order uſes appetite and impulſes, and, in ſhort, aſſumes a ſecondary life. Hence, he is repreſented as ſkilled in the equeſtrian art. He, therefore, is filled from thoſe that are firſt, but fills thoſe after him with an anagogic converſation from more elevated natures. But the Clazomenians are analogous to ſouls converſant with generation, who require, indeed, the aſſiſtance of proximate dæmons, but all of them aſpire afterthat which is on high, and the participation of divine diſcourſe. Hence, leaving their habitation, the body, they proceed from ignorance to intellectual prudence, for this is Athens, and, in the firſt place, are united to the dæmons above them, to whom the forum and the duad pertain, and an aſcent through the duad to the monad. But, in the ſecond place, they are extended through theſe to certain angels and Gods: for all aſſociation and converſe between men and Gods, both when aſleep and when awake, are through dæmons, as Diotima ſays in The Banquet. Again, therefore, according to another mode, we may tranſfer the analogy from things to perſons: and it is neceſſary, prior to the myſtic theory of things themſelves, to exerciſe our dianoëtic power in theſe as in images. For the men alſo immediately meeting with Adimantus and Glauco, the brothers of Antiphon, on their coming to Athens, poſſeſſes an image of another theological conception, that aſcending ſouls derive much aſſiſtance from good fortune, which coarranges them with ſuch things as are proper, and where, and in ſuch a manner as is proper; and alſo that we

do not alone require the gifts of good fortune in externals, but in the anagogic energies of the ſoul. Hence Socrates ſays in the Phædrus that mania about the objects of love is given to the lover by the Gods with the greateſt good fortune. And deducing ſouls from the intelligible, he ſays that different ſouls deſcend into bodies with different fortunes. Prior to bodies, therefore, they experience the gifts of fortune, and are governed by it, and led to that which is adapted to their nature. Very properly, therefore, are returning ſouls here ſaid to be conjoined with the cauſes which give perfection to them through a certain fortune. And you may again ſee how here alſo the order of the perſons is preſerved: for they meet with Adimantus and Glauco. But that of theſe men Glauco was the more perfect, Socrates manifeſts in The Republic; for he there ſays, that he always admired the nature of Glauco. So that, if Adimantus was the inferior, he very properly ſays that they met with Adimantus and Glauco: for the imperfect is firſt connected with the more imperfect, and through theſe partakes of the more perfect.

The very firſt ſentence alſo manifeſts the character of the dialogue; for it is void of the ſuperfluous, is accurate and pure. And indeed conciſe, pure, and ſpontaneous language is adapted to intellectual projections. Nor does Plato alone preſerve this propriety of diction, but Parmenides alſo in his poetry, though the poetic form of compoſition is accuſtomed to uſe metaphors, figures, and tropes; but at the ſame time he embraces the unadorned, the ſimple, and the pure form of enunciation. This is evident from ſuch like expreſſions, as "being approaches to being" (εον γαρ εοντι πελαζει); and again, "ſince they now ſubſiſt together (επει νυν εστιν ὁμου); likewiſe, "it is not fit that there ſhould be any thing, either greater or ſmaller;" (ουτε τι μειζον, ουτε τι βαιοτερον πελειν χρεων εστι:) and every thing elſe of this kind. So that it rather appears to be proſe than poetical language. It is evident, therefore, in this Introduction of Plato, firſt, that he has choſen a rapid form of diction; for this is adapted to the things themſelves. In the ſecond place, he has attended to conciſeneſs, together with the figure of the impetuous, which entirely binds together the diction, and rapidly gives completion to the conception. And, in the third place, he proceeds through the moſt neceſſary words, cutting off all ſuch particulars from the narration, as ſome one for the ſake of ornament might ſophiſtically add.

P. 38.

P. 38. *And upon our begging him to relate the diſcourſes, &c.*

The requeſt of the Clazomenians repreſents the genuine adherence of ſouls to their proper leaders. For they can no otherwiſe obtain a union and revolve in conjunction with the Gods, than through theſe dæmons. But a knowledge of them, in the firſt place, precedes the requeſt: for how can they make a requeſt of thoſe of whoſe nature they are ignorant, and alſo of the benefits of which they are the leaders? In the next place, a deſire of the participation of them ſucceeds. For it is neceſſary to aſpire after the things of which we are in want, ſince without aſpiring we ſhall not be in the order of thoſe that are indigent. But the unwillingneſs of Antiphon to comply, preſents us with an image of the occult and ineffable power of divine cauſes. For a divine nature, wherever it may be, is with difficulty apprehended and known, and is ſcarcely unfolded to ſouls, even when they genuinely receive its participation, and a communion with it. For they require to be accuſtomed to the divine ſplendour which divine dæmons exhibit to ſouls extended to them, and haſtening through them to perceive every thing divine. But to ſouls firmly and ſtably receiving them, theſe dæmons expand and unfold divine truth. And this is the narration: an expanding and unfolding of things concealed, and an anagogic perfection imparted to ſouls from divine dæmons.

P. 38. *Antiphon, therefore, ſaid that Pythodorus related, &c.*

It appears to me, ſays Proclus, that the reduction of all the perſons to Parmenides, indicates much of the truth of the things themſelves. For all the multitude and all the orders of beings are united about their divine cauſe. And this is indicated to the more ſagacious, by ſaying in ſucceſſion, Antiphon, Pythodorus, Zeno, Parmenides. The mention alſo of the Panathenæa contributes to the whole deſign of the dialogue: for we learn from hiſtory, that in the celebration of this feſtival the Athenians dwelt together. Again, therefore, here alſo the multitude is united and coarranged about the Goddeſs who preſides over the city. But this was the end of the dialogue, to ſuſpend all things from *the one*, and clearly to ſhow that every thing is thence derived. The aſſertion too, that theſe men did not come to Athens, but to the Panathenæa, is no ſmall praiſe. They came, therefore, for the ſake of the Goddeſs and the feſtival,

and not for oſtentation, nor to philoſophize in a popular way, which is rejected by the Pythagoreans. For a thing of this kind is the buſineſs of a ſophiſt, and of men intent on gain.

P. 38. *That Parmenides was very much advanced in years, &c.*

An elderly man among the Greeks was limited by ſeventy years. Parmenides, therefore, was very elderly. But he was called an old man who paſſed beyond this decad. The countenance alſo of Parmenides was graceful through his life: for a certain elegance and venerableneſs deſcends from the ſoul in worthy men, and extends as far as to the body. Theſe things, however, may be much more perfectly ſurveyed in the ſoul itſelf. Thus, for inſtance, the ſoul poſſeſſes the elderly, from being full of intellect and ſcience. For it is uſual to call intellectual diſciplines, and thoſe which embrace the whole of nature, hoary, as it is evident from the Timæus, in which thoſe ſouls are called juvenile with whom there is no hoary diſcipline, viz. who do not according to their ſummit participate of intellectual light. For the black belongs to the worſe, as the white to the better coordination. But the ſoul is καλη δε και αγαθη την οψιν*, as extending its eye to intelligible *beauty*, and to the *goodneſs* which gives ſubſiſtence to all things, and through the participation of which all things are *good*. We may ſtill, however, more perfectly ſurvey theſe things in the Gods, according to analogy. For where do the *elderly* and the *hoary* ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner as in them? Which are likewiſe celebrated by theologiſts among the paternal Gods. Where, alſo, are *the beautiful* and *the good*, ſuch as they poſſeſs? Plato alſo, in ſaying unitedly καλον αγαθον, ſpeaks in a manner the moſt adapted to thoſe natures in whom *the one* and *the good* are the ſame.

P. 38. *But that Zeno was nearly forty years old, &c.*

Such was Zeno, perhaps indeed *graceful* and *tall* in his perſon, but much more ſo in his diſcourſes. For ſuch things as Parmenides delivered in an intorted and contracted manner, theſe Zeno evolved, and extended into *long* diſcuſſions. And hence the ſcurrilous Timon calls him either-tongued, as being at the ſame time ſkilled in confutation and narration. If alſo he is ſaid to have been beloved by Parmenides, the

* i. e. Literally of a *beautiful* and *good* aſpect.

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aſcent indeed to both was to one and the ſame divinity: for this is the peculiarity of the truly amatory art. But if you are willing to ſpeak more perfectly, and to ſay that in the Gods themſelves things ſecondary are contained in ſuch as are firſt, and that all things, in ſhort, are conjoined to being itſelf from which the progreſſion and extenſion to beings are derived, you will not, I think, be very remote from the truth.

P. 38. *He likewiſe ſaid that he met with them together with Pythodorus, &c.*

Let their meeting with Pythodorus be a ſymbol to thoſe who look to paradigms, of the Gods becoming firſt unfolded into light through angels, and in the order of angels: for a houſe is a ſymbol of the order of each. But this meeting being beyond the walls, ſignifies the exempt and incomprehenſible nature of the Gods. As, therefore, all appear collected in the houſe of Pythodorus, ſome from the city, and others elſewhere, ſo alſo the governors of the world and the intelligible Gods become apparent in angels, and are known by us through the eſſence of theſe.

P. 38. *Where alſo Socrates came, &c.*

Here we may perceive how Socrates, through a diſpoſition naturally good in the extreme, earneſtly follows theſe divine men, and how he does not aſſociate with ſophiſts and the wiſe for the ſame cauſes. For he aſſociates with the former in order to confute their ignorance and pride, but with the latter in order to call forth their ſcience and intellect. Here, therefore, he becomes the leader of the lovers of philoſophy: for all of them deſire to hear, but they obtain their deſire together with and through him. But theſe things as well as the former are images of the Gods. Socrates was young, a young leader, Plato all but repeating what he ſays in the Phædrus, "the mighty leader Jupiter firſt proceeds, and the army of Gods and dæmons follows him." For intellect being every where allotted a convertive order, leads upwards, and together with itſelf converts all the multitude ſuſpended from it. Socrates alſo being young is a ſymbol of the youthfulneſs which is celebrated in the Gods. For theology calls Jupiter himſelf and Bacchus *boys* and *young*; and, in ſhort, theologiſts thus call the intellectual when compared with the intelligible and paternal. But the deſire of the writings of Zeno ſymbolically manifeſts how

here thoſe which are the third in order, firſt participate of the powers which are emitted in thoſe of the middle rank, but afterwards are conjoined with their ſummits, and have communion with their intelligibles.

P. 38. *Zeno himſelf read to them, &c.*

Plato here affords us a wonderful indication of divine concerns; and he who is not aſleep to analogies will ſee in theſe images a ſublime theory. For, in the firſt place, Parmenides not being preſent at the beginning, but when the diſcourſe was finiſhed, is a ſymbol of more divine cauſes unfolding themſelves to ſubordinate, after a perfect participation of proximate natures, but not before. The diſcourſe of Zeno therefore, being completed, the great Parmenides appears; and together with him Pythodorus and Ariſtotle enter, of which two the former is Zenonic, but Ariſtotle is in a certain reſpect coarranged with Parmenides; for he diſpoſes, together with him, the hypotheſes, doing nothing elſe than anſwering. But here Parmenides, as we have often ſaid, is analogous to that which is every where firſt among divine natures, whether it be the firſt being, or the intelligible, or in whatever other way you may think fit to denominate it: for this is in all the divine orders, and in each of the Gods. Hence he fills all that hear him with divine conceptions, imitating that order which adorns all things, firſt, middle, and laſt: for he gives perfection to Zeno, the middle being every where from that ſummit: but he perfects Socrates through both himſelf and Zeno; juſt as there the progreſſion of third is through firſt and middle natures. He alſo perfects Pythodorus, but not ſimply from himſelf alone, but in conjunction with Zeno and Socrates. But he gives perfection to Ariſtotle laſt of all, and from himſelf alone. For ſomething is imparted from Parmenides as far as to the laſt habit, to which the energy and power of Zeno do not proceed. Juſt as the production of the firſt being naturally extends further than that of life. But Zeno is himſelf filled from Parmenides, but fills in one way Pythodorus as his diſciple, but in another way Socrates as one that explores together with him. Pythodorus, too, is not only able to participate of Zeno, but alſo of Socrates. For, in divine natures, the middle extends its energy to that which is poſterior to itſelf, and proceeds through all things, imparting mere aptitude to the laſt of its participants, which

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it again perfects in conjunction with the natures proximately ſuſpended from it. So that the former participation indicates the imperfect repreſentation of things firſt, which it imparts energizing prior to ſecondary natures. But the ſecond participation indicates a perfection of repreſentation ſubſiſting through things proximate. And Socrates, who is the third, gives completion to the triad which pervades through all numbers, and ſubſiſts analogous to the intellect which is there, or in whatever other way you may be willing to denominate it. Hence he firſt participates of the doctrines of Zeno, and is conjoined through him with Parmenides; juſt as in the Gods, the intellect in each is proximately filled with a certain divine life, but through this is united with the intelligible itſelf, and its proper hyparxis. But Pythodorus, as being arranged according to the unfolding genus, is the diſciple of Zeno, and participates of the prolific doubts of Socrates. For the Gods give ſubſiſtence to angels from middle and third powers, and not from ſuch as are firſt; for theſe are generative of Gods. And Ariſtotle is analogouſly arranged to ſouls which through a divine afflatus are often conjoined with the moſt divine natures, but afterwards fall from this bleſſedneſs. For it is nothing wonderful, that a ſoul which is now entheaſtically diſpoſed ſhould again chooſe an atheiſtical and dark life. But he is filled from Parmenides alone; ſince in the Gods alſo, it is the property of ſuch as are firſt to impart to ſouls of this kind a certain participation of divine light, through tranſcendency of power. Thus theologiſts denominate an intellectual life Saturnian, but not Jovian, though the aſcent is through the mighty Jupiter. But as Jupiter, being filled from his father, and aſcending to him as to his proper intelligible, elevates alſo that which is poſterior to himſelf; in like manner ſouls, though they make their aſcent together with Jupiter, yet that intellectual life fills the middle and third orders of them, and, in the laſt place, ſouls which energize enthuſiaſtically about it. Nor ſhould you wonder if divine natures have ſuch an order with reſpect to each other, ſince you may alſo behold in philoſophers themſelves, how he who among theſe is more perfect is alſo more powerful, and benefits a greater number. Thus Cebes or Simmias benefits himſelf alone, or ſome other ſimilar to himſelf; but Socrates benefits himſelf, and theſe, and Thraſymachus. In like manner Parmenides, being more powerful, benefits him who has the leaſt aptitude of thoſe that are aſſembled. But he manifeſts the obſcurity of the participation by calling him the youngeſt of thoſe that are preſent; which is a

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ſymbol of an imperfect habit; and by adding that he afterwards became one of the thirty tyrants; whence alſo we juſtly conſidered him as analogous to thoſe ſouls that once lived enthuſiaſtically, and in conjunction with angels, juſt as he makes his entrance together with Pythodorus, but who afterwards fall from this power. For Pythodorus remains in his proper habits, ſo that he alſo partakes of another converſation; juſt as the angelic tribe always remains wholly beneficent, and fills ſecondary with the participation of divine natures. But Ariſtotle inſtead of a philoſopher becomes a tyrant. For ſouls which poſſeſs a life of this kind according to habitude and not eſſentially, ſometimes depart from this order, and deſcend into the realms of generation: for a tyranny is a ſymbol of the life in generation; ſince ſuch a life becomes ſituated under the throne of Neceſſity, in conſequence of being led under paſſive, unſtable and diſordered appetite. For Ariſtotle having been one of the thirty tyrants that governed Athens, contains a repreſentation of a gigantic and earth-born life, which rules over Minerval and Olympian goods. When reaſon and intellect take the lead in ſuch ſouls, then Olympian benefits and thoſe of Minerva have dominion, and the whole life is royal and philoſophic; but when multitude, or in ſhort that which is worſe and earth-born, holds the reins of empire, then the whole life is a tyranny. If, therefore, Plato ſays that Ariſtotle was one of the thirty tyrants, it will appear to be the ſame as if he had ſaid, that he is analogous to ſouls who at one time energize enthuſiaſtically, and at another rank among the earth-born race, and who, by ſubmitting their life to thoſe moſt bitter tyrants the paſſions, become themſelves tyrants over themſelves. And perhaps the philoſopher manifeſts through theſe things, that it is not impoſſible for the ſame ſoul to evolve different lives, and at one time to philoſophize, and at another to live tyrannically; and again to paſs from a tyrannic to a philoſophic life.

P. 38. *If beings are many, it is requiſite that the ſame things ſhould be both ſimilar and diſſimilar, &c.*

Through theſe and the other arguments of Zeno it is ſhown that it is impoſſible for the many to have a ſubſiſtence when deprived of *the one*. Beginning from hence too, we ſhall find a conciſe way to the firſt principle of things. It is neceſſary, therefore, that there ſhould either be many principles not participating of a certain one, or that there

here ſhould be one principle only void of multitude, or many principles participating of *the one*, or one containing multitude in itſelf. But if there are many principles deſtitute of *the one*, all ſuch abſurdities will happen, as the arguments of Zeno adduce to thoſe who aſſert that beings are many without *the one*. If there are many principles, but which participate of a certain one, i. e. which have a certain one conſubſiſtent with them, that participated one muſt proceed to its participants from another one which has a prior ſubſiſtence: for every one which is ſomething belonging to other things proceeds from that which is ſimply one. But if there is one principle poſſeſſing in itſelf multitude, it will be a whole, and will conſiſt from the many parts or elements which it contains. And this will not be the truly one, but a paſſive one, as we learn from the Sophiſta. In conſequence of this, too, it will neither be ſimple nor ſufficient, things which it is neceſſary the principle ſhould poſſeſs. It is neceſſary, therefore, that there ſhould be one principle of all things void of multitude. And thus much we may collect from all the arguments of Zeno.

We may alſo obſerve that Socrates again imitates his paradigm intellect, expanding himſelf and his intellections to Zeno, and calling forth his ſcience. For in the paradigms of theſe men the ſubordinate ſuſpend the whole of their energy from the middle natures, and, through an expanſion of their proper powers, are ſupernally filled with more perfect goods.

P. 39. *Is it not then the ſole intention of your diſcourſes to evince by conteſting, &c.*

Parmenides, eſtabliſhing himſelf in *the one*, and ſurveying the monad of all beings, does not convert himſelf to multitude and its diſſipated ſubſiſtence; but Zeno flies from multitude to *the one*, and takes away multitude. For the former of theſe two is ſimilar to one purified, elevated, and having laid aſide the multitude in himſelf; but the latter to one aſcending, and laying aſide multitude, and this becauſe he is not entirely ſeparated from it. Hence contention (το διαμαχεσθαι) is adapted to him; for he does not yet poſſeſs a tranquil life, ſeparated from impediments; nor, as it oppoſes multitude, does it yet end in *the one* alone. But this contention, and this ending through many arguments in the ſame negative concluſion, manifeſt to Socrates that the many do not ſubſiſt ſeparate from *the one*: for Plato aſſimilates the path

through negations to a battle. Thus in the Republic he exhorts to diſcourſe about *the good*, as if piercing through a battle, thinking it fit to ſpeak of it in no other way than through negative concluſions. And here it is neceſſary, indeed, not to conſider the word *contending* careleſsly; but through this we ſhould make it known, that both in this place, and in the Republic, *contention* is intended by Plato to ſignify *negations*. As each of the arguments too of Zeno is ſelf-perfect, and demonſtrative of the concluſion, this is the peculiarity of ſcientific power.

P. 40. *Do you think that there is a certain form of ſimilitude, &c.*

Parmenides leading upwards all beings to the exempt one being, or being itſelf, and withdrawing his conceptions from that which is multiplied and diſtributed, to the one monad of all the multitude of beings, the many on the contrary give the multitude of beings a precedency to intellect and union, and do not even conſider being itſelf as the principle; but they aſſert that diſtributed multitude ſimply ſubſiſts, and receives a progreſſion into being ſeparate from being itſelf. That thus thinking, however, they defame the doctrine of Parmenides, is evident. For, Parmenides being of opinion that being ſhould be conſidered as alone characterized by unity, ſeparate from multitude, they on the contrary eſtabliſh multitude deprived of unity; though indeed it is impoſſible that multitude ſhould not participate of *the one*: for every multitude is of *the one*. All multitudes, therefore, and all the bulks of bodies, are vanquiſhed by the participation of unity. Hence if multitude requires *the one*, but *the one* is unindigent of multitude, it is better to call being one, than the many alone ſubſiſting by themſelves ſeparate from the participation of *the one*. And Parmenides indeed, evincing that being is one, gives ſubſiſtence alſo to the multitude of beings, not only to that of ſenſibles, but likewiſe to the multitude of intelligibles: for in theſe there is a divine number of all things united to each other. Empedocles alſo afterwards perceiving this, as being himſelf a Pythagorean, calls the whole of an intelligible nature a ſphere, as being united to itſelf, and aſſerts that it attracts to itſelf, through beauty, the beautifying and uniting God. For all things there, loving and deſiring each other, are eternally united to each other. Their love alſo is intelligible, and their aſſociation and mixture are ineffable. But the many being exiles from union, and the monad of beings, and

through

through their life, which is divifible and diſtributed, being drawn down to multitude, to multiform opinions, to indefinite phantaſies, to paſſive ſenſes and material appetites, conſider the manies themſelves ſeparate from their union, and do not ſee in what manner theſe manys are vanquiſhed, through the coordinated monads which they contain, how things indefinite are ſubject to definite meaſures, and how diſſipated natures ſubſiſt in ſympathy and in union through the participation of things common; and not perceiving this, they wander from the truth, and baſely revile and deride the doctrine of Parmenides. Zeno, therefore, knowing that they were thus affected, becomes indeed a corrector of multitude, but a leader to intellect from folly, and a guardian of the doctrine of his preceptor. And at firſt he perſuades to recur from theſe multitudes to the unities in the many, and to behold how this multitude, though tending to infinity, is at the ſame time vanquiſhed by the monad of beings, and is held together by a certain unity which it contains. But he perſuades, aſſuming an hypotheſis pleaſing to the vulgar, viz. the ſubſiſtence of multitude deprived of unity: for thus their aſſertion is eaſily confuted; ſince, if they had eſtabliſhed the many together with *the one*, they would not as yet be confuted through his arguments. Parmenides alſo himſelf manifeſts in his hypotheſis, that he is accuſtomed to ſhow that the ſame thing is ſimilar and diſſimilar, no otherwiſe than by receiving *the many* ſeparate from *the one*.

Zeno, therefore, as we have ſaid, conſiders theſe many deprived of *the one*, which accedes to, and is contained in them. Nor yet does he conſider intelligibles alone, nor ſenſibles alone, but, in ſhort, all ſuch things as are ſaid to be many in the intelligible and ſenſible orders. For it is the province of a more perfect and principal ſcience to extend the ſame method to all things of a ſimilar form, and to ſurvey in all things that which is analogous. Whether, therefore, there is intelligible, or ſenſible, or intellectual, or dianoëtic multitude, all this is aſſumed at preſent. Hence it is requiſite to diſcover how multitudes are no where to be found deprived of *the one*. For, if they were deprived of *the one*, they would be at the ſame time ſimilar and diſſimilar; ſince things which do not participate of *one* and the ſame are diſſimilar to each other; and again, according to this very thing, they communicate with each other, viz. by not participating of *the one*. But things which poſſeſs ſomething common and the ſame are ſimilar; ſo that the ſame things are both ſimilar and diſſimilar. If, therefore, the many are without a participation of *the one*, according to this one thing, the non-participation

ticipation of *the one*, they will be both ſimilar and diſſimilar; viz. conſidered as poſſeſſing this in common they will be ſimilar, but conſidered as not poſſeſſing *the one* they will be diſſimilar: for, becauſe they are paſſive to this very thing, the non-participation of *the one*, they are ſimilar; ſo that the ſame things are both ſimilar and diſſimilar. For, in ſhort, the poſſeſſion of nothing common is itſelf common to them: and hence the aſſertion ſubverts itſelf. Indeed, the things which are ſhown to be both ſimilar and diſſimilar are again ſhown to be neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar. For, if they do not participate of *the one*, they are, in ſhort, not ſimilar; ſince ſimilars are ſimilar by the participation of a certain one; for ſimilitude is a certain oneneſs. And again, if they do not participate of *the one*, this is common to them; but things of which there is ſomething common, theſe according to this very thing are not diſſimilar. So that the many are neither ſimilar nor diſſimilar. It is impoſſible, therefore, that multitude can ſubſiſt deprived of *the one*, becauſe ſo many abſurdities happen to thoſe who adopt ſuch an hypotheſis. For it is a dire thing that contradiction ſhould concur; but more dire that this ſhould be the caſe with contraries; and it is the moſt dire of all things that both contraries and contradictions ſhould be conſequent to the aſſertion. By ſhowing, therefore, that the ſame thing is ſimilar and diſſimilar, we have collected contraries; but by ſhowing that the ſame thing is ſimilar and not ſimilar, and neither of theſe, we have collected contradictions. For the ſimilar is a contradiction to the not ſimilar, and the diſſimilar to the non-diſſimilar.

Hence alſo we may be able to evince that it is impoſſible there ſhould be many firſt principles. For, with reſpect to theſe many principles, whether do they participate of one thing, or not of one thing? For, if they participate, that which they participate will be prior to them, and there will no longer be many principles, but one principle. But if they do not participate, they will be ſimilar to each other, in conſequence of this non-participation being common to them, and diſſimilar ſo far as they do not participate of a certain common one. But this is impoſſible, that the ſame things according to the ſame ſhould be both ſimilars and diſſimilars. In like manner we may collect that theſe many principles are neither ſimilars nor diſſimilars. But if they were participants of a certain one, we could not collect that they are diſſimilars according to the participation of this one, but only that they are ſimilars: and thus we ſhall ſubvert the ſubſiſtence of many firſt principles.

Through this method, therefore, Zeno evinces that it is impoſſible to ſeparate the many

many from *the one*, and riſes from multitude to the monads of the many, that we may perceive what the nature is of the exempt unities of things. For the coordinated monads are images of thoſe that are uncoordinated. But Socrates agitating the diſcourſe about ideas; ſuppoſing things common to have a ſubſiſtence themſelves by themſelves, and ſurveying another multitude in them, thinks it proper that Zeno ſhould alſo transfer this method to forms, and make it apparent in theſe, how the ſimilar is diſſimilar, and the diſſimilar ſimilar. And ſhortly after Proclus further obſerves as follows:

Socrates, before he enters on the doubts in which a formal eſſence is involved, aſks Zeno whether he admits that forms have a ſubſiſtence, and whether or not he is among thoſe who embrace this cauſe as well as himſelf; and, in ſhort, what opinion he has concerning them. For the Pythagoreans were contemplators of forms; and Socrates himſelf manifeſts this in the Sophiſta, calling the wiſe men in Italy, the friends of forms. But he who eſpecially venerates and clearly eſtabliſhes forms is Socrates, from the inveſtigation concerning definitions diſcovering the nature of the things defined; and paſſing from theſe as images to formal cauſes themſelves. He, therefore, in the firſt place, aſks if Zeno alſo himſelf admits that there are forms, and venerates this eſſence of all things, ſubſiſting from and eſtabliſhed in itſelf, and not requiring any other ſeat, which he characterizes by the words *itſelf by itſelf* (αυτο καθ' αυτο), conceiving that theſe words are properly adapted to this eſſence. For they indicate the unmingled, ſimple, and pure nature of forms. Thus, through the word *itſelf*, he ſignifies the ſimplicity of thoſe things; but, through the words *by itſelf*, their purity unmingled with ſecondary natures. And indeed, through the words *by itſelf*, he ſeparates forms from the things predicated of the many. For which among theſe is *by itſelf*? ſince it poſſeſſes its ſubſiſtence in a habitude to ſubjects, is collected from ſenſible perception, is the object of opinion, and is accommodated to the conceptions * of the phantaſy. But by the word *itſelf* he ſeparates forms from that which is common in particulars, and which is definable: for this is contained in

* A thing of this kind is in modern language *an abſtract idea*. Such ideas as they are of an origin poſterior, muſt alſo be ſubordinate to ſenſibles; and the ſoul, if ſhe has no higher conceptions, muſt even be viler than matter itſelf; matter being the recipient of eſſential forms, and the ſoul of ſuch as are generated from theſe.

ſomething

ſomething different from itſelf, and ſubſiſts together with matter; whence alſo it is filled with internal change, and is in a certain reſpect mortal, through communion with that which is material. By no means, therefore, muſt it be ſaid, that forms which ſubſiſt by themſelves, which are eſtabliſhed on a ſacred foundation, and are immaterial and eternal, are the ſame with material forms of poſterior origin, and which are full of variety and habitude. For the former are unmingled, undefiled and ſimple, and are eternally eſtabliſhed in the demiurgus of the univerſe; poſſeſſing the undefiled and the pure from inflexible deity, which proceeds together with the demiurgus, but the ſimple from the demiurgic intellectual eſſence, which is ſingle and impartible, and, as the Chaldæan theologiſts would ſay, has a fontal ſubſiſtence. You may alſo ſay that the term *itſelf* ſeparates form from thoſe conceptions which are derived from ſenſibles (εννοηματα). For no one of theſe is *itſelf*; ſince they accord with the things of which they are the conceptions, belong to and ſubſiſt in others. But the words *by itſelf* ſeparate form from that which ſubſiſts in particulars, and which is in ſomething different from itſelf.

Neither, therefore, muſt we admit their opinion who ſay that idea is the ſame with that which is common in the many: for ideas ſubſiſt prior to the things which are common in ſenſibles, and the latter derive their ſubſiſtence from the former. Nor muſt we aſſent to thoſe who conſider ideas as the ſame with thoſe conceptions which we derive from ſenſibles, and who, in conſequence of this, inquire how there are not alſo ideas of individuals, and of things which are contrary to nature. For the conceptions of theſe things are entirely ſecondary to the particulars from which they are excited, and are in us, and not in the power that adorned the univerſe, and in whom we ſay ideas ſubſiſt. Nor yet muſt we admit the opinion of thoſe who connect ideas with ſpermatic reaſons. For the reaſons or productive principles in ſeeds are imperfect; and thoſe in nature, which generates ſeeds, are deſtitute of knowledge. But ideas ſubſiſt in energy always the ſame, and are eſſentially intellectual. If, therefore, we wiſh to define their idiom through things which are more known, we muſt receive from phyſical reaſons, the producing that which they produce, by their very being; but from the reaſons of art, the being gnoſtic of the things which they make, though they do not make by their very being. Hence we ſay that ideas are demiurgic, and at the ſame time intellectual cauſes of all things which are perfected according to

nature,

nature, being immovable, prior to things moved, ſimple prior to compoſites, and ſeparate prior to the things which are inſeparable from matter. On this account, Parmenides does not ceaſe diſcourſing concerning them, till at the end of his arguments he ſays that they are Gods; through this ſignifying all that we have previouſly obſerved.

With reſpect to the ſimilar and the diſſimilar, theſe ſubſiſt primarily in the demiurgus, or, to ſpeak more clearly, they have in him a ſontal ſubſiſtence; ſince they ſubſiſt more conſpicuouſly in the aſſimilative Gods, and eſpecially in the paternal Deities of that order, as is evident from the ſecond hypotheſis of this dialogue. But ſince the demiurgus poſſeſſes the one fountain of theſe, the form of ſimilitude is alſo contained in him, preſubſiſting in the one monad of ideas. The demiurgus, therefore, is a monad comprehenſive of many divine monads, which impart to each other their proper idioms: one, the idiom of purity; another, of an aſſimilative eſſence; and another of ſomething elſe, according to which they are allotted their proper hyparxis. For it muſt not be thought that forms indeed preſubſiſt, as the cauſes of things which are generated according to them, but that there is not a different idea by which generated natures become ſimilar and diſſimilar to forms. Both ſimilitude, however, and diſſimilitude, are immaterial, pure, ſimple, uniform, and eternal eſſences; the former being collective, unific, the cauſe of bound, and uniform; and the latter, the ſource of diviſion, internal change, and infinity. But the order of theſe ideas is neither in the moſt generic nor in the moſt ſpecific of forms. For the moſt generic are ſuch forms as are participated by all beings, ſo that there is not any thing whatever which does not ſubſiſt from the participation of theſe, ſuch as *eſſence*, *ſameneſs*, *difference*; ſince theſe pervade to all beings. For what is there void of eſſence? what of difference? what of ſameneſs? Do not all things poſſeſs a certain hyparxis? And are they not eſſentially ſeparated from other things; and do they not alſo communicate with them? If this be the caſe, this triad is the common cauſe of all beings. But the moſt ſpecific ideas are ſuch as are naturally adapted to be participated by individual forms, ſuch as man, horſe, dog; and each of this kind. For theſe proximately generate the monads in individuals, ſuch as man in particulars, and dog and horſe in the many, and in a ſimilar manner each of the reſt. But the forms which ſubſiſt between theſe, have indeed a very extended ſubſiſtence, but do not energize in all beings.

Thus,

Thus, for inſtance, juſtice ſubſiſts in ſouls, but not in wood and ſtones. Among theſe middle forms, therefore, ſimilitude and diſſimilitude muſt be ranked: for though they are participated by moſt, yet not by all things; ſince, as Proclus well obſerves, where is there either ſimilitude or diſſimilitude among infinites?

P. 40. *For if any one ſhould ſhow that ſimilars themſelves become diſſimilar, &c.*

Forms are not to be conſidered as entirely unmingled, and without communication with each other, but each is that which it is, preſerving its idiom pure; and at the ſame time it participates of others without confuſion, not as becoming ſomething belonging to them, but as receiving the idiom of that which it participates, and to this imparting its own idiom. Thus, for inſtance, ſameneſs participates of difference, not being difference, and difference participates of ſameneſs, ſo far as they communicate with each other. Thus alſo ſimilitude and diſſimilitude participate of each other; but neither is ſimilitude diſſimilitude, nor diſſimilitude ſimilitude. Nor, ſo far as the one is ſimilitude, is it diſſimilar, nor, ſo far as the other is diſſimilitude, ſimilar. For the expreſſion *ſo far as*, is twofold. In the firſt place, it is uſed when one thing is always accompanied with another; as if ſome one ſhould ſay, So far as there is air, according to this there is alſo light; and ſo far as there is light, according to this there is alſo air. But admitting that there is illuminated air, yet neither is air light, nor light air, but air is in light, and light in air; becauſe the parts of air and light are ſituated near each other, and there is no one of theſe according to which the other is not alſo beheld. But this expreſſion is alſo uſed after another manner, when it is applied to any thing which always eſſentially introduces another thing; as when we ſay, Man is a recipient of ſcience. For it is not true that light is in the air, or air in light, according to this ſignification, ſince air does not entirely cointroduce light, as we ſay man cointroduces a recipient of ſcience; ſince the eſſence of air is different from that of light. Similitude, therefore, participates of diſſimilitude according to the former of theſe modes; for there is nothing belonging to it which does not participate of diſſimilitude; and yet the being of the former is different from that of the latter. For it does not participate in one part and not in another, ſince nothing impedes its pervading through diſſimilitude; nor is its impartible nature of ſuch a kind that it participates of it in one

reſpect, and in another remains unmingled with it. For the whole proceeds through the whole, ſimilitude through diſſimilitude, and in like manner diſſimilitude through ſimilitude. Not, indeed, that each, in conſequence of being that which it is, participates of the other; but while it participates it preſerves its own eſſence pure. This, therefore, is the peculiarity of incorporeal forms: to pervade through each other without confuſion; to be diſtinct from each other without ſeparation; and to be more united than things which are corrupted together, through their impartible nature; and to be more diſtinct from each other than things which are here ſeparated, through their unmingled purity.

Socrates, therefore, ſays Proclus, doubting whether forms ſubſiſt in conjunction with each other, calling on Zeno to aſſiſt him in the ſolution of this doubt, and apprehending that forms are not ſo mingled that the ſimilar itſelf is the diſſimilar, calls a dogma of this kind a *prodigy*, and rejects any ſuch mixture. But again, ſuſpecting that forms, through the union of intelligibles, participate in a certain reſpect of each other, he ſays he ſhould *wonder* if any one were able to ſhow that this is the caſe, employing for this purpoſe the language of one ſuſpecting. And at length inferring that they may be both united and ſeparated, he calls him who is able to demonſtrate this *admirable*. And here you ſee the order of aſcent: for Socrates in the firſt place denies; in the ſecond place, he has a ſuſpicion of the truth; and in the third place, he is firmly convinced of the truth through demonſtration. And neither is his negation of the mixture of forms blamable; for, according to the mode which he alludes to, they are unmingled: nor is his ſuſpicion falſe; for in one reſpect they are able to participate of each other, and in another they do not mutually communicate. And his laſt deciſion is moſt true; for they are both united with and ſeparated from each other.

P. 41. *Does it alſo appear to you that there is a certain ſpecies or form of juſtice, &c.*

A divine and demiurgic intellect comprehends things multiplied unitedly, things partible impartibly, and things divided indiviſibly. But it is ſoul which firſt divides things which preſubſiſt in intellect according to ſupreme union; and this is not only true of our ſoul, but likewiſe of that which is divine. For, becauſe it is not allotted intellections which are alone eſtabliſhed in eternity, but deſires to comprehend the

collected energy of intellect, aſpiring after the perfection which it contains, and its ſimple form of intelligence,—hence, it runs round intellect, and by the tranſitions of its projective energies divides the impartible nature of forms, perceiving the beautiful itſelf, the juſt itſelf, and every other form ſeparately, and underſtanding all things by ſurveying one at a time, and not all things at once. For, in ſhort, as it ranks in the third order from *the one*, it very properly poſſeſſes an energy of this kind. For that is one alone, and is prior to intellection. But intellect underſtands all things as one; and ſoul underſtands all things by ſurveying one at a time. Diviſion, therefore, firſt ſubſiſts in ſoul; and hence theologiſts ſay, that in the lacerations of Bacchus the intellect of the God was preſerved undivided by the providence of Minerva. But ſoul is that which is firſt diſtributed into parts; and to this a ſection into ſeven parts firſt pertains. It is, therefore, no longer wonderful, that, divine forms preſubſiſting unitedly in the demiurgic intellect, our ſoul ſhould apply herſelf to them diviſibly, and ſhould at one time ſurvey the firſt and moſt common forms; at another, thoſe which poſſeſs a middle form; and at another time, the moſt partial and as it were individual forms. For, ſince even a divine ſoul divides that which is impartible by its tranſitive adheſions and contacts, what ought we to ſay concerning a partial ſoul ſuch as ours? Muſt it not, much prior to this, apprehend partibly and diviſibly things which ſubſiſt together and in each other? It is, therefore, by no means wonderful that inquiries and anſwers ſhould at different times apprehend different forms; juſt as external diſcourſe divides the one and ſimple conception of the ſoul, and temporally paſſes through the united conceptions of intellect.

The forms, however, which were before mentioned by Socrates are moſt generic and common, viz. unity, multitude, ſimilitude, diſſimilitude, permanency, motion; but thoſe which are now preſented to our view are partly ſecondary to theſe, and partly not; juſt as, with reſpect to human virtue, we ſay that it is partly ſubordinate to, and partly better than, the ſoul: for, ſo far as it is perfective of it is better than the ſoul, but, ſo far as it is ſomething belonging to, and ſubſiſting in, the ſoul, it is ſubordinate to it. In like manner the good*, the beautiful, and the juſt, are partly more excellent than forms which produce eſſences, and are partly inferior to them. For, ſo

* Viz. the good, conſidered as ſubſiſting among ideas, and not as that good which is ſupereſſential, and the principle of all things.

far

far as they are moſt generic, theſe alſo communicate with them; but the latter are the primary cauſes of being to ſenſibles, and the former are the ſources of their perfection; the juſt proceeding as far as to ſouls, and adorning and perfecting theſe, but the beautiful extending its illuminations even as far as to bodies. Hence Socrates in the Phædrus ſays, that beauty has the prerogative of being the moſt apparent and the moſt lovely of all things; but that the ſplendour of juſtice is not viſible in the imitations of it which are here. Again, the good perfects all things according to the peculiar eſſence of each. For the beautiful perfects according to the ſymmetry of form with reſpect to matter; and ſymmetry then ſubſiſts when that which is naturally more excellent rules over that which is naturally inferior. According to this ſymmetry, therefore, the beautiful ſhines in bodies. But the good illuminates according to the perfect; and is preſent to every thing inveſted with form, when it poſſeſſes perfection from nature. In this triad, therefore, the firſt is the good, the ſecond the beautiful, and the third the juſt.

But that there are forms or ideas of theſe, and of all ſuch as theſe, as, for inſtance, of temperance, fortitude, prudence, we ſhall find, by conſidering that every virtue, and every perfection according to virtue, aſſimilates us to a divine nature, and that, by how much the more it is inherent in us, by ſo much the nearer do we approach to an intellectual life. If, therefore, the beautiful and the good, and every virtue, aſſimilate us to intellect, intellect will entirely poſſeſs the intellectual paradigms of theſe. For, with reſpect to the ſimilar, when it is ſaid to be ſimilar to that which is more excellent, then, that which is more excellent poſſeſſes that primarily which the ſubordinate nature receiving becomes ſimilar to it. The forms of the virtues, therefore, muſt neceſſarily ſubſiſt in intellect prior to ſoul. Each of theſe, however, muſt be conſidered in a twofold reſpect, viz. as a divine unity, and as an intellectual form. Thus, for inſtance, the juſt which ſubſiſts in forms is not the ſame with that which ſubſiſts in the Gods. For the former is one particular idea, is a part of another, and poſſeſſes intelligence proceeding as far as to ſouls; but the latter is a certain whole, and proceeds in its providential energies as far as to the laſt of things. It alſo originates from the firſt intellectual Gods; for there it is firſt apparent. But the former is an idea contained in the demiurgic intellect. Thus alſo, with reſpect to the beautiful, that which ſubſiſts as a form is different from that which is the unity of divine beauty. And

the energy of the latter, indeed, is directed to the Gods ſo far as they are Gods, and firſt originates from the firſt intelligible; but the former is in ideas, and is beheld about ideas. And laſtly, with reſpect to the good, one is eſſential, and the other, as we have before obſerved, is ſupereſſential.

P. 42. *I mean hair, clay, and mud, or any thing elſe which is vile and abject, &c.*

It is neceſſary, ſays Proclus, either that there ſhould only be ideas of things which ſubſiſt according to nature, or alſo of things which are contrary to theſe; and if only of things according to nature, that there ſhould alone be ideas of things perpetual, or alſo of each of the things which are not perpetual. And if there are alone ideas of things perpetual, they muſt either be of ſuch as are eſſential, or alſo of ſuch as are uneſſential. And if of the eſſential, they muſt either be alone confined to wholes, or alſo extend to parts; and if to wholes alone, either to ſuch as are alone ſimple, or alſo to ſuch as are compoſed from theſe. Such then being the diviſion of ideas, we ſay, that of intellects proceeding from one intellectual eſſence it is not proper to eſtabliſh paradigms: for that of which there is a paradigm muſt neceſſarily be an image. But to call an intellectual eſſence an image, is of all things the moſt abſurd: for every image is the idol (εἴδωλον) or reſemblance of that of which it is the image; and the Elean gueſt in the Sophiſta expreſsly denominates an idol *not true being*. If, therefore, every intellectual eſſence belongs to true being, it will not be proper to denominate it either an image or an idol. For, indeed, every intellectual nature is impartible, and the progreſſion of it is effected through ſameneſs; whence alſo ſecondary intellects ſubſiſt in unproceeding union in ſuch as are firſt, and are partially what the intellect which ranks as a whole is totally. But it is neceſſary in the image that diſſimilitude ſhould be mingled with ſimilitude; through the latter of which the image is converted to its paradigm. In intellectual eſſences, therefore, there are not image and paradigm, but cauſe alone, and things proceeding from cauſe. Whence alſo theologiſts, placing many fountains in the demiurgic intellect, aſſert that there is one of the multitude of ideas. Hence, not every thing which proceeds from the demiurgus proceeds according to a formal cauſe; but ſuch things as make a more extended progreſſion, and ſuch as poſſeſs a partible eſſence, theſe ſubſiſt from an ideal cauſe. But the other

fountains are generative of intellectual and divine hypoſtaſes. We muſt not, therefore, eſtabliſh in intellect a paradigmatic cauſe of every intellectual eſſence, but a cauſe alone which is characterized by unity, and is divine.

In the next place, it is requiſite to conſider if there is a primary cauſe of ſouls in forms, and whether there is one or many. But that there is, indeed, a certain monad of them in the demiurgus, in which monad every number of ſouls is comprehended monadically, is evident from the nature of things, and from the doctrine of Plato. For, if ſoul is the firſt generated nature, and that which is primarily partible, it is neceſſary that the impartible form ſhould precede things partible, and the eternal, things which are in any way generated. And if, as time is to eternity, ſo is ſoul to intellect, but time is the image of eternity, it is alſo neceſſary that ſoul ſhould be the image of intellect. And if in being there is not only life, as Socrates ſays in the Philebus, but alſo ſoul, it is neceſſary to conſider the ſoul which is there as the paradigm of the multitude of ſouls proceeding from intellect, and as comprehending, after the manner of unity, both their order and their number. But if there is not one form of rational ſouls alone, but there are alſo many forms after the one, ſince all of them are immortal, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a paradigm of each. Again, however, it is impoſſible that the proceeding multitude ſhould be juſt as numerous as that which abides: for progreſſion increaſes quantity, but diminiſhes power. We muſt therefore ſay, that there is a monad in the divine intellect, which is paradigmatic of all ſouls, from which the multitude of them flows, and which unitedly comprehends the meaſure that bounds their number. But with this monad a ſecond number is connate, divided, and paradigmatic of divine ſouls, containing the proper paradigm of each, and one form, from which divine ſouls proceed firſt, and afterwards the multitude coordinate with each. Thus, from the paradigm of the ſoul of the ſun, the divine ſoul of the ſun firſt proceeds; in the next place, all ſuch angelic ſouls as are of a ſolar characteriſtic; in the third place, ſuch as are of a dæmoniacal rank about the ſun; and, in the laſt place, ſuch as are partial: on which account alſo there are coordinations of parts to wholes, and of attendants to their leaders; the one intellectual cauſe of them imparting union and connection to their progreſſion. In like manner, alſo, the paradigm of the lunar ſoul firſt generates the divine ſoul about the moon, afterwards the angelic, then the dæmoniacal, and then that which is partial; and the

intellectual

intellectual monad comprehends all the number of theſe. The like alſo takes place in other divine ſouls; for each has a ſeparate idea: but the orders of angelic, dæmoniacal, or partial ſouls, which follow them, participate of the one idea. And as the one monad of the paradigms of ſouls which are there, gives ſubſiſtence to the one ſoul of the world, ſo the many monads produce the multitude of ſouls; and the former comprehends the whole multitude uniformly, but the latter, the meaſures of their proper ſeries. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, primarily comprehends the forms of divine ſouls, which it firſt generates; but each of theſe forms is one and at the ſame time many; for it *cauſally* contains all the multitude of the ſouls ſubſiſting under it. And thus every ſoul ſubſiſts according to a certain proper paradigm; but all do not after the ſame manner participate of the ſame form. Antient theologiſts alſo having the ſame conceptions on this ſubject ſay, that the total cauſes of ſouls, which generate the whole ſeries of them, are different from the partial cauſes, through which they derive a ſeparation according to ſpecies, and a diviſion as it were into individual ſouls.

In the next place, with reſpect to irrational ſouls, it is evident that there is alſo an intelligible paradigm of theſe; if we conſider irrational ſouls to be all ſecondary lives, and which are diviſible about bodies. Whence then do theſe derive their perpetuity? It muſt neceſſarily indeed be from a certain immovable and intellectual cauſe: and it appears that this is accompliſhed as follows:

Again then, one monad and one idea muſt be arranged prior to theſe, whether it be fontal or ſenſitive nature, or in whatever other way you may be willing to call it. For it may be ſaid that irrational ſouls derive their ſubſiſtence from the one demiurgic ſenſe, through a gnoſtic idiom; but through orexis or appetite, from the higheſt or fontal nature, which ſubſiſts prior to the multitude of natures. From theſe cauſes, therefore, the multitude of perpetual but naturally irrational ſouls proceeds; this multitude ſubſiſting partibly in eternal vehicles, in which alſo it is eſtabliſhed according to a certain number, and the formal meaſure which is there. For every perpetual multitude is bounded; and prior to every bounded multitude *that* ſubſiſts which bounds and numbers this multitude. Theſe irrational alſo proceed from rational ſouls, or rather from the paradigms which they contain: for, through theſe, here alſo they are ſuſpended from rational ſouls, becauſe there the one meaſure of them, together with

the multitude of forms, at the ſame time generates this number of theſe. Divine ſouls indeed, and ſuch as are pure, preſerve alſo their irrational nature undefiled; but partial employ irrational ſouls, as they have a compoſite life, the more excellent part having dominion in ſome, and being frequently in a ſtate of ſubjection in others. From theſe perpetual irrational ſouls, ſuch as are mortal are allotted their generation; theſe alſo being preſerved according to ſpecies, through their intellectual paradigm, but the individuals periſhing, becauſe they derive their ſubſiſtence from the junior * Gods, as the irrational prior to theſe are generated from thoſe ſupernal ſouls whoſe fabricating energy is complicated with the monad of the whole of their ſeries. Souls that periſh, therefore, have a certain analogy to the divine cauſes from which they derive their ſubſiſtence, and immortal ſouls to their formal cauſes.

In the third place, let us conſider how we are to admit a paradigm of Nature. For we muſt not, as Plato ſays, eſtabliſh forms of fire, water, and motion, but deprive nature, which is the ſource of theſe, of an intellectual cauſe. Theologiſts indeed place the fountain of it in the vivific Goddeſs Rhea; for they ſay that immenſe Nature is ſuſpended from the ſhoulders of the goddeſs. But, according to Plato, we muſt ſay that the form of it ſubſiſts in the demiurgic intellect, which form is the origin of every natural vehicle. Timæus alſo ſays, that the demiurgus pointed out to ſouls the *nature* of the univerſe, and the laws of fate: for in him the one nature of all things, and the comprehenſion of thoſe fatal decrees according to which he arranges and divides the univerſe, ſubſiſt. For, if it is the demiurgus who ſpeaks, he converts ſouls to himſelf: but, if this be the caſe, he alſo ſhows to them the nature of the univerſe, and the laws of fate, ſubſiſting in himſelf. Hence the one form of nature is there; but the ſouls alſo that uſe, produce the natures which are inſpired from them; and theſe perpetual natures again generate partial and temporal natures. It may be concluded, therefore, that the paradigm of natures unitedly comprehends in the demiurgic intellect the number of ſuch as have a perpetual ſubſiſtence; but that the ſeparated cauſes of perpetual natures are contained in Vulcan, who according to theologiſts is the fabricator of the form of body alone. For from this divinity every phyſical order, and the number of natures, proximately ſubſiſt and are revivified.

* See the Timæus.

In

In the fourth place, with reſpect to bodies, muſt we not admit that the one and total cauſe of theſe is in the firſt demiurgus, which cauſe comprehends all the number of the bodies that rank as wholes? but, after this monad, that the ſeparated cauſes of bodies which rank as parts ſubſiſt in the fabricating cauſe of a corporeal nature? This, indeed, muſt neceſſarily be the caſe: for he who comprehends the one mundane form is the firſt father of the univerſe; and thoſe things which are generated through neceſſity muſt conſequently be parts; and theſe require the providence of that power which fabricates bodies. Beſides, this alſo is evident, that, as we ſaid of ſouls, it is here likewiſe requiſite to aſſert that there are intellectual and formal cauſes of divine bodies; for the vehicles of dæmons and partial ſouls participate of theſe cauſes in a ſecond and third gradation. Thus, for inſtance, the form of the ſolar body generates alſo the ſolar vehicles of dæmons and partial ſouls; and hence, as ſoul is to ſoul, ſo is vehicle to its proper ſphere. And, in ſhort, ſince there is a multitude of divine cauſes, the cauſes of bodies muſt be conſidered as ſubſiſting differently in different divinities. Thus, in Vulcan, the fabricator of body, the ſeparated cauſes of bodies, ſo far as bodies, ſubſiſt; but in the generative principles of ſouls they ſubſiſt pſychically; and in Jupiter, the demiurgus of wholes, they ſubſiſt as animals, thence deriving their hypoſtaſis both according to ſouls and bodies.

It now remains that we conſider, with reſpect to matter, whether there is alſo a form of this. And here perhaps it is neceſſary, that as in ſouls, natures, and bodies, fabrication does not begin from the imperfect; ſo likewiſe in matter, prior to that which is formleſs, and which has an evaneſcent being, that which is in a certain reſpect form, and which is beheld in one boundary and permanency, will be the paradigm of matter. This likewiſe will poſſeſs a twofold generation, viz. from its paradigm, and from a divine cauſe alone: for every thing intellectual produces in conjunction with divinity; but divinity proceeds by itſelf, and as far as to things which do not poſſeſs their generation from intellectual form.

After having, therefore, conſidered the ſimple hypoſtaſes of beings, let us direct our attention to the things compoſed from theſe,—I mean animals and plants. For there will be intellectual paradigms of all theſe; becauſe not the genus alone but likewiſe the ſpecies of each gives completion to the univerſe, and makes it more ſimilar to its paradigm. For the intelligible world comprehends all ſuch animals intelligibly

as the apparent world contains ſenſibly. Each therefore of theſe is aſſimilated to a certain intellectual form: but animal itſelf, or the extremity of the intelligible triad, comprehends unitedly and intelligibly the cauſes of ſouls, bodies, and animals. For, as it contracts in the tetrad of ideas all the number of them, ſo it preaſſumes according to union the diſtributed cauſes of things which are as it were ſimple, and alſo of ſuch which are as it were compoſite in intellectuals. For, in ſhort, the univerſal and the eſſential are thence derived. Or whence do things poſſeſs the never-failing, if there is no eternal cauſe? Whence that which is common, and which extends to a multitude of things? For whatever is derived from the circular motion of the heavens is partial, ſince the motion itſelf of the heavens is in a certain reſpect partial. But that univerſal ſhould be generated from that which is partial, is among the number of things impoſſible. Every form, therefore, both of plants and animals, thence ſubſiſts according to a certain intellectual paradigm. For every thing generated, and every thing which has in any reſpect a ſubſiſtence, has its being from a cauſe. Whence then are theſe viſible forms, and from what cauſe? Shall we ſay, from one that is mutable? But this is impoſſible. They muſt, therefore, derive their ſubſiſtence from an immovable cauſe, ſince they are perpetual. And we ſay that an intellectual is a cauſe of this kind: for it abides perfectly in eternity. Shall we admit, therefore, that there are not only forms of ſpecies, but alſo of particulars? as, for inſtance, of Socrates, and of every individual, not ſo far as he is a man, but ſo far as he is a particular individual. But if this be the caſe, muſt not the mortal be neceſſarily immortal? For, if every thing which is generated according to idea is generated according to an immovable cauſe, and every thing which ſubſiſts according to an immovable cauſe is immutable in eſſence, Socrates, and each individual of the human ſpecies, will be eſtabliſhed according to a perpetual ſameneſs of eſſence; which is impoſſible. It is likewiſe abſurd that idea ſhould at one time be the paradigm of ſomething, and at another not. For eternal being poſſeſſes whatever it does poſſeſs eternally; and hence, that which is paradigmatic will either not poſſeſs form, or will always poſſeſs it; ſince it would be abſurd to aſſert that there is any thing accidental among ideas. If therefore it is a paradigm, it is neceſſary that the image of it alſo ſhould be erpetual: for every paradigm is the paradigm of an image. But if it is at one time eſſential, and at another not, it will alſo at one time be a paradigm, and at

another not. Beſides, is it not neceſſary to be perſuaded by Socrates, who ſays that we are led to admit the ſubſiſtence of ideas, that we may have the one prior to the many? For, if there are ideas of particulars, there will be one prior to one, or rather infinites prior to finites; ſince, ſenſible natures being finite, ideas will be infinite. Nothing, however, can be more abſurd than this: for things nearer to *the one* are more bounded, according to number, than ſuch as are more remote from it. And hence it appears that there can be no ideas of individuals. Since, however, every thing which is generated is generated from a certain cauſe, we muſt alſo admit that there are cauſes of individuals; the one general cauſe being the order of the univerſe, but the many cauſes, the motion of the heavens, partial natures, the characteriſtic peculiarities of the ſeaſons, climates, and the *inſpective guardians* of theſe. For, the cauſe being moved moves together with itſelf, in a certain reſpect, that which is generated from it. Hence, from the idioms of the preſiding cauſes, different appropriate figures, colours, voices, and motions are imparted to different animals. For the generations are various in different places, and partial natures not only proceed from the whole of nature, but receive ſomething from the idiom of ſeeds, and are faſhioned by verging to bodies, and becoming as it were eminently corporeal, through departing from themſelves. We ſee, therefore, that they do not ſubſiſt from a paradigmatic cauſe: for it is not the ſame thing to ſubſiſt from a cauſe, and to be generated according to a paradigm. For cauſe is multifariouſly predicated, one of which is the paradigmatic.

Again, with reſpect to parts, ſhall we ſay that there are alſo ideas of theſe, ſo that there is not only a paradigm of man, but alſo of finger and eye, and every thing of this kind! Indeed, becauſe each of theſe is univerſal and eſſence, it ſubſiſts from a certain ſtable cauſe; but becauſe they are parts, and not wholes, they are ſubordinate to an impartible and intellectual eſſence. For there is no abſurdity in admitting that ſuch things as are not only parts, but wholes, ſubſiſt according to that eſſence; but it is abſurd to admit this of ſuch things as are parts only. For the generation of wholes is from thence, ſince the uniform, prior to the multiplied, and the whole, prior to part, is thence derived. Will it not, therefore, be right to aſſert of all ſuch things, that the cauſes of them are not intellectual, (for every intellect is impartible, and conſequently wholes ſubſiſt in it prior to parts, and impartible prior to partible natures,) but that they are pſychical and phyſical. For that which is primarily partible is in ſouls, and

after these in natures. Here, therefore, there is a reason and form of finger and tooth, and of each of these. And the wholeness of these, indeed, presubsists in intellect, but that which in the one also comprehends multitude is in souls. That which vitally distributes the one from the multitude is in natures; and that which makes a division accompanied with interval is in bodies. In short, it must not be denied that there are definite dæmoniacal causes of these, as invocations upon the finger, eye, and heart evince: but of the wholes which comprehend these parts there are divine causes.

In the next place let us consider accidents. Have these then also ideas, or is there also a twofold consideration about these? For some of them are perfective of, and give completion to, essences, such as similitude, beauty, health, and virtue; but others subsist indeed in essences, yet do not give completion to, nor perfect them, such as whiteness, blackness, and every thing of this kind. Things, therefore, which give completion to, and are perfective of, essences have paradigmatic causes precedaneously; but things which are ingenerated in bodies are indeed produced according to reason, and the temperament of bodies is not sufficient to their generation, but form is derived inwardly from nature, yet they are not produced according to a certain definite intellectual cause. For the essential, the perfective, and the common, pertain to forms; but that which is deprived of all these subsists from some other cause, and not from the first forms. For nature, receiving the order of forms proceeding into corporeal masses, divides wholes from parts, and essences from accidents, which prior to this were united and impartible; expanding these by her divisive powers. It is not indeed possible, that things perfectly divided should immediately subsist from things united, and things most partial from such as are most common; but a division must necessarily be produced from the condition of subjection in the natures which subsist between. We must therefore admit, that there is a cause of figure which is the prolific source of all figures, and one monad of numbers which is generative of all numbers; since even the monad which is with us evinces that it contains unitedly the even and the odd, and all the forms of numbers. What then ought we to think concerning the monad which is there? Must it not be, that it is uniformly the cause of all things, and that its infinite power generates also in us infinite number? Indeed, this must necessarily be the case, since the monad which is here proceeds as the image of that.

In the next place, with respect to things artificial, shall we say that there are ideas

alſo of theſe? Socrates, indeed, in the Republic, does not refuſe to ſpeak of the idea of a bed, and of a table; but there he calls the productive principle in the dianoëtic part of the artiſt, idea, and ſays that this productive principle is the progeny of divinity, becauſe he was of opinion that the artificial itſelf is imparted to ſouls from divinity. For, if it ſhould be ſaid that the forms of theſe are in intellect, whether do theſe pervade to the ſenſible world immediately, or through nature as a medium? For, if immediately, it will be abſurd, ſince a progreſſion of this kind no where ſubſiſts in other forms, but ſuch things as are nearer to intellect are the firſt participants of ideas. But if through nature as a medium, becauſe the arts are ſaid to imitate nature, much prior to art nature will poſſeſs the forms of things artificial. But all things which are generated from nature live, and undergo generation and increaſe, if they belong to things which are generated in matter: for nature is a certain life, and the cauſe of things vital. It is however impoſſible that a bed, or any thing elſe which is the production of art, ſhould live and be increaſed. And hence things artificial will not have preſubſiſting ideas, nor intellectual paradigms of their ſubſiſtence. If, however, ſome one ſhould be willing to call the ſciences arts, we muſt make the following diviſion:—Of arts, ſuch as lead back the ſoul, and aſſimilate it to intellect, of theſe we muſt admit that there are ideas, to which they aſſimilate us: for figure, and the intelligence of figure, are ſimilar, and alſo number, and the intelligence of number. We muſt admit, therefore, that there are ideas of arithmetic, muſic, geometry, and aſtronomy, not indeed ſo far as they are applied to practical purpoſes, but ſo far as they are intellectual, and inſpective of divine forms. For theſe indeed conjoin us with intellect, when, like the Coryphæan philoſopher in the Theætetus, we aſtronomize above the heavens, ſurvey the intellectual harmony according to which the demiurgus generated ſouls and this univerſe, and contemplate that number which ſubſiſts in all forms occultly and ſeparately, and the intellectual figure, which is generative of all figures, and according to which the father of the univerſe convolves the world, and gives to each of the elements its proper figure. Of theſe, therefore, we muſt eſtabliſh ideas, and of ſuch other ſciences as elevate ſouls to intellect, and the aſſiſtance of which we require in running back to the intelligible. But, with reſpect to ſuch ſciences as pertain to the ſoul while ſporting and employing herſelf about mortal concerns, and adminiſtering to human indigence, of theſe there are no intellectual forms, but the ſoul poſſeſſes a power in opinion,

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nion, which is the fruitful ſource of theorems, and is naturally adapted to generate and judgeof ſuch-like particulars. There are, however, by no means ſeparate forms of the arts, or of things artificial. But it is not wonderful that the cauſes of theſe ſhould ſubſiſt in dæmons, who are ſaid to be the inſpective guardians of arts, and toimpart them to men; or that they ſhould alſo be ſymbolically in the Gods. Thus, for inſtance, a certain dæmon of the order of Vulcan is ſaid to preſide over the brazier's art, and to contain the form of this art; but the mighty Vulcan himſelf is ſaid ſymbolically to fabricate the heavens from braſs. In a ſimilar manner, there is a certain Minerval dæmon who preſides over the weaver's art, Minerva herſelf being celebrated as weaving in a different and demiurgic manner the order of intellectual forms.

In the next place, withreſpect to evil, muſt we ſay that there is ſuch thing as evil itſelf, the idea of evils? or ſhall we ſay, that as the form of things endued with interval is impartible, and of things multiplied, monadic, ſo the paradigm of things evil is good? For the aſſertion is by no means ſane, which admits that evil itſelf ſubſiſts among ideas, leſt we ſhould be compelled to ſay that divinity himſelf is the cauſe of thoſe evils of which he contains the paradigms; though we, when we look to thoſe paradigms, become better than we were before. But if ſome one ſhould ſay that the form of evils is good, we aſk, whether it is alone good in its eſſence, or alſo in its energy? For, if in its eſſence alone, it will be productive of evil by its energy, which it is not lawful to aſſert; but if in its energy alſo, it is evident that what is generated by it will be good. For the effect of beneficent power and energy is good, no leſs than the effect of fire is hot. Evil, therefore, ſo far as evil, is not generated according to a certain paradigm. But if, as Parmenides alſo ſays, every idea is a God, and no God, as we learn from the Republic, is the cauſe of evil, neither muſt we ſay, that ideas being Gods are the cauſes of evil. But paradigms are the cauſes of the things of which they are paradigms; and hence, no idea is the cauſe of evil.

From all that has been ſaid, we may ſummarily collect that ideas are of univerſal eſſences, and of the perfections in theſe. For the good, the eſſential, and the perpetual, are moſt adapted to forms; the firſt of theſe pervading from the firſt cauſe, the ſecond from the higheſt being, and the third from eternity, to the firſt order of forms. From theſe three elements, therefore, we may define what things are generated according to a certain paradigmatic intellectual cauſe, and what ſubſiſt from other principles,

and not from an intellectual paradigm. For hair, though it ſhould be a leading part, will not be there; for it has been ſhown that other things are there, and not parts. But clay is an indefinite mixture of two elements not ſubſiſting according to a phyſical reaſon; ſince we are alſo accuſtomed to connect together ten thouſand other particulars for our uſe. We do not however refer any thing of this kind to form: for theſe works are either the offspring of art, or of a deliberative tendency to things in our power. And as to mud, ſince it is a certain evil of that with which it ſubſiſts, it cannot ſubſiſt from ideas, becauſe, as we have ſhown, nothing evil is generated from thence. On this account theſe things, becauſe they are exits and privations of ideas, do not from them derive their origin. For darkneſs is a privation of light; but the ſun, being the cauſe of light, is not alſo the cauſe of its privation. In like manner, intellect, being the cauſe of knowledge, does not alſo give ſubſiſtence to ignorance, which is the privation of knowledge; and ſoul, being the ſupplier of life, does not alſo impart a privation of life. But if ſome one ſhould ſay that intellect knowing good knows alſo evil, and on this account ſhould place evil in intellect, to this we muſt reply, that there is no paradigm of evil in intellect, but that it poſſeſſes a knowledge of evil; and that this is the paradigm of all the knowledge of evil, which he who receives is benefited. For ignorance is evil, but not the knowledge of ignorance, this being one knowledge both of itſelf and of ignorance. For, if we thus ſpeak, we ſhall neither introduce ideas of things evil, as ſome of the Platoniſts have, nor ſhall we ſay that intellect alone knows things of a more excellent nature, as others have aſſerted; but, ranking between both, we ſhall admit that it has a knowledge of evils, but we ſhall not introduce a paradigmatic cauſe of theſe, ſince it would be evil.

The following tranſlation of extracts from the beginning of the MS. of Damaſcius περι αρχων, or CONCERNING PRINCIPLES, may be conſidered as an admirable comment on the concluding part of the firſt hypotheſis of this dialogue, where it is inferred (p. 160.) that *the one* neither *is* one, nor *is*; and that it can neither be named, nor ſpoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. The extracts are taken and tranſlated from the MS. in the Bodleian library. The difficulty of tranſlating theſe extracts, like the ſublimity which they contain, can be known only to a few.

Whether

Whether ſhall we ſay that the one principle of all things is beyond all things? or that it is ſomething belonging to all things, being as it were the ſummit of the things proceeding from it? And ſhall we ſay that all things ſubſiſt together with it, or that they are poſterior to and originate from it? For if ſome one ſhould aſſert this, how will the principle be ſomething external to all things? For, thoſe things are in ſhort all, of which no one whatever is abſent. But the principle is abſent, as not ranking among all things. All things, therefore, are not ſimply poſterior to the principle, but beſides the principle. Further ſtill, all things muſt be conſidered as many finite things: for things infinite will plainly not be all. Nothing, therefore, will be external to all things. For *allneſs* (παντοτης) is a certain boundary and comprehenſion, in which the principle is the boundary upwards, and that which is the ultimate proceſſion from the principle, the boundary downwards. All things, therefore, ſubſiſt together with the boundaries. Again, the principle is coordinated with the things which proceed from the principle; for it is ſaid to be and is the principle of them. The cauſe alſo is coordinated with the things cauſed, and that which is firſt with the things poſterior to the firſt. But things of which there is one coordination, being many, are ſaid to be all; ſo that the principle alſo is among all things. And, in ſhort, we call ſuch things as we conceive to ſubſiſt in any way whatever, all things; and we alſo conceive the principle to ſubſiſt. Hence we are accuſtomed to call all the city, the governor and the governed, and all the race, the begetter and the begotten. But if all things ſubſiſt together with the principle, will not the principle be ſomething belonging to all things, the principle alſo being aſſumed in conjunction with all things? The one coordination, therefore, of all things, which we ſay is all, is without a principle, and without a cauſe, leſt we ſhould aſcend to infinity. It is however neceſſary that every thing ſhould either be the principle, or from the principle. All things, therefore, are either the principle, or from the principle. But if the latter be the caſe, the principle will not ſubſiſt together with all things, but will be external to all things, as the principle of the things proceeding from it. If the former be admitted, what will that be which will proceed from all things, as from the principle? All things, therefore, are neither the principle, nor from the principle *. Further ſtill, all things are in a certain reſpect beheld ſubſiſting in multitude, and a certain ſepara-

* For the principle ſo far as it is the principle ranks among all things.

tion.

ion. For we cannot conceive the all without theſe. How, therefore, do a certain ſeparation and multitude directly appear? Or are not all things every where in ſeparation and multitude? But is *the one* the ſummit of the many, and *the monad* the united ſubſiſtence of things which are ſeparated from each other? And, ſtill further, is *the one* more ſimple than *the monad?* In the firſt place, however, if this be ſaid, every monad is number, though ſubſiſting contractedly and in profound union; and thus the monad alſo is all things. And, in the next place, *the one* is not ſomething belonging to *the many*; for thus it would give completion to *the many*, in the ſame manner as each of other things. But as numerous as are the many according to a certain diviſion, ſo numerous alſo will *the one* be prior to diviſion, according to the every way impartible. For it is not *the one* as that which is *ſmalleſt*, as Speuſippus appears to ſay, but it is *the one* as all things. For by its own ſimplicity it accedes to all things, and makes all things to be one. Hence all things proceed from it, becauſe it is itſelf all things prior to all. And as that which has an united ſubſiſtence is prior to things which are ſeparated from each other, ſo *the one* is *many* prior to *the many*. But when we expand every conception belonging to our nature to all things, then we do not predicate all things after the ſame manner, but in a triple reſpect at leaſt; viz. *unically*, *unitedly*, and in a *multiplied* manner. All things, therefore, are from *the one*, and with reference to *the one*, as we are accuſtomed to ſay. If then, according to a more uſual manner of ſpeaking, we call things which conſiſt in multitude and ſeparation all things, we muſt admit that *the united*, and in a ſtill greater degree *the one*, are the principles of theſe. But if we conſider theſe two as all things, and aſſume them in conjunction with all other things, according to habitude and coordination with them, as we have before ſaid, we muſt then inveſtigate another principle prior to all things, which it is no longer proper to conſider as in any way all things, nor to co-arrange with its progeny. For if ſome one ſhould ſay that *the one*, though it is all things which have in any reſpect a ſubſiſtence, yet is *one* prior to *all things*, and is more *one* than *all things*; ſince it is *one* by itſelf, but *all things* as the cauſe of all, and according to a coordination with all things;—if this ſhould be ſaid, *the one* will thus be doubled, and we ourſelves ſhall become doubled, and multiplied about its ſimplicity. For by being *the one* it is all things after the moſt ſimple manner. At the ſame time alſo, though this ſhould be ſaid, it is neceſſary that the principle of all things

ſhould

ſhould be exempt from all things, and conſequently that it ſhould be exempt from the moſt ſimple *allneſs*, and from a ſimplicity abſorbing all things, ſuch as is that of *the one*. Our ſoul, therefore, propheſies that the principle which is beyond all things that can in any reſpect be conceived, is uncoordinated with all things. Neither, therefore, muſt it be called principle, nor cauſe, nor that which is firſt, nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means, therefore, muſt we celebrate it as all things, nor, in ſhort, is it to be celebrated, nor recalled into memory. For, whatever we conceive or conſider is either ſomething belonging to all things, or is all things, although analyſing we ſhould aſcend to that which is moſt ſimple, which is the moſt comprehenſive of all things, being as it were the ultimate circumference, not of beings, but of non-beings: for, of beings, that which has an united ſubſiſtence, and is perfectly without ſeparation, is the extremity, ſince every being is mingled from elements which are either *bound* and *infinity*, or the progeny of theſe. But *the one* is ſimply the laſt boundary of *the many*. For we cannot conceive any thing more ſimple than that which is perfectly one; which if we denominate the principle, and cauſe, the firſt and the moſt ſimple, theſe and all other things are there only according to *the one*. But we not being able to contract our conceptions into profound union, are divided about it, and predicate of *the one* the diſtributed multitude which is in ourſelves; unleſs we deſpiſe theſe appellations alſo, becauſe *the many* cannot be adapted to *the one*. Hence it can neither be known nor named; for, if it could, it would in this reſpect be *many*. Or theſe things alſo will be contained in it, according to *the one*. For the nature of *the one* is all-receptive, or rather all-producing, and there is not any thing whatever which *the one* is not. Hence all things are as it were evolved from it. It is, therefore, properly cauſe, and the firſt, the end, and the laſt, the defenſive encloſure of all things, and the one nature of all things; not that nature which is in things, and which proceeds from *the one*, but that which is prior to them, which is the moſt impartible ſummit of all things whatever, and the greateſt comprehenſion of all things which in any reſpect are ſaid to have a being.

But if *the one* is the cauſe of all things, and is comprehenſive of all things, what aſcent will there be for us beyond this alſo? For we do not ſtrive in vain, extending ourſelves to that which is nothing. For that which is not even *one*, *is* not according to the moſt juſt mode of ſpeaking. Whence then do we conceive that there is

ſomething beyond *the one?* for *the many* require nothing elſe than *the one*. And hence *the one* alone is the cauſe of *the many*. Hence alſo *the one* is entirely cauſe, becauſe it is neceſſary that the cauſe of the many ſhould alone be *the one*. For it cannot be nothing; ſince nothing is the cauſe of nothing. Nor can it be *the many*: for ſo far as *many* they are uncoordinated; and *the many* will not be one cauſe. But if there are many cauſes, they will not be cauſes of each other, through being uncoordinated, and through a progreſſion in a circle, the ſame things being cauſes and the things cauſed. Each, therefore, will be the cauſe of itſelf, and thus there will be no cauſe of the many. Hence it is neceſſary that *the one* ſhould be the cauſe of the many, and which is alſo the cauſe of their coordination: for there is a certain conſpiring coordination, and a union with each other.

If, therefore, ſome one thus doubting ſhould ſay that *the one* is a ſufficient principle, and ſhould add as the ſummit that we have not any conception or ſuſpicion more ſimple than that of *the one*, and ſhould therefore aſk how we can ſuſpect any thing beyond the laſt ſuſpicion and conception we are able to frame;—if ſome one ſhould thus ſpeak, we muſt pardon the doubt. For a ſpeculation of this kind is as it ſeems inacceſſible and immenſe: at the ſame time, however, from things more known to us we muſt extend the ineffable parturitions of our ſoul, to the ineffable coſenſation of this ſublime truth. For, as that which ſubſiſts without is in every reſpect more honourable than that which ſubſiſts with habitude, and the uncoordinated than the coordinated, as the theoretic than the political life, and Saturn for inſtance than Jupiter; being than forms, and *the one* than *the many*, of which *the one* is the principle; ſo, in ſhort, that which tranſcends every thing of this kind is more honourable than all cauſes and principles, and is not to be conſidered as ſubſiſting in any coarrangement and habitude; ſince *the one* is naturally prior to *the many*, that which is moſt ſimple to things more compoſite, and that which is moſt comprehenſive to the things which it comprehends. So that, if you are willing thus to ſpeak, *the firſt* is beyond all ſuch oppoſition, not only that which is in things coordinate, but even that which takes place from its ſubſiſtence as the firſt. *The one*, therefore, and the united are poſterior to the firſt: for theſe cauſally contain multitude as numerous as that which is unfolded from them. *The one*, however, is no leſs one, if indeed it is not more ſo, becauſe ſeparate multitude is poſterior to and not in it; and the united is no leſs united becauſe it contracted in

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one things ſeparated prior to ſeparation. Each of theſe, therefore, is all things, whether according to coordination, or according to their own nature. But all things cannot be things firſt, nor the principle. Nor yet one of them alone, becauſe this one will be at the ſame time all things, according to *the one*; but we ſhall not yet have diſcovered that which is beyond all things. To which we may alſo add, that *the one* is the ſummit of *the many*, as the cauſe of the things proceeding from it. We may likewiſe ſay that we form a conception of *the one* according to a purified ſuſpicion extended to that which is moſt ſimple and moſt comprehenſive. But that which is moſt venerable muſt neceſſarily be incomprehenſible by all conceptions and ſuſpicions; ſince alſo, in other things, that which always ſoars beyond our conceptions is more honourable than that which is more obvious: ſo that what flies from all our ſuſpicions will be moſt honourable. But, if this be the caſe, it is *nothing*. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than *the one*, the other poſterior to ſenſibles. If alſo we ſtrive in vain in aſſerting theſe things, ſtriving in vain is likewiſe twofold; the one falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no reſpect whatever has any ſubſiſtence. For *this* alſo is ineffable, as Plato ſays, but according to the worſe, but *that* according to the better. If, too, we ſearch for a certain advantage ariſing from it, this is the moſt neceſſary advantage of all others, that all things thence proceed as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For neither do they proceed as *the one* produces *the many*, nor as *the united* things *ſeparated*, but as the ineffable ſimilarly produces all things, ineffably. But if in aſſerting theſe things concerning it, that it is ineffable, that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehenſible, we ſubvert what we ſay, it is proper to know that theſe are the names and words of our parturitions, daring anxiouſly to explore it, and which, ſtanding in the veſtibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but ſignify the manner in which we are affected about it, our doubts and diſappointment; nor yet this clearly, but through indications to ſuch as are able to underſtand theſe inveſtigations. We alſo ſee that our parturitions ſuffer theſe things about *the one*, and that in a ſimilar manner they are ſolicitous and ſubverted. For *the one*, ſays Plato, if it is, is not *the one*. But if it is not, no aſſertion can be adapted to it: ſo that neither can there be a negation of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a name

ſimple. Nor is there any opinion nor ſcience of it; for neither are theſe ſimple: nor is intellect itſelf ſimple. So that *the one* is in every reſpect unknown and ineffable.

What then? Shall we inveſtigate ſomething elſe beyond the ineffable? Or, perhaps, indeed, Plato leads us ineffably through *the one* as a medium, to the ineffable beyond *the one*, which is now the ſubject of diſcuſſion; and this by an ablation of *the one*, in the ſame manner as he leads us to *the one* by an ablation of other things. For, that he gives to *the one* a certain poſition is evident from his Sophiſta, where he demonſtrates that it ſubſiſts prior to being, itſelf by itſelf. But if, having aſcended as far as to *the one*, he is ſilent, this alſo is becoming in Plato to be perfectly ſilent, after the manner of the antients, concerning things in every reſpect unſpeakable: for the diſcourſe was, indeed, moſt dangerous, in conſequence of falling on idiotical ears. Indeed, when diſcourſing concerning that which in no reſpect has any ſubſiſtence, he ſubverts his aſſertions, and is fearful of falling into the ſea of diſſimilitude, or, rather, of unſubſiſting void. But if demonſtrations do not accord with *the one*, it is by no means wonderful: for they are human and diviſible, and more compoſite than is fit. Indeed, they are not even adapted to being, ſince they are formal, or rather they are neither adapted to forms nor eſſences. Or, is it not Plato himſelf, who in his Epiſtles* evinces that we have nothing which is ſignificant of form, no type, nor name, nor diſcourſe, nor opinion, nor ſcience? For it is intellect alone which can apprehend ideas by its projecting energies, which we cannot poſſeſs while buſily engaged in diſcourſe. If, therefore, we even energize intellectually, ſince in this caſe our intellection is characterized by form, we ſhall not accord with *the united* and with being. And if at any time we are able to project a contracted intelligence, even this is unadapted and diſcordant with *the one*. If, alſo, we energize according to the moſt profoundly united intelligence, and through this occultly perceive *the one itſelf*, yet even this is expanded only as far as to *the one*, if there is a knowledge of *the one*; for this we have not yet determined. At the ſame time, however, let us now apply ourſelves to the diſcuſſion of things of ſuch great importance, through indications and ſuſpicions, being purified, with reſpect to unuſual conceptions, and led through analogies and negations, deſpiſing what we poſſeſs with reſpect to theſe, and advancing from things more diſhonour-

* See the ſeventh Epiſtle of Plato.

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able with us to things more honourable. Shall we therefore ſay, that the nature which we now inveſtigate as the firſt, is ſo perfectly ineffable, that it muſt not even be admitted concerning it that it is thus ineffable; but that *the one* is ineffable, as flying from all compoſition of words and names, and all diſtinction of that which is known from that which knows, and is to be apprehended in a manner the moſt ſimple and comprehenſive, and that it is not one alone as the idiom of one, but as *one all things*, and one prior to all things, and not one which is ſomething belonging to all things? Theſe, indeed, are the parturitions of the ſoul, and are thus purified with reſpect to *the ſimply one*, and that which is truly the one cauſe of all things. But, in ſhort, we thus form a conception of *the one* which we contain as the ſummit or flower of our eſſence, as being more proximate and allied to us, and more prompt to ſuch a ſuſpicion of that which nearly leaves all things behind it. But, from ſome particular thing which is made the ſubject of hypotheſis, the tranſition is eaſy to that which is ſimply ſuppoſed, though we ſhould in no reſpect accede to it, but, being carried in that which is moſt ſimple in us, ſhould form a ſuſpicion concerning that which is prior to all things. *The one*, therefore, is thus effable, and thus ineffable; but that which is beyond it is to be honoured in the moſt perfect ſilence, and, prior to this, by the moſt perfect ignorance*, which deſpiſes all knowledge.

Let us, therefore, now conſider, in the ſecond place, how it is ſaid to be perfectly unknown. For, if this be true, how do we aſſert all theſe things concerning it? For we do not elucidate by much diſcuſſion about things of which we are ignorant. But if it is in reality uncoordinated with all things, and without habitude to all things, and is nothing of all things, nor even *the one itſelf*, theſe very things are the nature of it. Beſides, with reſpect to its being unknown, we either know that it is unknown, or we are ignorant of this. But if the latter, how do we ſay that it is perfectly unknown? And if we know this, in this reſpect therefore it is known. Or ſhall we ſay that it is known, that the unknown is unknown? We cannot therefore deny one thing of another, not knowing that which is the ſubject of the negation; nor can we ſay that

* As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance worſe than knowledge, ſo the ſilence in which our aſcent to the ineffable terminates is ſucceeded by an ignorance ſuperior to all knowledge. Let it, however, be carefully remembered, that ſuch an ignorance is only to be obtained after the moſt ſcientific and intellectual energies.

it is not this or that, when we can in no reſpect reach it. How, therefore, can we deny of that of which we are perfectly ignorant the things which we know? For this is juſt as if ſome one who was blind from his birth ſhould aſſert that heat is not in colour. Or perhaps, indeed, he alſo will juſtly ſay, that colour is not hot. For he knows this by the touch; but he knows nothing of colour, except that it is not tangible: for he knows that he does not know it. Such a knowledge, indeed, is not a knowledge of colour, but of his own ignorance. And we alſo, when we ſay that the firſt is unknown, do not announce any thing of it, but we confeſs the manner in which we are affected about it. For the non-perception of the blind man is not in the colour, nor yet his blindneſs, but in him. The ignorance, therefore, of that of which we are ignorant is in us. For the knowledge of that which is known, is in him that knows, and not in the thing known. But if knowledge is in that which is known, being as it were the ſplendour of it, ſo ſome one ſhould ſay ignorance is in that which is unknown, being as it were the darkneſs of it, or obſcurity, according to which it is unknown by, and is unapparent to, all things,—he who ſays this is ignorant, that as blindneſs is a privation, ſo likewiſe all ignorance, and that as is the inviſible, ſo that of which we are ignorant, and which is unknown. In other things, therefore, the privation of this or that leaves ſomething elſe. For that which is incorporeal, though inviſible, yet is intelligible: and that which is not intelligible by a certain intelligence, leaves at the ſame time ſomething elſe. But if we take away every conception and ſuſpicion, this alſo we muſt ſay is perfectly unknown by us, about which we cloſe every eye*. Nor muſt we aſſert any thing of it, as we do of the intelligible, that it is not adapted to be ſeen by the eyes, or as we do of *the one*, that it is not naturally adapted to be underſtood by an eſſential and abundant intellection: for it imparts nothing by which it can be apprehended, nothing which can lead to a ſuſpicion of its nature. For neither do we only ſay that it is unknown, that being ſomething elſe it may naturally poſſeſs the unknown, but we do not think it fit to predicate of it either *being*, or *the one*, or *all things*, or *the principle of all things*, or, in ſhort, *any thing*. Neither, therefore, are theſe things the nature of it, viz. *the nothing*, *the being beyond all things*, *ſupereſſential ſubſiſtence*, and *the uncoordinated with all things*; but theſe are only ablations of things poſterior to it. How, therefore, do we ſpeak concerning it? Shall we ſay,

* Παν ομμα μυομεν.

that,

that, knowing theſe poſterior things, we deſpiſe them with reſpect to the poſition, if I may ſo ſpeak, of that which is in every reſpect ineffable? For, as that which is beyond ſome particular knowledge is better than that which is apprehended by ſuch knowledge, ſo that which is beyond all ſuſpicion muſt neceſſarily be moſt venerable; not that it is known to be ſo, but poſſeſſing the moſt venerable as in us, and as the conſequence of the manner in which we are affected about it. We alſo call this a prodigy, from its being entirely incomprehenſible by our conceptions: for it is through analogy, if that which in a certain reſpect is unknown, according to a more excellent ſubſiſtence, is ſuperior to that which is in every reſpect known. Hence, that which is in every reſpect unknown according to a more excellent ſubſiſtence, muſt neceſſarily be acknowledged to be ſupreme, though it indeed has neither the ſupreme, nor the moſt excellent, nor the moſt venerable: for theſe things are our confeſſions about that, which entirely flies from all our conceptions and ſuſpicions. For by this very aſſertion, that we can form no ſuſpicion of it, we acknowledge that it is moſt wonderful; ſince, if we ſhould ſuſpect any thing concerning it, we muſt alſo inveſtigate ſomething elſe prior to this ſuſpicion, and either proceed to infinity in our ſearch, or ſtop at that which is perfectly ineffable. Can we, therefore, demonſtrate any thing concerning it? and is that demonſtrable which we do not think fit to conſider as a thing whoſe ſubſiſtence we can even ſuſpect? Or, when we aſſert theſe things, do we not indeed demonſtrate *concerning* it, but not *it*? For neither does it contain the demonſtrable, nor any thing elſe. What then? Do we not opine concerning it theſe things which we now aſſert? But if there is an opinion of it, it is alſo the object of opinion. Or ſhall we ſay we opine that it is not theſe things? for Ariſtotle alſo ſays that there is true opinion. If, therefore, the opinion is true, the thing likewiſe is to which opinion being adapted becomes true. For, in conſequence of the thing ſubſiſting, the opinion alſo is true. Though, indeed, how will it be, or how will that be true which is perfectly unknown? Or ſhall we ſay this is true, that it is not theſe things, and that it is not known? Is it therefore truly falſe, that it is theſe things, and that it is known? Or ſhall we ſay that theſe things are to be referred to privations, and to that which in a certain reſpect is not, in which there may be a falling from the hypoſtaſis of form? Juſt as we call the abſence of light darkneſs. For, light not exiſting, neither is there any darkneſs. But to that which is never and in no reſpect being, nothing among beings

can, as Plato ſays, accede. Neither, therefore, is it non-being, nor, in ſhort, privation; and even the expreſſion *never in no reſpect* (το μηδαμη μηδαμως) is incapable of ſignifying its nature. For this expreſſion is being, and *ſignification* is ſomething belonging to beings. Likewiſe, though we ſhould opine that it is not in any reſpect, yet at the ſame time ſince it thus becomes the object of opinion, it belongs to beings. Hence, Plato very properly calls that which never and in no reſpect is, ineffable and incapable of being opined, and this according to the worſe than the effable and opinion, in the ſame manner as we ſay the ſupreme is according to that which is better than theſe. What then, do we not think and are we not perſuaded that the ſupreme thus ſubſiſts? Or, as we have often ſaid, do not theſe things expreſs the manner in which we are affected about it? But we poſſeſs in ourſelves this opinion, which is therefore empty, as is the opinion of a vacuum and the infinite. As therefore we form a phantaſtic and fictitious opinion of theſe, though they are not, as if they were, juſt as we opine the ſun to be no larger than a ſphere whoſe diameter is but a foot, though this is far from being the caſe;—ſo, if we opine any thing concerning that which never and in no reſpect is, or concerning that of which we write theſe things, the opinion is our own, and the vain attempt is in us, in apprehending which we think that we apprehend the ſupreme. It is, however, nothing pertaining to us, ſo much does it tranſcend our conceptions. How, therefore, do we demonſtrate that there is ſuch an ignorance in us concerning it? And how do we ſay that it is unknown? We reply, in one word, Becauſe we always find that what is above knowledge is more honourable; ſo that what is above all knowledge, if it were to be found, would be found to be moſt honourable. But it is ſufficient to the demonſtration that it cannot be found. We alſo ſay that it is above all things; becauſe, if it were any thing known, it would rank among all things; and there would be ſomething common to it with all things, viz. the being known. But there is one coordination of things in which there is ſomething common; ſo that in conſequence of this it will ſubſiſt together with all things. Hence it is neceſſary that it ſhould be unknown.

In the third place, the unknown is inherent in beings as well as the known, though they are relatively inherent at the ſame time. As, therefore, we ſay that the ſame thing is relatively large and ſmall, ſo alſo we ſay, that a thing is known and unknown with reference to different things. And as the ſame thing, by participating of the

two

two forms, the great and the ſmall, is at the ſame time both great and ſmall, ſo that which at the ſame time participates of the known and the unknown is both theſe. Thus, the intelligible is unknown to ſenſe, but is known to intellect. For the more excellent will not be privation, the inferior at the ſame time being form; ſince every abſence, and a privation of this kind, is either in matter or in ſoul; but all things are preſent in intellect, and ſtill more in a certain reſpect in the intelligible. Unleſs, indeed, we denominate privation according to a more excellent ſubſiſtence, as we ſay that is not form which is above form; and that is not being which is ſupereſſential; and that is nothing which is truly unknown, according to a tranſcendency which ſurpaſſes all things. If, therefore, *the one* is the laſt known of things which are in any reſpect whatever known or ſuſpected, that which is beyond *the one* is primarily and perfectly unknown; which alſo is ſo unknown, that neither has it an unknown nature, nor can we accede to it as to the unknown, but it is even unknown to us whether it is unknown. For there is an all-perfect ignorance about it, nor can we know it, neither as known, nor as unknown. Hence, we are on all ſides ſubverted, in conſequence of not being able to reach it in any reſpect, becauſe it is not even one thing; or rather, it is not that which is not even one thing. Hence, it is that which in no reſpect whatever has any ſubſiſtence; or it is even beyond this, ſince this is a negation of being, and that which is not even one thing is a negation of *the one*. But that which is not one thing, or, in other words, that which is nothing, is a void, and a falling from all things. We do not, however, thus conceive concerning the ineffable. Or ſhall we ſay that *nothing* is twofold, the one being beyond, and the other below, all things? For *the one* alſo is twofold, *this* being the extreme, as *the one* of matter, and *that* the firſt, as that which is more antient than being. So that with reſpect to *nothing* alſo, *this* will be as that which is not even the laſt one, but *that*, as neither being the firſt one. In this way, therefore, that which is unknown and ineffable is twofold, *this*, as not even poſſeſſing the laſt ſuſpicion of ſubſiſtence, and *that*, as not even being the firſt of things. Muſt we, therefore, conſider it as that which is unknown to *us*? Or this indeed is nothing paradoxical: for it will be unknown even to much-honoured intellect, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak. For every intellect looks to the intelligible; and the intelligible is either *form* or *being*. But may not divine knowledge know it; and may it not be known to this ſupereſſentially? This knowledge, however, applies itſelf

to *the one*, but that which we are now inveſtigating is beyond *the one*. In ſhort, if it alſo is known, in conjunction with others, it will alſo be ſomething belonging to all things; for it will be common to it with others to be known, and thus far it will be coordinated with others. Further ſtill, if it is known, divine knowledge will comprehend it. It will, therefore, define it. Every boundary, however, aſcends ultimately as far as to *the one*; but *that* is beyond *the one*. It is, therefore, perfectly incomprehenſible and inviſible, and conſequently is not to be apprehended by any kind of knowledge. To which we may add, that knowledge is of things which may be known, as beings, or as having a ſubſiſtence, or as participating of *the one*. But this is beyond all theſe. Further ſtill, *the one* alſo appears to be unknown, if it is neceſſary that what is known ſhould be one thing, and that which knows another, though both ſhould be in the ſame thing. So that *the truly one* will not know itſelf: for it does not poſſeſs a certain duplicity. There will not, therefore, be in it that which knows, and that which is known. Hence, neither will a God, conſidered according to *the one itſelf* alone, and as being conjoined with *the one*, be united with that which is ſimple, according to duplicity. For how can the double be conjoined with the ſimple? But if he knows *the one* by *the one*, that which knows, and alſo that which is known, will be *one*, and in each the nature of *the one* will be ſhown, ſubſiſting alone and being *one*. So that he will not be conjoined as different with that which is different, or as that which is gnoſtic with that which is known, ſince this very thing is one alone; ſo that neither will he be conjoined according to knowledge. Much more, therefore, is that which is not even *the one* unknown. But if *the one* is the laſt thing known, we know nothing of that which is beyond *the one*; ſo that the preſent rhapſody is vain. Or ſhall we ſay we know that theſe things are unworthy to be aſſerted, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, of the firſt hypotheſis, ſince, not yet knowing even intelligible forms, we deſpiſe the images which ſubſiſt in us of their eternal and impartible nature; ſince theſe images are partible, and multifariouſly mutable. Further ſtill, being ignorant of the contracted ſubſiſtence of intelligible ſpecies and genera, but poſſeſſing an image of this, which is a contraction of the genera and ſpecies in us, we ſuſpect that being itſelf reſembles this contraction, but is at the ſame time ſomething more excellent; and this muſt be eſpecially the caſe with that which has an united ſubſiſtence. But now we are ignorant of *the one*, not contracting, but expanding all things to it;

and in us ſimplicity itſelf conſiſts, with relation to the all which we contain, but is very far from coming into contact with the all-perfect nature of *the one*. For *the one* and *the ſimple* in our nature, are in the ſmalleſt degree that which they are ſaid to be, except that they are a ſign or indication of the nature which is there. Thus alſo aſſuming in intellect every thing which can be in any reſpect known or ſuſpected, we think fit to aſcribe it as far as to *the one*; if it be requiſite to ſpeak of things unſpeakable, and to conceive things which are inconceivable. At the ſame time, alſo, we think fit to make that the ſubject of hypotheſis, which cannot be compared, and is uncoordinated with all things, and which is ſo exempt, that neither in reality does it poſſeſs the exempt. For that which is exempt is always exempt from ſomething, and is not in every reſpect exempt, as poſſeſſing habitude to that from which it is exempt, and, in ſhort, preceding in a certain coordination. If, therefore, we intend to make that which is truly exempt the ſubject of hypotheſis, we muſt not even ſuppoſe it to be exempt. For, accurately ſpeaking, its proper name will not be verified when aſcribed to *the exempt*; for in this caſe it would at the ſame time be coordinated; ſo that it is neceſſary even to deny this of it. Likewiſe, negation is a certain ſentence, and that which is denied is a certain thing; but that of which we are now endeavouring to ſpeak is not any thing. Neither, therefore, can it be denied, nor ſpoken of, nor be in any way known: ſo that neither is it poſſible to deny the negation; but that which appears to us to be a demonſtration of what we ſay, is a perfect ſubverſion of language and conceptions. What end, therefore, will there be of the diſcourſe, except the moſt profound ſilence, and an acknowledgment that we know nothing of that which it is not lawful, ſince impoſſible, to lead into knowledge?

May it not, therefore, be ſaid by ſome one who ventures to make ſuch-like inquiries, if we aſſert ſomething concerning it from things of a poſterior nature, ſince in theſe the monad is every where the leader of a certain proper number; for there is one firſt ſoul and many ſouls, one firſt intellect and many intellects, one firſt being and many beings, and one firſt unity and many unities;—if this be the caſe, may it not be ſaid that in a ſimilar manner it is requiſite there ſhould be one ineffable and many ineffables? If this then be admitted, it will be neceſſary to ſay that the ineffable is ineffably prolific. It will, therefore, generate a proper multitude. Or may we not ſay, that theſe and ſuch-like conceptions ariſe from forgetting what has been before aſſerted?

For there is nothing common between it and other things; nor will there be any thing pertaining to it among things which are ſpoken of, or conceived, or ſuſpected. Neither, therefore, can *the one* nor *the many*, neither *the prolific* nor *the productive*, nor that which is in any reſpect a cauſe, neither any analogy nor ſimilitude can be aſcribed to it. For it is eſpecially neceſſary to induce quiet, in that which is arcane, firmly abiding in the adytum of the ſoul. But if it be neceſſary to indicate ſomething concerning it by negations, we muſt ſay that it is neither one nor many, neither prolific nor unprolific, neither cauſe nor cauſeleſs; thus in reality ſubverting ourſelves, I know not how, by negations to infinity. Shall we, therefore, thus trifling adduce that which in no reſpect has any ſubſiſtence whatever? For to this all theſe aſſertions are adapted, and after all theſe the very ſubverſion *itſelf*, as the Elean philoſopher teaches us. This queſtion indeed is not difficult to ſolve; for we have before ſaid that all theſe things apply to that which is not in any reſpect, in conſequence of its being worſe than all theſe, but they apply to the firſt, in conſequence of admitting it to be better than all theſe. For the things denied are not denied of each after the ſame manner; but upwards things leſs, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, are denied of that which is more excellent; and downwards, things better of that which is worſe, if it be poſſible ſo to ſpeak. For we deny things both of matter and *the one*, but in a twofold reſpect, after the above-mentioned manner. This queſtion then, as I have ſaid, is eaſily ſolved.

Again, therefore, it may be ſaid, Does not ſomething proceed from it to the things which are here? Or how indeed ſhould this not be the caſe, if all things are from it? For every thing participates of that from which it proceeds. For, if nothing elſe, it thence poſſeſſes that which it is, reſpiring its proper principle, and converting itſelf to it as much as poſſible. What indeed ſhould hinder it from imparting ſomething of itſelf to its progeny? What other medium is there? And how is it not neceſſary that the ſecond ſhould always be nearer to the one principle than the third? and the third than the fourth? And if this be the caſe, muſt it not alſo leſs depart from it? If this too be the caſe, muſt it not alſo more abide in the boundary of its nature? Hence, too, muſt it not alſo be more aſſimilated to it, ſo that it likewiſe will be adapted to participate of it, and ſo that it will participate of it? How alſo could we ſuſpect theſe things concerning it, unleſs we contained a certain veſtige of it,—a veſtige

haſtening as it were to be conjoined with it? Shall we, therefore, ſay that being arcane it beſtows an arcane participation on all things, through which there is in every thing ſomething arcane? For we acknowledge that ſome things are more arcane than others, *the one* than *being*, *being* than *life*, *life* than *intellect*, and thus always in ſucceſſion after the ſame manner; or rather inverſely; from matter as far as to a rational eſſence, theſe things ſubſiſt according to the worſe, but thoſe according to the better, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak. May we not however ſay that he who admits this will alſo make a progreſſion from the firſt, and a certain arcane order of things proceeding, and that thus we ſhall introduce all ſuch effables to the arcane, as we have condiſtributed with the effable? We ſhall therefore make three monads and three numbers, and no longer two; viz. the eſſential, the unical, or that which is characterized by unity, and the arcane. And thus we ſhall admit what we formerly rejected, i. e. multitude in the arcane, and an order of things firſt, middle, and laſt. There will alſo be permanency, progreſſion and regreſſion; and, in ſhort, we ſhall mingle much of the effable with the ineffable. But if, as we have ſaid, the term *it* or *thoſe* can not be introducedto that arcane nature which we conſider as above *the one* and *the many*, neither muſt any thing elſe beſides *the one* be admitted as prior to the many, nor any thing elſe be condiſtributed with the many in participation. Neither, therefore, is it participated, nor does it impart any thing of itſelf to its progeny; nor is every God arcane prior to its being one, as it is one prior to its being eſſence. May we not ſay, therefore, that language here being ſubverted evinces that this nature is arcane by conceiving contraries according to every mode from things poſterior to it? And why is this wonderful, ſince we are alſo involved in ſimilar doubts concerning *the one?* Indeed, is not this alſo the caſe concerning being and that which is perfectly united?

In another part, near the beginning of the ſame admirable work, he remarks that *the one* in every thing is the mere true thing itſelf. Thus, for inſtance, *the one* of man is the mere true man, that of ſoul is the mere true ſoul, and that of body the mere true body. Thus alſo *the one* of the ſun, and *the one* of the moon, are the mere true ſun and moon. After which he obſerves as follows: Neither *the one* nor all things accords with the nature of *the one*. For theſe are oppoſed to each other, and diſtribute our conceptions. For, if we look to the ſimple and *the one*, we deſtroy its immenſely great perfection: and if we conceive all things ſubſiſting together, we

aboliſh

aboliſh *the one* and the ſimple. But this is becauſe we are divided, and look to divided idioms. At the ſame time, however, aſpiring after the knowledge of it, we connect all things together, that we may thus be able to apprehend this mighty nature. But fearing the introduction of all multitudes, or contracting the peculiar nature of *the one*, and rejoicing in that which is ſimple and the firſt in ſpeaking of the moſt antient principle, we thus introduce *the one itſelf* as a ſymbol of ſimplicity; ſince we likewiſe introduce *all things* as a ſymbol of the comprehenſion of all things. But that which is above or prior to both we can neither conceive nor denominate. And why is it wonderful that we ſhould ſuffer theſe things about it, ſince the diſtinct knowledge of it is unical, which we cannot perceive? Other things too of this kind we ſuffer about *being*. For, endeavouring to perceive *being*, we diſmiſs it, but run round the elements of it, bound and infinity. But if we form a more true conception of it, that it is an united plenitude of all things, in this caſe the conception of *all things* draws us down to multitude, and the conception of *the united* aboliſhes that of all things. Neither however is this yet wonderful. For, with reſpect to forms alſo, when we wiſh to ſurvey any one of theſe, we run round the elements of it, and, ſtriving to perceive its unity, we obliterate its elements. At the ſame time, however, every form is one and many; not indeed partly one, and partly many, but the whole of it is through the whole a thing of this kind. Not being able, therefore, to apprehend this collectively, we rejoice in acceding to it with a diſtribution of our conceptions. But always adhering in our aſcent, like thoſe who climb clinging with their hands and feet to things which extend us to a more impartible nature, we obtain in a certain reſpect a coſenſation in the diſtribution, of that which is uniform. We deſpiſe, therefore, this with reſpect to the collected apprehenſion of it, which we cannot obtain, unleſs a certain veſtige of collected intelligence in our nature is agitated. And this is the light of truth, which is ſuddenly enkindled, as if from the colliſion of fire ſtones. For our greateſt conceptions, when exerciſed with each other, verge to a uniform and ſimple ſummit as their end, like the extremities of lines in a circle haſtening to the centre. And though even thus they ſubſiſt indeed with diſtribution, yet a certain veſtige of the knowledge of form which we contain is pre-excited; juſt as the equal tendency of all the lines in a circle to terminate in the middle affords a certain obſcure repreſentation of the centre. After the ſame

manner

manner alſo we aſcend to being, in the firſt place, by underſtanding every form which falls upon us as diſtributed, not only as impartible, but alſo as united, and this by confounding, if it be proper ſo to ſpeak, the multitude in each. In the next place, we muſt collect every thing ſeparated together, and take away the circumſcriptions, juſt as if making many ſtreams of water to be one collection of water, except that we muſt not underſtand that which is united from all things, as one collection of water, but we muſt conceive that which is prior to all things, as the form of water prior to divided ſtreams of water. Thus, therefore, we muſt expand ourſelves to *the one*, firſt collecting and afterwards diſmiſſing what we have collected, for the ſuper-expanded tranſcendency of *the one*. Aſcending, therefore, ſhall we meet with it as that which is known? Or, wiſhing to meet with it as ſuch, ſhall we arrive at the unknown? Or may we not ſay that each of theſe is true? For we meet with it afar off as that which is known; and when we are united to it from afar, paſſing beyond that in our nature which is gnoſtic of *the one*, then are we brought to be one, that is, to be unknown inſtead of being gnoſtic. This contact, therefore, as of one with one, is above knowledge, but the other is as of that which is gnoſtic with that which is known. As however the crooked is known by the ſtraight, ſo we form a conjecture of the unknown by the known. And this indeed is a mode of knowledge. *The one*, therefore, is ſo far known, that it does not admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and imparts a gnoſtic indication of itſelf. Unlike other things, however, the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but, on the contrary, leſs known; knowledge being diſſolved by *the one* into ignorance, ſince, as we have before obſerved, where there is knowledge there alſo is ſeparation. But ſeparation approaching to *the one* is incloſed in union; ſo that knowledge alſo is reſunded into ignorance. Thus, too, the analogy of Plato requires. For firſt we endeavour to ſee the ſun, and we do indeed ſee it afar off; but by how much the nearer we approach to it, by ſo much the leſs do we ſee it; and at length we neither ſee other things, nor it, the eye becoming ſpontaneouſly dazzled by its light. Is, therefore, *the one* in its proper nature unknown, though there is ſomething elſe unknown beſides *the one*? *The one* indeed wills to be by itſelf, but with no other; but the unknown beyond *the one* is perfectly ineffable, which we acknowledge neither knows nor is ignorant, but has with reſpect to itſelf ſuper-ignorance. Hence by proximity to this *the one*

itſelf

itſelf is darkened: for, being very near to the immenſe principle, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak, it remains as it were in the adytum of that truly myſtic ſilence. On this account, Plato in ſpeaking of it finds all his aſſertions ſubverted: for it is near to the ſubverſion of every thing, which takes place about the firſt. It differs from it however in this, that it is *one* ſimply, and that according to *the one* it is alſo at the ſame time all things. But the firſt is above *the one* and all things, being more ſimple than both theſe.

P. 166. *Note. Such then is the intelligible triad.*

In order to convince the reader that the doctrine here delivered of the intelligible triad is not a fiction deviſed by the latter Platoniſts, I ſhall preſent him with the following tranſlation from the ſame excellent work of Damaſcius (Περι αρχων,) *Concerning principles**, in which the agreement of all the antient theologiſts concerning this triad is moſt admirably evinced.

The theology contained in the Orphic rhapſodies concerning the intelligible Gods is as follows:—*Time* is ſymbolically placed for the one principle of the univerſe; but *æther* and *chaos*, for the two poſterior to this one: and *being*, ſimply conſidered, is repreſented under the ſymbol of an egg. And this is the firſt triad of the intelligible Gods. But for the perfection of the ſecond triad they eſtabliſh either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a God, or a white garment, or a cloud: becauſe from theſe Phanes leaps forth into light. For, indeed, they philoſophize variouſly concerning the middle triad. But Phanes here repreſents intellect. But conceiving him over and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to Orpheus. But they call the third triad Metis as *intellect*†, Ericapæus as *power*, and Phanes as *father*. But whether or not are we to conſider the middle triad according to the three-ſhaped God, while conceived in the egg‡? for the middle always repreſents each of the extremes; as in this inſtance, where the egg and the three-ſhaped God ſubſiſt together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which is united; but that the three-ſhaped and really multiform God is the ſeparating and diſcriminating cauſe of that which is

* Vide Wolfii Anecdot. Græc. tom. iii. p. 252.

† Ὡς νους is omitted in the original.

‡ This is not an interrogative ſentence in the original, but certainly ought to be ſo.

intelligible

intelligible. Likewiſe, the middle triad ſubſiſts according to the egg, as yet united; but the third* according to the God who ſeparates and diſtributes the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus is as follows. According to them *water* and *matter* were the firſt productions from which earth was ſecretly drawn forth: ſo that water and earth are eſtabliſhed as the two firſt principles: the latter of theſe having a *diſperſed* ſubſiſtence, but the former conglutinating and connecting the latter. But they are ſilent concerning the principle prior to theſe two, as being ineffable: for, as there are no illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature is from hence ſufficiently evinced. But the third principle poſterior to theſe two, *water* and *earth*, and which is generated from them, is a *dragon*, naturally endued with the heads of a bull and a lion, but in the middle having the countenance of the God himſelf. They add, likewiſe, that he has wings on his ſhoulders, and that he is called *undecaying Time*, and *Hercules*; that *Neceſſity* reſides with him, which is the ſame as *Nature*, and incorporeal *Adraſtia*, which is extended throughout the univerſe, whoſe limits ſhe binds in amicable conjunction. But, as it appears to me, they denominate this third principle as eſtabliſhed according to eſſence, and aſſert, beſides this, that it ſubſiſts as male and female, for the purpoſe of exhibiting the generative cauſes of all things.

I likewiſe find in the Orphic rhapſodies, that, neglecting the two firſt principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in ſilence, the third principle, poſterior to the two, is eſtabliſhed by the theology as the original; becauſe this firſt of all poſſeſſes ſomething effable and commenſurate to human diſcourſe. For, in the former hypotheſis, the highly reverenced and undecaying *Time*, the father of æther and chaos, was the principle: but in this *Time* is neglected, and the principle becomes *a dragon*. It likewiſe ſays that there was a triple offspring; moiſt æther, an infinite chaos, and cloudy and dark Erebus; delivering this ſecond triad analogous to the firſt: this being potential, as that was paternal. Hence, the third proceſſion of this triad is dark Erebus: its paternal and ſummit æther, not according to a ſimple but intellectual ſubſiſtence: but its middle, infinite chaos, conſidered as a progeny or proceſſion, and among theſe parturient, becauſe from theſe the third intelligible triad proceeds. What then is the third intelligible triad? I anſwer, The egg; the duad of the natures of male and female

* Το τριτον is, I conceive, erroneouſly ommitted in the original.

which it contains, and the multitude of all-various ſeeds, reſiding in the middle of this triad: and the third among theſe is an incorporeal God, bearing golden wings on his ſhoulders; but in his inward parts naturally poſſeſſing the heads of bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, inveſted with the all-various forms of wild beaſts. This laſt then muſt be conſidered as the *intellect* of the triad; but the middle progeny, which are *many* as well as *two*, correſpond to *power*, and the egg itſelf is the *paternal principle* of the third triad: but the third God of this third triad, this theology celebrates as *Protogonus*, and calls him *Jupiter*, the diſpoſer of all things and of the whole world; and on this account denominates him *Pan*. And ſuch is the information which this theology affords us, concerning the genealogy of the intelligible principles of things.

But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the theology of Orpheus, the whole intelligible order is paſſed over in ſilence, as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of verbal enunciation. Eudemus, therefore, commences his genealogy from *Night*, from which alſo Homer begins: though Eudemus is far from making the Homeric genealogy conſiſtent and connected, for he aſſerts that Homer begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent that *Night* is according to Homer the greateſt divinity, ſince ſhe is reverenced even by Jupiter himſelf. For the poet ſays of Jupiter—"that he feared leſt he ſhould act in a manner diſpleaſing to ſwift *Night* *.' So that Homer begins his genealogy of the Gods from *Night*. But it appears to me that Heſiod, when he aſſerts that Chaos was firſt generated, ſignifies by Chaos the incomprehenſible and perfectly united nature of that which is intelligible: but that he produces Earth † the firſt from thence, as a certain principle of the whole proceſſion of the Gods. Unleſs perhaps Chaos is the ſecond of the two principles; but Earth ‡, Tartarus, and Love form the triple intelligible. So that

* Αζετο γαρ μη νυκτι θεη αποθυμια ῥεζοι. Iliad. lib. ξ. ver. 261.

† Τγν is printed inſtead of Γην.

‡ As the whole of the Grecian theology is the progeny of the myſtic traditions of Orpheus, it is evident that the Gods which Heſiod celebrates by the epithets of *Earth*, *Heaven*, &c. cannot be the viſible *Heaven* and *Earth*: for Plato in the Cratylus, following the Orphic doctrine concerning the Gods, as will appear in our notes on that dialogue, plainly ſhows, in explaining the name of Jupiter, that this divinity, who is ſubordinate to *Saturn*, *Heaven*, *Earth*, &c. is the artificer of the ſenſible univerſe; and conſequently *Saturn*, *Heaven*,

that *Love* is to be placed for the third monad of the intelligible order, conſidered according to its convertive nature; for it is thus denominated by Orpheus in his rhapſodies. But *Earth* for the firſt, as being firſt eſtabliſhed in a certain firm and eſſential permanency. And *Tartarus* for the middle, as in a certain reſpect exciting and moving forms into diſtribution. But Acuſilaus appears to me to eſtabliſh *Chaos* for the firſt principle, as entirely unknown; and after this, two principles, *Erebus* as male, and *Night* as female; placing the latter for *infinity*, but the former for *bound*. But from the mixture of theſe, he ſays * that *Æther*, *Love*, and *Counſel* are generated forming three intelligible hypoſtaſes. And he places *Æther* as the ſummit; but *Love* in the middle, according to its naturally middle ſubſiſtence; but *Metis* or *Counſel* as the third, and the ſame as highly-reverenced intellect. And, according to the hiſtory of Eudemus, from theſe he produces a great number of other Gods. But Epimenides eſtabliſhes *Air* and *Night* as the two firſt principles; manifeſtly reverencing in ſilence the one principle prior to theſe two. But from Air and Night *Tartarus* is generated, forming, as it appears to me, the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature from the two. And this mixture is called by ſome an intelligible medium, becauſe it extends itſelf to both the ſummit and the end. But from the mixture of the extremes with each other an egg is generated, which is truly an intelligible animal: and from this again another progeny proceeds. But according to Pherecydes Syrius, the three firſt principles are, *a Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature*, *Time* †, and *an Earthly Nature*: one of theſe ſubſiſting, as I conceive, prior to the other two. But

Heaven, *Earth*, &c. are much ſuperior to the mundane deities. Indeed, if this be not admitted, the Theogony of Heſiod muſt be perfectly abſurd and inexplicable. For why does he call Jupiter, agreeably to Homer, (πατηρ ανδρων τε θεων τε), "*father of Gods and men?*" Shall we ſay that he means literally that Jupiter is the father of *all* the Gods? But this is impoſſible; for he delivers the generation of Gods who are the parents of Jupiter. He can, therefore, only mean that Jupiter is the parent of all the mundane Gods: and his Theogony, when conſidered according to this expoſition, will be found to be beautifully conſiſtent and ſublime; whereas, according to modern interpretations, the whole is a mere chaos, more wild than the delirious viſions of Swedenborg, and more unconnected than the *filthy* rant of the ſtool-preaching methodiſt. I only add, that την is erroneouſly printed in the Excerpta of Wolfius for γην.

* Φημι in the original ſhould doubtleſs be φησι.

† Χθονον is printed for χρονον.

he aſſerts that *Time* generates from the progeny of itſelf, *Fire*, *Spirit*, and *Water*: which ſignify, as it appears to me, the triple nature of that which is intelligible. But from theſe, diſtributed into five profound receſſes, a numerous progeny of Gods is conſtituted, which he calls *five-times animated* (πεντεμψυχος); and which is, perhaps, the ſame as if he had ſaid πεντεκοσμος, or a *five-fold world*. But we may probaby diſcourſe on this ſubject at ſome other opportunity. And thus much may ſuffice at preſent concerning the hypotheſis derived from the Grecian fables, which are both many and various.

But with reſpect to the theology of the barbarians, the Babylonians ſeem to paſs over in ſilence the one principle of the univerſe. But they eſtabliſh two principles, Tauthé and Apaſoon. And they conſider Apaſoon as the huſband of Tauthe, whom they denominate the mother of the Gods; from whom an only-begotten ſon *Mooumis* was produced: which, as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world deduced from two principles*. But from theſe another proceſſion is derived, *Dache* and *Dachus*. And likewiſe a third from theſe, *Kiſſare* and *Aſſoorus*. And from theſe again three deities are produced, *Anus*, *Illinus*, and *Aus*. But from *Aus* and *Dache* a ſon called Belus is produced, who they ſay is the demiurgus of the world. But with reſpect to the Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus, ſome of them call all the intelligible and united world *Place*, and ſome of them *Time*: from which *a good divinity* and *an evil dæmon* are diſtributed; *Light* and *Darkneſs* ſubſiſting prior to theſe, according to the aſſertions of others. However, both the one and the other, after an undiſtributed nature, conſider that nature as having a ſubſiſtence which diſtributes the twofold coordination of better natures: one of which coordinations *Oroſmades* preſides over, and the other *Arimanius*. But the Sidonians, according to the ſame hiſtorian, place before all things *Time*, *Deſire*, and *Cloudy Darkneſs*. And they aſſert, that from the mingling of *Deſire* and *Darkneſs* as two principles, *Air* and *a gentle Wind* were produced: *Air* evincing the ſummit of the intelligible triad; but *the gentle Wind* raiſed and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of the intelligible. And again, that from both theſe the bird *Otus*, ſimilar to a night raven, was produced; repreſenting, as it appears to me, intelligible intellect. But as we find (with-

* That is, from *bound* and *infinite*.

out the aſſiſtance of Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Moſchus, places *Æther* and *Air* as the two firſt principles, from which the intelligible God *Oulomus* was produced; who, as it appears to me, is the ſummit of the intelligible order. But from this God (yet proceeding together with him) they aſſert that *Chouſorus* was produced, being the firſt unfolding proceſſion. And after this *an egg* ſucceeds; which I think muſt be called intelligible intellect. But the unfolding *Chouſorus* is intelligible power, becauſe this is the firſt nature which diſtributes an undiſtributed ſubſiſtence: unleſs, perhaps, after the two principles *Æther* and *Air*, the ſummit is *one Wind*; but the middle *two Winds*, the *ſouth-weſt* and the *ſouth*; for in a certain reſpect they place theſe prior to *Oulomus*. But *Oulomus* himſelf is intelligible intellect: and unfolding *Chouſorus** the firſt order after the intelligible ſeries. And the *egg itſelf* is heaven: from the burſting of which into two parts, the ſections are ſaid to have become heaven and earth. But with reſpect to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is related of them by Eudemus. According to certain Egyptian philoſophers, however, among us, *an unknown Darkneſs* is celebrated in ſome Egyptian writings as the one principle of the univerſe, and this *thrice pronounced as ſuch*: but for the two principles after the firſt, they place *water* and *ſand*, according to Heraiſcus; but according to the more antient writer Aſclepiades, *ſand* and *water*; from which, and after which, the firſt *Kamephis* is generated. But after this *a ſecond*, and from this again *a third*; by all which the whole intelligible diſtribution is accompliſhed. For thus Aſclepiades determines. But the more modern Heraiſcus ſays, that the Egyptians, denominating the third Kamephis from his father and grandfather, aſſert that he is *the Sun*; which, doubtleſs, ſignifies in this caſe intelligible intellect. But a more accurate knowledge of theſe affairs muſt be received from the above-mentioned authors themſelves. It muſt, however, be obſerved, that with the Egyptians there are many diſtributions of things according to union; becauſe they unfold an intelligible nature into characteriſtics, or peculiarities of many Gods, as may be learned from ſuch as are deſirous of conſulting their writings on this ſubject.

Thus far Damaſcius; from which curious and intereſting relation the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the antient theologiſts with each other

* χουσωρος ſhould be read inſtead of χουσωρου.

in

in celebrating the intelligible triad, and venerating in ſilence the ineffable principle of things, but may likewiſe behold the origin of the chriſtian trinity, its deviation from truth, and the abſurdity, and even impiety, with which a belief in it is unavoidably attended. Conſonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the Chaldæans concerning the intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes Picus, in his *Concluſions according to the opinion of the Chaldæan theologiſts* *. "The intelligible coordination (ſays he) is not in the intellectual coordination, as Amaſis the Egyptian aſſerts, but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed in the abyſs of the firſt unity, and under the obſcurity of the firſt darkneſs." Coordinatio intelligibilis non eſt in intellectuali coordinatione, ut dixit Amaſis Ægyptius, ſed eſt ſuper omnem intellectualem hierarchium, in abyſſo primæ unitatis, et ſub caligine primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abſcondita.

But from this triad it may be demonſtrated, that all the proceſſions of the Gods may be comprehended in ſix orders, viz. the *intelligible order*, the *intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual*, the *intellectual*, the *ſupermundane*, the *liberated*, and the *mundane* †. For the *intelligible*, as we have already obſerved, muſt hold the firſt rank, and muſt conſiſt of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, i. e. muſt *abide*, *proceed*, and *return*, and this ſupereſſentially; at the ſame time that it is characterized, or ſubſiſts principally according to *being*. But, in the next place, that which is both *intelligible* and *intellectual* ſucceeds, which muſt likewiſe be triple, but muſt principally ſubſiſt according to *life*, or *intelligence*. And, in the third place, the *intellectual* order muſt ſucceed, which is *triply convertive*. But as, in conſequence of the exiſtence of the ſenſible world, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be ſome demiurgic cauſe of its exiſtence, this cauſe can only be found in *intellect*, and in the laſt hypoſtaſis of the *intellectual triad*. For all forms in this hypoſtaſis ſubſiſt according to all-various and perfect diviſions; and forms can only fabricate when they have a perfect intellectual ſeparation from each other. But ſince *fabrication* is nothing more than *proceſſion*, the demiurgus will be to the poſterior order of the Gods what *the one* is to the orders prior to the *demiurgus*; and conſequently he will be that ſecondarily which the firſt cauſe of all is primarily. Hence, his

* Vid. Pici Opera, tom. i. p. 54.

† i. e. Θειοι τοποι, νοητοι και νοεροι, νοεροι, ὑπερκοσμιοι, απολυτοι ſive ὑπερουρανιοι, et εγκοσμιοι.

firſt production will be an order of Gods analogous to the *intelligible* order, and which is denominated *ſupermundane*. After this he muſt produce an order of Gods ſimilar to the *intelligible* and *intellectual* order, and which are denominated *liberated* Gods. And in the laſt place, a proceſſion correſpondent to the *intellectual* order, and which can be no other than the *mundane* Gods. For the demiurgus is chiefly characterized according to diverſity, and is allotted the boundary of all univerſal hypoſtaſes.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PHÆDRUS.

Page 323. *It alone uſes contemplative intellect, &c.*

By the governor of the ſoul in this place a partial intellect is meant. For this intellect is proximately eſtabliſhed above our eſſence, which it alſo elevates and perfects; and to which we convert ourſelves, when we are purified through philoſophy, and conjoin our intellectual power with its intelligence. This partial intellect is participated by all other proximate dæmoniacal ſouls, and illuminates ours, when we convert ourſelves to it, and render our reaſon intellectual. In ſhort, as every partial ſoul is eſſentially ſuſpended from a certain dæmon, and every dæmon has a dæmoniacal intellect above itſelf, hence, every partial ſoul will have this intellect ranked prior to itſelf as an impartible eſſence. Of this intellect, therefore, the firſt participant will be a dæmoniacal ſoul, but the ſecond, the partial ſouls under this, which alſo makes them to be partial. It alſo appears that the intellect immediately above every dæmon, ſo far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the dæmon which proximately participates it, but that it alſo comprehends the number of the ſouls which are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of theſe. Every partial ſoul, therefore, will have as an indiviſible eſſence its proper paradigm, which this intellect contains, and not ſimply the whole intellect, in the ſame manner as the dæmon which is eſſentially its leader. Hence the impartible belonging to every partial ſoul may be accurately defined to be the idea of that ſoul, comprehended in the one intellect which is deſtined to be the leader of the dæmoniacal ſeries under which every ſuch ſoul is arranged. And thus it will be true, that the intellect of every partial ſoul is alone

ſupernally

ſupernally eſtabliſhed among eternal entities, and that every ſuch ſoul is a medium between the impartible above it, and the impartible nature below it. This, then, is the intelligence prior to the ſoul, and which the ſoul participates, when its intellectual part energizes intellectually. This alſo is the intellect which Plato in the Timæus indicates under the appellation of *intelligence*, when he ſays "that true being is apprehended by *intelligence* in conjunction with reaſon; and to which he likewiſe alludes in the latter part of the ſame dialogue, where he ſays, "that this intelligence is in the Gods, but that it is participated by a few only of the human race."

P. 322. *Likewiſe Jupiter the mighty leader, &c.*

IT is ſaid by Plato* in the Phædrus, that there are twelve leaders who preſide over the univerſe, who govern all the mundane Gods, and all the companies of dæmons, and who ſublimely march to an intelligible nature. It is likewiſe aſſerted that Jupiter preſides over theſe twelve Gods, who drives a winged chariot, who diſtributes all things in order, takes care of and leads all the attendant army, firſt to an *elevated place of ſpeculation* within the heavens, and to thoſe bleſſed contemplations and evolutions of intelligibles which it contains; but afterwards to that *ſubceleſtial arch* which proximately embraces the heavens, and which the heavens contain: and after this arch they proceed into heaven and to the *back of heaven*. And in this place divine ſouls are ſaid to ſtand, and, whilſt they are carried along with the heavens, to contemplate every ſuperior eſſence. But prior to the heavens there is ſaid to be *a place* which is called *ſuperceleſtial*, in which *true eſſence*, the *plain of truth*, *the kingdom of Adraſtia*, *and the divine choir of virtues*, reſide: and it is aſſerted that by the intelligence of theſe monads ſouls are nouriſhed and benefited, while they follow the revolution of the heavens.

And thus much is aſſerted in the Phædrus, where Socrates clearly ſpeaks, as one agitated by a divine impulſe, and touches on myſtical concerns. But it is requiſite to conſider, in the firſt place, what this *heaven* may be, which Socrates ſpeaks of, and in what order of beings it is placed. For, having diſcovered this, we may then con-

* This account of that divine order which was denominated by antient theologiſts *intelligible*, and at the ſame time *intellectual*, is extracted from the fourth book of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

template the ſubceleſtial arch, and the back of heaven; ſince each of theſe is aſſumed according to an habitude, or alliance to heaven; the one, indeed, being primarily ſituated above, and the other primarily placed under heaven.

What then is that heaven to which Jupiter brings the Gods? If we call it ſenſible, after the manner of ſome, it will be neceſſary that the more excellent genera ſhould naturally be converted to things ſubordinate. For Jupiter, that great leader in the heavens, if he is himſelf carried to this ſenſible heaven, and leads to this all the attendant Gods, he muſt himſelf have a converſion to things inferior and poſterior to himſelf. And this, together with Jupiter, muſt be the caſe with all the deities and dæmons that are ſuſpended from him; though the ſame Socrates in the Phædrus aſſerts, that even a partial ſoul, when in a *perfect* ſtate, revolves on high, and governs the univerſe. How, then, can the leaders of total ſouls be converted to this ſenſible heaven, and exchange their intelligible place of ſurvey for a worſe condition?—they, who through theſe ſouls preſide over the univerſe, that they may illuminate mundane natures, with an abſolute and liberated power! Beſides, what bleſſed intellections can the Gods obtain by contemplating this ſenſible heaven? And what evolutions can there be there of the whole knowledge of ſenſible concerns? ſince on this hypotheſis Plato muſt be condemned for producing a relation of no value with reſpect to the knowledge of the intelligible Gods. For the Gods perfectly know things ſubſiſting in this ſenſible region, not by a converſion to them, but becauſe they contain the cauſes of them in themſelves. Hence, in conſequence of knowing themſelves, they likewiſe know in a cauſal manner and govern theſe ſenſible concerns, not ſurveying them, and verging to things which are governed, but through love converting ſubordinate natures to themſelves. It is not, therefore, lawful for the Gods, by whom all heaven is governed, and who conſider it as worthy their providential care, ever to ſubſiſt under its revolution. Nor, indeed, is there any beatitude in the contemplation of things ſituated under the heavens. Nor are the ſouls who are converted to a contemplation of this kind in the number of the bleſſed, and among ſuch as follow the Gods; but they rank among thoſe who exchange intelligible aliment for the food of opinion, and ſuch as Socrates repreſents thoſe lame ſouls, who have broken their wings, and are in a merged condition. Since, then, circumſtances of this kind belong to partial ſouls, who do not rank in the number of the bleſſed, how can we refer a converſion

verſion to this ſenſible heaven to the leading Gods? Beſides, Socrates aſſerts, that ſouls ſtanding on the back of heaven are carried round by the celeſtial revolution. But Timæus and the Athenian gueſt ſay, that ſouls perform all things in the heavens from their own motions, and externally inveſt bodies by their powers; and that in conſequence of living their own life, through the whole of time, they impart to bodies ſecondary powers of motion. How, then, can theſe things accord with thoſe who conſider this heaven as ſenſible? For ſouls do not contemplate, and, as it were, dance round intelligibles, in conſequence of the revolution of the heavens: but, through the unapparent circumvolution of ſouls, bodies themſelves are carried round in a circle, and about theſe perform their revolutions. If any one, therefore, ſhould ſay that this is the ſenſible heaven, and that ſouls are at the ſame time carried round with its revolutions, and are diſtributed according to its back, profundity, and ſubceleſtial arch, it is neceſſary to admit that many abſurdities will enſue.

But if any one aſſerts, that the heaven to which Jupiter leads all his attendant Gods and dæmons is intelligible, he will unfold the divine narrations of Plato, in a manner agreeable to the nature of things, and will follow his moſt celebrated interpreters. For both Plotinus and Jamblichus conſider this as a certain intelligible heaven. And prior to theſe, Plato himſelf in the Cratylus, following the Orphic theogony, calls Saturn indeed the father of Jupiter, and Heaven the father of Saturn. And he unfolds the Demiurgus of the univerſe by certain appellations, inveſtigating the truth which names contain. And he denominates the Demiurgus as one who contains a divine intellect: but Heaven as the intelligence of firſt intelligibles. For Heaven, ſays he, is ſight looking to things on high. And hence, Heaven ſubſiſts prior to every divine intellect with which the mighty Saturn is ſaid to be replete; but it underſtands ſuperior natures, and whatever is ſituated beyond the celeſtial order. The mighty Heaven, therefore, is allotted a middle kingdom between intelligibles and intellectuals.

For, indeed, the celeſtial revolution in the Phædrus is *intelligence*, by which all the Gods, and their attendant ſouls, obtain the contemplation of intelligibles. For intelligence is between intellect and the intelligible. In this medium, therefore, we muſt eſtabliſh the whole Heaven; and we muſt aſſert that it contains one bond of the divine orders; being, indeed, the father of the intellectual race, but generated by the

kings prior to itſelf, whom it is ſaid to behold. We muſt alſo conſider it as ſituated between the ſuperceleſtial place and ſubceleſtial arch.

Again, therefore, if the ſuperceleſtial place is indeed that imparticipable and occult genus of the intelligible Gods, how can we eſtabliſh there ſo great a divine multitude, and this ſeparated, viz. truth, ſcience, juſtice, temperance, the meadow, and Adraſtia? For neither are the fountains of virtues proper to the intelligible Gods, nor ſeparation and variety of forms. For ſuch things as are firſt and moſt characterized by unity, extend the demiurgic intellect of wholes to an intelligible exemplar, and to the comprehenſion of forms which there ſubſiſt. But, in the Phædrus, Socrates aſſerts that a partial intellect contemplates the ſuperceleſtial place. For this (as it is beautifully ſaid by our anceſtors) is the governor of the ſoul. If, then, it is requiſite to inveſtigate the difference of intelligibles from this analogy, as the demiurgic intellect is imparticipable, but that which is partial is participable; ſo with reſpect to that which is intelligible, the intelligible of the demiurgus is the firſt paradigm of firſt intelligibles, but the intelligible of a partial intellect is the paradigm of ſecondary intelligibles, which are indeed intelligibles, but are allotted an intelligible ſupremacy as among intellectuals. But if the ſuperceleſtial place is ſituated above the celeſtial revolution, but is inferior to the intelligible triads, becauſe it is more expanded; for it is the plain of truth, but is not unknown, and is divided according to a multitude of forms, and contains a variety of powers, and the meadow which is there nouriſhes ſouls, and is viſible to their natures, the firſt intelligibles illuminating ſouls with an ineffable union, at the ſame time that they are not known by them, through intelligence:—if this be the caſe, it is neceſſary that the ſuperceleſtial place ſhould be ſituated between the intelligible nature and the celeſtial revolution. But alſo, if Plato himſelf eſtabliſhes true eſſence in this place, muſt he not conſider this place as intelligible, and as participating firſt intelligibles? For, becauſe it is eſſence, it is intelligible; but, becauſe it is true eſſence, it participates of being. And if it contains in itſelf a multitude of intelligibles, it cannot be placed in the firſt triad. For *one being* is there, and not a multitude of beings. But if it poſſeſſes a various life, which the *meadow* evinces, it is inferior to the ſecond triad. For intelligible life is one, and without ſeparation. And from its ſhining with divided forms, all-various orders, and prolific powers, it is inferior to the third or all-perfect triad. If, therefore, the ſuperceleſtial place is poſterior to theſe in

antiquity and power, but is placed above the celeſtial order, it is indeed intelligible, but is the ſummit of the intellectual Gods. And on this account aliment is thence derived to ſouls. For that which is intelligible is aliment, becauſe firſt intelligibles are ſaid to nouriſh ſouls; and theſe are the beautiful, the wiſe, and the good. For with theſe, according to Plato, the winged nature of the ſoul is nouriſhed, but is corrupted, and periſhes through things of a contrary nature. Theſe things, however, ſubſiſt there in an exempt manner, and through union and ſilence. But the ſuperceleſtial place is ſaid to nouriſh through intelligence and energy, and to fill the bleſſed choir of ſouls with intelligible light, and the prolific rivers of life.

But after the ſuperceleſtial place, and Heaven itſelf, the ſubceleſtial arch is ſituated, which, as is evident to every one, is placed under, and not in the Heavens: for it is not called by Plato a *celeſtial*, but a *ſubceleſtial* arch. And that it is likewiſe proximately ſituated under the celeſtial revolution, is evident from what is ſaid concerning it. But if it is requiſite that the ſubceleſtial arch, thus ſubſiſting, ſhould be eſtabliſhed as the ſame with the ſummit of intellectuals, and not as the ſame with the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, it will be neceſſary to contemplate what remains. For the intellectual ſummit ſeparates itſelf from the celeſtial kingdom: but the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual Gods is conjoined, and every way ſurrounded with this kingdom. And this *ſummit* eſtabliſhes the whole of intellect and intellectual multitude, and (as Socrates ſays) the bleſſed tranſitions of the Gods. But the *extremity* bounds alone the celeſtial ſeries, and ſupplies to the Gods an aſcent to Heaven. For when the Gods aſcend to the banquet, and delicious food, and to the plenitude of intelligible good, then they proceed on high to the ſubceleſtial arch, and through this to the celeſtial revolution. Hence, if you aſſert that the ſubceleſtial arch perfects the Gods, and converts them to the whole of heaven, and to the ſuperceleſtial place, you will not wander from the conceptions of Plato. For the Gods are nouriſhed with the intelligible, with the meadow, and the divine forms which the ſuperceleſtial place contains. But they are repleniſhed with this aliment through the ſubceleſtial arch: for through this they participate of the celeſtial revolution. They revolve, therefore, through the ſubceleſtial arch; but they receive a vigorous intelligence from the celeſtial order, and they are repleniſhed with intelligible goods from the ſuperceleſtial place. It is evident, therefore, that the ſuperceleſtial

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place is allotted an intelligible ſummit; but the celeſtial revolution obtains a middle extent, and the ſubceleſtial arch poſſeſſes an intelligible extremity. For all things are contained in this. And intellect indeed is endued with a convertive power; but the intelligible is the object of deſire. And divine intelligence fills up the middle; perfecting indeed the converſions of divine natures, and conjoining them with ſuch as are firſt; but rendering the deſires of intelligibles apparent, and repleniſhing ſecondary natures with preceding goods. And thus I think we have ſufficiently treated concerning the order of theſe three.

Perhaps, however, ſome one may inquire, why we characterize according to this medium the whole progreſſion of the intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual Gods; and why of the extremes we call one ſuperceleſtial, but the other ſubceleſtial, from its habitude to the middle; demonſtrating *of the one exempt tranſcendency*, but of the other a proximate and conjoined hypobaſis (i. e. ſubject baſis, or foundation). To this then we ſhall briefly anſwer, that this whole genus of the intelligible and intellectual Gods is connective of both theſe extremes, to ſome things indeed being the cauſe of converſion, but to others of an unfolding into light, and a preſence extended to ſecondary natures. As, therefore, we call all the intelligible Gods paternal and unical, characterizing them from the ſummit, and aſſert that they are the boundaries of wholes, the fabricators of eſſence, the cauſes of perpetuity, and the authors of the production of form; in the ſame manner we evince that theſe middle Gods, from the medium which they contain, are the leaders of the bonds of wholes. For this whole middle order is vivific, connective, and perfective. But its ſummit indeed unfolds the impreſſions of intelligibles, and their ineffable union. But its termination converts the intellectual Gods, and conjoins them with intelligibles. And its middle leads this order as to a centre, and eſtabliſhes the total genera of the Gods. For, through a tendency to the middle, we attribute alſo to the extremes a habitude of tranſcendency and ſubjection; denominating the one above, and the other beneath the middle.

Let us now conſider what the negations are by which Plato celebrates this middle order of Gods. Theſe ſacred genera, therefore, the connective, the perfective, and the paternal, of thoſe divine natures which are properly called intellectual, are proximately eſtabliſhed after the intelligible ſummit of all intellectuals. For this ſummit,

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